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Introduction: Disputed Memories in
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
In April 2007 the world media reported widely on violent riots that had broken
out in Tallinn when thousands of people took to the streets in a clash over the
decision to move the so-called Bronze soldier from its central location in the Es-
tonian capital. For the Russian population of Estonia, the statue was a symbol of
the heroic Soviet soldiers who died in Estonia fighting against Nazi Germany.
However, for the majority of ethnic Estonians these Soviet soldiers were new oc-
cupiers representing the same Soviet power that had first crushed their inde-
pendence in 1940 and again in 1945. The controversy over this war memorial
as well the high emotions evoked by its removal illustrate well the complexity
and specificity of memories in the part of Europe which until the end of the
Cold War was generally called “Eastern Europe” and today is labelled, in more
nuanced ways, Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
The particularity of the experiences of this part of Europe is yet not generally
recognized and understood, neither among EU-elites, who in the name of inte-
gration want to unify European memory, nor by the broad Western European
public, whose understanding of Europe’s different war and Cold War experiences
are very limited. The German historian Karl Schlögel, one of the few Western his-
torians realizing the dilemma caused by this asymmetry of memories in Europe,
has described the complexity and specificity of Eastern European experiences in
the following way:
Eastern and central Europe was the principal theatre of the epoch of world wars and rev-
olutions, of the new thirty years war and of the violence linked to it, a degree of violence
which was in many respects unprecedented. This region of the continent found itself be-
tween the main fronts of the European civil war, between nationalism and communism, be-
tween German National Socialism and Soviet communism. It was the principal theatre of
the genocide of the European Jews, of systematic social and ethnic cleansing policies;
the terrain of deployment of the greatest military machines, and of burnt earth; of forced
population movements, of flight; and of a liberation that was to a great extent the replace-
ment of one foreign occupation by another. There is no point on the map of this region, no
family, no biography that is not marked by this double experience. This is the central zone
of the “century of extremes.”¹
 Karl Schlögel. “Places and Strata of Memory. Approaches to Eastern Europe.” Eurozine, 
December . http://www.eurozine.com/articles/ - --schlogel-en.html ( January
).
This “double experience” of two totalitarian regimes – National Socialism and
Communism, plays a paradoxical role in the region. On the one hand, it consti-
tutes a common feature that sets the whole region apart from the West of Europe
and creates a bond in the form of a shared “tragic fate”. On the other hand, how-
ever, the shared past events are interpreted differently by the different nations in
the region, frequently in antagonistic ways. The case of the Baltic States (see Mel-
chior as well Kaprans in this volume) is very illuminating in this respect. Due to
large scale Soviet deportations of Latvians and Estonians to the Gulag, these
people suffered as much, or even more, from the Soviet regime than from the
Nazis. Therefore they tend to see both regimes as equally criminal, which is to-
tally unacceptable to Russia, which responds by accusing the Balts of revision-
ism and by using this accusation in a political game with the West, where
these issues are highly sensitive. Memories of the “Bloodlands”, as Timothy
Snyder called this region,² are also morally troubling. Categories such as victims,
perpetrators, collaborators and bystanders, often used in the Western discourse
about World War II, are very difficult to apply in discussing the memories of
those from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Both individuals and na-
tional and ethnic groups in this region often shifted their roles with the many,
often violent, turns in the history of the “century of extremes”. The same people
who were victims at one stage could become perpetrators at another, and vice
versa. The same military formation could be seen as heroes and liberators by
one group and as criminals or traitors by another (this is for example the case
with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA, – see Yurchuk). Until today expressions
of moral judgment regarding these kinds of events, such as for example the mass
murder of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA in 1943, continue to evoke high emotions
and heated debates.
Having to live with such a troubling past, transmitted not only through var-
ious media but also via family stories, leads to people becoming personally en-
gaged in the memories, thus contributing to emotional intensity. As a conse-
quence, the past is not “a foreign country”, memory of it is always there at
hand to be used, to be referred to, leading sometimes to an excess of memory,
that is, to situations where we can speak of too much memory, when a commun-
ity is obsessed by the past.³ These obsessions can complicate the situation when
new political and ethnic conflicts emerge in a region. They can give continuous
nourishment to memories of victimization, of enmity or of the past glory that has
 Timothy Snyder. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books, .
 Jeffrey Blustein. The Moral Demands of Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
, –.
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to be restored. The power of memory to exacerbate conflicts could be clearly ob-
served during the Balkan wars in 1990s or the conflict between Russia and Uk-
raine that started 2014.
In order to better understand the developments in contemporary Central,
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, we need to understand the content as well
as the complexity of the memories in these societies. Research is needed into
questions such as how regional memories are used (or manipulated) today,
who the users are and what motivates them. An important contribution to the
field was made by the research project Memory at War,⁴ which was conducted
by Cambridge University and resulted in several publications.⁵ Two of the re-
searchers involved in this project, Blacker and Etkind, stated that “The fraught
memory landscapes of Eastern Europe cry for more engagement with the critical
perspectives of Western memory scholars”.⁶ Unfortunately, most publications
dealing with these topics focus only on one or two countries in the region and
there are still too few books that include a broader panorama of the region’s
memory disputes.
The present book aims to respond to the appeal by Blacker and Etkind for
greater engagement by Western memory scholars “in the memory landscapes
of Eastern Europe”.We want to give the readers a broad insight into memory dis-
putes in several Eastern European countries as well as disputes on memories
that transcend the borders of these countries. Having a regional focus, our
book at the same time has as its ambition to contribute to the overall scholarship
in memory studies by presenting cases that approach memory in innovative
ways. We take seriously the remark by Blacker and Etkind that this region is
“a fascinating laboratory in which to study memory in action”.⁷ Thus a second
goal of our volume is to use the thirteen carefully selected cases from Central,
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to demonstrate and investigate the intercon-
nectedness between disputed memory, mediation of emotions and politics. The
 For extensive information about the project see http://www.memoryatwar.org/projects.
 Remembering Katyn. Ed. Alexander Etkind et al. Cambridge: Polity, ; Memory and Theory
in Eastern Europe. Ed. Alexander Etkind and Uilleam Blacker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
; Alexander Etkind. Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, ; Memory, Conflict and New Media: Web Wars in
Post-Socialist States. Ed. Ellen Rutten and Julie Fedor. London: Routledge, . However, one
has to mention yet another important recent publication dealing with the subject: History, Mem-
ory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Memory Game. Ed. Georges Mink and Laure Neu-
mayer. New York: Palgrave, .
 Blacker and Etkind. “Introduction.” Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe. Ed. Alexander Et-
kind and Uilleam Blacker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
 Ibid.
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chapters study representations of difficult and disputed pasts in various media,
including monuments, museum exhibitions, individual and political discourse
and new electronic media. At the same time the book tries to avoid the “repre-
sentation bias” of memory studies, understood as the tendency to focus on
the representation of a specific past within a particular media setting, without
taking into account either the reception of the mediated memory or the context
and conditions of its production and transmission.⁸ Thus several authors of the
chapters are keen to analyze memory mediation as a process, paying attention to
issues of reception, that is, to reactions to the mediated memories. They also an-
alyze carefully the social context in which the specific memories are mediated
(see for example the contributions by Kotljarchuk, Yurchuk, Kaprans, Sindbæk
Andersen and Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa).
In their studies the authors emphasize the role of emotions in the formation
and transmission of memory, an aspect that has long been downplayed in mem-
ory studies and has just recently come to the fore.⁹ The case studies presented
show the dynamics of affect in the interaction between individual and cultural
memory (see for example Wylęgała in this book), deal with trauma as mediatized
event (see Denti) and they show how culturally mediated, deeply rooted images
of the past structure our feelings when we are faced with the need to reinterpret
the past (see for example the chapter by Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa).
Yet another innovative aspect of the present volume is the attempt to take
the study of memory beyond methodological nationalism. While recognizing
the continuous importance of national memories, we want rather to emphasize
region, locality and place and show their interplay with national memory. Thus
we contribute to the opening of studies of memory in Eastern Europe towards a
transnational perspective, described as follows by Ann Rigney and Chiara de Ce-
sari: “‘Transnationalism’ recognizes the significance of national frameworks,
alongside the potential of cultural production, both to reinforce and to transcend
them.”¹⁰ In line with this perspective the studies in our volume investigate mem-
ory disputes on different social levels, ranging from very localized and spatially
determined negotiations of memory to interpretations and uses of memory in na-
tional and international politics. Thus these studies emphasize the importance of
space (including digital space) and location, which in each case define premises
 Wulf Kansteiner. “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective mem-
ory Studies.” History and Theory . (): –.
 Aleida Assmann. “Impact and Resonance – Towards a Theory of Emotions in Cultural Mem-
ory.” Södertörn Lectures,  (): .
 Ann Rigney and Chiara De Cesari. “Introduction.” Transnational Memory. Circulation, Artic-
ulation, Scales. Ed. Ann Rigney and Chiara De Cesari. Berlin: De Gruyter, , .
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and resources and set out the type of battlefield or arena for memory negotia-
tion.
It is also important to emphasize that, in response to the recent development
in cultural memory studies, the present volume is very much a product of multi-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship. It not only contains contributions
by historians and researchers of cultural studies but also by ethnologists, soci-
ologists and political scientists. The latter point in their texts to the role of mem-
ories mediated in political discourse. Two of the texts (Denti and Forsberg) touch
upon the question of “apology” as a memory practice, a subject very much dis-
cussed in recent studies on memory and transitional justice.
In the case studies presented in this volume the authors analyze the tense
relations and mutual influences of memory, emotions and politics in contexts
characterized by recent political upheaval, new nation-building and state-build-
ing projects as well as the impact of European integration processes. During the
last decades, massive changes and political ruptures have brought memory dis-
putes to the fore, resulting in a “memory boom” in Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe. In many places the fall of one monolithic socialist value system
with a strict official interpretation of the past has opened the possibilities for
new approaches to memory and history. As a consequence, an urgent need
emerged to take up formerly taboo subjects. Many archives that had previously
been inaccessible could be opened and this created new opportunities for rewrit-
ing history. At the same time the information uncovered has not seldom been put
to ethical and/or political uses, thus leading to new confrontations. Throughout
the region, difficult and disputed memories of catastrophic events in Europe’s
twentieth century have been approached from new angles, and new questions
are being posed. Fierce debates about the past take place such as that in Poland
when a book was published about Polish complicity in the Holocaust in the town
of Jedwabne,¹¹ the treatment of the German civilian population in the Czechoslo-
vakia after WWII;¹² the dispute over the memorial to Bandera in Lviv in
 Barbara Törnquist-Plewa. “The Jedwabne Killing – a Challenge for Polish Collective Memory.
An Analysis of the Polish Debate on Jan Gross’ book Neighbours.” The Echoes of the Holocaust.
Ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson. Lund: Nordic University Press, , –.
 Tomas Sniegon. “Between Old Animosity and New Mourning, Meanings of Czech Post-Com-
munist Memorials of Mass Killings of the Sudeten Germans.” Which Memory, Whose Future? Re-
membering Ethnic Cleansings and Lost Cultural Diversity in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Eu-
ropean Cities. Ed. Barbara Törnquist-Plewa. London: Berghahn, .
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Ukraine;¹³ the criticism of the “House of Terror” in Budapest,¹⁴ the reassessment
of WWII massacres in post-Yugoslav Serbia and Croatia,¹⁵ to name just a few.
Often, the fall of the old memory regime leads to a reversal of memory,
meaning that what was formerly regarded as positive is now judged negatively
and the opposite; a process that Katherine Verdery has described as “reordering
of meaningful worlds”.¹⁶ Our volume tries to capture this process in the region in
a number of different contexts. In some cases this reordering opens possibilities
for reconciliation and sometimes allows for changed attitudes towards former
enemies (for example relations between Poles and Germans, see the chapter
by Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa). However, a reversal can sometimes re-
sult in the reawakening of positive attitudes toward extremely right-wing nation-
alist movements from the past (see for example the chapters by Melchior and
Yurchuk).While it is easy to condemn such tendencies, it is important to under-
stand what makes people, who may otherwise show pro-democratic and pro-Eu-
ropean attitudes, produce memory representations glorifying non-democratic or-
ganizations and authoritarian figures. The chapter by Yurchuk in this volume
gives some insight into this complex phenomenon by pointing to the urgent
need of new nations to reclaim their past.¹⁷ After the long period of the commu-
nist oppression, people search for stories about the resistance to communism in
the past and about the national fighters whose existence could legitimate the
current national state. However, the paradox and the dilemma for the new na-
tions is that the anti-communist fighters as well as the heroes of national strug-
gle in the past often stand for values that are incompatible with the modern de-
mocracies. What past can be reclaimed in that case? This is a challenge that
several nations in the region have to face. Our volume signals the need to go be-
hind the Western stereotype that interprets Eastern Europe as mired in primor-
 Eleonora Narvselius. “The ‘Bandera Debate’: The Contentious Legacy of World War II and
Liberalization of Collective Memory in Western Ukraine.” Canadian Slavonic Papers .–
(): –.
 Kristian Gerner. “Hungary, Romania, the Holocaust and Historical Culture.” The Holocaust –
Post-War Battlefields. Genocide as Historical Culture. Ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander.
Malmö-Lund: Sekel, , –.
 Tea Sindbæk. Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s difficult past –. Aar-
hus: Aarhus University Press, .
 Katherine Verdery. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. New York: Columbia University Press,
, .
 For more elaborated discussion of this subject see also Yuliya Yurchuk. Reordering of Mean-
ingful Worlds. Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in History , .
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dial nationalism and approaching this region using new perspectives, for exam-
ple those applied in postcolonial theory.¹⁸
Inside countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, new political
regimes have raised demands for reassessing recent history, confronting both the
communist version of history and the history of communism itself. The ways of
confronting or coping with the crimes and oppression of the communist period
vary greatly across the region, spanning from judicial prosecution, and lustra-
tion to lenience and almost indifference.¹⁹ While such differences may be ex-
plained in part by states’ and politicians’ different needs and motivations in
the present, they are also caused by the difficulty in defining and delimiting
the attitudes towards the communist past. After all, the experiences of commu-
nism vary greatly between the periods of harsh Stalinist suppression in the 1940s
and 1950s and the widespread reform communism of the 1980s, and between
countries, from Albania’s prolonged experience of heavily oppressive Stalinism
to Yugoslavia’s open borders and the consumer socialism of the 1970s.
The changing memory regimes of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
are also influenced by external pressure. Since the end of the Cold War, the Euro-
pean Union has positioned itself as an active player in European memory poli-
tics, foregrounding the Holocaust as an essential part of Europe’s shared cultural
memory.²⁰ It has been argued that the inclusion of the Holocaust as an important
element of national history was one of the entrance tickets to the European
Union in the 2000s.²¹ Indeed, from the 1990s, the Holocaust seemed to emerge
as a globally shared memory, both functioning as a standard reference of histor-
ical suffering and often challenging national and local perspectives on twentieth
 In the book Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decoloniza-
tion. Stanford: Stanford University Press, , Michael Rothberg broke new ground in combing
postcolonial discourse and memory studies. This is still in need of being explored, especially in
the investigation of memory in Eastern Europe, as pointed out in Blacker and Etkind. “Introduc-
tion,” .
 Timothy Garton Ash. “Trials, purges and history lessons: treating a difficult past in Post-com-
munist Europe.” Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Ed. Jan-Werner Müller. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, , –.
 Aline Sierp. History, Memory, and Transeuropean Identity: Unifying Divisions. London: Rout-
ledge, ; Anne Wæhrens. Erindringspolitik til forhandling: EU og erindringen om Holocaust,
–. Doctoral thesis, University of Copenhagen, .
 Tony Judt. Postwar. A history of Europe since . London: William Heinemann, ,
–.
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century history.²² Thus, the understanding of the recent past was exposed to
local and national as well as international pressure, which created confronta-
tions and demanded negotiations about various versions of local, national, Eu-
ropean and even global memory. Indeed, as Cecilie Banke points out in her
chapter on Turkey and the Armenian genocide, global Holocaust memory may
set difficult – and potentially obstructive – standards for memory negotiations,
thus obfuscating attempts towards reconciliation processes. And as the inform-
ants quoted in Inge Melchior’s chapter seem to suggest, the West-European fore-
grounding of the Holocaust as a memory standard may be perceived as more of a
denial of local memory than as an invitation to a shared European memory com-
munity. Indeed, as Melchior’s chapter demonstrates in the case of memory com-
munities in Estonia, for many nations and peoples in Eastern Europe who went
through the tragic double experience of the Nazi reign and Soviet-style commu-
nism, both of these regimes are of equal importance to remember. Therefore, in
contrast to the West, Eastern European societies do not tend to see the Holocaust
as exceptional and instead wish to universalize the memory of other genocides
and violations of human rights, especially the memory of the Gulag and other
communist crimes. In their view, Europe as a whole has much to learn from
this legacy, which also has a potential to contribute to the formation of
human rights, just as the Holocaust memories did. The representatives of Eastern
European EU members have made efforts to call upon the EU to condemn and
educate their members about communist crimes in a way similar to what has
been done regarding Nazism.²³ One of the driving forces behind this demand
is the will to have their experiences of the communist dictatorship recognized
as an important part of the common European memory. Memory and identity
are interconnected, as identity is to a large extent sustained by memory, by
what a community remembers and what it forgets.²⁴ By turning the memory of
the Gulag and other communist crimes into a common European, not only
East European, memory, Eastern Europeans hope to broaden the scope of social
understanding for their view of the past and to incorporate it into the European
community of memory, thus strengthening their bonds with other EU members.
The Western EU members for their part treat with a large dose of suspicion the
Eastern European initiatives in the field of memory politics such as for example
 On the notion of Holocaust as a cosmopolitan memory, see Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaid-
er. “Memory unbound: the Holocaust and the formation of cosmopolitan memory.” European
Journal of Social Theory . (): –.
 It was clearly expressed in the so called Prague Declaration, for its content see http://
www.praguedeclaration.org/.
 Barbara Misztal. Theories of Social Remembering. London: Open University Press, .
8 Tea Sindbæk Andersen and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa
the establishment in 2008 of the European Day of Remembrance of the Victims
of Stalinism and Nazism, perceiving these commemorative events as an attempt
to relativize and diminish the importance of the Holocaust memory, with a hid-
den agenda of avoiding responsibility. The mistrust has some ground in the fact
that several countries of Eastern Europe still have difficulty acknowledging their
inhabitants’ complicity in the Holocaust. This clash over memory constitutes a
substantial obstacle in the construction of a common European memory.
A core question addressed in this book is how disputed and difficult mem-
ories in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe are represented, and how such
representations are received and retransmitted. Indeed, it is exactly this “medi-
ation”, the presentation and transmission through various types of texts and ar-
tefacts – or “media”, in the widest sense of the word – that enable memory to
become known by large groups of people. As Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney point
out, “memory can only become collective as part of a continuous process where-
by memories are shared with the help of symbolic artefacts that mediate be-
tween individuals […] and create community across space and time”.²⁵ The chap-
ters of this book examine a wide variety of types of memory transmission,
including classic memory sites or in Alexander Etkind’s term “hardware memo-
ries” such as monuments, memorials and museums, as well “software memo-
ries” in the form of texts in newspapers and new digital media, but also memo-
ries mediated in political rhetoric and discourse (see Forsberg’s and Denti’s
chapters in this volume) and oral communication (see the chapter by Wylęgała).
Moreover, the thematic focus on disputed or difficult memories demands an em-
phasis on debates and reactions, enabling the authors to look not only at mem-
ory representations but also at negotiations (for examples, see the chapters by
Kulyk as well as Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa). In this way, by looking
at different types of communication and the interaction between them, the chap-
ters highlight the significance of the media through which memory is transmit-
ted.
The role of mediation is crucial not only in enabling the distribution and
sharing of memory but also in investing emotional value in memory representa-
tions. We know that memory issues can be highly emotional. As Alison Lands-
berg has argued, memory of events that are quite remote in time and place
can be made accessible and emotionally relevant to us. The ways in which his-
torical narratives are mediated, often through modern mass culture, can create
 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney. “Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics.” Mediation,
Remediation and the Dynamic of Cultural Memory. Ed. Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney. Berlin: De
Gruyter, , .
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what is in fact a personal experience, turning it into a deeply felt memory.²⁶ Also
in new, more interactive types of media, memory representations have substan-
tial emotional impact. Adi Kuntsman has pointed out how circulation of memory
of war and violence on the Internet can intensify or transform feelings and affec-
tive states. Indeed, Kuntsman argues, these memory mediations often make an
actual physical impression through what she calls the “cybertouch”.²⁷
When trying to understand these processes, we need to study the “emotion-
ality of texts”, as Sarah Ahmed has phrased it.²⁸ Text is to be understood here
rather broadly to include a wide array of meaning-transmitting products such
as films, photos, works of art, commemoration ceremonies as well as history
books and media discourse. Identification and involvement are created through
emotional appeal, Ahmed argues, by inviting the receiver to share in the
emotion.²⁹ This is where mediations and text also obtain physiological functions,
adding extra layers of emotion and affect to the representations of memory. We
need to take seriously the fact that acts of remembering and of experiencing rep-
resentations of memory are done by physically embodied individuals, and mem-
ory is perceived, processed and transmitted through bodies, brains, senses and
capacities for communication. Emotions cannot be separated from bodily
senses, and thus the reading or viewing of certain types of memory representa-
tions may cause affective and bodily reactions. This encourages us to consider
what representations of memory and participation in memory transmissions
may do to human beings as bodies and brains. Patricia Clough has described
the challenge of analyzing representations of extreme violence and suffering:
as pity, disgust and horror rise in the reader, she says, “affect is at work” and
could be used to mobilize for both compassion and aggression.³⁰ Memory trans-
missions can have similar effects, creating identification and involvement and
touching us across time and space. A key question is which types of mediation
may have such effects and how? While certain memory representations and sites
 Alison Landsberg. Prosthetic memory. The transformation of American remembrance in the
age of global mass culture. New York: Columbia University Press, , , –.
 Adi Kuntsman. “Online memories, digital conflicts and the cybertouch of war.” Digital Icons:
Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media  (): ; Adi Kuntsman. “In-
troduction: Affective Fabrics of Digital Cultures.” Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion. Ed.
Athina Karatzogianni and Adi Kuntsman. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
 Sara Ahmed. The Cultural Politics of Emotions. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, ,
.
 Ibid, .
 Patricia Ticineto Clough. “War By Other Means: What Difference Do(es) the Graphic(s)
Make?” Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion. Ed. Athina Karatzogianni and Adi Kuntsman.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
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of memory cause strong affective reactions, as Sophie Oliver’s chapter demon-
strates, others only provoke a vague response, as is implied in the chapter by
Birga Meyer or expressed in the relative lack of engagement of Yuliya Yurchuk’s
informants (see Oliver, Meyer and Yurchuk in this volume).
The importance of space and location for practices of memory is a funda-
mental concern within memory studies. Specific places or sites of memory func-
tion as prisms through which we can observe the complex dynamics of memories
meeting and interacting. Sites of memory memory can be concrete physical en-
tities, such as monuments, memorials, and cemeteries set aside to embody both
private and collective remembering and mourning.³¹ They are places where indi-
viduals are confronted with remnants and expressions of our shared history, cat-
alyzing individual responses and commemorations, but they can also take on
more political functions as places to ceremoniously celebrate collective identity
and shared glorious history.³² Sites of memory may also be wider spaces or city-
scapes, characterized by the multi-layering of fragments from the past in an
urban palimpsest and in topographies of memory.³³ Yet, sites of memory need
not be physical or localized at all; the term may also refer to an image, a text,
a narrative or an event. The point is that such “sites”, whether material or discur-
sive, become the focus of collective remembrance and of historical meaning.
They tend to attract intense attention from those involved in remembering and
are constantly being invested with new meaning.³⁴
Investigating the entanglement of memory with emotion, mediation and
place, this book seeks to demonstrate in particular the social power and political
impact of painful and troubled memory. It aims to emphasize that memory of dif-
ficult and painful pasts is often heavily invested with politics and emotion, and
therefore disputes about memory are rarely easily reconcilable. The chapters in
this book show how and why memory may be different and how transmission
of memory may act upon individuals, interest groups and political units. Indeed,
memory of Europe’s troubled past may crucially influence relations between in-
dividuals, memory communities and states. By presenting this series of chapters
on disputed memories of troubling pasts across Europe, we seek to emphasize
 Jay Winter. Sites of memory, sites of mourning: The Great War in European cultural history.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
 James E. Young. The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. New Haven: Yale
University Press, ; Pierre Nora. Realms of memory: rethinking the French past. New York:
Columbia University Press,  vols., –.
 Young. The Texture of Memory.
 Ann Rigney. “Plenitude, scarcity and the circulation of cultural memory.” Journal of Europe-
an Studies . (): .
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the complexity of the layers of memory of the troubled twentieth century in Cen-
tral, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Across Europe, different memory narra-
tives dominate and different aspects of the past are foregrounded, depending on
historical experience, memory traditions, political needs and the means of mem-
ory transmission. There is an urgent need to understand the complexities of Eu-
rope’s twentieth century and the memory of it, and to include all of Europe’s re-
gions in this process. We are far from suggesting any kind of relativism with
regard to interpretations of the difficult pasts, for we strongly believe that
there is a need to understand as thoroughly as possible the troubling events
our societies struggle to remember. But we argue that there is a need to recognize
a plurality of memory perspectives.
The chapters in this book investigate memory disputes played out around
very different types of memory sites, from the very concrete such as monuments
and memorials, to heroes or victims, to memory sites in the form of difficult and
disputed events such as the Ottoman genocide against Armenians or the Sre-
brenica massacre, and on to sites of memory in media and cyberspace. Moreover,
the chapters investigate memory disputes at very different spatial and social lev-
els. While some chapters look at conflicting and complex interpretations of one
singular site of memory, others study the negotiation of memories within partic-
ular, more or less established groups, and others again investigate memory as a
factor in the establishment of national politics and as a cause for dispute on the
international arena and across national borders.
The chapters are organized according to the different social spaces investi-
gated. The first part of the book looks at memory disputes and negotiations
over troubling pasts that have had an effect on, or may affect international
and regional politics. It focuses on the negotiation of memory in political dis-
course on public and official levels. We decided to begin the book with Cecilie
Felicia Stockholm Banke’s chapter on the Armenian genocide since, as Blacker
and Etkind has pointed out,³⁵ this genocide has become a historical prototype
for many Eastern European developments, a paradigmatic case of mass violence
of “the century of extremes”. Banke’s chapter presents the genocide as part of
international memory and points to the strong emotions caused by the interna-
tional political actualization of a human catastrophe that took place 100 years
ago. Banke investigates how the memory of the Armenian genocide is negotiated
in foreign politics and how strategies of remembering, not remembering and dia-
logically forgetting are at play. The chapter that follows, written by Tuomas Fors-
berg, deals with the role of World War II memory in the relationship between
 Blacker and Etkind. “Introduction,” .
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Russia and Finland. Forsberg shows how a difficult and divided memory may
constitute a challenge to foreign policy but may also be addressed politically
and diplomatically, amongst others through the use of apologies.While Forsberg
touches upon the subject of apology, the next author, Davide Denti, looks more
closely at the role of apologies as a tool of reconciliation and at its functions in
the domestic, international and regional politics of Serbia and Bosnia. Denti’s
chapter examines how a memory as recent and as emotionally troubling as
the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 may be addressed politically.
The book’s second part is concerned with sites of memory not as monuments
reifying established narratives, but as locations that activate processes of trans-
mission of memory and emotion. The chapters investigate the interaction be-
tween the memory site and the audience or receivers of memory transmission
and look at ways in which these memory transmissions may challenge recipients
and oppose other memory narratives. Sophie Oliver’s chapter on Berlin’s memo-
rials studies how emotions may be transmitted through the spatial organization
of sites of painful memory. Oliver analyzes the choreography of the memorial
sites and the responses of visitors. In her chapter on the representation of Hol-
ocaust victimhood, Birga Meyer analyzes photographic stereotypes of Jewish
Holocaust victims. Meyer’s chapter points to the power of visual representation
as troubling images, but also to the ways in which national and European mem-
ories collide. Andrej Kotljarchuk’s chapter on the commemoration of the Roma
Holocaust in Ukraine investigates how sites of memory represent public memory
or the lack thereof. Looking also at the decision-making behind the erection of
monuments, Kotljarchuk shows some of the dynamics and negotiation within
commemorative politics.
The third part of the book focuses on local memory as memory that adheres
to a periphery or border region and is somehow marginalized or at odds with
larger, institutionalized memory narratives. The chapters in this part are con-
cerned with the memories of groups, or memory communities, and with orally
transmitted memories. The investigations are based on interviews with members
of a marginalized memory community or with intended recipients of transmis-
sion of the marginalized local memory. Anna Wylęgała’s chapter on the memory
of forced migrations in Poland and Ukraine studies individuals’ narratives about
their deportation and the interrelations between memory and identity in the
small communities of expellees. Wylęgała points to shared characteristics of
these memory communities and their relations to the surrounding society. In
her chapter on the memory of World War II in Estonia, Inge Melchior investigates
how memory actors and small memory communities react to experiences of
being marginalized by national and European memory politics. Melchior’s chap-
ter demonstrates how feelings of non-recognition may lead to defensive strat-
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egies and polarization of memory communities. Yuliya Yurchuk’s chapter inves-
tigates the development of the memory of Ukraine’s nationalist insurgent army
during World War II and how this relatively newly expressed memory interacts
with established Soviet era memory narratives. Yurchuk looks at ways in
which the new memory is activated and received and suggests that the two mem-
ories, though potentially diverging, can coexist without significant difficulty.
The last and largest part of the book examines transmissions of memory in
media spaces. Though memory is always mediated, these chapters show the
ways the media as such play a crucial role, setting a more open and fluctuating
stage for memory transmission. Unlike oral memory transmission, which de-
mands personal presence and a degree of intimacy, and sites of memory that
suggest a more carefully calculated and stable memory narrative, media such
as newspapers, internet sites and social networking sites engender both fast
and far-reaching memory transmission, creating new and diverse memory com-
munities. Moreover, digital social media allow for new forms of engagement and
participation in memory negotiation. This part of the book contains five chapters.
Giving it more space in the book, we want to emphasize the importance of the
digital sphere for negotiations of memories in Central, Eastern and South-East-
ern Europe. In some contexts in the region, this is one of the few spaces
where alternative memories can be voiced. However, this openness does not
mean that the Internet is only used by democratic forces. Frequently it is also
a forum for political propaganda, sometimes disguised as independent, and
using digital tools in ways that are perceived as adhering to rules of independ-
ence and objectivity. The Internet is also far from being a “de-nationalised
space”.³⁶ Martins Kaprans’ chapter on memory wars on Wikipedia, which
opens the last section of our book, deals with the above-mentioned challenges
of memory work in digital spaces. This chapter is followed by Volodymyr Kulyk’s
chapter on the memory of Soviet rule and resistance. It studies memory negotia-
tions, or the lack thereof, on online networks, arguing that web debates, often
highly affective, in many cases contribute to establishing borders between irrec-
oncilable viewpoints. Yet in certain cases, the online networks can create alter-
native rooms for real dialogue, creating particular Internet memory communities
around specific questions. Tea Sindbæk Andersen’s chapter on football and
memories of Croatian fascism on Facebook investigates how the meaning of a
historical symbol, in this case a chant used by Croatia’s Second World War quis-
 Ellen Rutten and Vera Zvereva. “Introduction.” Memory, Conflict and New Media: Web Wars
in Post-Socialist States. Eds. Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor and Vera Zvereva, London: Routledge,
, –.
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ling regime, is negotiated on social media, and how different memory agents, in-
cluding a large audience of individual Facebook users, contribute to this negotia-
tion. Facebook and other digital media are thus shown to facilitate quick and un-
limited transmission of memory narratives, potentially enabling fast and wide
mobilization of a digital memory community. Yet, there are very different ways
of participating, and the nature of the media itself makes the memory narratives
transmitted somehow fragmentary. Elvin Gjevori’s chapter on memory and insti-
tutionalization in Albania explores how a troubling past can also serve as a re-
source for political reform and institution building. Gjevori shows how newspa-
per comments draw on the memory of a very repressive communist regime and of
state crises in the transition period in order to promote current reform initiatives.
And finally, Igor Pietraszewski and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa’s chapter on the de-
bate about the Centennial Hall in Wrocław shows how newspapers and online
discussions forums may be the site of struggle between national and post-nation-
al Europeanized perspectives on memory. Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa
point to the complex and difficult relations between national and European
memory narratives and to the problem of respecting the memories of the
Other when it is at odds with our own memory. Indeed, the printed and often
also digitalized media created a discursive public space in which highly emotion-
al transmissions of memory and views of memory could take place.
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Part 1: Transnational Memory Politics

Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke
Global Memory and Dialogic Forgetting:
The Armenian Case
In January 2012, just before the annual Holocaust Remembrance Day, the French
Senate passed a bill that would criminalize the denial of officially recognized
genocides, including the Armenian genocide initiated in 1915. The bill was,
not surprisingly, met by a firm protest from the Turkish government, which de-
nounced the French act and demanded that, instead of interfering with Turkish
history, France should admit its own past atrocities in Algeria. Even among writ-
ers and historians, and within the international community of genocide scholars,
several found it wrong to introduce a law that would officially make denying the
Armenian genocide a crime. The Turkish-Armenian journalist and newspaper ed-
itor, Hrant Dink,who was well known for his firm criticism of the Turkish govern-
ment, was already critical when the French law first came before the parliament
in 2006.¹ The British historian, Timothy Garton Ash, wrote during the debate:
“The question is: should it be a crime under the law of France, or other coun-
tries, to dispute whether those terrible events constituted a genocide, a term
used in international law? While not minimizing the suffering of the Armenians,
the celebrated Ottoman specialist Bernard Lewis has in the past disputed that
precise point. And is the French parliament equipped and entitled to set itself
up as a tribunal on world history, handing down verdicts on the past conduct
of other nations? The answers are: no and no.”²
The decision on behalf of the French Senate makes it relevant to ask why
something that happened over 90 years ago continues to evoke strong feelings
and can even provoke a diplomatic crisis like the one between France and Tur-
key. When the bill was passed, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that it was “evi-
dent discrimination, racism and massacre of free speech” and reiterated Turkey’s
intention to institute penalties against France.³ And diplomatic relations were af-
 The Economist,  December . http://www.economist.com/node/ ( No-
vember )
 Timothy Garton Ash. “In France, genocide has become a political brickbat.” The Guardian, 
January . http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree//jan//france-genocide-politi-
cal-brickbat ( November )
 “French Bill on Genocide Is Denounced by Turkey.” New York Times,  January . http://
www.nytimes.com////world/europe/turkey-lashes-out-at-france-over-genocide-
bill.html ( November ).
fected, even though the French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, who had openly
opposed the bill, did reach out to the Turks.
To answer the question about the capacity of past events to affect us so pow-
erfully in the present, we must not only consider the domestic politics involved,
and here I refer to the voting power of approximately 500.000 French citizens of
Armenian descent, but we must also understand how, in general, the politics of
memory have developed in Europe over the past two decades, giving crimes of
the past an increased impact on foreign relations and international politics.
The recognition of the massacre of the Armenians committed by the Young
Turks and their helpers during the First World War has been an issue ever since
the war ended. “The Armenian Genocide of 1915 remains one of the most painful
episodes of mass killing in the history of the modern genocide,” writes Norman
Naimark in his preface to the co-edited volume A Question of Genocide.⁴ Why this
is the case can be explained, in part, by the controversy between the Turks and
the Armenians over what actually happened – whether genocide occurred and to
what extent the Ottoman state was deliberately attempting to destroy the Arme-
nians – and whether the Turkish state should be held accountable.
The literature is in this respect considerable. From being ignored by scholars
for almost fifty years, the Armenian massacres have since the mid 1960s increas-
ingly become a focus of attention on behalf of historians, sociologists and law-
yers, not least because of the emerging field of genocide studies.⁵ Thus, part of
the scholarly interest in the Armenian massacres can be explained by the gener-
al interest that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s in the history of the Holo-
 Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göcek and Norman M. Naimark. A Question of Genocide. Ar-
menians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ,
xiii–xix.
 See among others Donald Bloxham. The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism,
and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press,
; Taner Akcam. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Respon-
sibility. London: Constable & Robinson, ; David Gaunt. Massacres, Resistance and Protec-
tors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Piscataway, N. J.: Gorgias
Press, ; Richard G. Hovannisian. The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the
Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, –. Cambridge,
Mass.: National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, ; Richard G. Hovannisian,
Ed. The Armenian Genocide in Perspective. New Brunswich, N. J., and Oxford: Transaction Books,
; Robert Melson. Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the
Holocaust. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . Within the field of comparative genocide
studies, Leo Kuper’s work is considered particularly important, see Genocide: Its Political Use in
the th Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, , and The Prevention of Genocide, New
Haven: Yale University Press, .
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caust and other genocides. But the controversy around the recognition of the
massacres as genocide and the geopolitical dimension of the issue has also
lead to increased international interest. According to Klas-Göran Karlsson and
Kristian Gerner, the Armenian massacres returned as an issue that could attract
world attention in 1965, when thousands of Armenians demonstrated in the
streets of Yerevan, the capital of the then Soviet republic Armenia, on 24 April
during the fiftieth anniversary of the deportations of 1915.⁶ The protests were
part of the national upheavals that occurred in the Soviet-Caucasus, but in Arme-
nia the demonstration was also a protest against the silencing of the Armenian
tragedy of 1915. In that sense, the striving for national independence in the Ar-
menian case was from the beginning strongly connected with the striving for jus-
tice and for an official recognition of the massacres. The protest was met by the
Soviet government by the installation in 1967 of a monument, Tsitsernakaberd, to
commemorate the victims. Since then, the Armenian question has been a disput-
ed issue that also includes an important historical lesson, not only for the coun-
tries implicated, but for the international community in general.
The massacre of the Armenians during the First World War took place in full
view of the international community, and the principle of nonintervention in the
affairs of sovereign states won over calls for humanitarian intervention. The mas-
sacres occurred while the allies of the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Austria-
Hungary, as well as the Russian Empire, and even the neutral United States of
America, passively stood by. This lack of international intervention to stop the
deportation and the mass killings of Armenians marks an episode in the history
of modern genocide that is littered with sorrow and strong emotions.
This failure to intervene and stop the deportations could thus be mistaken
for a legitimizing signal. Fewer than three decades later another authoritarian
regime committed a similar, though in scale and scope more massive, crime –
the deliberate mass killing of Jews during the Second World War, while other
states stood passively by. Thus the experience from the First World War taught
states that a crime similar to the massacre committed against the Armenians,
the Assyrians, and the Greeks could, in fact, be considered an accepted, and
very effective, strategy for handling religious minorities or other social groups.
The lack of any sense of obligation of international parties to condemn such
deeds was especially evident when the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was recog-
nized by the major powers in the Treaty of Lausanne, which failed even to men-
tion the Armenians or enforce minority protection on the Kemalist state. Thus,
the deportations could in fact be considered “a potential solution to population
 Kristian Gerner and Klas-Göran Karlsson. Folkmordens Historia. Stockholm: Atlantis, .
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problems”, as Ronald Suny writes: “With the Soviet Republic as the only existing
Armenian political presence, there was little incentive for Western governments
to deal with this matter. In the new republic of Turkey there was a cold silence
about the events of the late Ottoman period beyond the heroic nationalist narra-
tive of Kemalist resistance to foreign aggression.”⁷
In this respect, both the lack of official recognition on behalf of the Turkish
state of this particular crime, and the failure on behalf of the international com-
munity to prevent this crime from happening, have made this genocide into a
particularly painful episode in modern history. Neither has the perpetrator
state acknowledged its guilt, nor has the international community admitted its
responsibility.
Memory – terms and definitions
If we compare how the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust have been dealt
with in their aftermaths, we may understand some of the difficulties embedded
in the quest for an official recognition of the Armenian genocide. Most European
countries have an official policy for how to commemorate the Holocaust and also
for how to teach the history of the Holocaust to future generations. Since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, several resolutions, declarations, and official statements
that express these intentions have been put forward by individual states and in-
ternational bodies, such as the European Parliament, the European Council,
OSCE and the UN. And most European countries have an annual Holocaust re-
membrance day. Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and even Denmark,
have acknowledged their share of responsibility for the crimes committed by
Nazi-Germany during the Second World War.
When comparing this development with how other cases of genocide have
been dealt with in the aftermath, we find similarities. First of all, the role of
the victim communities in developing a culture of remembrance is crucial. In
this respect, the global Armenian community plays an important role in continu-
ing to push for an official acknowledgement of the Armenian tragedy as geno-
cide. Also, several countries including Russia, France and Germany have recog-
nized the event as a genocide and more than 135 memorials, spread across 25
countries, commemorate the Armenian Genocide. However, neither the Armeni-
 Ronald Grigor Suny. “Writing Genocide. The Fate of the Ottoman Armenians.” A Question of
Genocide. Eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek and Norman Naimark. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, , .
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an genocide, nor the Rwanda genocide, nor the genocide in Bosnia have a posi-
tion in global memory that approaches that of the Holocaust.Why this is the case
may be an interesting question, but it is not my intention to discuss it here.
Instead, I will argue that the way the Holocaust has been confronted, dealt
with, and included in national remembrance activities since the late 1950s has
contributed to the development of a general pattern for how memory of mass
atrocities is dealt with, or rather ought to be dealt with. To a certain extent,
we may say that the commemoration of the Holocaust has established a
model for how other genocides and historical crimes ought to be dealt with in
the present. In this sense, the politics of memory after the Holocaust has helped
to set a standard for how states should behave in relation to atrocities committed
in the past.
Some scholars, such as Paul Connerton, would claim that “the frequent dis-
cussion of and the apparently high value ascribed to memory in recent years is
vitally connected to the accumulated repercussion of the holocaustal events of
the last century.”⁸ Omar Bartov states that the Holocaust has generated new
and particularly intense forms of memory.⁹ However, as Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered
Vinitsky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy argue, it is rather what Holocaust memory
symbolizes that has placed this specific memory in the center of current political
culture. As they say, “the image of the Holocaust victim has not simply become
first among victims generally, but has supposedly placed the image of the victim
at the core of contemporary culture as a whole”.¹⁰ In that sense, “the post-Hol-
ocaust landscape is one littered with victims, including not only the victims of
the Holocaust but those whose victimhood is often defined by the master
image of the broken Auschwitz inmate, and unfortunately often compared to
or measured against him or her.”¹¹
In other words, what originally emerged as a quest on the part of groups and
people representing the victims of the Holocaust has developed into an icon of a
global memory imperative, in which victims from past atrocities claim the right
to be acknowledged in the same way as victims of the Holocaust.
This cosmopolitanization of memory, as Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider
define it, has led to a shift “away from the territorialized nation-state and the
 Paul Connerton. How Modernity Forgets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , here
cited from Jeffrey K. Olick,Vered Vinitsky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy, The Collective Memory Read-
er. Oxford: Oxford University Press, , .
 Omer Bartov, The Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation.
New York: Oxford University Press .
 Olick, Vintsky-Seroussi and Levi, The Collective Memory Reader, .
 Ibid.
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ethnically bounded framework that are commonly associated with the notion of
collective memory” toward a global memory culture defined by human rights
values.¹² In this global memory culture, violence, injustice, and suffering have
to be addressed and, to some extent, also atoned for. While states have histori-
cally dealt with war and conflict in their aftermath by forgetting them, a paradig-
matic shift occurred, as Aleida Assmann argues, with the return of Holocaust
memory after a period of latency.¹³
Four models of remembering
Assmann has introduced four models for how current societies deal with, or try
to overcome a traumatic history of violence.¹⁴ These four models are (1) dialogic
forgetting, (2) remembering in order to prevent forgetting, (3) remembering in
order to forget, and (4) dialogic remembering.
Dialogic forgetting is, as Assmann points out, another expression for ‘si-
lence’, and is based on the belief that “controlling and containing the explosive
force of memory” will not only bring an end to war and conflict, but is also a
necessary predicate for a society to start a new era. The model can be recognized
in several historic cases, such as the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece, and,
later, after the Thirty-Years-War, when the peace treaty of Münster-Osnabrück in-
cluded the formula perpetua oblivio et amnestia. But as Assmann also points out,
“even after 1945 the model of dialogic forgetting was still widely used as a polit-
ical resource.”¹⁵ This was the case in Western Europe, and particular in Germany,
where silence seemed to have been an accepted strategy for how to leave the war
behind and move on, not only economically, but also politically. Also in Spain,
the strategy of forgetting could be applied to describe the way the memory of the
Spanish civil war was contained during the whole Franco-period. Only in 2007,
when a law of memory was passed by the Spanish parliament, was this strategy
 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider. Human Rights and Memory. University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, . Here cited from Olick, Vintsky-Seroussi and Levi, The Collective
Memory Reader, .
 Aleida Assmann, “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing
with a Traumatic Past” in Gertraud Borea Auer and Wodak, Ruth. Eds. Justice and Memory. Con-
fronting traumatic pasts. An international comparison. Vienna: Passagen Verlag, .
 Assmann, “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with a
Traumatic Past”, .
 Ibid, 
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of forgetting abandoned and replaced by an explicit condemnation of the Fascist
dictatorship and an acknowledgement of the suffering of the victims.¹⁶
The second model, remembering in order to prevent forgetting, is based on
the paradigmatic case of Holocaust memory. The shift from forgetting to remem-
bering is most obviously observed in the way the Holocaust was first neglected,
then addressed, and finally acknowledged. Or as Raul Hilberg stated in 1988: “In
the beginning there was no Holocaust. When it took place in the middle of the
twentieth century, its nature was not fully grasped,” meaning there was no ac-
knowledgement of the murder of European Jewry.¹⁷ This shift from forgetting
to remembering happened in several stages, as described by, among others,
Tony Judt in Postwar.¹⁸ Looking at the way Europe, and more specifically West
Europe came to terms with the Holocaust, we may divide the decades following
the end of the war into three very generally defined phases.¹⁹ The first phase was
during the immediate post-war years, beginning with the liberation of the camps
and ending with the Nuremberg trial, and was characterized by black-and-white
photos being distributed by the Allies in the West-European press. The gravity of
this crime, having taken place in the heart of the European continent, became
known through these pictures, taken by soldiers and camp survivors. The horrors
were confronted, but no questions were asked. The lesson of this phase was that
Nazism was defeated, and the guilty were convicted at Nuremberg.
The second phase starting in the late 1940s, but being most intense during
the 1960s, saw artists using the Holocaust to express something profound about
Western civilization, capitalism, consumerism, and what was seen as a general
decline of Western values. For the new generation maturing during the decades
following the war, the crimes of National Socialism came to represent the utmost
expression of a degenerate society, where alienation and disengagement had re-
placed all human dignity. As such, the Holocaust, as would soon be the term de-
 For the debate about historical memory in Spain, see Carlos Jerez-Ferran and Samuel
Amago. Eds. Unearthing Franco’s Legacy. Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory
in Spain. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, . See also Paul Preston. The Spanish
Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, .
 Raul Hilberg. “Development in the Historiography of the Holocaust.” Comprehending the Hol-
ocaust. Historical and Literary Research. Eds. Asher Cohen, Yoav Gelber and Charlotte Wardi.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, , .
 Tony Judt, Postwar. A history of Europe since . New York: Penguin Press, .
 For an extended presentation of this phase-model, see Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, “Re-
membering Europe’s Heart of Darkness. Legacies of the Holocaust in Postwar European Societ-
ies.” A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance. Eds. Malgorzata Pak-
ier and Bo Stråth. New York: Berghahn Books, .
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scribing the murder against first of all European Jews, became a symbol of de-
generation and moral decline, as would also be the way artists started to include
references to the Holocaust in their works.²⁰ This artistic expression of the Hol-
ocaust embodies a great deal of political criticism on behalf of leftwing youth in
the US and Europe. Some say that this kind of art could be seen as an intellectual
abstraction, a way to deal with the Holocaust without really confronting it. Dur-
ing this phase, however, the post-war generation started asking questions, using
the Holocaust as a reference for how far capitalism could go. This period also
saw the publication of the first scholarly works about the Holocaust, which de-
veloped a more nuanced picture of the Holocaust and how it happened.
During this second phase, the ideological battle about how to understand
the crimes of National Socialism began. Similar to the anti-fascist discourse of
the 1930s, the left wing conflated the Holocaust and Nazi war crimes with colo-
nialism and imperialism. To some extent, this way of interpreting the Holocaust
relativized the crimes committed during the Second World War by comparing
them to crimes committed by the European colonial powers. An example of
this kind of relativism can, according to French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut,
be observed in the Barbie case in France in the mid-1980s. The Nazi war criminal
Klaus Barbie, also known as ‘the butcher of Lyon’, was captured in 1983 and
brought to trial in Lyon four years later in 1987. During the trial, the lawyer for
the defense, Jacques Vergés, shifted the focus from the crimes of the Nazis
and those their collaborators committed in France during the Vichy Regime, to
the crimes committed by France as a colonial power in Algeria and other former
colonies. Thus, while following the proceedings, Finkielkraut noted that the rel-
ativism of this trial showed how France, again, managed to avoid confronting the
active role of the Vichy Regime in the persecution and deportation of French
Jews.²¹ However, what Finkielkraut did not include in his criticism was the in-
creased tendency also among scholars of modern genocides to address the
crimes of National Socialism within a larger frame of genocide studies, and
thus studies of political mass violence in general.²²
Finkielkraut can be seen as representing a movement which advocates jus-
tice on behalf of the victims and the principles of international humanitarian
 See Banke, “Remembering Europe’s Heart of Darkness.” See also Max Liljefors. Bilder av För-
intelsen. Mening. Minne. Kompromettering. Lund: Palmkrons Förlag, .
 Alain Finkielkraut. Remembering in Vain. The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Human-
ity. New York: Columbia University Press,  (). See also Henry Rousso. The Vichy Syn-
drome: History and Memory in France Since . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
 For this development among researchers, see Dan Stone’s introduction to The Historiography
of Genocide. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, .
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law. This justice-oriented movement started to grow stronger in the years follow-
ing the fall of the Berlin wall and received a tremendous boost with the wars of
succession in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The movement, which has
its roots in the late nineteenth century human rights movement, was institution-
alized after the Second World War by the Nuremberg Trials, the International
Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, and the UN genocide convention of the
same year. In addition to this, the 1980s also saw the emergence of Holocaust
deniers,who questioned the Holocaust and the factual basis of the new research.
Initially, a movement directed primarily by neo-Nazis, Holocaust deniers have
now cloaked their bigotry, raising questions about the Holocaust in a way that
may look like scientific critique. British historian David Irving is an example
of this phenomenon.
The third phase saw the appearance of memorials, such as that in Berlin by
Peter Eisenman, but also those in France and Belgium and Norway. Here the role
of each individual country is acknowledged, and several European heads of state
publicly admitted their countries’ responsibility, or, as Alfred Pijpers puts it, they
all acknowledge their ‘holocaust guilt’.²³
Based on the above, we may conclude that Western European countries dealt
with the Holocaust in different phases. The first was the immediate confrontation
with Nazi war crimes through the distribution of black and white photographs
from the camps. The second was characterized by economic recovery and si-
lence. The silence, however, was only on the surface, because, even though
there was no official acknowledgement of the genocide of European Jews, artists
and writers had already started, in the immediate post-war years, to address the
Holocaust through works communicating and interpreting their personal experi-
ence from the camps. Then followed the trials of the late 1950s and early 1960s,
which initiated a new phase – the third – the age of testimony, during which
some of the first scholarly works appeared documenting the crimes of the
Nazi-Regime. The final and current phase can be characterized as the “age of
memory”, because it is in this phase that several European states have instituted
an official Holocaust Remembrance Day, admitted their share of responsibility,
and developed specific programs for keeping alive the memory of the Holocaust.
In explaining this phase, Assmann uses the example of Germany.When Ger-
many, during the 1960s, moved from, in Assmann’s words, “an immediate period
of dialogic forgetting into the phase of remember in order to never forget,” it be-
came a member of the transnational Holocaust community of memory, in which
 Alfred Pijpers, “Now We Should All Acknowledge Our Holocaust Guilt.” Europe’s World, Au-
tumn, , –.
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the overall goal is to remember in order never to forget. And soon, other European
states followed, along with the UN.²⁴ In this sense, today exists a transnational
community of memory that, as Levy and Sznaider describe, has acquired the
character of a civil religion.
Turkey and the dialogic “forgetting”
If we now turn to the Armenian genocide and consider how Holocaust memory
has developed and affected the Armenian case, we can say that this cosmopoli-
tanization of memory partly explains the ongoing controversies about applying
the term, genocide, to the Armenian massacre. I say partly, because debates
about terms and words can also be a strategy for exactly this, dialogic forgetting.
Discussing which term may be the right one – massacre, tragedy, atrocities, gen-
ocide – can be a pragmatic solution for containing the explosive forces of mem-
ory. In the words of Machiavelli, as referred to by Assmann, “it is easy to conquer
a people, but next to impossible to conquer their memories. Unless they are scat-
tered and dispersed, the citizens of a conquered city will never forget their for-
mer freedom and their old memories. They will introduce them on every occasion
that presents itself.”²⁵ In a Machiavellian sense, as long as this dialogic forgetting
is occurring in present Turkey, the Armenian community will never forget their
old memories. They will continue to use every occasion to introduce the collec-
tive memory of the brutal deportations that destroyed the Ottoman Armenian
community during the First World War. Or as Nefissa Naguib writes about the Ar-
menian memories of relief in Jerusalem, core components of the collective mem-
ory of the Armenians are genocide, deportation and rescue and relief. These are
the memories that bind the Armenians together.²⁶
Before moving on, I need to stress that the term memory – its uses and
meaning – is not uncontested among scholars. Memory is about how history
is perceived in the present. Memory, therefore, lives through generations, either
 Assmann, “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with a
Traumatic Past”, .
 Assmann, “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with a
Traumatic Past”, . Assmann refers to Niccoló Machiavelli. Der Fürst, Stuttgart: Kröner,
, .
 Nefissa Naguib, “A Nation of Widows: Armenian Memories of Relief in Jerusalem.” Interpret-
ing Welfare and Relief in the Middle East. Eds. Nefissa Naguib and Inger Marie Okkenhaug. Lei-
den: Brill, , –.
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in the mind of the individual or as the collective memory of a specific group.²⁷
While the concept of “collective memory” has been criticized for being a meta-
phor associated with the organic notion of a community, memory as an analyt-
ical concept can, in fact, refer both to individual memories or a community of
memory.²⁸ Thus, the field has moved away from the essentialized vision of collec-
tive memory as a substitute for national communities, towards a set of analytical
tools – remembrance, commemoration, discourse about the past, politics of
memory, and practices of remembrance – that can be applied to the study of
how societies come to terms with their past.²⁹
In genocide studies, coming to terms with past atrocities has often meant de-
veloping a legal process following the atrocities, combined on occasion with
local, cultural-specific reconciliation mechanisms.³⁰ In Rwanda, for example, a
local reconciliation process was introduced with the Gacacas and, as in Germany
after its experience with the Holocaust, it is against the law to question the 1994-
genocide. In several cases, the process of coming to terms often also involves the
development and institutionalization of an official narrative in museums,
schools, and on days of national remembrance. As such, both institutionalized
memory and individual memories of victims play important roles in how a soci-
ety overcomes a traumatic and violent past.³¹
However, this process of overcoming past atrocities can often lead to new
controversies about which atrocities should be recognized, especially in coun-
tries where a significant segment of the population identified with, or participat-
ed in, the crimes of previous regimes. In some cases, past atrocities are not ad-
dressed because they carry with them the potential seeds of renewed internal
 Maurice Halbwalchs. On Collective Memory. University of Chicago Press, ; Paul Conner-
ton. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
 Aleida Assmann. “Four Formats of Memory – From Individual to collective Forms of Con-
structing the Past.” Cultural Memory and Historical Consciouness in the German-Speaking
World since . Eds. Christian Emden and David Midgley. Bern: Peter Lang, ; Reinhart
Koselleck. “Gebrochene Erinnerung. Deutsche und polische Vergangenheiten.” Jahrbuch der
Deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung, . Göttingen, .
 Bo Stråth. “Preface.” Collective Traumas. Memories of War and Conflict in th Century Eu-
rope. Eds. Conny Mithander, John Sundholm and Maria Holmgren Troy. Brussels: Peter Lang,
, –.
 Lawrence Douglas. The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Hol-
ocaust. New Haven: Yale University Press, ; Helen Fein. Accounting for Genocide: Victims
and Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: The Free Press, .
 Nancy Adler, Selma Leydesdorff, Mary Cahmberlain and Leyla Neyzi. Eds. Memories of Mass
Repression. Narrating Life Stories in the Aftermath of Atrocity. New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-
lishers, .
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conflict, and therefore remain ‘blind spots’ in the historical landscape, as in the
case with Jan T. Gross’ controversial book, Neighbors. The Destrcution of the Jew-
ish Community in Jedwabne.³² In this book, Gross describes how 1,600 Jews were
slaughtered during the Second World War, not by the Nazis but by their Polish
neighbors. The publication of the book was followed by a heated debate in Po-
land about relations to the country’s Jewish population, and provoked at the
same time a painful process of reinterpreting Polish history. In other cases, mem-
ories of one past atrocity overshadow others and create a competition for what
should be remembered, as in Hungary where the crimes of communism are
being commemorated and included as an important element in the post-commu-
nist Hungarian national identity, while the crimes of National Socialism receive
increasingly less attention.³³
Applying knowledge from the developments described above to the Armeni-
an case, how can memory theory help us to understand the current controversies
that exist around the Armenian genocide? The Armenian genocide is commemo-
rated each year on 24 April, in Armenia and in several other countries around the
world. The global Armenian diaspora community commemorates the tragedy
that befell their families and relatives. In this sense, there exists a culture of com-
memoration for the Armenian genocide that keeps the memory of the massacre
alive. The Armenian genocide is, in Armenia and among Armenians around the
world, remembered in order not to forget. This was also President Obama’s mes-
sage in his address on the occasion of the Armenian Remembrance Day in 2011,
when he spoke of the victims and how we must never forget the Armenian trag-
edy – the “Meds Yeghern.”³⁴
However, while the Holocaust has established a model for how to remember
in order not to forget, the model has also led to a new imperative. A third model
of remembering has been introduced – remembering in order to forget. This
model was introduced as a therapeutic tool to cleanse, to purge, to heal, and
to reconcile. Within international relations, commemoration can be used by
countries to demonstrate that they have adopted other strategies, and that ag-
 Jan Tomasz Gross. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, .
 See among others Julia Creet. “The House of Terror and the Holocaust Memorial Centre: Re-
sentment and Melancholia in Post- Hungary.” European Cultural Memory Post-. Eds. Conny
Mithander, John Sundholm and Adrian Velicu. Rodopi: Amsterdam/New York, NY, , .
 Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day,  April , http://www.whi-
tehouse.gov/the-press-office////statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day (
November )
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gression is no longer an option. In her work about apologies in international pol-
itics, Jennifer Lind describes how countries that remember and atone for past vi-
olence are signaling that they are unlikely to adopt aggressive strategies.³⁵ In this
sense, “the way a country remembers or forgets past violence leads others to
have positive or negative feelings about that country. Apologies, reparations,
and so on are signs of respect: They reflect a belief that a country that is a recip-
ient of an apology is too important to treat poorly. By contrast, a country’s deni-
als, glorification, or whitewashing of past atrocities signal contempt for a people,
for their country’s status, and for the future of the bilateral relationship.”³⁶
When turning the focus to the case of Armenia and Turkey, we may say that
Turkey has made some steps towards signaling a different attitude in its relation
to Armenia. But public memory after the Armenian genocide remains in the
phase of dialogic forgetting. Some recent attempts in Turkey may signal a
move towards remembering in order to prevent forgetting. However, it is more like-
ly that at present, the developments in Turkey and the historical accord that was
established between Armenia and Turkey in 2010 are a sign of remembering in
order to forget. The accord is in this case used as a way to reconcile a delicate
relationship between two states – a relationship that also affects how other
states relate to both Armenia and Turkey. As long as this controversy between
Turkey and Armenia exists, other states will have to carefully consider how to
officially address the massacres against the Armenians during the First World
War. In this sense, what seems to be an intimate conflict between two states
about how to interpret their common past, appears to have international dimen-
sions and affects not only the geopolitics in the Caucasus region, but also Tur-
key’s relation to both the EU and the US.
One may ask whether, in order to move this stymied process forward, it may
be advisable to separate the Armenian genocide as a historical crime from the
global memory paradigm, and, with this, to also separate the quest for acknowl-
edgement from the global memory movement which is associated with the Hol-
ocaust. As Seyhan Bayraktar has argued in her study of memory, after the Arme-
nian genocide there is still a long way to go for a paradigmatic shift in Turkey.³⁷
The question is whether a necessary predicate for this shift is that the Armenian
genocide no longer be understood within the framework of comparative geno-
cides (including the Holocaust) but is moved to a broader contextual frame
 Jennifer Lind. Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, .
 Ibid, .
 Seyhan Bayraktar. Politik und Erinnerung: der Diskurs über den Armeniermord in der Türkei
zwischen Nationalismus und Europäisierung. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, .
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that allows for a more profound understanding of the political mass violence
that occurred in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The point I
want to make here is that it may be that the term genocide and the continuous
quest for having the massacres against the Armenians in 1915 recognized as such
prevents Turkey and Armenia from making progress in their common under-
standing of this shared past.
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Tuomas Forsberg
Overcoming Memory Conflicts: Russia,
Finland and the Second World War
The relevance of collective memory for contemporary world politics is usually
understood as lying in the way the past affects our present identities and
views of the other. Conflicts over memory may cause violent responses, or at
least create tensions and significantly hamper mutual cooperation in cases
where common interests otherwise exist. If this is so, there is a strong practical
interest in overcoming such problems and developing knowledge about how
memory conflicts can be reconciled.
Thus far, we have only tentative knowledge of how to overcome the limits
and deal effectively with the conditions in which memory conflicts arise in
world politics. Studies on transitional justice have mainly focused on the inter-
nal aspect of memory conflicts despite the fact that most civil wars have an in-
ternational or transnational dimension.¹ With regard to the significance of for-
giveness in international relations, there are both advocates and skeptics, but
a huge gap remains between the normative and empirical research. Many empir-
ical studies on apologies and memory conflicts are descriptive and often merely
repeat the initial assumption, namely that forgiveness could play an important
role in international conflict resolution. Skeptics, in turn, are not interested in
studying in detail their assumptions about the inefficacy of forgiveness in inter-
national relations. Only recently, have we seen steps towards more concrete ex-
planatory research that links theoretical and empirical elements to the aim of in-
creasing our understanding of when and how apologies and forgiveness function
positively. Probably the most significant recent study is by Jennifer Lind, who ar-
gues that apologies are not necessary for political reconciliation between states,
 David Mendeloff. “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the En-
thusiasm?” International Studies Review  (): –; Tristan Anne Borer. “Truth Telling
as a Peace-Building Activity: A Theoretical Overview.” Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace
Building in Post-Conflict Societies. Ed. Tristan Anne Borer. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, , –; Eric Brahm. “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commissions Success
and Impact.” International Studies Perspectives  (): –; Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch,
Megan MacKenzie and Mohamed Sesay. “Measuring the Impacts of Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions: Placing the Global ‘Success’ of TRC’s in Local Perspective.” Cooperation and
Conflict  (): –.
and moreover, that attempts to extract apologies often lead to counterproductive
results in the form of a conservative backlash effect.²
In this article, I will argue that practices related to forgiveness help reduce
conflicts and foster cooperation between states and nations, even when apolo-
gies and forgiveness are only partial. I will first outline a theory of how memory
conflicts and historical problems affect relations between states and then discuss
the concept of forgiveness and its potential usefulness in influencing these
mechanisms. I will distinguish between maximal and minimal models of forgive-
ness and argue that in practice, a mixed model, imperfect apology may lead to
forgiveness and reconciliation. To provide an empirical basis, the article looks at
the role of the memory of World War II in relations between Russia and Finland.
In addition to functioning as an illustrative example of the mechanisms of over-
coming international memory conflicts, the Finnish case is interesting from the
perspective of mapping the collective memories of World War II because it is lo-
cated between the eastern and western memory cultures in Europe.³
Strategies for Reconciling Memory Conflicts
There are a number of conceptual issues that need clarification when discussing
the reconciliation of problems arising from the past. Although discussion of
memory conflicts and the construction of views about historical problems are
often strongly subjective, the factual nature of past wrongdoings cannot be en-
tirely disregarded. Transgressions that have a certain objective magnitude in
terms of harm inflicted and legal and moral norms broken are more likely to
give rise to memory conflicts significant enough to affect overall political as
well as economic and cultural relations. Wars of aggression, massacres and
other war crimes, grave human rights violations, deportation, and stolen territo-
ry or property are often the sources of memory conflicts.⁴ Yet, the wrongdoings
themselves are not necessarily at the heart of memory conflicts but rather a fac-
tual disagreement about what actually happened or the interpretation of who
 Jennifer Lind. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell, .
 See Patrick Finney. Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National
Identity, Collective Memory. New York: Routledge,  and Aleida Assmann. “Europe’s Divided
Memory.” Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe. Eds. Uilleam Blacker, Alexander Etkind, and
Julie Fedor. Basingstoke: Palgrave, , –.
 For discussion of different kinds of evil, see Claudia Card. The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of
Evil. Oxford: Oxford University, .
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was responsible for what. Although what happened yesterday is already history,
it is politically meaningful to see memory conflicts as related to events of a pre-
vious era defined by a change of leadership, generation or the broader interna-
tional context. Sometimes memory conflicts can stem from a relatively distant
past, but typically the more recent the past wrongdoing is, the more strongly
the actors can identify themselves with the victims.⁵
We may also ask which actors are those who should overcome a memory
conflict. While the concept of collective memory can be operationalised in vari-
ous ways, the relevant aspect here is how the decision-makers and other key rep-
resentatives of the state deal with the past and to what extent they are affected
by the national memory culture and public concerns related to the past in con-
ducting foreign policy.⁶ Individual and social memories naturally intersect in the
minds of decision-makers. They both actively shape as well as respond to the
public representations of the past and the memory culture of the wider society.
Furthermore, the way in which memory conflicts affect current relations be-
tween the parties involved should also be unpacked. One way is to regard the
problems of the past as psychological traumas that are emotional “wounds” (in-
deed, traumas are literally “wounds”) that prevent normal behavior in the trau-
matised subject. Though a strict medical analysis is not the point here, it might
be recalled that post-traumatic stress disorder is classified as an emotional ill-
ness that results in various reactions such as feelings of rejection, guilt and
anger. A common feature of traumas is the avoidance effect. Normal everyday
interaction with someone who brings certain memories to life can be so stressful
for the traumatised subject that it is avoided.⁷
Secondly, historical problems can burden relations between states because
one of the states demands some kind of justice for the perceived historical
wrongs. Because of the existence of such historical problems, the state leaders
or members of a nation whose rights have been violated can think that the
state or nation that has committed wrongdoing has merited punishment or, at
 On victimhood, see Tami Amanda Jakoby. “A Theory of Victimhood: Politics, Conflict and the
Construction of Victim-based Identity.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies . ():
–.
 On collective memory and politics, see James Wertsch. Voices of Collective Remembering. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, ; Richard Ned Lebow. “The Future of Memory.” Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science . (): – and Eric Langen-
bacher. “Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations.” Power
and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations. Eds. Eric Langenbacher, and Yossi
Shain. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press , –.
 See e.g. Judith Lewis Herman. Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence from Domestic
Abuse to Political Terror. New York: Basic Books, .
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least, is not worthy of any closer form of cooperation. There is a strong retributive
instinct after wrongdoings.⁸ Yet, the moral issue is not linked merely to punish-
ment. Dealing with the past is important because, as James Booth notes, “the re-
membrance of past wrongs is one of the faces of justice itself”.⁹
Thirdly, problems of history can restrict cooperation and increase conflicts
because the way the state interprets history and, in particular, deals with its
past wrongdoings is often seen as a sign of its trustworthiness and intentions.¹⁰
The way history is treated is hence a clue for one state or group about whether or
not the other has a continuing propensity to deceive or use violence in mutual
relations as, for example, the degree of respect for human rights or other princi-
ples of democracy. Finally, historical problems can affect present relations ad-
versely when they provide negative material for identity building and thus im-
portant elements in making enemy images. “National myth-making” based on
history can thus have a significant impact on international relations.¹¹
Furthermore, there is no consensus or clear-cut way to measure the quality
of reconciliation. It is often difficult to distinguish between causal and constitu-
tive aspects of it.¹² Yet, a rough scale can be constructed, where a minimum def-
inition of reconciliation requires that not only have open hostilities between the
parties ceased but also that there is a radically diminished likelihood for violent
conflict marked by the absence of enemy rhetoric and preparation for war.¹³ Even
such a condition of a stable peace is often not enough, however, because recon-
ciliation can also be needed in cases where no threat of violent conflict exists but
historical problems still burden the relationship. Reconciliation at this stage
would thus also mean that historical problems do not play any significant role
in normal everyday interaction between the parties. The scale here is not strictly
 Jeffrie Murphy. Getting Even: Forgiveness and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford, .
 William James Booth. “The Unforgotten: Memories of Justice.” American Political Science Re-
view . (): –, here .
 Jennifer Lind. Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell, .
 Yinan He. The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since
World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
 Siri Gloppen. “Roads to Reconciliation: A Conceptual Framework.” Roads to Reconciliation.
Eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri Suhrke. Lanham, MA: Lexington, , –; Trudy
Govier. Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgment, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable
Peace. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books,  and Valerie Rosoux. “Reconciliation as a Peace-
Building Process: Scope and Limits.” The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Eds. Jacob Ber-
covitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and Ira William Zartman. London: Sage, , –.
 For examples and discussion, see Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics; He,
The Search for Reconciliation and Tang, “Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy.” World
Politics . (): –.
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linear, since states that have overcome the burden of the past in their relations
may still prepare for a possible violent conflict with each other, but do so for rea-
sons other than historical.
At the other end of the continuum, full reconciliation can be defined as some
sort of greater harmony between the parties. Although national unity often is a
stated goal after civil conflict, a common identity can be seen as a utopian and
superfluous goal in relations between states and nations. Yet, integration be-
tween France and Germany, for example, may be regarded as a case where his-
torical problems were turned into shared experiences that strengthen the rela-
tionship and created a shared identity. Thus while the concept of
reconciliation should be stretched slightly further than to the simple disappear-
ance of a threat of renewed violence and war, the expectation of “harmony” is
perhaps too demanding in most contexts.
What strategies are available for states to use to overcome memory conflicts
and achieve reconciliation of one or another degree? Although we cannot change
the past, we can change the ways in which we remember it publicly and give sig-
nificance to past events.¹⁴ Doing nothing in terms of official history politics is, of
course, also a strategic choice, and it might sometimes be a working solution.
The parties can encapsulate or compartmentalise historical memories so that
they do not play a role in their routine interactions. In transitional justice liter-
ature, the alternatives are usually vengeance and forgiveness, or judicial trials
versus amnesty to the perpetrators.¹⁵ In this sense, it is important to distinguish
between forgiving and forgetting, since the former depends on the prior ac-
knowledgement of the truth about the wrongdoings, whereas the latter is simply
a strategy to let the past rest.
If the key problem is the subjective trauma caused by the past, then the trau-
matised nation simply needs time to heal. If some sort of analogy of individual
therapy applies to collectives, they also need to mourn, reflect on their emotions
and adjust to the new circumstances. If allowing time for healing is the best way
to overcome historical problems between two states, the preferred strategy is not
to intervene in the domestic memory processes.Vamik Volkan, who speaks of the
“chosen traumas” of nations, argues that “forgiveness is possible only when the
group that suffered has done a significant amount of mourning”. In his view,
 See e.g. Raphael Samuel. Theatres of Memory. London: Verso, .
 Martha Minow. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass
Violence. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, . Tuomas Forsberg. “The Philosophy and Practice of
Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative Issues.” Burying the Past. Making
Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Ed. Nigel Biggar. Washington D.C.: Georgetown Uni-
versity Press, , –.
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“the focus should be on helping with the work of mourning and not on the single
(seemingly magical) act of asking forgiveness.”¹⁶ From this perspective, it can
also be important that the traumatised subject can tell his or her story about
the wrongdoings and be heard by the wider public.
If the key problem with the historical injustice is a moral one, then some sort
of moral restoration of order is needed.¹⁷ Then the typical strategies available are
retribution or abstaining from retribution through forgiveness. There is a strong
tradition of regarding reconciliation as something that can be achieved only if
the moral order has been restored through retribution.¹⁸ Yet, this tradition has
been challenged by those who advocate restorative justice instead of retributive
justice and see forgiveness as a means to restore the moral order without
punishment.¹⁹ Important in both cases, however, is that the truth about the
past wrongdoings is spelled out and remembered, though in the case of punish-
ment it is secondary whether the perpetrator actually accepts the truth. For the
process of forgiveness as justice, a shared perception about the truth and ac-
knowledgement of the past wrongdoings by the perpetrator are essential.
If the key problem related to past wrongdoings is related to building trust,
the parties involved need to find ways to signal unambiguously the values and
intentions on which such trust can be built. Lind argues that contrition and re-
membrance are costly signals because they make domestic mobilisation for pos-
sible future wars and political conflicts more difficult. It is not only important
what the state leaders say to their counterparts and to the victims but also
how they convey the message to their domestic audience.²⁰ Abstaining from
the glorification of past violence and accepting criticism of past deeds can dem-
onstrate peaceful intentions and increase domestic pluralism. Taking into ac-
count the views of the other country can further clear up doubts about intentions
when historical interpretations constitute difficult issues in bilateral relations.
If a historical wrongdoing constitutes a national myth that supports the
identities of large groups and is conducive to producing a negative image of
the other, the burden of rectifying the situation often shifts to the party who
 Vamik Volkan. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Boulder, CO: Westview,
, .
 Margaret Urban Walker. Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing. New
York: Cambridge University Press, .
 Jeffrie Murphy. Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
.
 See e.g. Dennis Sullivan, and Larry Tifft. Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspec-
tive. Abingdon: Routledge, .
 Lind. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics, .
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wants to keep alive these memories of past wrongdoings, since the wrongdoer
can choose to alleviate or strengthen such images. Nevertheless, apologies by
the wrongdoer and other steps towards reconciliation in historical disputes
can be regarded as signs of respect that can improve the overall image of the
country.²¹ The problem, however, is that historical memories are seldom the
only source of conflicting identities. If the negative views of the other prevail,
it might be hard to overcome historical problems by focusing solely on the strat-
egies of dealing with the past.What is needed is a more profound transformation
of identities. On the other hand, full convergence of the historical narratives and
national identities based on them do not need to exist for stable peace and nor-
malised relations between former enemies to emerge.
In sum, diverse mechanisms exist for solving memory conflicts depending
on the way they influence the level of cooperation or the likelihood of conflict.
Emotions and rationality play different roles in the solution of these problems.
Healing from trauma through mourning and getting even in moral terms are
strongly emotional processes.²² Judging the other state’s interpretations of histor-
ical wrongdoings and their efforts to show contrition is a more cognitive process
through which intentions and capabilities to mobilise resources are revealed.
Identity formation, in turn, affects the relationship in a more habitual way in
terms of background thinking. The practice of forgiveness and its effectiveness
as a tool of conflict resolution depend on which of these mechanisms is seen
as a central aspect in the process of reconciliation. Apologies and forgiveness
primarily address the problem of moral restoration but they can also transform
cognitive assessments and identities.
 He. The Search for Reconciliation.
 Michael Ure. “Post-Traumatic Societies: On Reconciliation, Justice and the Emotions.” Euro-
pean Journal of Social Theory . (): –; Jeffrey Blustein. “Forgiveness, Commem-
oration and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions.”Metaphilosophy . (): –
; Emma Hutchison. “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and
Community after the Bali Bombing.” International Relations . (): – and Emma
Hutchison, and Roland Bleiker. “Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstituting Identity and Com-
munity after Trauma.” European Journal of Social Theory . (): –.
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Theories of Forgiveness
The concept of forgiveness is complex and multifaceted.²³ The purpose here is
not to dwell in detail on the discussion of this concept, but rather to distinguish
between maximalist and minimalist understandings of forgiveness as two almost
opposing ways to conceive of its role in conflict resolution. From the maximalist
point of view, apologies may be subject to a number of necessary conditions.
These conditions are, for example, that the perpetrators acknowledge the injus-
tice of the offense as a fact, deplore and regrets it, and confess their own guilt
and involvement in the injustice and commits themselves at least implicitly to
change their behaviour and not to repeat the same offence. An apology should
also include a sincere desire to do something to compensate for violations, and
to help the victims. These terms of an apology can be further elaborated and ad-
ditional conditions listed. For example, Nick Smith considered “a categorical
apology” a benchmark of an apology’s highest manifestation. It would include,
most importantly, corroborated factual record, acceptance of blame, possession
of appropriate standing, identification of each harm, shared commitment to
moral principles underlying each harm, recognition of the victim as a moral in-
terlocutor, and regret.²⁴
If the relevant conditions of the apology are not met, it is incomplete or par-
tial. Merely feeling sorry and expressing remorse or regret is not an apology. An
explanation for why something is not done as it should have been done is not an
“apology” but an “excuse”. In politics, ambiguous half-apologies are very typi-
cal. Politicians may apologise to the voters, for example, rather than to the vic-
tims. There is no clear boundary for when an incomplete apology will no longer
be an apology. Interpretation is often a question of cultural and other contextual
factors. Therefore, it is more meaningful to understand the effects of various
complete and incomplete requests for forgiveness than to try to agree on an
exact definition of apology. As Lind has noted, acceptance of an apology cannot
be regarded as an indicator for how perfect an apology has been, because then
we could not examine the impact of the completeness of various apologies on
the settlement of disputes.²⁵ Sometimes incomplete apologies can be accepted
while at other times they can seem like an insult and arouse resentment.
 Joanna North. “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness.” Philosophy, . (): –; Peter
Digeser. Political Forgiveness. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  and Nick Smith. I Was
Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
 Smith. I Was Wrong, –. See also Ernesto Verdeja. “Official Apologies in the After-
math of Political Violence.” Metaphilosophy . (): –.
 Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.
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For some theorists of forgiveness, the completeness of an apology is not es-
sential because forgiveness is primarily based on empathy.²⁶ The minimalist view
puts emphasis on the victims and their ability to understand the wrongdoer rath-
er than on the wrongdoer and the nature of apology. Through understanding the
other party and its actions from its perspective, we no longer see it as evil. For-
giveness also requires that we examine our own acts from the point of view of
the other.When it is understood that we are also guilty of wrongdoing, it is easier
to forgive the other. Donald Shriver has called such a policy of forgiveness the
“ethics of enemies”.²⁷
The paradigmatic model of forgiveness is based on the normative assump-
tion that the wrongdoer has the duty to apologise. Although granting forgiveness
can be regarded more as a virtue than a duty, the model expects that the one
who has suffered and whose rights have been violated, in turn, should forgive,
if the conditions of apology are fulfilled. A full apology best signals the party’s
real desire to move closer to and overcome the old conflicts. In other words, the
more complete the apology is, the better the chance for the policy of forgiveness
to succeed, and past problems between states or nations to be overcome. By con-
trast, “the combination of apology with justification, excuse, or even explana-
tion weakens, or perhaps, destroys the apology”.²⁸
The paradigmatic model of forgiveness also assumes that acknowledging the
facts of the historical wrongdoing constitute the starting phase in the process of
reconciliation. Elizar Barkan notes that demands for apologies and refusals of
them are first steps, “a diplomatic dance that may last for a while” that paves
the way for overcoming historical injustice, but an apology is not the satisfactory
end result.²⁹ Similarly,William Long and Peter Brecke argue that the first step in
the process of reconciliation is the acknowledgement of the facts.³⁰ Joanna
 Michael McCullogh, Everett Worthington, and Kenneth Rachal. “Interpersonal Forgiving in
Close Relationships.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . (): –. Ever-
ett Worthington. “The Pyramid Model of Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about
Unforgiveness and Promoting Forgiveness.” Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological Research
and Theological Forgiveness. Ed. Everett Worthington. Philadelphia. PA: Templeton Foundation
Press, , –.
 Donald W. Shriver, Jr. An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, .
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Quinn contends that societies and individuals must first engage in a process of
acknowledgement before any of the other steps, i.e. forgiveness and develop-
ment of trust and social cohesion leading to reconciliation, can begin to take
place.³¹
Yet, this sequence is not necessarily the only possibility. Equally well, it can
be assumed that reconciliation can start without any shared view of the histor-
ical facts or any apologies. Rohne proposes a fourfold model of relational resto-
ration, which starts from material reparations, leading to discussion of the past,
to mutual empathy and forgiveness.³² In other words, in this model historical
problems can be overcome only when a certain level of reconciliation has al-
ready been achieved, but dealing with them is still important in deepening the
process. In some cases, it is possible to think that partial apologies or acknowl-
edgement of the facts of the historical problem can be accepted as sufficient ges-
tures in sustaining the process of reconciliation. As Marta Valinas and Jana Ar-
sovska remark in the context of Kosovo, even a simple public acknowledgement
of the crimes by the perpetrators can be a significant factor in encouraging co-
operation and enhancing dialogue.³³
As often is the case, simplistic models are deficient in one way or another.
While apologies tend to increase the sense of justice and make forgiveness
more likely,³⁴ the paradigmatic model of forgiveness does not take into account
the fact that demanding an apology may lead to counterproductive reactions in
the domestic debate of the country that has committed wrongdoings and thereby
increase the burden of the past.³⁵ By contrast, the problem with the minimalist
view is that it is not always the case that the victim and the wrongdoer are equal-
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ly blameworthy. Sometimes it is very clear who the wrongdoer and who the vic-
tim is and relativising this difference through empathy and self-reflection would
not help to restore moral order, provide evidence about intentions or create and
strengthen common norms and identities. We thus need to relax the concept of
forgiveness and even accept imperfect forms of forgiveness as potential means of
overcoming conflicts.
There is little systematic research into the effectiveness of apologies, in par-
ticular when it comes to international relations. It is clear that there are huge cul-
tural and other contextual differences in the forms and functions of apologies
that do not allow for strict generalisations.³⁶ The realist theory still dominates
the basic understanding of apologies and forgiveness in international relations.
Even those who think that forgiveness has a major role to play in resolving do-
mestic conflicts and civil wars are skeptical as to whether it would work in rela-
tions between states. On the other hand, many studies show that people have a
capacity to forgive after violent conflicts and repeated violations of human
rights.³⁷
The Winter War and Russo-Finnish Relations
Russo-Finnish relations are often seen as being stable and friendly. The current
confrontation between the EU and Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis naturally
affects this image but the effects of the conflict have not yet destroyed this pos-
itive picture entirely. Unlike other EU-members bordering Russia, Finland has not
joined NATO. Although various problems on the agenda already existed between
the two states before the Ukrainian crisis, they mainly involved practical issues
or were derivatives of broader dynamics in the relations between Russia and the
EU.³⁸ Occasionally, the bilateral relations have been strained, and there have
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been incidents concerning, for example, child custody issues of children with a
Russian background in Finland that have negatively affected the public percep-
tion of the state of the relationship. Overall, however, these tensions have been
less severe when compared to Russia’s relations with the Baltic States and Po-
land. Many observers may thereby conclude that the relations between Russia
and Finland are good because there is no burden of history. Yet, such interpre-
tations downplay the potential of history to cause problems in terms of memory
conflicts. The Finns conceive that Finland has had a long history of wars with
Russia since they understand the era of Swedish rule as being part of the history
of the nation. In particular, the Winter War in 1939 has been deeply ingrained in
the national memory as a Soviet aggression towards an innocent victim.
The Winter War started when the Soviet Union invaded Finland at the end of
November 1939 and it ended in March 1940 when peace between the parties was
concluded in Moscow. Unlike the Baltic States, Finland was saved from Soviet
annexation but as a result of the peace treaty Finland lost the Karelian Isthmus
and other eastern areas inhabited almost entirely by ethnic Finns, including Fin-
land’s second biggest city, Vyborg. More than 400,000 people lost their homes
and were resettled in the remaining Finnish territory. In June 1941, Finland
joined the German attack against the Soviet Union, regained the lost territories
and occupied Eastern Karelia but lost them again in the peace treaties of 1944
and 1947. A hundred thousand Finns died in the war; however, Finland was
not occupied by the Soviet forces and it retained its independence, though a So-
viet-led Allied Control Commission stayed in the country until 1947 and a naval
base near Helsinki was leased to Russia. Finland also concluded a Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union in
1948.³⁹
The Soviet view of these events was that the Winter War was launched by the
Finnish armed forces that opened fire across the border near the village of Main-
ila. The Finnish state before the war, despite Social Democrats being in the gov-
ernment, was seen by the Soviets as fascist and repressive of workers. Moreover,
the Soviet side read the war history backwards: the fact that Finland was culpa-
ble of joining the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was used to
justify the Soviet invasion of 1939 and the territorial annexations. In addition,
they regarded the war as strategically necessary because the Finnish border be-
fore the war ran only 30 kilometers from the centre of St. Petersburg.
 See e.g. David Kirby. A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
, –.
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The Finns, on the other hand, saw the Winter War as a one-sided aggression
by the Soviets and a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and bi-
lateral treaties of non-aggression. The cause of the war was attributed to Commu-
nist expansionism, to Stalin’s wickedness and to the secret protocol of the Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany that allocated
Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. The Finnish view was that Finland
had not posed any threat to the Soviet Union, but had conducted a policy of
strict neutrality. The war and its outcome were therefore seen as deeply unjust.
The Soviet side had calculated that they would get support from the Finnish
working class, since there had been a bloody civil war that the Reds lost in
1918, but the Soviet attack actually united the nation. The war of 1941– 1944
was seen as a consequence of the Winter War and was thus named “the Contin-
uation War”.
After World War II, Finland conducted a policy of friendship in its relations
with the Soviet Union and was careful not to give grounds for Soviet criticism of
it. Thus Finland did not try to seek any apologies from the Soviet side, but rather
sought to cleanse its own history and politics of anti-Soviet elements. The posi-
tion of Finland was defensive, as shown by the fact that 13 Finnish politicians,
among them war-time President Risto Ryti but not Marshall Mannerheim, were
convicted as war criminals in a domestic trial. Finland tried to stick to the inter-
pretation that when joining Germany in the so-called Continuation War, it was
conducting a separate war and was only a co-warrior and not an ally to Germany
since there was no formal treaty (before summer of 1944), though German forces
occupied northern parts of Finland and the war plans were in fact coordinated.
This thesis of a separate war was largely invalidated first by foreign and then by
Finnish historians already in the 1960s, but the interpretation that Finland was
the innocent victim of the Soviet Union in the Winter War and did not have any
other meaningful choice but to align with Germany in 1941 remained the stan-
dard view throughout the Cold War period. The Finnish leftist interpretation of
Finland’s participation in the war was of course closer to the Soviet views. Cer-
tain aspects of the war such as the Finns’ crossing the old Finnish border and
occupying the Soviet Eastern Karelia were widely criticised, but when an attempt
was made in the 1970s to introduce the Soviet version of the Winter War in
school teaching as the correct interpretation of it, it was quickly denounced.⁴⁰
 See Ville Kivimäki. “Introduction: Three Wars and Their Epitaphs: The Finnish History and
Scholarship of World War II.” Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations. Eds.
Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki. Leiden: Brill, , – and Juhana Aunesluoma. “Two
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Although Finland’s official foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was
friendly, the relationship remained politically precarious. Finland tried to con-
duct a policy of neutrality despite the FCMA treaty with the Soviet Union and
was not sure whether it was able to preserve its relative freedom and perhaps
even its formal independence in the future. The friendship policy was supported
by the masses but at the same time it was regarded as a liturgy that did not re-
flect true sentiments. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the old enemy image
was kept at bay and the whole nation and not only those who were politically
on the left took some genuine steps towards reconciliation.⁴¹ However, the begin-
nings of the friendship policy were dictated primarily by power relations and the
steps towards reconciliation were taken without a mutual policy of dealing with
the past. Rather, new images of the other were built as a response to present re-
alities. But the history issue related to the Soviet invasion in 1939 had not disap-
peared. As Max Jakobson, the prominent Finnish diplomat and pundit wrote in
1987, the Winter War was still a neurotic question that burdened the
relationship.⁴²
In the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union started a course of reform under
Gorbachev’s leadership, it was very much welcomed in Finland. At the begin-
ning, the Soviet interpretations of the World War II remained largely intact,
but the representatives of the Soviet Union, including its press, no longer ac-
cused the Finns of initiating the Winter War as had been done in the 1970s.
The Soviet Union did not take any responsibility for initiating the war, but it
was rather seen as a regrettable incident or a minor border conflict between
the countries. In the late 1980s some leading Soviet war historians such as Dmi-
tri Volkogonov had already adopted the view that the Winter War was Stalin’s
fault, but the issue was still sensitive in the eyes of the majority of the old Soviet
establishment.⁴³ When Gorbachev’s visit to Finland in October 1989 was plan-
ned, the reformers in the Kremlin wanted to give a positive signal with regard
to history politics. They suggested two options: to recognise Finland’s neutrality
and to acknowledge the responsibility of the Soviet Union in launching the Win-
ter War. The Kremlin opted for recognising Finland’s neutrality, which Gorbachev
then did in his speech at Finlandia Hall. An acknowledgement that the Soviet
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Union had started the Winter War was in Gorbachev’s draft speech, but in the
final version Gorbachev just referred to the responsible lessons that both coun-
tries had drawn from the tragedy of 1939– 1944.⁴⁴
Finland’s political leadership would have preferred Gorbachev to acknowl-
edge that the Soviet Union was responsible for the outbreak of the Winter
War. Recognising Finland’s neutrality was important because the status of neu-
trality was fiercely contested during the Cold War period, but President Koivisto
wanted to avoid the impression that Finland’s neutrality would depend primarily
on the explicit recognition of the Soviet leader. A statement regretting the war
would thus have had clear symbolic value. The Finns were nevertheless pleased
that the 60th anniversary of the Winter War could be commemorated in Novem-
ber 1989 without fear of an anti-Soviet label, though the state leadership still
kept a low profile in the issue.⁴⁵
Nevertheless, soon after Gorbachev’s visit to Finland, acts demonstrating
Moscow’s willingness to deal with politics of history followed. The secret proto-
col of the Molotov–Ribbentrop treaty was condemned in December 1989 by the
Soviet Congress.⁴⁶ In Finland, the political constraints that had restrained inter-
pretations of history were broken, followed by a “neo-patriotic turn” in collective
representations of the past.⁴⁷ The Finnish leaders that had been convicted as war
criminals were rehabilitated and regarded as patriotic heroes. Discussion started
in the media about the loss of Karelia, but attempts to bring about the return of
the lost territories did not gain support of the leading politicians, who argued
that they had been lost in the peace treaties and these could not be renegotiated.
The war crimes of Soviet partisans against the Finnish civilians in Lapland were
taken up as a forgotten issue in light of new research.⁴⁸ At the same time, histor-
ians also revealed more details about the closeness of the Finnish-German coop-
eration before and during the “Continuation War” 1941–1944 and the bad treat-
ment of the Soviet prisoners of war in Finland and of the Russian population in
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the occupied Eastern Karelia.⁴⁹ Although the tune was self-critical in much of
such professional history writing, it was also brought up, for example, that
the German military assistance had been crucial in stopping the Soviet offensive
and thus preventing the Red Army from marching to Helsinki in the late summer
1944.⁵⁰
For the Finnish politicians in the early 1990s, the key objective was to avoid
Russia’s political intervention in the national history debates and assure the Rus-
sians that open discussion in Finland should not be seen as a provocation
against Russia. Instead of trying to demand official apologies from Russia, not
to mention attempting to gain compensation or regaining the lost territories, a
cooperative and pragmatic attitude was adopted towards healing the remaining
wounds of history. Finland’s official policy consisted of facilitating border cross-
ings and creating possibilities to visit old home sites or war theatres in the for-
mer Finnish territory, as well as to renovate cemeteries and other cultural monu-
ments together with the Russians.Without making an issue of it, the government
also encouraged joint Finnish-Russian research projects on World War II.⁵¹
Overall, Russia’s history policy towards Finland during President Boris Yelt-
sin’s era was reconciliatory. Yeltsin’s visit to Finland in the summer of 1992 dem-
onstrated this policy most visibly. As part of the official program he laid a wreath
at the Hietaniemi cemetery to the grave of war heroes. In his non-public dinner
speech, he spontaneously claimed that he was sorry for the Winter War. Russia
and Finland also concluded a treaty on graveyards and war monuments. During
their two hour journey to Turku, Finnish President Koivisto had a chance to ex-
plain the war history from the Finnish perspective face to face to Yeltsin. His mo-
tivation was not to put pressure on the Russian leadership but to increase mutual
understanding. For Koivisto, it was significant that Yeltsin listened to him and he
felt that most of the pressure of these historical problems had been removed
when Yeltsin understood why the historical issues such as the loss of Karelia
were still discussed and remembered in Finland. “So please, take this issue
calmly and in a spirit of friendship”, Koivisto advised Yeltsin.⁵² In May 1994, dur-
 The seminal work was that of Mauno Jokipii. Jatkosodan synty: tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen
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ing President Ahtisaari’s visit to Russia, Yeltsin publicly admitted that the Winter
War was part of an offensive policy of Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Also, the Rus-
sian ambassador to Finland, Yuri Derjabin, was apologetic in his many speeches
and interviews. He contended that the Winter War was a Soviet invasion, and
that it was shameful that the former Finnish city of Vyborg was in ruins.⁵³
The few visible breaches related to politics of history during the Yeltsin era
tell quite a lot about the dynamics of memory conflicts in the Russo-Finnish re-
lations.When visiting the Karelian Republic in Russia in July 1997, Ahtisaari told
the local TV reporter who asked about the discussion in Finland of the loss of
Karelia that Russians had to understand those Finns who still felt that injustice
had occurred during the war. When Ahtisaari then visited Moscow in November
1997, Yeltsin unexpectedly demanded in a press conference that the Finns stop
discussing Karelia, but Ahtisaari replied by saying that he is the last man to for-
bid any discussion on Karelia in Finland. In the official dinner speech during the
visit, Ahtisaari gave credit to Yeltsin for his reconciliatory gestures during his
1992 visit to Finland and assured him that the Finns understood them as such
and valued his approach.⁵⁴
President Vladimir Putin continued the reconciliatory gestures related to pol-
itics of history during his visit to Finland in September 2001. Not only did he
place a wreath at the cross of the war heroes, as Yeltsin had done, but he also
visited the grave of Mannerheim. This is not as perplexing as it might seem.
Though Mannerheim symbolised the Finnish struggle against the Soviet
Union, he was also regarded as a Russian war hero since he had been a former
General in the Russian army who during the Russian civil war fought against the
Bolsheviks. Moreover, Putin wanted to signal the closeness of the relations by
doing the same thing as the King of Sweden had done when visiting Finland.⁵⁵
Although Putin drove the Russian politics of history in many regards towards a
more conservative direction, no serious attempt followed to change the interpre-
tation that the Soviet Union started the Winter War. In 2004, when meeting Pres-
ident Tarja Halonen in Moscow, Putin repeated that the Winter War was a mis-
take of Stalin, but reflecting the same worry as Yeltsin had had about the
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potential territorial demands, he added strongly that a discussion about Karelia
in Finland is detrimental and borders cannot be changed because there are too
many similar border problems elsewhere.⁵⁶
In its relations with Russia, Finland focused on concrete and pragmatic
problems to do with trade, border crossings and the environment, and on devel-
oping the overall relations between the EU and Russia.⁵⁷ Memory conflicts did
not play any significant role in these questions.When Prime Minister Paavo Lip-
ponen participated in the unveiling of the first Winter War memorial in the Kare-
lian Isthmus in 2000, he declared that “peace and reconciliation had won in the
Finnish-Russian relations”.⁵⁸ A good indicator of the formal reconciliation was
that the Finnish leaders, unlike many other Eastern European leaders, did not
see any political problem in participating at the commemorative events of the
victory of World War II in Moscow and their presence there did not evoke
much public debate at home. President Ahtisaari participated in the fiftieth an-
niversary of the Victory day in 1995 and President Halonen in the respective six-
tieth anniversary in 2005 (President Niinistö decided not to travel to Moscow for
the 70th in 2015 as most Western leaders had declined the invitation). Discussion
about the loss of Karelia continued in civil society, and tabloids occasionally
made headlines of the issue, but this discussion remained limited and politically
ineffective. Border changes were not on the agenda of any government or any sig-
nificant political party or decision-maker. While many of the Karelian evacuees,
their descendants, and many other Finns hoped that the restoration of Karelia
could have been possible, pushing the idea forward was “limited to the activities
of small, albeit vociferous groups” and it did not receive support from more than
one third of the citizens in public opinion polls.⁵⁹ The Karelian question is a good
example how smoothly, relatively speaking, difficult questions in Russo-Finnish
relations were handled.
The political problems related to the history of World War II had thus be-
come marginal issues in Finnish-Russian relations already during the 1990s. His-
tory was sometimes debated in the media, but on the political level, it was more
often the Russian representatives who wanted to check that Finnish views of the
past did not lead to territorial claims or other anti-Russian attitudes rather than
 “Путин встревожен и расстроен.” Russki Reporter ( January ). http://rusrep.ru/ar-
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the Finnish politicians asking for more evidence of Russia’s changed attitude to-
wards the common past. One rare example exists of political interventions relat-
ed to the history of World War II by the Finnish political leaders after the end of
the Cold War. It was President Halonen’s speech in Paris in March 2005, when
she explained Finnish war history by repeating the thesis of a separate war in
contrast to Finland’s being an ally of Germany. This evoked some discussion
both domestically as well as in Russia, but did not constitute a diplomatic
incident.⁶⁰
Because of the generally positive image that the Russian government and so-
ciety had of Finland, there was no need to highlight potentially inflammatory
history issues in the Russian media. For example, the meetings in Finland of for-
mer Finnish SS-soldiers who had fought in the Eastern front in 1941– 1942 never
gained the sort of massive negative attention as did corresponding meetings in
the Baltic States. The attempts to reinterpret the history of the Winter War in Rus-
sia in accordance with the Soviet view that Finland had started it were few and
they did not get much publicity.⁶¹ Russian history textbooks in the 2000s con-
tended that the Soviet Union had started the Winter War.⁶² Putin’s speech to Rus-
sian military historians in March 2013 received some public attention abroad, be-
cause he stated that he saw the key reason for the Winter War being the
closeness of the Finnish border to Leningrad and the need to correct that “mis-
take”. However, this passage of the speech was removed from the official version
that was published on the Kremlin’s webpage.⁶³ For Russia, the Winter War re-
mained a small conflict in the Great Patriotic War and hence it was easier to
admit the culpability of the Soviet Union and its leaders, in particular in starting
that war, since it did not change the overall interpretation of the Soviet heroism
during World War II.
Although the history issues have not been high on the political agenda in
Finnish foreign policy towards Russia, it can be stated that the memory conflicts
 Kinnunen and Jokisipilä. “Shifting Images of ‘Our Wars’.”
 Vladimir, Baryshnikov. От прохладного мира к зимней войне: восточная политика Фин-
ляндии в -е годы. [From the Cold World to the Winter War: Finland’s Eastern Policy in the
s]. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, .
 Kari Kaunismaa. Punatähdestä kaksoiskotkaan: Neuvostoliiton romahtamisen vaikutus venäl-
äisen keskikoulun historian oppikirjoihin [From the Red Star to the Double Eagle. The Impact of
the Collapse of the Soviet Union on the Russian Middle School Textbooks]. Turku: Uniprint,
.
 Vladimir Putin. “Meeting with Founding Congress of the Russian Military Historical Society
Participants.”  March , http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ ( April
).
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have not been totally overcome in the minds of Finns. In the view of Professor of
Russian Studies Timo Vihavainen, the historical heritage still has a strong influ-
ence on Finnish attitudes towards Russia today.⁶⁴ He contends that people show
a remarkable readiness to accept unpleasant information about developments in
Russia and are not willing to engage with the Russian society properly. However,
as the media researcher Pentti Raittila has pointed out, most Finns think that
there is a negative bias towards Russia amongst the population in Finland,
though they themselves deny that they would have any negative conceptions
of Russia. Indeed, in most public opinion surveys conducted on the image of
Russia in Finland, it has been hard to detect any strong negative bias. While a
hostile attitude towards Russians is still strong in some segments of the Finnish
people, Raittila concludes, a normalising approach emphasising neutrality and
rationality is being reinforced elsewhere in the society.⁶⁵
The Finnish foreign policy leadership did not think that Finland as a nation
suffered from any particular historical trauma because of World War II. Finnish
political leaders sometimes contrasted this to the Baltic States, where they saw
the past as being the root cause of the problems in the relations of those states
with Russia.⁶⁶ This is not to deny that probably many Finns, and especially those
of the older generations, have been traumatised by the war and consequences of
it such as having lost their relatives or homes. According to a recent study on the
historical consciousness in Finland, three quarters of Finns disagreed with the
claim that Finns are people without any major collective traumas.⁶⁷ But the trau-
mas were felt more by the older generation rather than being a trans-generation-
al phenomenon. The Finnish-Russian reconciliation could thus be explained as a
process of healing through the passage of time.When the Russian leaders disas-
sociated Russia from the aggressive policies of Stalin and allowed the Finns to
have their truth of the war, it reduced the extent to which the bitter memories
of the Soviet era were kept alive. The increased possibilities to alleviate mourn-
ing through open debate, normalising the existence of the associations of “evac-
uated” Karelians and the possibility of arranging nostalgic visits to the lost ter-
ritories after the end of the Cold War can be seen as therapeutic for, rather than
 Timo Vihavainen. “Does History Play a Role in Finnish-Russian Relations?” The Two-Level
Game: Russia’s Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union. Ed. Hanna
Smith. Aleksanteri Papers , Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, .
 Pentti Raittila. Russia in Finnish Media and Everyday Discourse. Paper presented at the Nord-
media Conference, Reykjavik, – August .
 Mika Aaltola. “Agile Small State Agency: Heuristic Plays and Flexible National Identity Mark-
ers in Finnish Foreign Policy.” Nationalities Papers  (): –.
 Pilvi Torsti. Suomalaiset ja historia [The Finns and History]. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, .
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counterproductive to, historical reconciliation. For some, however, the absence
of historical issues on the political agenda does not indicate that the trauma
has been overcome. Rather there are those who have argued in the domestic de-
bate that Finland and its foreign policy leaders suffer from a trauma that pre-
vents it from raising the morally justified issues of territorial restoration in its re-
lations with Russia.⁶⁸
The moral dimension was hence present in the Finnish debate, but the need
to seek for moral repair was significantly balanced by the perception that Fin-
land also had invaded the Soviet Union and violated international norms. More-
over, Finns perceived World War II more as a success than a defeat.⁶⁹ Though
Finns considered themselves more victims than perpetrators, the historical mem-
ory was not black and white. Finland’s moral sense of getting even was largely
fulfilled when it was no longer accused of initiating the war, and the territorial
loss was mentally compensated by the ability to retain independence and avoid
communist rule. This is why Yeltsin and Putin’s acknowledgements of the Soviet
culpability in the Winter War were seen as enough to close the books on the
higher political level.
To some extent the Russian way of dealing with the past was also read as a
signal of its intentions. The apologetic gestures of Yeltsin were interpreted in Fin-
land as evidence of Russia’s new values and strengthened the confidence that
Russia did not threaten Finland’s independence or political freedom. Similarly,
Putin’s policy of continuing Yeltsin’s rapprochement in politics of history was
also regarded as reassuring. Yet, political acts relating to history were not the
most important signals in judging whether a recurrence of a military conflict
with Russia would be likely. Russia’s general direction towards democratisation
and cooperation with the West, as well as the military force structure and the
transparency of the Russian leaders to provide information on the Russian
armed forces placed in the regions near Finland were more important factors
in the threat calculation, particularly in the 1990s.⁷⁰
The memories of World War II continue to be core material for Finnish iden-
tity, but the picture of the national history has become more multifaceted.When
asked, the Finns today give more credit for their feelings of identity to education-
al achievements than to the war experience.⁷¹ Yet, the patriotic view still holds
that the war was the true test of Finland’s statehood and the sacrifices that
 Martti Siirala and Sirpa Kulonen. Syvissä raiteissa: kansallisen itsetunnon matka. [In Deep
Tracks: The Journey of National Self-Confidence]. Helsinki: WSOY, .
 Torsti. Suomalaiset ja historia.
 Blomberg. Vakauden kaipuu, .
 Torsti. Suomalaiset ja historia.
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were made on the front are something for which every Finn should be thankful
even today. There is no independence day celebration that does not honour the
war veterans as “cult figures” and remind Finns of the struggle in the war against
the Soviet Union, which is seen as fundamental for the independence and well-
being of the nation and which includes aspects of “sacredness”.⁷² Through this
historical construction of the nation, it can be claimed that Russia automatically
represents the “other” to Finland.⁷³ Yet, it seems that this otherness, even in neo-
patriotic history, is void of strong enemy images.⁷⁴ At least to some degree, this
lack of strong enemy images helped Finns to perceive Russia’s half-apologetic
moves relating to the history of World War II as sufficient to overcome memory
conflicts rather than as a pretext for sparking new disputes in the name of open-
ness. Similarly, Russia can be seen as some kind of cultural and political “other”
for Finland even without the experience of World War II since the roots of this
identity distinction run much deeper in culture, history and political belief sys-
tems. For national identity construction, Russia has been central as the other but
it has not led to strong enemy images. Paradoxically, Finland may have joined
the European Union in 1995 for reasons of identity defined in opposition to Rus-
sia, but the membership in the EU has also made this dimension of identity con-
struction less palpable.⁷⁵
Although Russia turned more authoritarian in the Putin era, and the Russo-
Georgian war as well as the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Eastern
Ukraine has reminded Finns of Russia’s readiness to use military means against
its neighbours, memory conflicts between Finland and Russia have not signifi-
cantly intesified. Professor Vihavainen, for example, contended that discussions
in a Russo-Finnish history seminar related to the 75th anniversary of the Winter
War in spring 2015 were strictly professional, based on facts and reflecting high
 Heino Nyyssönen. “Remembering the Winter War in Finland.” Spivpratsia SRSR i Nimetstsini
u mihvoennii period ta pid tsas drugoi cvitovoi vijni: pritsini i naclidki [Collaboration between the
Soviet Union and Germany in the interwar period and during WWII: Causes and Consequences].
Eds. S.M. Kvi, et al. Kyiv: NaUKMA, Agrar Media Group, , –.
 Sami Moisio. Eds. R. Krishtalovska and O. Pazyuk. See the list of references. “Finland, Geo-
political Image of Threat and the Post-Cold War Confusion.” Geopolitics  (): – and
Vilho Harle, and Sami Moisio. Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja geo-
politiikka [Where is Finland? The History and Geopolitics of National Identity Politics]. Tampere:
Vastapaino, .
 Kinnunen and Jokisipilä. “Shifting Images of ‘Our Wars’”, .
 On Finnish identity construction, see Risto Alapuro. “What is Western and What is Eastern in
Finland?” Thesis Eleven  (): –. Christopher Browning. Constructivism, Narrative
and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland. Oxford: Peter Lang, .
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levels of mutual understanding despite the current international conflict and po-
litical tensions between Russia and the Western countries. It was as if the past
wars between the Soviet Union and Finland had been honest fights that the na-
tions had to accept as tragic episodes of their common history.⁷⁶
Conclusions
Major historical wrongdoings can be significant factors in creating and sustain-
ing conflicts and impeding cooperation in relations between states. Though con-
cerns related to material interests may often suppress disputes stemming from
felt historical injustice and national interpretations of historical wrongdoings,
it is important to understand how memory conflicts can be overcome in their
own right. The Finnish-Russian case described in this article suggests that it is
not possible to reduce the nature of memory conflicts to material dimensions
of strategic advantage, territorial claims or economic compensation. What was
at stake were interpretations of history and acknowledgements of responsibility.
Russia and Finland succeeded in the early 1990s in normalising their rela-
tions. The historical problems were marginalised by keeping them separate
from the official political agenda. For the Finnish foreign policy elite a sufficient
gesture of Russia occured when Yeltsin visited Finland and acknowledged Soviet
culpability in the Winter War. This process of overcoming memory conflicts in
Russia’s relations with Finland suggests that a full apology according to the
paradigmatic model of forgiveness was not needed. The Finnish government
never expected a full apology from Russia and they understood that such de-
mands could have been counterproductive. The Finnish leaders knew that the
main concern for the Russians was not that a full apology would create domestic
backlash effects, because in the case of Russia this concern was secondary due
to the Kremlin’s ability to control mass media and political opinion formation.
Instead the Finnish government realised that such demands would have violated
Russia’s status concerns too openly. Still, for the Finnish government and the
larger foreign policy elite a clear acknowledgement that the Russian leaders re-
garded the Soviet Union as the initiator of the Winter War was something that
they expected. A partial apology in the form of acknowledging the fact of the
wrongdoing and some authentic gestures to show remorse were thus important
 Timo Vihavainen. “Talvisotaseminaari Moskovassa.” [A Seminar on the Winter War in Mos-
cow.] Blog “Vihavainen” http://timo-vihavainen.blogspot.fi///talvisotaseminaari-mosko-
vassa.html ( March ).
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for the process of reconciliation, since on the basis of such symbolic acts the pol-
iticians were able to argue that the history disputes had been solved, though the
key interpretations were still nationally framed. The Finnish state leadership did
not, however, see the need to be active agents in the politics of history. The ques-
tions over historical facts could be left to the historians and the debates sur-
rounding their interpretation could be seen as part of an open society.
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Davide Denti
Sorry for Srebrenica? Public Apologies and
Genocide in the Western Balkans
The killing of more than 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys in Sre-
brenica in July 1995,¹ perpetrated by the Army of the self-proclaimed Republika
Srpska (VRS) under the command of Ratko Mladić, represents until now the only
internationally and judicially acknowledged act of genocide in Europe since the
end of the Second World War.²
The process of seeking recognition and justice for the genocide proved to be
long and perilous. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)³ ended without a
clear military victory by one side, a situation aptly described by Mary Kaldor’s
model of new wars.⁴ The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreements entrenched a consocia-
tional agreement between Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH), which would be capped by a thin layer of common institu-
tions, reconstituting the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the international
level, Bosnia later filed a case of genocide against Serbia and Montenegro at
the International Court of Justice (ICJ),⁵ while individual trials for war crimes
 The preliminary List of Missing Persons from Srebrenica includes , names. Potočari
Memorial Center website, http://www.potocarimc.ba/_ba/liste/nestali_z.php#z ( February
).
 In , in the Prosecutor v. Krstić case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found unanimously that the massacre in Srebrenica
constituted genocide as defined as a crime under international law. Radovan Karadžić and
Ratko Mladić are still indicted on charges of genocide and other war crimes for the war events
in Prijedor, Kljuc, Foča, Zvornik and other Bosnian municipalities. ICTY. Prosecutor v. Radislav
Krstić – Sentencing Judgement.  April . http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-
aje.pdf ( February ).
 Hereafter Bosnia.
 The war in Bosnia is a paradigmatic example of “new war”, a category blurring the border
between civil and international-conventional wars. Mary Kaldor. New and Old Wars: Organized
Violence in a Global Era. Oxford: Polity Press, .
 In the  Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ reached the conclusion that genocide had taken
place, while clearing Serbia and Montenegro of direct responsibility. It found that Belgrade was
in violation of international law and the  Genocide Convention by having failed to prevent
the  Srebrenica genocide, and by having failed to prosecute those responsible or transfer
them to the ICTY. ICJ. “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro).” Press Release ,
. http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr= &pt=&p=&p= ( February
).
and crimes against humanity for wartime events were dealt with by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and by domestic Bos-
nian courts, entrusted with retributive justice issues.⁶
The recent conflict left a vast legacy of dynamic memories in the region,
eventually waiting to be exploited for popular mobilisation by political entrepre-
neurs through historicising strategies. The presence of memories of conflict rais-
es the cost of apologising for domestic actors who may fear the risk of political
backlash. At the same time, since the year 2000, the countries of the region have
shared the same long-term goal of EU accession, thus creating a context in which
apologies may prove beneficial. They may depoliticise foreign policy issues,
allow positive responses to foreign solicitation, and reduce the conflict potential
of reactive memories by creating a new discourse and a new consensus about
history.
The presence of these two factors pushed the domestic actors to a strategy of
apologies marked by incompleteness and ambiguity, aimed at reaping the ben-
efits of reconciliation while keeping the potential costs of a domestic political
backlash at bay. In the case of Srebrenica, this is apparent in the forms and
the words of the apologies offered by the actors in the conflict. These include
the 2004 declaration of the Government of Republika Srpska on Srebrenica,
the 2010 resolution of the Serbian Parliamentary Assembly on Srebrenica, and
the 2013 apology of the Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić.
The next section of this chapter focuses on public apologies as a tool of re-
storative justice. Theories of justice and responsibility may help highlight the role
of apologies in fostering reconciliation, and also their possible limitations. I then
introduce a rational choice model of public apologies, based on the costs and
benefits of reparatory decisions, in order to explain the presence of ambiguities
when both the high costs and high benefits of apologising are present. I take into
account the presence of two main features in the Western Balkan region concern-
ing apologies and reconciliation: the legacies of conflict in collective memories,
and the common foreign policy goal of EU accession. These two factors together
make actors more likely to resort to apologies, but also to adopt strategies of am-
 Five indictees of the ICTY (Krstić, Beara, Popović, Nikolić, Tolimir), all former VRS officers,
have been found guilty of genocide (among other charges) and received either  years or life
sentences. Slobodan Milošević, accused of genocide or complicity in it, died before the verdict.
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić are currently facing trial for genocide and complicity in
genocide in several municipalities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Srebrenica. Do-
mestic Bosnian courts have sentenced  indictees for charges of genocide concerning Srebren-
ica, as have German courts in three cases. Further prosecutions are ongoing in Bosnia, Austria
and Serbia.
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biguity to reduce the political risks associated. Apologies are considered as both
a signal of and a catalyst for the reconciliation process. The third section traces
the process of apologising for the Srebrenica genocide in the framework of the
cycle of public apologies carried out among Western Balkan countries in the
last decade, highlighting their features and motivations and testing the theoret-
ical model applied. The conclusions sum up the main arguments of the chapter
about the particular features of the Western Balkans, which increase both the
costs and benefits of apologising, and produce the observed pattern of ambigu-
ous apologies.
Apologies, restorative justice, and
Europeanisation: a theoretical framework
Apologies as a tool of restorative justice
When dealing with past injustices, tools are available from both retributive and
restorative justice. As opposed to retributive justice, aimed at establishing indi-
vidual responsibilities and punishments for criminal acts, restorative (or repara-
tive) justice focuses on the needs of the victims, as right-holders, and of the of-
fenders, as duty-bearers, in order to achieve the satisfaction of the former, and
the reintegration of the latter. Victims are considered entitled to redress and to
address the causes and consequences of violations in both material and symbol-
ic ways,⁷ while offenders are encouraged to take responsibility for their actions,
by offering reparation, apologising, and committing to the avoidance of future
offences.
First, material reparations include concrete, appropriate and proportionate
forms of compensation, resulting in a final settlement through a specific agree-
ment between victims and perpetrators. The main risk in material reparations is
failing to address the emotional damage done to the victims by the wrongdoings,
thus simply “buying them off”.⁸ Second, symbolic reparations are policies at-
tempting to restore to victims their sense of dignity and human worth. A partic-
ular kind of symbolic reparation is apologies, intended as a speech act per-
formed by an appropriate person with appropriate words on an appropriate
 Shannon Jones. “Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?” Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplo-
macy  (): . http://www.clingendael.nl/publications//_cdsp_ dis
cussionpapersindiplomacy__jones.pdf ( February ).
 Jones. “Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?”, .
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occasion.⁹ The reasons for which victims demand apologies include the need for
a public admission of the transgression, a guarantee on future conduct, and
compensation to ease the victims’ reintegration in the society.¹⁰ Correspondingly,
the offender’s benefits include a restorative effect, as apologies may lead to
forgiveness.¹¹
Apologies are, linguistically, “performative utterances”, as “stating the
words ‘I apologise’ in itself accomplishes the apology”.¹² The value of an apology
is therefore less in its sincerity, and more in its effectiveness in creating emotion-
al satisfaction and closure. In fact, apologies do not only involve words, but also
a series of ritualistic features including the location, speaker, audience and
coverage.¹³ They can thus be usefully understood as rituals with strong perform-
ative power: as symbolic gestures, their meaning resides in the official realm
rather than in “truth” or “sincerity”. As argued by Horelt, “social performances
are ‘intrinsically effective’”, as the ritual “speaks for itself”.¹⁴ The lack of a re-
quirement of sincerity is particularly important when dealing with public apol-
ogies, as it is very difficult to establish the requirements for sincerity. In fact,
public apologies are mediated both institutionally, being uttered by public offi-
cials speaking on behalf of a group rather than for themselves, and mediatically,
being conveyed to their addressees through means of mass communication rath-
er than personally.
Scholars have analyzed the best and worst practices of apologies. Among the
former, Matt James underlines that an authentic apology should be recorded in
writing, clearly naming the wrongs, accepting responsibility, stating regret,
promising non-repetition, not demanding forgiveness, not being hypocritical
or arbitrary, and morally engaging the responsible ones through publicity, cere-
 The original definition of an apology as a speech act is by J. Austin. How to Do Things with
Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press, . Quoted in Joanna Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Re-
spect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”. The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past. Eds.
Mark Gibney et al. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, , .
 Jullyette Ukabiala. “Slave Trade ‘a crime against humanity’.” Africa Recovery . (): .
 Lee Taft. “Apology Subverted: the Commodification of Apology.” Yale Law Journal .
(): .
 Richard B. Bilder. “The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy.” Virginia Jour-
nal of International Law . (): .
 Michel-André Horelt. Rituals of Reconciliation. A Performance Based Approach to the Analysis
of Political Apologies for Historic Crimes. Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, .
http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/MemoryPolitics/Work
shop3/ HoreltEssay.pdf (21 February 2015).
 Horelt. Rituals of Reconciliation, .
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mony or reparations.¹⁵ On the other hand, Aaron Lazare points to the symptoms
of pseudo-apologies: vague or incomplete acknowledgements, the use of the pas-
sive voice, conditionality, questioning the damage which occurred, minimising
the offence, expressing empathy without taking responsibility, apologising to
the wrong party, and apologising for the wrong offence.¹⁶ According to Dinah
Shelton an apology, in order to be ‘genuine’, ‘authentic’, ‘effective’, should ex-
press the acceptance of responsibility without excuses, express sincere remorse
or regret, and offer reparations as a future commitment. If not, it could be just a
ritualised form of ‘politeness discourse’, or an expression of sorrow, compassion,
or regret for events which are not deemed to be the speaker’s responsibility.¹⁷
Apologies are usually entrusted only a secondary role in restorative justice,
as material compensations enjoy primacy.¹⁸ Apologies are sometimes dismissed
as “cheap reconciliation”, unable to change actual power relations.¹⁹ If material
compensations are not provided, victims might be asked “to become reconciled
to loss”,²⁰ thus enshrining injustice through a rights-based “politics of distrac-
tion”. In fact, although restitution is a necessary element, apologies are also
vital to reconciliation, since remembrance is linked to group and individual iden-
tity. Injustice always involves disrespect ²¹ while “apology is intrinsically an act
of respect”, ²² potentially able to restore the human worth and dignity of victims.
 Matt James. “Wrestling with the past: Apologies, Quasi-Apologies and Non-Apologies in Can-
ada.” The Age of Apology: Facing up the Past. Eds. Mark Gibney et al. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, , –.
 Aaron Lazare. On Apology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, , –.
 Nicholas Tavuchis. Mea culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, , .
 See for instance the UN International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in . UN Doc A// ().
 State-driven strategies of reconciliation usually de-emphasise restitution, and emphasise re-
pair forms conducive to state-building. As Gibney and Roxstrom argue, “forgiveness often per-
petuates the power imbalances that led to past violence, especially when the process is state-do-
minated”. Mark Gibney and Erik Roxstrom. “The Status of State Apologies.” Human Rights
Quarterly  (): .
 Andrew Rigby. Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, ,
.
 Bernard Boxill. “Morality of Reparation.” Social Theory and Practice  (): .
 Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd. “The practice of public apology: a qualified defense.”
Saskatchewan Law Review  (): .
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Public apologies and their limitations
In the definition put forward by Thompson, a political or public apology is “a
public act, carried out by the appropriate official, that acknowledges and
takes responsibility for an injustice committed (or allowed) by officers of the
state and commits governments to avoiding such injustices in the future”.²³
Bilder identifies several reasons for states to offer public apologies: (a) to fol-
low the belief that apologising is the right thing to do; (b) to preserve or restore
the image and reputation for decency and respect for legal and moral norms, a
strong asset in international society; (c) to signal a change in position on the le-
gality and appropriateness of a conduct, in the hope that apologising will help to
establish or reinforce the desired international norms and customs; (d) to pre-
serve the other party’s honour and avoid risking escalations (thus including po-
litical calculation and expediency); (e) to escape retribution or retaliation by de-
escalating the conflict; (f) to comply with external requests, e.g. ICJ sentences,
without the need for any authenticity, or even under full external coercion in
an act of purposeful humiliation, a possible source for further resentment; (g)
to perform a public relations gesture towards a third party, directed at a domestic
or international audience other than the state or people wronged, and designed
to win public approval. ²⁴
Similar reasons exist for not giving collective apologies: (a) to avoid ac-
knowledgement of the wrongs; (b) to avoid future liability, as apologies may
be construed as an admission of responsibility; (c) to avoid creating a precedent;
(d) to avoid weakening supported norms; (e) to save domestic honour, fearing
domestic political costs; (f) to respond to a lack of incentives: e.g. in case of
asymmetries of power, lack of possible retaliation, or no interest in maintaining
good relations.²⁵ As such, apologies work as a signal: the apologiser is giving the
victim an entitlement to trust that such things are true. ²⁶
Apologies may constitute the symbolic act able to break a cycle of violence
involving two nations. But, to be successful, “the stage must be set by a process
of negotiation and reconciliation”.²⁷ Reconciliation has been defined, by Hayner,
as “rebuilding relationships today that are not haunted by the conflicts and ha-
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
 Bilder. “The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy”, .
 Ibid, .
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
 Ibid, .
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treds of yesterday”. ²⁸ As in any response to a ‘large scale evil’, apologies entail
unavoidable tensions and lack of tidiness with which those involved must come
to terms. They include a trade-off between justice for victims and national
healing.²⁹
Starting from several empirical cases, scholars such as Thompson have
drafted an ideal type of a successful political apology. This requires, firstly, mem-
orability. An apology is an event that is supposed to constitute a watershed in
the history of inter-community relations; it thus needs thorough preparation, ad-
equate ceremony, and consequent actions. Secondly, the participation of both
victims and wrongdoers (or their representatives) is necessary in order to
reach a common understanding of the injustice by building a common narrative
of the past, endorsing the content and context of the apology, and negotiating on
subsequent acts of reparation. Thirdly, a clear commitment is needed, binding
for future governments and citizens, to avoid a repetition of such injustices.
This may be done by offering financial compensation or by embedding the
new narrative in the official history of the nation through textbook revisions, pla-
ques and monuments, exhibitions and commemoration days. A consensual par-
liamentary vote and the deliverance by an official above party politics, usually
the head of state, may also help depoliticise the issue. Although this ideal-
type may be very restrictive, even incomplete apologies may have positive ef-
fects, as “a general practice of apologies encourages nations to be aware of
the harm they can do to outsiders”. ³⁰
Nevertheless, political apologies also face important limitations. Firstly, how
can polities take responsibility for wrongs committed by their predecessors? It is
a challenge to understand and justify how contemporary actors may be able to
apologise for historical abuses, as the historical gap blurs the responsibility link.
³¹ The issue may be solved when considering that structured groups, such as
states, have decision-making processes and can act as agents.³² As argued by
Thompson, a state as a structured organisation is “an agent in its own rights,
 Priscilla Hayner. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York: Rout-
ledge, , .
 Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder. “Who’s Sorry Now? Government Apologies, Truth Commis-
sions, and Indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala and Peru.” Human
Rights Review (): .
http://www.corntassel.net/CorntasselHolder.pdf (21 February 2015).
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
 Melissa Nobles. The Politics of Official Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
.
 Trudy Govier. Forgiveness and Revenge. London: Routledge, . Ch. .
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whose existence transcends the lives of the individuals who make it up”, and
should therefore take responsibility for its past deeds.³³ Apologies are deemed
valid when there is an institution with a historical continuity, be it a church, a
party, or a state.³⁴ Nevertheless, several other problems remain. On the one
hand, according to standard theories of responsibility, the participation in com-
mitting an injustice is necessary for liability. Therefore it remains unexplained
how distant-past wrongdoings may give current members of a polity the entitle-
ment to apologise. Given that no individual consent is required in state member-
ship, as opposed to private organisations, citizens have no moral duty to accept
responsibility. On the other hand, always according to standard theories of re-
sponsibility, one needs to be a victim of injustice to be entitled to receive repar-
ation. It remains unexplained how successors of victims may be entitled to for-
give for the original crime and not only for the consequences that still directly
affect them. ³⁵
Secondly, how can a state be remorseful or contrite? For Govier, groups have
collective emotions: as they can forgive, they may also be able to apologise.³⁶
Nevertheless, the presence of collective remorse is contested in several cases
of political apologies, where the expediency is apparent. The distance between
interpersonal and institutional apologies blurs the relevance of the moral com-
ponent of apology. In fact, the mediation of apologies by the public sphere
and the media renders them problematic in terms of sincerity and authenticity.
Apologies may be given in reaction to requests rather than voluntarily; public
mediation may impede the genuine expression of emotion; and apologies may
be finally driven more by interests and ‘face-saving’ strategies.³⁷ To answer to
these issues, Tavuchis underlines that the authentic communication of sorrow
may be merely perfunctory in many-to-many apologies, if not simply ruled out
by the necessity of delegation.³⁸ The main function of collective apologies is
therefore not sorrow as sincerity, but putting things on a public record, through
a “public endorsement of the rules of conduct”.³⁹ According to Digeser, intending
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
 Max Clark and Gary Allen Fine. “‘A’ for Apology: Slavery and the Discourse of Remonstrance
in Two American Universities.” History and Memory . (): –.
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, –.
 Govier, quoted in Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political
Apology”, .
 Jones.”Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?”
 Tavuchis. Mea culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation.
 Bilder. “The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy”, –.
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apologies as a public act allows us to rule out the need for remorse.⁴⁰ The only
remaining requirements for a genuine apology are taking responsibility for the
past and offering a commitment for the future, conditions fulfilled by a transge-
nerational polity. For Thompson, “as an appropriate moral motivation, [it] may
be enough that citizens recognise the moral importance to fulfil transgeneration-
al obligations.” ⁴¹
Finally, how can states commit to avoid wrongdoings in the future? The issue
has been underlined especially by realist scholarship, pointing to how states be-
have in their own interest and are not moral persons in the sense of acting con-
sistently and responsibly over time. Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that
states can and do take long-term commitments, a phenomenon that may again
be explained through the lens of the ‘transgenerational polity’. Through official
acts of government (laws and treaties), their members pass on responsibilities
and entitlements through generations for the sake of promoting political stability
and individual security. ⁴²
A rational-choice analysis of reparation decisions
Different theories of International Relations (IR) allow one to make sense of the
motivations of states for offering public apologies. According to a rational-choice
approach to IR, apologising allows states to send signals about their intentions
in the international anarchy, in order to reduce uncertainty and increase their
material security. This rational-choice approach may be coupled with a construc-
tivist approach, according to which states also look for ontological security, de-
fined as “the desire to have a consistent sense of self and knowledge of [their]
place in the world”.⁴³
Apologising may thus be understood as the result of a cost-benefit analysis.
On the one hand, benefits include the re-establishment of diplomatic relations
and the end of barriers to cooperation, thus enhancing material security, togeth-
er with an accrued ontological security given by maintaining or projecting a cer-
tain image of self in the international community. On the other hand, the costs
include both the monetary value of compensations and the political risk in terms
of potential domestic reaction by a hostile audience, up to the level of threaten-
 Peter E. Digeser. Political Forgiveness. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, , .
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
 Ibid, –.
 Jones. “Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?”, .
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ing politicians’ own careers. ⁴⁴ To solve this conundrum, several policies may be
followed. A first one limits reparation to the symbolic side, excluding the possi-
bility of financial compensation to reduce material costs. A second one foresees
the use of a strategy of ambiguity to reduce the domestic political risks; this in-
cludes for instance the expression of empathy or regret without taking full re-
sponsibility for the facts.⁴⁵ On the basis of such factors it is possible to draw a
typology of reparatory decisions, following Jones:⁴⁶
Low Costs High Costs
Low Benefits Only symbolic reparations No reparations
High Benefits Symbolic and material
reparations
Ambiguous symbolic reparations
This chapter follows the static analysis approach provided for above. Neverthe-
less, the limitations of the approach should also be taken into consideration. In
fact, reparation decisions are not static, as perpetrators happen to change their
minds over time. This could be the consequence of either a change in foreign or
domestic policy interests or a change in the normative environment. A normative
change may be relevant in allowing for the vocalisation of victims’ demands,
and in reducing the domestic political costs. On the one hand, it may open up
spaces for the vocalisation of demands by previously disempowered victims,
for instance by women and minorities after the diffusion of norms of gender
equality and minority protection. In this regard, the action of third states, inter-
national organisations and NGOs becomes relevant in putting forward the vic-
tims’ demands and pressuring the perpetrators on reparative actions through
bottom-up ‘name and shame’ actions, recommendations, sanctions, and legal
actions. On the other hand, a normative change may help to reduce domestic po-
litical costs through the shift in public opinion caused by the internalisation of
norms, thus lowering the likelihood of having to face strong domestic opposi-
tion. As argued by Nobles, reparations follow an ideological change in political
elites through a top-down effect. ⁴⁷
The role of public apologies is still under-researched in Europeanisation
theory. Magen and Morlino recall, among the four main gaps in knowledge
 Jennifer Lind. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, .
 See above the symptoms of “pseudo-apologies” described by Lazare for further examples of
ambiguities in apologies.
 Jones. “Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?”, .
 Nobles. The Politics of Official Apologies.
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about the EU expansion-democratisation nexus, the lack of a literature focusing
on external-internal linkages of democratisation, as well as on the interaction
between external actors and domestic change processes. Apologies, as an
inter- and trans-national phenomenon, fit in this research agenda.⁴⁸ The process
of pre-accession adaptation is described as a major process of ‘external gover-
nance’. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier outline three models of EU external gov-
ernance and rules transfer, respectively based on external incentives or bargain-
ing by rewarding, independent domestic lesson-drawing, and socialisation and
learning. As the external incentives model maintains its main explanatory value
for rule transfer in pre-accession countries, its main factors of compliance are the
credibility of conditionality and the domestic cost of rule adoption. Rule transfer
is found to be dependent on the context of conditionality (democratic versus ac-
quis conditionality) and on country-specific conditions that influence the domes-
tic costs.⁴⁹ The presence of recent historic legacies of conflict has been listed
among the specific conditions that provide additional strategies for veto players
and raise the costs of compliance, in particular for the current enlargement
countries in the Western Balkans. In order to reach compliance in post-conflict
situations, therefore, additional factors have to be present to redress the balance:
an endgame situation with short-term, certain and relevant prospects of reward
and sanction; non-prohibitive costs for the incumbent governments; and ade-
quate levels of identification between the target government and society and
the EU.⁵⁰
There are two main factors which are peculiar to the Western Balkans and to
their cycle of public apologies: the presence of legacies of the recent conflicts
within collective memories, and their convergent foreign policy goal of achieving
EU membership.
Firstly, it should be remembered that the states of the region are no older
than 20–25 years: they came into being through the process of conflictual dis-
aggregation of Yugoslavia – or, in the case of Albania, through the state anarchy
of 1997– 1998.⁵¹ The conflicts of the recent past have left an important legacy in
 Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino. Eds. International Actors, Democratization and the
Rule of Law. Anchoring Democracy? New York: Routledge, , –.
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by conditionality: EU rule trans-
fer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy
. (Aug ): –.
 Frank Schimmelfennig. “EU political accession conditionality after the  enlargement:
consistency and effectiveness.” Journal of European Public Policy . (Sept ): –.
 Dorian Jano. “From ‘Balkanization’ to ‘Europeanization’: The Stages of Western Balkans Com-
plex Transformations.” L’Europe en Formation – (): –.
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collective memories. In their study, Georges Mink and Pascal Bonnard refer to the
presence of ‘seams’ or ‘veins’ (gisements) of ‘reactive memory’,⁵² stemming from
legacies of conflicts within the collective memories of public opinions. These
seams have the potential to be instrumentalised by political entrepreneurs to
achieve legitimacy and popular mobilisation through historicising strategies. In-
cumbent governments thus face higher costs of compliance, and will be wary of
apologising, wishing to avoid the risk of domestic political fallout.⁵³ The memo-
ries of recent conflicts are a factor raising the costs of public apologies. A first
function of public apologies is thus also to signal progress in the reconciliation
process, fuelled by civil society and external actors.⁵⁴ An apology becomes a via-
ble political option only when its costs are non-prohibitive, i.e. “no serious po-
litical or legal repercussion”⁵⁵ should be expected. The presence of public apol-
ogies means that the risks associated were low enough for incumbent politicians
to resort to it without fearing an existential threat to their own political careers.
Secondly, the Western Balkan countries are all candidate, or potential can-
didate, countries for EU accession, at least since 2003. The presence of a com-
mon foreign policy aim for these countries, together with EU conditionality on
regional cooperation, has led their elites to develop a convergent foreign policy
agenda. Their common goal is to ensure compliance with the acquis and with
pre-accession conditions, and at the same time to depoliticise foreign policy in
order to be able to respond positively to external demands without suffering do-
mestic backlash. Their common foreign policy goal of EU accession is a factor
raising the benefits of apologising. Moreover, apologies have the dynamic effect
of reducing the conflict potential of reactive memories by fostering a consensus
about the past and depoliticising collective memories, thus making it less easy
for political entrepreneurs to exploit the legitimacy effect of historicising strat-
egies. A second function of political apologies is thus to act as a catalyst for fur-
ther change and reconciliation, by further reducing the domestic political costs
 Georges Mink and Pascal Bonnard. Le passé au Présent. Gisements Mémoriels et Actions Pub-
liques en Europe Centrale et Orientale. Paris: Michel Houdiard, , .
 Lind. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.
 Reconciliation and regional cooperation have been buzzwords in the discourse of interna-
tional actors in the Western Balkans since the Dayton Peace Agreements. The creation of region-
al fora, such as the Stability Pact for South East Europe (today’s Regional Cooperation Council)
helped diffuse and implement the concept, reaching the agenda of national governments. Inter-
national conditionality on regional cooperation may be considered one of the factors fostering
reconciliation up to the level when apologies became feasible political options.
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, .
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faced by governments in addressing foreign policy issues and enacting EU-fos-
tered reforms.
In the Western Balkans, the presence of legacies of conflict raises the costs of
apologising, while the countries’ common foreign policy goal of EU accession
raises its benefits. In Jones’ typology of reparation decisions, the region thus
falls into the case featuring both high costs and high benefits of reparations.
As a result, it should be expected that the reconciliation process be punctuated
by ambiguous apologies and symbolic reparations, in addition to the retributive
justice delivered by the ICTY. Such a strategy of offering incomplete and partial
restorative justice is rational because it allows countries to reap the benefits of
reconciliation while permitting politicians to keep at bay the risk of domestic
backlash. The next section, reviewing the process of apologising for Srebrenica
and pointing to the role of external incentives and potential domestic backlashes
in fostering a strategy of ambiguity, validates the theoretical framework intro-
duced above.
Apologies for Srebrenica: a story in three acts
Three main apologies for Srebrenica have been uttered so far: the 2004 declara-
tion of the Government of Republika Srpska, the 2010 resolution of the Serbian
Parliamentary Assembly, and the 2013 apology by the President of Serbia, Tomi-
slav Nikolić.
The three episodes, which are the main focus of this chapter, are not isolat-
ed; they find their place within the bigger picture of the cycle of public apologies
that unfolded in the Western Balkans in general among former war enemies
since the year 2000 and peaked in 2010. Starting with the atonement of Milo
Đukanović for the role of Montenegrin soldiers in the siege of Dubrovnik, it con-
tinued with the exchanges between the new democratic leaders of Serbia and
Croatia between 2003 and 2007, particularly after the election of Boris Tadić.
Apologies in this first round remained partial and ambiguous in their acknowl-
edgement of responsibilities, thus not achieving an effect of sincerity. Finally, in
2010, a new round of apologies was started by the new Croatian president Ivo
Josipović and sustained by the need for Serbia to comply with EU expectations;
the apologies of 2010 were deeper and more comprehensive, but also fostered
stronger reactions and domestic opposition.
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The 2004 declaration on Srebrenica of the government
of Republika Srpska
The first apology for Srebrenica was uttered in 2004 by the government of Re-
publika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the
panorama of public apologies among Western Balkan states, it followed the
early atonement of Milo Đukanović in the year 2000 for the siege of Dubrovnik,
and the exchange in 2003 between Svetozar Marović, then president of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and the president of Croatia Stipe Mesić. ⁵⁶
The apology by the RS government constitutes a unicum in the gamut of pub-
lic apologies in the Western Balkans up to that moment. Firstly, it was the first
time that regret was expressed not as a personal initiative of a head of state, usu-
ally a second-tier political figure as in the cases of Đukanović and Marović, but
as an act of the governing executive body of the Serb-majority entity of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Secondly, it was also the first time that an act of apology
touched upon the matter of the war in Bosnia, with its complications as a new
war, in Kaldor’s terms,with its blurring of the internal/international dimension.⁵⁷
Finally, it was the first time that an apology was extended over a matter, the Sre-
brenica massacre or genocide, which until that time had been the object of offi-
cial attempts at revisionism or outright denial.⁵⁸
In 2003, the international High Representative Paddy Ashdown fostered the
setup by the government of Banja Luka of a Commission for Investigation of the
Events in Srebrenica, to “establish the full truth on the events in and around Sre-
 For a more comprehensive analysis of public apologies among Western Balkan countries:
Davide Denti. “Public Apologies in the Western Balkans: the Shadow of Ambiguity.” Public
Apology Between Ritual and Regret. Symbolic Excuses on False Pretenses or True Reconciliation
out of Sincere Regret? Eds. Daniel Cuypers et al. Amsterdam: Rodopi, , –.
 The  declaration of the RS government might seem a purely internal issue between one
sub-state executive and one minority population living on its territory. In fact, the war-time links
between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries (as recognised by the ICTY and ICJ), as
well as between the Srebrenica residents and the government of Sarajevo, allow us to consider
it together with the other international apologies expressed in relation to war-time deeds in the
region.
 Only two years before, in , a controversy had followed the publication of the “Report
about Case Srebrenica (first part)”, authored by Darko Trifunović on behalf of the Republika
Srpska Government Bureau for Relations with the ICTY. The report, denying the massacre and
accusing the Red Cross of fabrication of the findings, was subsequently disowned by the
Banja Luka authorities, and defined by the ICTY in the Deronjić sentence as “one of the worst
examples of revisionism”. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Pros-
ecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić – Sentencing Judgement.  March , . http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/deronjic/tjug/en/sj-e.pdf ( February ).
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brenica between 10th and 19th July 1995, aiming to establish lasting peace and
build confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁵⁹ In its final report, released in Oc-
tober 2004, the Commission published a list of 8,371 names of missing or killed
persons. The report also represented the first time that an official RS institution
acknowledged that the massacre had taken place on such a scale, and that Serb
militaries and paramilitaries were among its perpetrators. ⁶⁰ The Srebrenica
Commission report did not remain without consequences. Even before the text
of the report was made public, the president of RS, Dragan Čavić, admitted on
television that Srebrenica constituted a dark chapter of Serb history, and that
the “massacre” of thousands of civilians by Serb paramilitaries effectively violat-
ed international law.⁶¹ Soon afterwards, the RS government released an official
apology on its website, stating that:
The report clearly shows that enormous crimes were committed in the region of Srebrenica
in July 1995. ⁶² […] The Bosnian Serb Government shares the pain of the families of the Sre-
brenica victims, is truly sorry and apologises for the tragedy.⁶³
The “objective scientific evidence” stemming from the report,⁶⁴ together with the
need for RS not to see its international legitimacy obliterated as a polity built on
genocide, may have been instrumental in convincing the government of Banja
Luka to extend its apologies. The 2004 apology, as the previous ones in the re-
gion, remains a partial one, by not employing the term genocide and by not ac-
cepting full responsibility for the events. In the form that the RS government
used, it looked more like a “regretful acknowledgement” ⁶⁵ than a full apology.
On the other hand, its importance can hardly be overstated: for the first time, a
 Government of Republika Srpska. The Events in and around Srebrenica between th and th
July . Banja Luka,  June ; Government of Republika Srpska. Addendum to the Report
of the th June  on the Events in and around Srebrenica between th and th July .
Banja Luka,  October .
 Associated Press. “Bosnian Serbs Issue Apology for Massacre”. Bosnia Report New Series
No. .  November . http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=
&reportid= ( February ).
 Tanja Topić. “Otvaranje najmračnije stranice.” Vreme  July .
http://www.vreme.com/cms/ view.php?id=384060 (21 February 2015).
 Suad Smajić. “O jeziku mržnje i dvostrukog smisla.” Slobodna misao  (): .
 Associated Press. “Bosnian Serbs Issue Apology for Massacre”
 Sheri Fink. “Serbs’ Overdue Apology Delivers Hope for Humanity.” Detroit Free Press  De-
cember . http://warhospital.net/serbs.htm ( February )
 Lisa S. Villadsen. “The Regretful Acknowledgment: a Dignified End to a Disgraceful Story?”
Public Apology Between Ritual and Regret. Symbolic Excuses on False Pretenses or True Reconci-
liation out of Sincere Regret? Eds. Daniel Cuypers et al. Amsterdam: Rodopi, , –.
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Bosnian Serb official institution recognised the scale of the massacre and the
Serb involvement, extending apologies for it.⁶⁶
The 2010 resolution on Srebrenica by the Serbian
Parliamentary Assembly
The following years, between 2004 and 2007, saw a revival of public apologies
between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, following the election of Boris Tadić as
head of state in Serbia. Tadić apologised three times, in 2004, 2006,⁶⁷ and
2007,⁶⁸ repeatedly declaring: “I apologise to all those who suffered from crimes
committed in the name of the Serb people”.⁶⁹ Tadić’s gesture bore strong rele-
vance, since it was the first time that the primary political figure of Serbia apol-
ogised for war crimes. At the same time, Tadić’s ambiguity strategy, to defuse
raising too much controversy at home, included stressing the impossibility of
making the whole Serbian people responsible for crimes of specific individuals
who had to face prosecution in court, together with the need for all parties en-
gaged in conflict to apologise to each other, since “the same crimes have been
committed against the Serbs”. This kind of utterance has been defined by Lind
as a non-apology apology. The perception that it contained a moral equivalence
among crimes hindered its reception in Bosnia as a true atonement for war
crimes.
The next step came a few years later, in 2010, kick-starting a new cycle of
political apologies on a higher qualitative level.⁷⁰ In December 2009, Serbia
handed in its application for EU membership, and the authorities from Brussels
 As recalled by Fink, “this unified narrative is important, because conflicting historical mem-
ories are what ignite and drive many of the world’s armed conflicts. In the Balkans, radically
one-sided memories of World War II interethnic violence were used as justification to wage
war and commit atrocities in the early s.”
 Humanitarian Law Center. “Predsednik Srbije Boris Tadić se prilikom prve posete BiH, . de-
cembra . godine u Sarajevu, izvinio u ime srpskog naroda.” Zagreb,  December .
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p= ( February ).
 Humanitarian Law Center. Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries.  Report. Za-
greb, , –. http://www.documenta.hr/dokumenti/trans_eng.pdf ( February
).
 Lind. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.
 For an in-depth analysis of the  apology of the Serbian Parliamentary Assembly, see
Jasna Dragović-Soso. “Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament,
the European Union and the Politics of Compromise.” East European Politics . ():
–.
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made it clear that, in order to be recognised as a candidate, Belgrade had to ac-
cept responsibility for war crimes and act consistently, ultimately resulting in the
arrest and hand-over to the Hague tribunal of the last wartime fugitives.⁷¹ For the
Tadić administration, this was the opportunity to resume a long-standing societ-
al and parliamentary debate, and bring it to a conclusion. In fact, a draft parlia-
mentary declaration on Srebrenica had already been proposed in 2005 by a co-
alition of NGOs to counter the issue of genocide denial in Serbia itself. A counter-
proposal put forward by Vojislav Koštunica’s nationalist DSS party, though con-
demning the crime committed in Srebrenica, expressed revisionist attitudes to-
wards established facts and figures, and aimed at diluting its relevance by refer-
ring to Serbs’ victimhood narrative and the list of crimes against them since the
Second World War. The debate subsided until the 2007 ICJ Bosnian genocide
case, in which Serbia was cleared of direct responsibility but condemned for
omission. Tadić tried to revive the project of the parliamentary declaration, but
found no supportive majority. Finally, in 2009 the European Parliament (EP) it-
self passed a resolution on Srebrenica, demanding both full cooperation with the
ICTY, and symbolic reparations, exerting a form of moral pressure on Belgrade.
The same year, Serbia made a number of important steps towards European in-
tegration, including the entry into force of visa-free travel and of the interim
agreement on trade attached to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA). In autumn, the Commission released a positive opinion in its annual Prog-
ress Report, and Serbia submitted its formal application for EU membership. At
that moment, Tadić re-tabled for discussion the Parliamentary declaration on
Srebrenica. His fragile coalition between Democrats and Socialists found sup-
port on the issue by the few Liberal Democrats, while the declaration was op-
posed by the splintered but still nationalist opposition of Radicals and Progres-
sives, joined by diaspora Serbs.⁷² The text of the declaration was not born out of
a public-wide deliberation, but rather negotiated behind closed doors in order to
secure enough support for the 31 March 2010 vote, thus representing fundamen-
tally “an act of political compromise”:⁷³
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia most severely condemns the crime com-
mitted against the Bosniak population in Srebrenica in July 1995 in the manner established
 Jones. “Apology Diplomacy: Justice for All?”
 Dragović-Soso. “Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, the
European Union and the Politics of Compromise”, –.
 Ibid, .
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by the ruling of the International Court of Justice. [… It extends] condolences and apologies
to the families of the victims since not everything was done to prevent the tragedy.⁷⁴
The 2010 resolution of the Serbian Parliament differs from other cases of apolo-
gies by parliamentary acts in that it was not adopted consensually by the assem-
bly. To the contrary, the resolution was the object of an intense political debate,
and the majority was able to pass it only by a very narrow margin of two votes.
The Radical Party, in opposition, denounced it as shameful, while victims’ organ-
isations did not feel satisfied and found it to be a case of “too little, too late”.⁷⁵
Textually, the resolution does not explicitly refer to Srebrenica as genocide, but
ambiguously condemns the crime in its definition by the ICJ – i.e. as genocide,
though without explaining the ICJ’s evaluation – thus with an implicit recogni-
tion but without having to resort to the still unpalatable G-word.⁷⁶ It thus consti-
tuted a difficult exercise in reaching an equilibrium between breaching the state
of denial of many among the Serbian political elite and public opinion about the
war crimes, and risking causing a counterproductive domestic political backlash.
Nevertheless, in addition to its vagueness on the scale of the tragedy and on the
identity of its perpetrators, the declaration does not refrain from attempting to
relativise the crime by referring, in its fourth paragraph, to the expectation
that other legislatures from the region will follow by condemning and apologis-
ing for the crimes committed against the Serbs.⁷⁷
The assessment of the apology by the analysts was mixed. On the one hand,
Marko Attila Hoare downplayed it as “mealy-mouthed” and as aiming “to pacify
European public opinion”, “calculated to say enough to be acceptable to the
EU”,⁷⁸ though “probably the most that its authors could have pushed through
 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. Declaration of the National Assembly of the Re-
public of Serbia Condemning the Crime in Srebrenica.  March .
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/eng/pdf/2010/deklaracija%20o%20sre
brenici%20ENG.pdf (21 February 2015).
 Mirza Velagić. “Serbia’s Insincere Apology.”Congress of North American Bosniaks  April
. http://www.bosniak.org/serbias-insincere-apology/ ( February ).
 Helsinki Committee to Defend Human Rights in Serbia. “Srebrenica Resolution Opens a Pub-
lic Debate in Serbia.” Helsinki Bulletin . February . http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/
news_body.cfm?newsid= ( February ).
 Dragović-Soso. “Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, the
European Union and the Politics of Compromise”, .
 Robert Marquand. “War Crimes: Is Serbia’s Srebrenica Apology Genuine?” Christian Science
Monitor  March .
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0331/War-crimes-Is-Serbia-s-Srebrenica-apolo
gy-genuine (21 February 2015).
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parliament”.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Ivan Vejvoda noticed how a landmark resolu-
tion by the Serbian legislature might mark a turning point towards reconcilia-
tion, a sign that Serbian institutions are taking stock of the work of intellectuals
in the previous decade.⁸⁰ According to Tim Judah, the resolution was remarkable
as “it makes it still harder to insist that the massacre never happened or that the
number of victims has been grossly inflated.” Despite its limitations, and given
the deep polarisation in the Serbian parliament and public opinion, according to
Judah, it was “a lot better than nothing” and “that the resolution was proposed
at all is an achievement”.⁸¹ As highlighted by Dragović-Soso, the parliamentary
declaration was more “an instrument of foreign policy”, aimed at the EU audi-
ence in order to foster Serbia’s bid, rather than part of a longer-term process
of value transformation and coming to terms with the past, which still had to ma-
ture within Serbian society.⁸² When applying Jones’ typology of apologies, it is
evident how the parliamentary declaration fits the case of a situation with
high stakes with regard to both the potential benefits and the potential costs
of apologising, giving rise to a spurious apology, one limited to the symbolic
side and marked by multiple ambiguities, but still endowed with positive effects.
The 2013 apology by the President of Serbia,
Tomislav Nikolić
The resolution of the Serbian Parliament in 2010 was followed by a renewed
cycle of apologies between Serbia and Croatia, fostered by the election as
head of state in Zagreb of the Social Democrat Ivo Josipović who, in the words
of Slavenka Drakulić, “in the first year of his presidency has visited more
mass graves and apologized more than anybody else”.⁸³ Josipović apologized
in front of the Bosnian Parliament by saying: “I deeply regret that Croatia,
with its policies in the 1990s, contributed to that [conflict]”.⁸⁴ He then visited
 Marko Attila Hoare. “How to Apologise”. The Henry Jackson Society  May .
http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/how-to-apologise/(21 February 2015).
 Marquand. “War Crimes: Is Serbia’s Srebrenica Apology Genuine?”
 Tim Judah. “Serbia’s Honest Apology.” The New York Times  April . http://www.ny
times.com////opinion/judah.html ( February ).
 Dragović-Soso. “Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, the
European Union and the Politics of Compromise”, .
 Slavenka Drakulić. “A few ‘easy’ steps towards reconciliation.” Baltic Worlds  May .
http://balticworlds.com/towards-reconciliation/ ( February ).
 “Josipovic apologizes for Croatia’s role in war in Bosnia.” Croatian Times  April .
Sorry for Srebrenica? Public Apologies and Genocide in the Western Balkans 83
the site of the Sijekovac killings, in order to pay homage to the Serbian victims of
the Bosnian conflict as well. Finally, in November 2010 Josipović organised a
joint visit with Boris Tadić to Vukovar, paying homage to the Croatian and Ser-
bian victims of the killings in Ovcara and Paulin Dvor.⁸⁵ The Vukovar commem-
oration constitutes the most comprehensive act of atonement so far related to the
wars of the 1990s; analyzed against Thompson’s ideal-type,⁸⁶ it may be said to
include memorability, victims’ participation, and commitment for the future.⁸⁷
It also fostered regional reconciliation, as Bakir Izetbegović joined the party
once again by apologising, a few days before Tadić’s visit to Vukovar, “for
every innocent person killed by the Armija BiH”.⁸⁸ After it, though, the process
subsided, and it took almost three years before a new apology was offered.
The third time an apology was uttered for Srebrenica, it came from the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, a former vice-president of the
nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) of Vojislav Šešelj. After having lost four
consecutive presidential elections between 2000 and 2008, Nikolić broke with
Šešelj and founded the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), with which he won
the 2012 presidential election.
Nikolić’s first steps as a President were marked by a series of gaffes: in an
interview with the FAZ, he discussed his radical and Chetnik past, and was quot-
ed as saying that a Greater Serbia was his “unrealized dream”, since the interna-
tional borders of Croatia and Bosnia were now definitely settled, and that “Vu-
kovar was a Serb city and Croats have nothing to go back to there”.⁸⁹ Soon
after, Nikolić sparked even more controversy by declaring at the Montenegro tel-
evision that “there was no genocide in Srebrenica. In Srebrenica, grave war
crimes were committed by some Serbs who should be found, prosecuted and
punished. […] It is very difficult to indict someone and prove before a court
that an event qualifies as genocide.” He also declined to attend the annual Sre-
brenica commemoration, as Tadić had done in the past: “Don’t always ask the
http://www.croatiantimes.com/news/General_News/2010 - 04-15/10325/Josipovic_ apologizes_
for_Croatia%B4 s_role_in_war_in_Bosnia (21 February 2015).
 “Tadić i Josipović izrazili izvinjenje i žaljenje.” Danas.rs  November .
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/tadic_i_josipovic_izrazili_izvinjenje_i_zaljenje_.56.html?
news_id=202984 (21 February 2015).
 Thompson. “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology”, –.
 Again in Drakulić’s words: the event “really did look impressive: two heads of state demon-
strating good intentions, symbolically closing the vicious circle of war”.
 Drakulić. “A few ‘easy’ steps towards reconciliation.”
 Michael Martens. “Die Serben durften nicht entscheiden, wo sie leben wollen.” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung  May . http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/wahl-in-serbien-
die-serben-durften-nicht-entscheiden-wo-sie-leben-wollen-.html ( February ).
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Serbian president if he is going to Srebrenica, my predecessor was there and paid
tribute. Why should every president do the same?”⁹⁰
One year later, and merely one week after the April 2013 “First agreement on
the normalisation of relations” between Serbia and Kosovo reached in Brussels
by the Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and his counterpart Hashim Thaçi, the dis-
course of Nikolić changed substantially. Interviewed by the Bosnian state televi-
sion BHRT, Nikolić reiterated the argument that everything that happened during
the war, including Operation Oluja, had the features of genocide, but then
added:
I am on my knees because of that, here I’m on my knees and begging for a pardon for Ser-
bia because of the crime committed in Srebrenica. I apologise for all crimes committed by
any individual in the name of our state and our people.⁹¹
As in the previous case, this apology, too, refrains from the direct use of the term
genocide. The Serbian leadership, in fact, refuses to be considered as the only
responsible for it, seeing instead the Serbs also as victims of acts of ethnic
cleansing and genocide (thus the reference to Oluja).
On the other hand, Nikolić’s apology appears to be very important due to the
personal past of the Serbian President as a member of the SRS, a party which has
always held a nationalist and irredentist agenda, even opposing Milošević for
being too moderate, and denying any wrongdoing by Serb forces during the
conflict.⁹² Nikolić had also opposed the 2010 Parliamentary resolution on Sre-
brenica, as a member of the opposition to the Tadić administration. Finally,
his latest unfortunate declarations as President-elect had prompted an “ice
age”⁹³ in the relations of Serbia with Croatia and Bosnia.
 Reuters. “Serbian president denies Srebrenica genocide.” Genocide Watch  June .
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Serbia_12_06_02_Serbian_president_denies_Srebrenica
_genocide.pdf (21 February 2015).
 Dražen Remiković and Ivana Jovanović. “Analysts say Nikolic’s Srebrenica apology is signif-
icant.” Southeast European Times  April .
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/ xhtml/en_GB/ features/setimes/features/2013/04/29/
feature-01 (21 February 2015).
 As reminded by Nataša Kandić, one should “see his [Nikolić’s] statements in conjunction
with his own past”. Kandić underlined the importance of the virtual kneeling gesture, in parallel
to Willy Brandt’s  Kniefall, as “nobody has ever said anything like it in Serbia”. “Bosnians
are not enthusiastic about apology.” Deutsche Welle  April .
http://www.dw.de/bosnians-are-not-enthusiastic-about-apology/a-16775294 (21 February 2015).
 Predrag Šimic, quoted in Stefano Giantin. “Nikolic: “Belgrado s’inginocchia a Srebrenica”.”
Il Piccolo  April .
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One element that could have prompted the apology was the desire to im-
prove Serbia’s international relations, both bilaterally with Bosnia,⁹⁴ and multi-
laterally with the European Union.⁹⁵ On the one hand, according to Selim Šaćir-
ović, the apology could “contribute to return of confidence between BiH and
Serbia”, thus helping both parties to overcome the past and build trust.⁹⁶ The
personal past of Nikolić, though it casts shadows on the sincerity of the apology,
seems relevant in terms of the capacity of the apology to commit to the non-rep-
etition of similar acts in the future.⁹⁷ Moreover, it signals how the political ma-
jority in Serbia, the coalition of Socialists and Progressives, has adopted a stance
on Europe and on regional reconciliation which follows closely the one of the
previous alliance between Socialists and Democrats led by Tadić, the first to
say “sorry” for Srebrenica and up to now the Serbian leader with the best rela-
tions with Zagreb.⁹⁸ At any rate, Nikolic’s apology doesn’t seem to have struck a
http://ilpiccolo.gelocal.it/cronaca/2013/04/26/news/nikoli-mi-inginocchio-a-srebrenica-1.
6953442 (21 February 2015).
 Nikolić had recently been visited in Belgrade by two members of the tripartite Bosnian state
presidency, Nebojša Radmanović and Bakir Izetbegović, while the third member, Zeljko Komšić,
refused to follow, claiming that the Serbian President had offended the victims of the Bosnian
war in his speech at the UN General Assembly on the role of international war crimes courts, in
which Nikolić had described the Hague tribunal as an “inquisition”. After the apology, Komšić
commented that “this statement of President Nikolić will certainly contribute to the development
of better relations between BiH and Serbia in the future. That kind of statement will surely relax
things in the whole region”. Remiković and Jovanović. “Analysts say Nikolic’s Srebrenica apolo-
gy is significant.”
 According to Predrag Šimić, the apology could also have been aimed at ensuring that Serbia
obtained a final date for the start of EU accession negotiations by the European Council of June
. Giantin. “Nikolic: “Belgrado s’inginocchia a Srebrenica”.”
 Milorad Pupovać, president of the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS) of Croatia,
noted that Nikolić’s apology “is a confirmation of awareness of the severity of the crime that was
committed, the responsibility which feel all those who represent the Serbian people, about the
thing that the members of the Serbian people, or people who have performed some duties on
behalf of the state of Serbia committed crimes against members of the Bosniak people”, then
expressed confidence that it might help improve relationships. Remiković and Jovanović. “An-
alysts say Nikolic’s Srebrenica apology is significant.”
 According to Fahrudin Kladičanin, co-ordinator at the Forum  academic initiative in Novi
Pazar, “This is first time that Bosniaks in Serbia could hear such a thing from President Nikolić
since they still see him as Šešelj’s party member and it will, for sure, improve relations between
Serbs and Bosniaks not only on Bosnia and Serbia, also through the whole region. This is, for
sure, a step ahead for this authority and it should be respected.” Remiković and Jovanović. “An-
alysts say Nikolic’s Srebrenica apology is significant.”
 Predrag Šimić, quoted by Giantin. “Nikolic: “Belgrado s’inginocchia a Srebrenica”.”
86 Davide Denti
full chord in Bosnia, where many judged it insincere and unreliable.⁹⁹ Nikolić
also said that he would visit Srebrenica and make a donation to the victims,¹⁰⁰
but he did not attend the 2013 commemoration on 11 July, nor the one in 2014.
Finally, Nikolić’s apology may also have had domestic politics motives, in
response to the need for the Serbian President to regain control over public at-
tention at a moment in which his Prime Minister and main coalition partner
Ivica Dačić had come to the fore due to the Brussels agreement on Kosovo.
Conclusions: Sorry for Srebrenica? Apologies,
ambiguities, and EU integration
Reconciliation among Western Balkan countries after the wars of the 1990s is an
ongoing process involving the use of public apologies as a form of restorative
justice to complement retributive efforts in bringing justice for crimes such as
the Srebrenica genocide.
The apologies that have been extended up to now in relation to Srebrenica,
in 2004, 2010, and 2013, appear to be incomplete and ambiguous. Such features,
common to the wider cycle of apologies in the Western Balkan in relation to war-
time crimes, reveal the presence not only of strong incentives to apologise, due to
 Al Jazeera reported the opinion of Emir Suljagić, a survivor of the Srebrenica massacre, ac-
tivist and in  Bosniak candidate for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to
whom Nikolić’s behaviour was “duplicitous”: “Mind you, we’re dealing with a hard-line nation-
alist which let Kosovo go”, noting also that Nikolić’s apology is “one in a litany of presidential
apologies in the Balkans”. “Serbia president ‘apologises’ for massacre” Al Jazeera  April .
http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/europe/// .html ( February
).
The political activist Srđa Popović remarked that the apology was released “in the context of
upco ming negotiations of Serbia with the EU. I don’t believe that was meant in an honest
way. It’s merely political maneuvering and serves a political purpose”. “Bosnians are not enthu-
siastic about apology.” Deutsche Welle.
Also the association Mothers of Srebrenica criticised Nikolić, asking him to acknowledge the
facts as a genocide. The association’s president, Kada Hotić, recognised that “This statement
is a big step forward and I welcome it, considering what the current president of Serbia use
[d] to say before 10 or 20 years. However, he apologized on behalf of the crime, and not on be-
half of genocide.” Remiković and Jovanović. “Analysts say Nikolic’s Srebrenica apology is sig-
nificant.”
 “Nikolić: Izvinjavam se za zločin u Srebrenici.” Novosti.rs  April .
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:431190-Nikolic-Izvinjavam-se-
za-zlocin-u-Srebrenici (21 February 2015).
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these countries’ common foreign policy objective of EU membership, but also of
high costs, due to the potential domestic backlash resulting from the legacies of
the recent conflicts,with their stocks of reactive memories which may be used for
popular mobilisation.
The rational-choice approach to reparation decisions employed in this chap-
ter may help us understand the process of apologies for Srebrenica. It highlights
how, in the presence of high benefits and high costs, apologies come accompa-
nied by a strategy of ambiguity, allowing political actors to maximise the bene-
fits of apologising while minimising the risk of domestic backlash.
Public apologies thus exert a double function. First, they are signals of an
ongoing process of reconciliation, without which they would not be possible,
as politicians would face prohibitive threats for their careers. Second, they are
catalysts of additional change, since they help neutralise the conflict potential
of reactive memories, thus further reducing domestic costs and allowing the
process of reconciliation to continue. The process tracing of the three apologies
given for Srebrenica validates this framework of analysis and helps to explain
their ambiguous and partial nature.
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Part 2: Sites of Memory Transmission

Sophie Oliver
The Spatial Choreography of Emotion at
Berlin’s Memorials: Experience,
Ambivalence and the Ethics of Secondary
Witnessing
Even in the future, when we will have to do without direct encounters with witnesses, we
need not lose our emotional involvement. People three or four generations removed from
the Holocaust, and people without German roots, also feel deeply moved when they see
the names of Holocaust victims written on their suitcases at Auschwitz, or when they stum-
ble upon the ruins of the destroyed crematorium in the forsaken expanse of Birkenau, or
when they read ‘The Diary of Anne Frank’ or watch the film ‘The Pianist’. What we see
time and again is that autobiographies, documentaries, feature films, interviews with sur-
vivors and visits to the former sites of horror can make past suffering accessible to young
people and inspire them to open up their souls to it.
Bundespräsident (German Federal President) Gauck, 27 January 2015¹
On 30 August 2012, the German weekly Die Zeit carried the headline, superim-
posed onto a portrait of Adolf Hitler, “When will the past pass?”² The three-
page article that followed was concerned with the dwindling significance of Hol-
ocaust remembrance for a new generation of Germans keen to shake off the bur-
den of guilt; a generation of young people, of both German and immigrant de-
scent, who are increasingly resistant to any form of identification with the
dark past of their nation. Perhaps, writes the author of the article, this is just
the logical consequence of the passing of time. In any case, he concedes with
regret, one thing is clear: he will not be able to pass on to future generations
the historical lesson or ‘package from the past’ [Vergangenheitspäckchen] that
he once received, not with “the same content and weight.”³ The concern about
how to preserve the memory and meaning of the Holocaust and other human
tragedies in ways that may continue to instruct and serve as a warning to future
generations is not a new one, but as the time when survivors and eyewitnesses
will no longer be around to assist in these efforts draws nearer, it has become
 Speech of Joachim Gauck, President of Germany on Holocaust Remembrance Day,  January
. Online at http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Re
den///-Bundestag-Gedenken.html ( April ).
 “Wann vergeht die Vergangenheit?” Die Zeit No. .  August .
 “Das Vergangenheitspäckchen, das ich einst bekommen habe, werde ich nicht mit exakt dem-
selben Inhalt und demselben Gewicht weitergeben können.” Bernd Ulrich. “Wer sind wir,
heute?” Die Zeit No. , , .
more urgent than ever. In response to this situation, many cultural memory prac-
titioners are abandoning traditional forms of historical pedagogy in favour of
new, experimental and experiential ways of (re)presenting the past.⁴ Character-
istic of this development is the move towards encouraging interactive, embodied
and experience-based forms of reception, in particular at museums and memo-
rials. Such experiential cultural memory models seek, through a range of inno-
vative, multi-medial technologies and narrative strategies, to “transform by-
standers and later generations into ‘secondary witnesses’”;⁵ that is, to lead
them beyond mere spectatorship towards the kind of active, empathic and eth-
ical engagement more akin to witnessing. This trend has been observed at a
number of so-called “memory museums”⁶ as well as at “authentic” sites of trau-
ma, such as the former Nazi concentration camps. The attempt to provide visitors
to such sites with an authentic and engaging experience is frequently accompa-
nied by what German historian Matthias Heyl describes as a “choreography of
emotion.” In line with this “choreography”, he explains, specific affective re-
sponses to sites of historical trauma are either prescribed (sadness, empathy, a
sense of injustice) or prohibited (indifference, amusement). Heyl views this phe-
nomenon critically, arguing that attempts to direct visitors’ behaviour and emo-
tional responses can backfire, alienating rather than engaging audiences, partic-
ularly among the young.⁷
 The term “cultural memory” was developed by Jan and Aleida Assmann, and refers to the
ways in which memory is exteriorised, objectified and transmitted through symbolic forms
and objects, for example monuments, museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic insti-
tutions.
 Jens Andermann and Silke Arnold-de Simine. “Introduction: Memory Community and the
New Museum.” Theory, Culture and Society . (): .
 For a discussion of the meaning of this term see Silke Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum
and Museum Text: Intermediality in Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum and WG Sebald’s Aus-
terlitz.” Theory, Culture, Society . (): –.
 “Durch die Sphäre der Befangenheit wird ein verdruckter Erwartungshorizont geschaffen, der
signalisiert, dass die Gedenkstätte ein besonderer emotionaler Raum sei, die gegen Re-
gelverstöße geschützt werden muss […] Wir wissen aber, dass Drastik und Überwältigung ebenso
dazu geeignet sind, Zugänge eher zu verschließen, wie wir um das Widerstandpotentiel Jugend-
licher wissen, die sich – m.E. zurecht – dagegen wehren, wenn sie zum Objekt einer ‚Choreog-
raphie der Emotionen’ von außen gemacht werden. Gerade die hohe soziale Erwünschheit ge-
wisser emotionaler Reaktionen blockiert die emotionale Auseinandersetzung zuweilen.”
Matthias Heyl.Mit Überwältigendem überwältigen? Auf die nationalsozialistischen Massen Verbre-
chen bezongene Gedenkstätten und Emotionen. Keynote Speech at the Berlin-Brandenburgische
Forum für zeitgeschichtliche Bildung . http://lernen-aus-der-geschichte.de/Lernen-und-
Lehren/content/ ( April ).
96 Sophie Oliver
This article builds upon Heyl’s analogy of a choreography of emotion in
order to consider, in a more literal sense, the ways in which memory spaces func-
tion – or are designed to function – to evoke emotional and ethical forms of re-
ception in their interlocutors as part of an embodied performance of cultural
memory. I examine visitor experiences at two well-known Holocaust memorial
spaces that espouse an experiential and emotional approach to cultural memo-
ry: the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and the Jewish Museum, both
in Berlin. At these sites, architectural space and form are the central props
through and upon which the apparent authenticity of emotion and experience
is choreographed. We have to do here, specifically, with a spatial choreography
of emotion – one that is inspired, I suggest, by an ethics of reception based in
empathy and affect. As with all choreographies, however, it is completed only
by the presence and the movement of bodies. In this sense, all choreography
is to some extent also an improvisation. It is the bodies of the visitors who
come to the museum or memorial with their own experiences, attitudes and
identities that complete the performance of remembrance; as we might expect,
such encounters can produce unexpected and – to some – undesired responses.
Nonetheless, supporters of memorial spaces such as the Jewish Museum Berlin
and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe remain convinced of the power
of experience and affect to engage audiences personally and ethically with the
past and, especially, with the victims of historical trauma. Drawing on empirical
observations of visitor experiences at these two memory spaces, this article ex-
plores some of the implications of the experiential turn in cultural memory, re-
flecting in particular upon the notion of ethical spectatorship within this con-
text. I begin by providing some background on the emergence of experiential
cultural memory practices, highlighting the influence of new approaches in mu-
seum pedagogy, particularly in relation to redefining the role of the visitor-spec-
tators. In the second section of the paper, I examine in more detail the two Ber-
lin-based sites, focusing on the ways in which the spatialities of each are
designed so as to place an emphasis on affect, experience and open interpreta-
tion. Finally, I turn to visitors’ own reflections on the sites in order to ask what
the effects of this experiential approach within cultural memory practice might
be. To what extent can visitors be said to fulfil (or perceive themselves to be ful-
filling) the role implicitly attributed to them as participants of, or witnesses to,
the cultural memory of historical trauma? Does the experiential approach pro-
vide a useful response to the threat of amnesia and moral disengagement that
many see as being the future of Holocaust remembrance, or does it merely
give rise to more ambivalence and forgetting?
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The experiential turn in cultural memory
practice: some background
A hands-on experience of history – the DDR Museum is not an exhibition to regard […] the
visitor has to take part.⁸
The German Emigration Center is full of state-of-the-art museum technology, beginning
with the admission ticket, an iCard […] Each iCard contains the story of an individual
who either emigrated to the New World or found a new home in Germany. The iCard
also activates many audio stations and interactive displays making a museum visit a thor-
oughly personal and emotional experience. Individual information and pictures enable
identification with the actual person and invite visitors to become more involved with
their story and, thus, the history.⁹
How does one engage publics in a past that for many seems less and less rele-
vant to the present? The citations above, from the websites of the GDR Museum
in Berlin and The Emigration Museum in Bremerhaven, northern Germany, illus-
trate the interactive and experiential approach taken in recent years by a number
of institutions tasked with safeguarding the memory of important historical
events. Both museums emphasise the use of interactive technology and active
spectatorship as a means of providing visitors with an experience of the past
that is personal, emotional and, as a result, engaging. The GDR museum, descri-
bed on its website as “interactive, playful, vivid, entertaining and scientifically
well-founded”, promises visitors the “opportunity to experience the GDR every-
day life yourself” and invites them to partake of such “authentic” experiences as
driving in a simulator Trabi (Trabant, a car commonly produced in Soviet East
Germany) and exploring a replica East German living room.¹⁰ The concept at
the German Emigration Museum, named European Museum of the Year in
2007, is similar: visitors are taken on an imagined journey, beginning in the
“waiting hall” on a replica wharf of Bremerhaven – from which over 7.2 million
emigrants departed for the New World in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
– and ending at Grand Central Station in New York. Even the physical discomfort
of a voyage by boat is replicated, as one is made to walk through a swaying cor-
ridor, giving the feeling of “being at sea”. If they choose, visitors may dress up in
“historic emigrant clothing” and have a photograph taken as a keepsake. The
pièce de résistance, however, is the state-of-the-art iCard with which each visitor
 DDR Museum Website. http://www.ddr-museum.de/en/museum/ ( November ).
 Deutsches Auswanderer Haus Bremerhaven. http://www.dah-bremerhaven.de/en.museum.
php#Museumstechnik ( November ).
 DDR Museum Website. http://www.ddr-museum.de/en/museum/ ( November ).
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is presented before embarking on his or her journey. These electronic boarding
passes bear the name and identity of someone who either emigrated from or im-
migrated to Germany, and can be used throughout the exhibition to activate in-
formation terminals, where visitors can learn more about the life of the person
on their card.
The approach espoused by these museums is more than simply a means of
attracting crowds; it also reflects a fundamental change in attitudes towards
learning in museums and in the way visitors themselves are imagined. As Eilean
Hooper-Greenhill observes, recent decades have seen a shift in museum peda-
gogy “from thinking about visitors as an undifferentiated mass public to begin-
ning to accept visitors as active interpreters and performers of meaning-making
practices.”¹¹ This increasingly “democratic” approach to learning in museums
has been described as part of the “New Museology”, replacing the didactic
ethos of Victorian museum culture with “more reflexive and multicultural ap-
proaches” in which museum experts “no longer disseminate knowledge to
eager masses awaiting enlightenment” but rather “facilitate the active learning
of diverse visitor groups.”¹² The constructivist exhibition model developed by
George E. Hein is a perfect example of this experiential approach; in it “learning
is conceptualized as a process of experiencing the world and making sense of it
in one’s own mind within the context of one’s own cultural background.”¹³ In
other words, the visitor is no longer told what to think, but rather encouraged
to come up with his or her own interpretation of the material presented. In
many ways, this seems to be a liberating and entirely positive development, em-
braced by so-called memory museums as a means of renegotiating the codes and
practices of the traditional history museum. As Silke Arnold-de Simine explains:
These museums define themselves not just as sites of academic and institutional history
but as spaces of memory, exemplifying a shift from a perceived authoritative master dis-
course on the past to the paradigm of memory which supposedly allows for a wider
range of stories about the past.¹⁴
 Eilean Hooper-Greenhill. “Studying Visitors.” A Companion to Museum Studies. Ed. Sharon
MacDonald. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, , .
 Debbie Lisle. “Sublime Lessons: Education and Ambivalence in War Exhibitions.” Millenni-
um – Journal of International Studies  (): .
 Andrea Witcomb. “Interactivity: Thinking Beyond.” A Companion to Museum Studies. Ed.
Sharon MacDonald. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, . –, . For Hein’s own explan-
ation of the constructivist model, see George E. Hein. “The Constructivist Museum.” Journal for
Education in Museums  (): –.
 Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text”, . This last claim, Arnold-de Sim-
ine suggests, needs to be critically interrogated.
The Spatial Choreography of Emotion at Berlin’s Memorials 99
In the context of museums dealing with the cultural memory of historical trau-
ma, however, we might question whether such an open and tolerant approach is
always desirable.Writing on war exhibitions, Debbie Lisle is critical of what she
sees as New Museology’s too liberal stance on what counts as truth. There may
be cases, she suggests, where certain perspectives or interpretations may indeed
quite rightly be considered unacceptable. Should we tolerate, for example, the
perspective of Holocaust deniers or Neo-Nazis when creating the concept for a
museum on the Second World War? By seeking to correct the restrictive, top-
down didactics of the Victorian model, Lisle argues, New Museology has allowed
today’s curators “to avoid difficult decisions about truth, objectivity and bias by
invoking the norms of diversity, equality and tolerance”; in this sense, she sug-
gests, inclusivity may have the effect “of closing down critical space rather than
opening it up to diversity.”¹⁵
And yet, to say that New Museology adopts a more open pedagogical ap-
proach is not to assume that new museums act without intentions or desired ef-
fects. In many cases, the range of appropriate responses is set even before visi-
tors arrive. At sites of Holocaust remembrance, in particular, the question to ask
may not be whether in some cases it is preferable for museums to adopt a clear
moral stance, as Lisle suggests, but rather whether this is ever even avoidable.
The majority of visitors to such sites will already have a clear idea of what is ex-
pected of them, being to some extent already influenced by the codes and ex-
pectations that determine how one “ought” to respond to Holocaust narratives.
It would, moreover, be naïve to imagine that experiential exhibition models do
not produce specific intended effects of their own. As Arnold-de Simine notes:
The key feature of all the memory museums is that they encourage visitors to empathise
and identify with individual sufferers and victims, as if ‘reliving’ their experience […] Aim-
ing principally to achieve an emotional impact, memory museums provide people with an
experience and confront them with a moral imperative – which more often than not places
them at odds with their self-proclaimed objective of self-reflexivity.¹⁶
According to Andrea Witcomb, dialogic exhibition spaces such as those we have
been discussing “use the full range of creative arts [including interactivity] to
 Lisle. “Sublime Lessons”, . Hooper-Greenhill says something similar in her book Muse-
ums and the Shaping of Knowledge, when she writes that “the total experience (in living history
or interactive exhibits), the total immersion (in gallery workshops and events) can have the func-
tion, in the apparently democratized environment of the museum marketplace, of soothing, of
silencing, of quieting questions, of closing minds.” Eilean Hooper Greenhill, Museums and the
Shaping of Knowledge. New York: Routledge, , .
 Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text,” .
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construct a highly immersive, experiential environment” in order to create an
“aesthetic where there is a space for poetic, affective response.”¹⁷ Thus, while
visitors may not be told in so many words what to think, the immersive and ex-
periential nature of the exhibits will likely function in such a way as to influence
how they feel within the museum or memorial space. The theory is that engaging
the emotions through bodily activity makes for more effective and memorable
learning than is achieved through traditional “look but don’t touch” didactic ap-
proaches, in part because of the immediacy and apparent authenticity of affect.¹⁸
As a teacher in a study conducted by Eilean Hooper-Greenhill into school pupils’
learning experiences at museums comments: “Emotional response is the catalyst
[for learning] because it’s real.”¹⁹ Affect, it is suggested, increases our sense of
moral engagement because it provides a sense of personal connection to the sub-
ject matter at hand; as Hooper-Greenhill explains: “emotions are personal; they
are our way of claiming something as our own. An involvement without emotion
is distant, unengaged, essentially uninvolved.”²⁰ A learning encounter that is
experiential, embodied, and emotional can, she suggests, be formative in a
long-lasting and deep – even ontological – sense: “tacit learning shapes
subjectivities.”²¹ In this light, it seems particularly suited to the kind of learning
that many cultural memory spaces purport to provide. And yet, it is precisely this
type of emotional coercion that critics such as Matthias Heyl find problematic. In
the context of the cultural memory of historical trauma, the experiential ap-
proach reflects not only the pedagogical but also the moral or ethical priorities
of the institutions involved. Emotion is seen as a catalyst for moral transforma-
tion; its choreography through interactive exhibits, personal narratives and other
devices is thus more than a simple attempt to educate visitors about the past, it
seeks to implicate each individual within the sphere of responsibility implied by
the duty of remembrance. Nowhere is this more evident than at sites of Holo-
caust remembrance.
 Witcomb. “Interactivity: Thinking Beyond,” .
 As Hooper-Greenhill puts it: “The conscious processes of verbal experience, which involve
speaking, reading, listening, are not enough to engender true learning; the feeling processes,
which are largely unconscious, must also be engaged and the way to do this is through bodily
action. The research data shows the power of active bodily engagement to generate enjoyment,
knowledge, understanding and enhanced self-confidence.” Eilean Hooper-Greenhill. Museums
and Education: Purpose, Pedagogy, Performance. London and New York: Routledge, , .
 Hooper-Greenhill. Museums and Education, .
 Ibid.
 Ibid, .
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The spatial choreography of emotion:
architecture and embodied experience at
Holocaust memorials and museums
The United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum in Washington offers one of
the most well- known examples of a memory museum that combines interactive
and narrative elements in order to provide visitors with an experiential encoun-
ter with the cultural memory of historical trauma. A much debated ‘immersive’
prop used by the museum are the ‘identity cards’ with which visitors are present-
ed on entering. An accompaniment to the permanent exhibition, these small
booklets describe the experiences of someone who lived in Europe during the
Holocaust and are designed to “help visitors to personalize the historical events
of the time.”²² Interactive elements such as this, combined with other details of
exhibition design – the inclusion of individual photographs of victims, and of
replicas of original artefacts, for example – go a long way to creating the type
of emotive and engaging experience that, according to the museum website
“with unique power and authenticity […] teaches millions of people each year
about the dangers of unchecked hatred and the need to prevent genocide.” A
major part of the museum’s effectiveness lies not only in the objects and artefacts
presented, however, but in the space in which they are housed. From the outset,
the architectural design of the space privileged an emotional understanding of
the Holocaust, and was tailored to provide visitors with an affective experience
appropriate to the gravity of the subject matter. As the architect James Ingo Freed
explains:
I felt intuitively that this was an emotional building not an intellectual building […] I don’t
believe that you could ever understand the Holocaust with the mind. You have to feel it.²³
It is not meant to be an architectural walk, or a walk through memory, or an exposition of
emotion, but all of this. I want to leave it open as a resonator of emotions. Odd or quiet is
not enough. It must be intestinal, visceral; it must take you in its grip.²⁴
 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Division of Education online. Resources for the
Classroom: Identification cards. http://www.ushmm.org/education/foreducators/resource/pdf/
idcards.pdf ( September ).
 James Ingo Freed. “The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.” Assemblage  ():
, .
 Ingo Freed. “The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,” .
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In order to heighten the experience, Freed sought to produce in visitors a feeling
of separation and alienation from the city they were in, to mark both spatially
and acoustically that they were entering a different realm: “We disorient you,
shifting and re-centering you three times, to separate you emotionally as well
as visually from Washington.”²⁵ In addition to this spatial separation of visitors
from their normal, “outside” lives, the museum’s architectural form – and its ma-
nipulation by the exhibition designers – makes use of movement to direct or
choreograph visitors’ bodies in ways that provoke particular physiological and
emotional effects. As Edward Linenthal explains:
The feel and rhythm of the space and the setting of mood was important. Appelbaum [the
head of the design team] identified different qualities of space that helped to mediate the
narrative: constrictive space on the third floor for example, where the visitors enter the
world of the camps, the space becomes tight and mean, heavy and dark.²⁶
Appelbaum himself has commented that he sought to recreate for visitors the
feeling of flux and movement that existed during the years of exile and persecu-
tion under the Nazi regime. This inclusion of an embodied and emotive experi-
ence of movement was, he explains, central to the empathy-based pedagogy of
the museum:
We realised that if we followed those people under all that pressure as they moved from
their normal lives into ghettos, out of ghettos into trains, from trains to camps, within
the pathways of the camps, until finally to the end…[i]f visitors could take that same jour-
ney, they would understand the story because they will have experienced the story.²⁷
This emphasis on the movement of visitors’ bodies, and on the haptic and sen-
sory aspects of visitor experience as catalysts for empathic affect, marks the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum out as one of the earliest attempts
to enact what I am calling the spatial choreography of emotion. Its innovative
design prefigures similar architectural approaches at Holocaust museums and
memorials built around the world, including the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe and the Jewish Museum in Berlin. Both are similar to the Wash-
ington museum in that they enact what is first and foremost an architectural ex-
perience. As we shall see, in these memory spaces, the material aspects of the
 Ibid, .
 Edward T. Linenthal. “The Boundaries of Memory: The United States Holocaust Museum.”
American Quarterly . (): .
 Ralph Appelbaum. “For the Living.” WETA-TV (PBS) transcript, roll , t-, –, cited in
Linenthal. “The Boundaries of Memory,” .
The Spatial Choreography of Emotion at Berlin’s Memorials 103
architectural design and the space itself, in which visitors move, speak, and
breathe, are at the core of the experience offered to the public.
The Jewish Museum
Even before the official opening of Berlin’s Jewish Museum in 2001, more than
350,000 visitors queued to visit the empty building designed by Polish born ar-
chitect Daniel Libeskind, securing the status of the new museum as a major ar-
chitectural highlight in the city’s ever evolving urban landscape. Originally in-
tended as an annex to the existing city museum, Libeskind’s design altered
the very parameters of the architectural competition launched by the city plan-
ners: not only has the Jewish Museum gained its own, fully independent identity,
but its own extension in the form of an academy and research centre has recently
opened across the street. Libeskind’s proposal was – in the words of James
Young – a “spatial enactment of a philosophical problem”, namely, “how does
a city ‘house’ the memory of a people no longer at ‘home’ there?”²⁸ His response
to this problem drew on resources well beyond the anticipated confines of archi-
tectural design: a broken Star of David, plotted on a map of pre-war Berlin; an
unfinished opera; an essay by Walter Benjamin and a list of the names of Jewish
inhabitants of the city deported to concentration camps.²⁹ The title of the propos-
al, “Between the Lines”, referred to what Libeskind described as “two lines of
thinking, organisation, and relationship. One is a straight line, but broken into
many fragments; the other is a torturous line, but continuing indefinitely.”³⁰ Be-
tween these two lines, as between the architectural lines of the museum, there
emerges a series of voids, indicating the absence of Jewish life in Berlin since
the Shoah.³¹ The unique spatiality of Daniel Libeskind’s design – cold empty
spaces bordered by jagged edges and irregular, leaning concrete walls, the angu-
lar, zinc clad exterior punctured by a series of gashes or slits – provides both a
literal and metaphorical representation of absence and discontinuity. Simultane-
ously on the verge of becoming and of unbecoming, the building was to serve –
in Libeskind’s own words – as “an emblem where the not visible has made itself
apparent as a void, an invisible.” In line with the New Museology approach de-
 James E. Young. “Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memo-
rial Architecture.” Jewish Social Studies . (): , .
 Daniel Libeskind. The Space of an Encounter. London: Thames and Hudson, , –.
 Libeskind. The Space of an Encounter, .
 Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text,” .
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scribed above, Libeskind placed spectator experience at the core of his philo-
sophical concept: “The idea is very simple: to build a museum around a void
that runs through it, a void that is to be experienced by the public.”³² For Libe-
skind, the design of this museum offered an opportunity to rewrite the museum
script, including the role played by visitors. “The museum form itself”, he assert-
ed, “must be rethought to transcend the passive involvement of the viewer.”³³ A
key stage in this process, and an important side effect of Libeskind’s deconstruc-
tive design, has been to usurp the didactic structures of the traditional exhibition
space, thereby destabilising visitors’ expectations. As James Young explained in
2000:
Instead of merely housing the collection, this building seeks to estrange it from the viewer’s
own preconceptions. Such walls and oblique angles, [Libeskind] hopes, will defamiliarize
the all-too-familiar ritual objects and historical chronologies.³⁴
The museum’s exhibits have in many ways become secondary to the spatial top-
ography of the building itself, transforming it into a memorial space that troubles
the very historical narratives it holds, and forces visitors to think differently
about what a museum does. According to Naomi Stead, the Jewish Museum Ber-
lin proposes a complex overlapping of museum, memorial and monument: “the
museum as archive, for the collection and display of historical objects, the mu-
seum as memorial, for the provocation of memory in its visitors, and the muse-
um as monument, the physical embodiment of memory.”³⁵ And yet, the Jewish
Museum is not a Holocaust memorial, even if it is frequently mistaken for one.
As the deputy director of the museum Tom Freudenheim stated in 2001:
“We’ve been very assertive about not being a Holocaust Museum. The Holocaust
is inescapable here anyway, since the building has a Holocaust Tower and Libe-
skind’s architecture has all kinds of suggestive issues, if you want to read the
building in a certain way […] It’s a very important and a critical part of [the]
story and we’re not trying to downplay or underplay it or push it away, but it
isn’t the whole story of the history of the Jews in Germany.”³⁶ The “story” that
 Daniel Libeskind. “Between the lines.” Daniel Libeskind: Erweiterung des Berlin Museums mit
Abteilung Judisches Museum. Ed. Kristin Feireiss. Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, , .
 Libeskind. The Space of an Encounter, .
 Young. “Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum,” .
 Naomi Stead. “The Ruins of History: allegories of destruction in Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish
Museum.” Open Museum Journal  (): .
 Tom L. Freudenheim, Gautam Dasgupta, and Bonnie Marranca. “Berlin’s New Jewish Muse-
um: An Interview with Tom Freudenheim.” Journal of Performance and Art  vol. . ():
.
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the museum exhibition would like to tell, critic Peter Chametzky suggests, is one
of German-Jewish contributions to intellectual, scientific and artistic life; a story
of “assimilation and cooperation” that might be used to “promote a qualified tol-
erance of cultural diversity in contemporary Germany – to define the German na-
tional narrative as one that can be inclusive of religious and ethnic difference.”³⁷
This narrative, of course, runs contrary to the message communicated through
the building’s architectural voice. Indeed, there is a marked difference in
mood between the two floors of the museum – the upper floor housing the per-
manent exhibition, with its often cheerful celebration of German-Jewish culture
(epitomised, perhaps, in the vending machine offering kosher Haribo sweets),
and the lower floor, which visitors explore first. This lower space is made up
of three intersecting windowless “axes” or corridors. The Axis of Exile, with its
uneven and ascending floor, leads outside to the Garden of Exile, and is framed
by increasingly narrow, slanting walls. The Axis of Continuity forms a path con-
necting the old building of the museum with the staircase leading up to the ex-
hibition levels. It is interrupted or cut across by the Axis of the Holocaust, which
itself leads to the dead end of what has become known as the “Holocaust
Tower”: an unheated, twenty-four metre tall void lit only by a small opening
in the top corner of the space. This “voided void”³⁸ echoes the other empty, un-
heated and unlit voids that run vertically through the new building, and which
refer, according to Libeskind, “to that which can never be exhibited when it
comes to Jewish Berlin History: Humanity reduced to ashes.”³⁹
One of the most common readings of this spatial design, beyond an analysis
of its possible metaphorical meanings, is to emphasise its emotional impact
upon visitors. The museum building is said to provoke an “emotional and psy-
chological disturbance in the visitor” akin to a shattering of the ego.⁴⁰ Its archi-
tecture, it is argued, wants to invoke a “feeling of disorientation and irritation”,⁴¹
it destabilizes visitors, “somatically inducing feelings of displacement, empti-
ness, loss.”⁴² Observations within the space, as well as many visitors’ own ac-
counts of the museum, would seem to support this analysis. A sense of disorien-
tation is visible on faces and in body language, as visitors wonder which path
 Peter Chametzky. “Not What We Expected: The Jewish museum Berlin in Practice.” Museum
and Society . (): .
 Libeskind. The Space of an Encounter, .
 Daniel Libeskind, citied on Jewish Museum Berlin Website, http://www.jmberlin.de/main/
EN/-About-The-Museum/-Architecture/-libeskind-Building.php ( November ).
 Stead. “The Ruins of History,” .
 Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text,” .
 Chametzky. “Not What We Expected,” .
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they are supposed to take, which axis should come first. On one occasion, I ob-
served a man asking one of the museum guides for directions, only to be told
that in this lower level, there is no direction: each must decide for him or herself
which way to walk around the exhibit. Other visitors reflected critically upon the
order in which they had decided to view the space: coming out of the “Holocaust
Tower” one Frenchman commented to his group: “It’s difficult. It’s the end. We
should have done that at the end.” The result, for many, is a sense of unfamiliar-
ity and apprehension expressed in a cautious and uncertain step, and the fre-
quent looking around to locate companions. As one visitor expressed it:
The ground floor is very uncomfortable – all these empty rooms, highlighting the curves
and sharp angles. You feel unsure, unconfident and fearful. You need to do some efforts
to go further, every step seems to be difficult, you feel a balance disorder.⁴³
Visitor books – which are in general completed after visitors have been through
the permanent exhibition on the upper level – refer again and again (though by
no means always) to the experiential or emotional effects of the building. Com-
ments such as: “The Void Monument – I cried”, and “L’architecture fait vivre une
réele histoire [the architecture brings history to life]” seem to confirm, at least
partially, the interpretation of the museum as “an experiential space [which]
tries to generate visceral reactions and emotionally as well as psychologically
disturbing effects of disorientation in museum visitors.”⁴⁴ The emotional disturb-
ance experienced by visitors has been interpreted by some scholars as a form of
re-enactment or re-living of the process of mourning. As Stead puts it:
The museum is able to function as a memorial without conventional monumentality, since
each visitor ‘performs’ the commemoration as a function of his or her passage through the
space. The museum is thus ‘worked through’ in a choreographed process analogous to
Freud’s work of mourning.⁴⁵
 The visitor accounts cited in this article were collected over a period of two years between
 and , through various methods, including informal interviews, an online survey
and an examination of visitors’ own written accounts of their experiences in visitor comment
books at the sites and on online blogs. In some cases, as here, I have drawn from student essays
written for the course ‘Testimony and its Reception in th Century Literature, Art and Film’ that
I taught at the University of Potsdam in the Summer Semester of .
 Arnold-de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text,” . Arnold-de Simine lists this ex-
periential reading of the museum as one of three possible readings, the two other being meta-
phorical (the museum as metaphor that it is the visitor’s responsibility to interpret) and allego-
rical (the museum as emblem).
 Stead. “The Ruins of History,” .
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The Jewish Museum Berlin takes on an “antimonumental monumentality” for
Stead, to the extent that it privileges the individual experience of each museum
visitor as part of a “performance” of mourning and commemoration.⁴⁶ The em-
phasis here is upon the notion of active spectatorship; the idea, central to the
New Museology approach, that interpretation is open. This concept is clearly ex-
pressed on an information panel at the bottom of the stairs as one enters the
lower floor. Citing Libeskind, the panel instructs visitors about the architectural
concept: “What is important is the experience you get from it. The interpretation
is open.” This assertion of openness and inclusion does not go unappreciated by
visitors, as the following comment indicates:
I really liked being a part of the monument – that my own feelings symbolised something,
that they meant something. I could really experience the installations with (almost) all of
my senses. This kind of experience was very personal because certainly every person thinks
about the same things in a different way.⁴⁷
And yet, despite claims of openness, there are elements of the lower floor of the
Jewish Museum that act in ways that most certainly guide or direct visitors’ emo-
tions. Even if, arguably, the architectural experience may be open to interpreta-
tion, the museum’s display practices seem to counteract this endeavour, cleav-
ing, in David A. Ellison’s words “to a more conventional style at odds with the
building’s larger claims to auratic abstraction.”⁴⁸ An example of this occurs at
the entrance to the Garden of Exile, where an information panel makes clear
the intended effects of the space. Another citation from Libeskind informs visi-
tors about the sensations a stroll through the forty-nine columns on slanting
ground will evoke in them, and about the interpretation they should make of
the experience: “One feels a little sick walking through it. But it is accurate, be-
cause that is what perfect order feels like when you leave the history of Berlin.”
Small prompts such as this make clear the intended effects of the museum space
and point, however subtly, to the choreography of emotion at work there.
 Ibid, .
 Extract from a student essay, written for the course “Testimony and its Reception in th Cen-
tury Literature, Art and Film”, Potsdam, .
 David A. Ellison. “The Spoiler’s Art: Embarassed Space as Memorialisation.” The South At-
lantic Quarterly . (): .
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The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe
The memorial’s design is experience-based, insofar as it aims to create a particular emo-
tional experience among visitors who walk through the vast field of stelae […] It is intended
to elicit a somatic, corporal form of memory, based not primarily on reflection but on emo-
tional experience.⁴⁹
Like the Jewish Museum Berlin, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe
has been described by scholars as an experiential memorial space in which emo-
tion is privileged over intellectual engagement with historical facts. Opened to
the public in 2005, after more than a decade of debate and controversy,⁵⁰ the me-
morial occupies a large plot in the centre of Berlin, between Brandenburg Gate
and Potsdamer Platz. It was designed by New York based architect Peter Eisen-
man (originally in collaboration with sculptor Richard Serra), and consists of an
undulating field of 2,711 concrete stelae, which visitors may enter and exit from
any angle. Given that Libeskind once studied under Eisenman, it is not surpris-
ing that this memorial should possess the same kind of “auratic abstraction”
often associated with the Jewish museum.While criticised by some, the abstract
elements of the design – there is little signage, and, if one fails (as many do) to
visit the information centre underneath, nothing to indicate the intended pur-
pose of the memorial – reflect both Eisenman’s own conceptual struggle with
the problematic of aestheticizing the Holocaust, and his stated desire to leave
the site open to all uses and interpretations. As he famously commented: “You
can’t tell them what to do with it. If they want to knock the stones over tomor-
row, honestly, that’s fine. People are going to picnic in the field. Children will
play tag in the field. There will be fashion models modeling there and films
will be shot there. I can easily imagine some spy shoot ’em ups ending in the
field. What can I say? It’s not a sacred place.”⁵¹ Not a sacred or “authentic”
place, (though building, as Irit Dekel suggests, literally and figuratively, on the
palimpsest of Berlin’s historical memory, including Goebbel’s headquarters
 Kirsten Harjes. “Stumbling Stones: Holocaust Memorials, National Identity, and Democratic
Inclusion in Berlin.” German Politics & Society . (): .
 These debates and the process of commissioning the memorial are well documented else-
where. See, for example James Young. “Germany’s Holocaust Memorial Problem – And
Mine.” The Public Historian . (): –.
 “How long does one feel guilty? SPIEGEL Interview with Holocaust Monument Architect
Peter Eisenman”Spiegel Online International,  September . http://www.spiegel.de/inter
national/spiegel-interview-with-holocaust-monument-architect-peter-eisenman-how-long-does-
one-feel-guilty-a-.html ( November ).
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and Hitler’s bunker nearby⁵²), the memorial does not stand for anything. It is not
intended to be read as a symbol; it is, Eisenman has somewhat cryptically ex-
plained, “what Immanuel Kant calls the Ding an sich. It is a Thing; it is there
[…] you cannot represent that which defies description.”⁵³ And yet, it is clear
from Eisenman’s comments elsewhere that he did have a specific effect in
mind when he designed the memorial. In an interview for Die Zeit, Eisenman ex-
plained that he did not wish to represent the Holocaust (in any case for Eisen-
man an impossible and flawed task), but rather to produce an experience of un-
certainty for visitors: “They should ask: what is this? Where am I?” Even more
striking (and precise) is his assertion that at the memorial, “the cognitive expe-
rience should give way to the emotional”.⁵⁴ Eisenman, then, wanted the memo-
rial to provoke an affective experience for visitors, causing them to question
themselves and the very process of remembrance and memorialisation itself.
He has to a large extent been successful in this aim. As Hanno Rauterberg
wrote in his comments accompanying a dedicated photo essay about the site,
the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is a space that cannot be fully cap-
tured through the eyes, it is not a memorial to be looked at, but must rather be
experienced in three and even four dimensions. This is not a landscape of re-
membrance [Erinnerungslandschaft], he suggests; what has been created is a
landscape of experience [Erfahrungslandschaft].⁵⁵ The “experience” offered by
this space is sensory and embodied; visitors walk through and interact with
the Field of Stelae, get lost within it, while all the time absorbing the sounds,
textures and shadows it – and its other visitors – produce. For Kirsten Harjes,
this kind of design departs from traditional memorial models in that it offers
“a form of memory that is more tangible, tactile, and authentic”, a memorial
in which “the visitor emotionally and physically participates in the memory”.⁵⁶
As at the Jewish Museum, a walk through this memorial is designed to be disori-
enting: narrow spaces, cold concrete, and uneven floors give one the sensation
 Irit Dekel. “Pan-topia: Exposing the Palimpsest of Meanings at the Holocaust Memorial, Ber-
lin.” History and Theory: The Protocols Bezalel Academy of Art and Design  (). http://
bezalel.secured.co.il/zope/home/en/ ( November ).
 Peter Eisenman. Interview(s) with Johan Åhr. Johan Åhr. “Memory and Mourning in Berlin:
On Peter Eisenman’s Holocaust-Mahnmal.” Modern Judaism . (): , .
 “Was ist noch Kritisch?” [Interview with Die Zeit and Peter Eisenman led by Thomas Asshe-
uer, Hanno Rauterberg, Ullrich Schwarz] Zeit Online,  January . http://www.zeit.de//
/_eisenman-intervi.xml ( November ).
 Hanno Rauterberg. “Baustelle des Gedenkens.” Holocaust Mahnmal Berlin. Baden: Lars Mül-
ler Publishers, , .
 Harjes.”Stumbling Stones: Holocaust Memorials, National Identity, and Democratic Inclu-
sion in Berlin,” .
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of being lost, unsure and uncertain on one’s feet. Visitor accounts of the site in-
dicate that a number of people experienced rather strong – and often disturbing
– emotional responses, using words such as ‘claustrophobic’, ‘confusing’, ‘op-
pressive’ and ‘trapped’ to describe how they felt.⁵⁷ One visitor admits: ‘I was
not exactly scared, but I remember that it felt strange and eery [sic]. I was so re-
lieved when I saw one of my friends again because the situation made me feel
alone and disoriented.’⁵⁸ Reported physiological responses included goose pim-
ples, increased heart rate and general feelings of tension.⁵⁹ In travel blogs de-
scribing the memorial, words such as ‘eerie’, ‘chilling’, ’sobering’, ‘unsettling’,
‘isolated’ and ‘alone’ appear over and over again, with one woman describing
the concrete stelae of the memorial as ‘looming menacingly’, adding that she
‘emerged again with relief ’ on the other side of the memorial. Another blog writ-
er stresses the unexpected feeling of loneliness within the otherwise busy public
space:
I walked deep into the middle and with each uneven step I seemed to descend from where I
had started at street level. I could no longer see the horizon; all I could see were gray stones
surrounding me, towering over me. Under my feet was a grid pattern which seemed to sim-
ulate the larger grid I was lost in. I looked up to the sky for some orientation, but the in-
distinct, overcast sky provided no texture for me. From the screams and laughter in the dis-
tance I knew I wasn’t alone, but for that moment I felt alone, completely and utterly
alone.⁶⁰
These types of affective and even physiological response are welcomed by Ei-
senman, who despite his stated desire to leave the memorial open to all interpre-
tations and interactions, confessed: “I have heard people say they were in awe
and felt a sense of speechlessness; their hands got moist, and I am pleased
with these kinds of reactions.”⁶¹ And yet, simple observation on any day of
the week will prove that Eisenman was correct in his prediction; the memorial
is different things to different people. For young children with little previous
knowledge of the Holocaust, it is a joyous playground. For a number of my re-
spondents the experience was barely affective at all. For the author of the follow-
 These responses were collected by the author between  and  through an online
survey entitled “Experiences of Memory”.
 Extract from a student essay, written for the course ‘Testimony and its Reception in th Cen-
tury Literature, Art and Film’, Potsdam, .
 Response to the survey “Experiences of Memory”.
 Pillar Perspectives Blog  June . www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs///Pillar
+Perspectives+-+Holocaust+Memorial+Berlin?destId= ( October ).
 Åhr. “Memory and Mourning in Berlin,” .
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ing travel blog, the Memorial was simply another stop on a long list of tourist
attractions, equal in interest and importance to the site of a celebrity faux-pas:
We saw the Brandenburg Gate, Parliament House, the hotel where Michael Jackson dangled
his baby over the balcony, the Holocaust Memorial and other buildings.⁶²
Similarly, at the Jewish Museum, it would be inaccurate to say that all, or per-
haps even most visitors were deeply emotionally moved by the space, or, if
they were, that they necessarily interpreted this as a form of remembrance or
commemoration of Holocaust victims. Even for those who did report signs of
emotional unsettlement, we might question the cause or source of their appa-
rently affective experiences – were these visitors simply feeling what they
thought they should feel? Was their account of the experience influenced by
what they thought I, as a researcher, wanted to hear? In other words, shouldn’t
we treat the notion of authenticity with suspicion, even, or especially when used
in relation to emotions? As important as these questions are, I would like to set
them aside for now; let us for the sake of argument accept that at least some vis-
itors do genuinely experience emotional unsettlement at these sites. The ques-
tion still remains: what is the effect of all this? Does such affect enable visitors
to better understand and respond with empathy to the suffering of victims, and
does it encourage them to re-evaluate their role within the landscape of cultural
memory?
Constructing chronotopes of witnessing:
Experience, emotion and transformation
The [United States Holocaust Memorial] Museum needs to elicit in its visitors an imaginary
identification – the desire to know and to feel, the curiosity and passion that shape the
postmemory of survivor children. At its best, it would include all of its visitors in the gen-
eration of postmemory. The Museum’s architecture and exhibits aim at just that effect; to
get us close to the affect of the event.’⁶³
Marianne Hirsch’s suggestion that all visitors to the United States Holocaust Me-
morial Museum might in some sense adopt, through their experience of the
space, the role of carriers of memory in a way similar to the children of survivors,
 Angela and Nicole MacCaster. “Berlin.” Travel Blog. http://www.travelblog.org/Europe/Ger
many/Berlin/Berlin/blog-.html ( November ).
 Marianne Hirsch. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, , .
112 Sophie Oliver
reflects a belief – also held to a certain extent by the museum designers – that
providing visitors with an embodied, emotional experience will involve them in a
way that exceeds mere unattached spectatorship and leads them more towards
the position of (secondary) witnesses. A similar assumption could be and has
been made about the possible impact of our two Berlin-based memory spaces.
Memorial spaces such as these are, as Andrew Gross has commented, designed
to “act out the trauma of the Holocaust as architecture; walking through them is
supposed to be a step towards working through that trauma as feeling and
experience.”⁶⁴ Both aim to engage their interlocutors on an embodied, emotional
and ethical level: it is not only (or not at all) about leaving with a more accurate
knowledge of the facts of the Holocaust; indeed, at the Holocaust Memorial,
many visitors overlook or decide not to explore the information centre at all.
Rather, the aesthetic encounter with the memorial space itself is conceived as
a moment of “witnessing”; a unique and corporeal experience, characterised
by intense and often unsettling affect that, it is alleged, provides a deeper under-
standing of the other’s trauma. That this kind of empathic affect might possess
ethical or transformative potential is acknowledged by psychologist Martin Hoff-
man and, to a lesser extent, Dominick LaCapra in their separate work on ‘em-
pathic distress’ and ‘empathic unsettlement’. Both concepts adopt a broad def-
inition of empathy in terms of its manifestation as affect. Empathic
unsettlement or distress can accommodate a range of emotions from discomfort
to fear or sadness, to anger and a sense of injustice. For LaCapra, empathic un-
settlement consists in “being responsive to the traumatic experience of others,
notably of victims” and involves “a kind of virtual experience through which
one puts oneself in the other’s position while recognizing the difference of
that position.”⁶⁵ According to LaCapra, opening oneself to empathic unsettle-
ment is pedagogically useful because “it complements and supplements [the]
empirical research and analysis” of traditional historiography by helping us to
“understand traumatic events and victims”.⁶⁶ For Hoffman, empathic distress
may also serve to motivate pro-social attitudes and behaviour, thus transforming
passive spectators into active, ethical witnesses. Empathic distress becomes a
form of witnessing, he suggests, “when it becomes so intense and penetrates
so deeply into one’s motive system that it changes one’s behaviour beyond the
immediate situation”, inspiring one to act on behalf of suffering others in both
 Andrew Gross. “Holocaust Tourism in Berlin: Religion, Politics, and the Negative Sublime.”
Journeys: The International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing . (): .
 Dominick LaCapra. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, , .
 Ibid, .
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general and specific ways.⁶⁷ The potential for empathy to promote witnessing at-
titudes has also been explored by E. Ann Kaplan in her work on atrocity
images.⁶⁸ Kaplan cites a particularly poignant passage from Susan Sontag’s On
Photography, in which Sontag describes how deeply moved and altered she
had been after viewing images of the Bergen-Belsen and Dachau concentration
camps for the first time: “Nothing I have seen – in photographs or in real life –
ever cut me as sharply, deeply, instantaneously. Indeed it seems plausible to me
to divide my life into two parts, before I saw those photographs (I was twelve)
and after.”⁶⁹ Despite Sontag’s own critical reflections upon the viewing of atroc-
ity photographs, it is clear that in some sense her early encounter with what are
by now iconic images of suffering constituted a “breaking point” in her under-
standing of the world – one that may well have initiated her lifelong political en-
gagement with human suffering and its representation. Indeed, this is a convinc-
ing example of a witnessing attitude emerging from a personal experience of
empathic distress after a mediated encounter with the suffering of others. For Ka-
plan, witnessing involves “feeling so shocked by suffering that one is moved to
act.”⁷⁰ “In witnessing”, she writes, “we understand empathy’s potential social
impact, especially when it is deeply and enduringly felt”⁷¹ – as in the case of
Susan Sontag’s experience. But witnessing is not the only possible outcome of
empathy, as Kaplan is careful to explain. Indeed, there are cases where too
much affect or the “wrong” type of empathy may work against ethical or political
engagement. Kaplan uses the term “empty empathy” to describe “the transitory,
fleeting nature of the empathic emotions that viewers often experience; [when]
what starts as an empathic response gets transformed into numbing by the suc-
cession of catastrophes displayed before the viewer.”⁷² In other words, she sug-
gests, overexposure to (re)presentations of suffering and empathic or affective
over-arousal can in fact limit our capacity for pro-social behaviour. There are
cases, she notes, when “the empathic response to an image of catastrophe [is]
 Martin L. Hoffman. “Empathy, Justice, and the Law.” Empathy: Philosophical and Psycholog-
ical Perspectives. Eds. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ,
–.
 E. Ann Kaplan. “Global trauma and public feelings: Viewing images of catastrophe.” Con-
sumption Markets and Culture . (): –; “Empathy and Trauma Culture: Imaging Cat-
astrophe.” Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Eds. Amy Coplan and Peter
Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, , –.
 Susan Sontag. On Photography. New York: Anchor Doubleday, , –.




so strong and so painful that the individual turns away, or thinks distracting
thoughts, unable to endure the feelings aroused.”⁷³ In this case, not only does
too much empathy have a paralysing effect, disabling the observer’s capacity
for pro-social action, but the experience of empty empathy itself becomes a
form of harm or violence against spectators, disempowering them and, in
some cases, leaving them traumatised themselves.
The trouble with images that arouse empty empathy is the passive position such pictures
put the viewer in […] they do not move the viewer to action. They rather make one feel
hopeless.⁷⁴
Some visitor accounts of our two Berlin memorials seem to support this view. In
one woman’s account, the experience of affect and empathic unsettlement is ac-
companied by over arousal and paralysing feelings of dejection and hopeless-
ness. For this woman, the Jewish Museum represented the culmination of a ser-
ies of affect-filled cultural memory experiences in Berlin that resulted in a kind
of ethical disempowerment:
While all of the historical information we took in was incredible, it took an emotional toll
on my husband and I. There’s just no way that you can tour Berlin’s Nazi sites and muse-
ums without coming to the conclusion that most Germans were culpable in the rise of Hitler
and the majority carried out his fanatical and genocidal policies without question. In the
Jewish Museum cafeteria, I covered my face with my hands. “So basically, most humans
are evil”, I said to him. “Pretty much”, he replied.⁷⁵
My own personal response to the Jewish Museum was similar. Visiting it for the
first time, I found myself gradually overwhelmed by the space; my discomfort in
the museum was palpable and culminated in my viewing of an installation by
Menashe Kadishman. Kadishman’s work is made up of hundreds of metal
faces laid on the floor in one of the “voids” that are so central to the architecture
of the museum. These faces are meant to represent, I assumed, the Jewish vic-
tims of the Holocaust, and are laid out in such a way that visitors can walk
over them. On witnessing this performance of interactive spectatorship, I expe-
rienced a very physical feeling of nausea. The effect of empathic unsettlement
for me was that I left the memorial space immediately, unable to continue my
tour of the museum and its exhibits. And yet, I am still writing and thinking
 Ibid.
 Ibid, .
 “Berlin: Third Reich Site.”Chris Around the World: A travel journalist’s tips from the road.
http://caroundtheworld.com////berlin-third-reich-sites/ ( March ).
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about the experience today, years later, just as the woman in my previous citation
wrote and reflected upon her experience after the event.
There is some evidence that the Holocaust Memorial, while often emotional-
ly or physically distressing to visitors, also served to increase the sense of under-
standing and ethical engagement of some respondents, either by providing them
with the physical and temporal space to reflect or by prompting a recognition of
the responsibility of visitors to abstain from certain forms of behaviour, with the
ensuing a motivation to act upon that recognition by confronting other visitors:
Being in Berlin and visiting the memorial brought all of my latent feelings and emotions
about the Holocaust into very sharp focus […] My visit to Berlin was a whirlwind of activity;
visiting the Memorial provided me with a moment of calm. ⁷⁶
I generally remember that it was always very intense moments walking through the memo-
rial. The slight loss of orientation, the disconnection to what happens outside the memorial
when diving into it and the quietness are encouraging emotions and thoughts. Apart from
these feelings I always felt anger and frustration about people running around, shouting
without any signs of reflection. I was often tempted to confront them to think about
what they do and where they are doing it.⁷⁷
Some visitor accounts of the memorial clearly indicated a progression from em-
pathic distress to a subsequent process of reflection and even ethical engage-
ment, both in relation to the Holocaust as the original event, and to the com-
memorative function of the memorial. This is especially evident in the
following blog entry:
The vibe I am getting at the site was – LOST. A frustrating sentiment I am sure that every
Jew experienced during the Holocaust. Then another vibe was – PANIC. I don’t know but I
just felt hysteria. And lastly – WHY. I mean why the murder? It did not have to happen,
right? I believe that art only speaks to you when you let it, and it’s very special when it
does.⁷⁸
Other accounts – both solicited and unsolicited – focus on the impact and be-
haviour of other visitors. For some, children playing hide and seek among the
stelae was disturbing and disrespectful; for others it was something positive,
“a sign that the memorial was engaging the imagination of the visitor, reaching
 Response to the survey “Experiences of Memory”.
 Response to the survey “Experiences of Memory”.
 “Holocaust Memorial Berlin.” Dutched Pinay Travel Diaries. http://misstph.blogspot.de/
//holocaust-memorial-in-berlin.html ( November ).
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out to them on different levels, the emotional as well as the intellectual.”⁷⁹ Inter-
action with other visitors was in some cases even viewed as an indicator of the
existence of a community bound by a shared burden of remembrance: “Through
encountering other spectators, we consider not only the space but ourselves as
spectators and as individuals that share a history.”⁸⁰ In the case of the following
blogger, not only does the experience of empathic unsettlement encourage re-
flection or confrontation with major ethical and social questions, it also provides
a source of personal catharsis.
I’m a little tired and I know that reflected in the bell-bottom of each of my tears are some
slight visions and reflections of more immediate personal heartaches of (maybe) missing
home and (certainly) family who my heart is missing now and from the past as I begin
this huge journey. My body has seized the opportunity; found its excuse to let it all leak
out a little bit.⁸¹
In all of the cases I am citing here, it is impossible to know in concrete terms if
and how these visitors’ experiences altered their subsequent behaviour, beyond
encouraging them to reflect and speak about the memorial spaces. As Susannah
Radstone has warned, there is a danger that the processes of traumatic identifi-
cation encouraged by sites such as these may come to replace more traditional,
and perhaps more effective modes of political engagement.⁸² And yet, it does
seem plausible to suggest that the visitors cited have undergone some kind of
transformation as a result of their experiences. If we can speak of a witnessing
moment, then this moment occurs, I would argue, not in the experience of affect
or unsettlement, but in the decision to reflect upon this experience with others.
Many who visit these sites do chose to write or speak about their experience, or
to post photographs and short films of their visits online. The sharing network
You Tube is replete with such videos – from extracts of a tourist’s amateur hol-
iday film to recordings of complex dance choreographies performed within the
memorial space. Such online testimonials are often intended to educate or in-
form others who may not be able to visit the sites – one blogger, for example,
published a post dedicated to encouraging those who visit Berlin to engage
 “Friday photo – Children at the Holocaust memorial in Berlin.  April ” Heather on her
Travels.http://www.heatheronhertravels.com/ (  November ).
 Extract from a student essay, written for the course “Testimony and its Reception in th Cen-
tury Literature, Art and Film”, Potsdam, .
 Berlin: History, blisters and wide open spaces. http://www.travbuddy.com/travel-blogs/
/Berlin-History-blisters-wide-, ( November ).
 Susannah Radstone. “Memory Studies: For and Against.” Journal of Memory Studies .
(): . Cited in Arnold de Simine. “Memory Museum and Museum Text,” .
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with its Holocaust history. Of the three sites she recommends, the two she de-
scribes most fervently are the Jewish Museum and the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe.
Conclusion
The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and the Jewish Museum in Berlin
construct a spatial aesthetics in which affective experiences of empathic distress
are encouraged via complex interactions of space, form and the movement of
bodies. Whether this spatial choreography of emotions will necessarily promote
a deeper understanding of trauma and ethical engagement in visitors is by no
means a given; indeed, empirical research seems to suggest that visitor respons-
es are as much characterised by ambivalence as they are by empathy or concern.
Even when empathy or affect is present, it can have the effect of alienating or
paralysing visitors, rather than encouraging them to become engaged politically.
When something akin to ethical witnessing or transformation does occur, it usu-
ally takes the form of an act of reflection or working through: visitors “bear wit-
ness” publically, either through conversation and debate with friends and collea-
gues or, often, through the use of digital media. A short look at the many and
varied comments such digital testimonies inspire demonstrates the extent to
which such forms of (inter)active engagement with cultural memory can accord
memorial visits with an “afterlife”, the potential influence of which is limitless.
In all cases, however, it is crucial to acknowledge the significance of that which
visitors themselves bring to the aesthetic encounter with the memorial space.
Their previous knowledge, expectations and experiences will all have an effect
on their experience. For it is they who participate in and perform the choreo-
graphic moment – sometimes supporting, sometimes challenging the narrative
of the space. Indeed, I would suggest, it may be precisely this spectatorial am-
bivalence, this possibility for unconditioned and unchoreographed responses
that provides such memorial spaces with the potential to produce moments of
ethical reception or witnessing. Historical memory, like personal memory, is nei-
ther stable nor a-political; it cannot guarantee consensus or unity, whether on
the macro level of national and transnational politics, or on the micro level of
individual encounters with ever-expanding cultural memory practices. In some
ways, both the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and the Jewish Museum
Berlin offer an eloquent response to Adorno’s critique about poetry after Ausch-
witz; neither tries to represent the Holocaust in a way that draws a line under the
past in any redemptive sense, instead they testify to the impossibility of doing so.
118 Sophie Oliver
Perhaps it is in this act of witnessing against the possibility of a final, redemptive
testimony that visitors to both sites can most ethically partake.
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Birga U. Meyer
The Universal Victim – Representing Jews
and Roma in a European Holocaust Museum
Although the Holocaust is being commemorated throughout Europe, the idea
that its memory has a common European form is usually denied. Scholars
argue either that each nation state has its own form of national commemoration
or that national differences override any common European memory. However,
the research on which this denial is based rarely takes more than one nation
state into account and,where it does, it emphasizes the distinctiveness of nation-
al elements. Following Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, I believe that the mem-
ory of the Holocaust is comprised by local, national, European and even global
elements simultaneously.¹ The binary distinction between a national and Euro-
pean memory, however, positions one form of memory against the other so
that the ways that they combine and interact are no longer visible.
In this article, I will analyze the representation of Jewish and Roma victims
as one crucial component within Holocaust representations.² Examining the per-
manent exhibition at the Holocauszt Emlékközpont/Holocaust Memorial Center
(HDKE) in Budapest, I ask how this exhibition constructs a narrative about
the victims through pictorial and textual representations and explore the extent
to which these representations build on an imagined concept of victimhood. The
HDKE is a particularly striking example of museum representations, because it
stands within the traditions of so-called Holocaust museums and references in-
ternational Holocaust commemoration while also explicitly countering the dom-
inant right-wing discourse about the Holocaust in Hungary.
 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider. Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust. Frankfurt/
M.: Suhrkamp, . –. The term global is misleading as it suggests unity within memory
constructions both in the western and in the non-western world dominated by the West. For a
critique on the claim that Holocaust memory is global, see Jeffrey C Alexander. “On the Social
Construction of Moral Universal: The ‘Holocaust’ from War Crime to Trauma Drama.” European
Journal of Social Theory .(): –, .
 Aiming to identify European, national and regional elements and their interrelations in Hol-
ocaust representations, my dissertation analyzes permanent exhibitions in history museums in
Hungary, Austria and Italy. Historical culture and memory can be analyzed by turning to their
cultural products. Klas-Göran Karlsson. “The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture.” Ech-
oes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe. Eds. Klas-Göran Karlsson and
Ulf Zander. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, , –, .
Framing the image of victims in the Holocauszt
Emlékközpont exhibition in Budapest: between
European and national commemoration
After the Hungarian parliament decided in March 2002 to establish the HDKE,
the centre was quickly set up in a former Orthodox Synagogue in a small side
street of the 9th district in Budapest.³ It opened on 15 April 2004 with a temporary
exhibition on the Auschwitz-Album, including, in addition to this exhibit, a hast-
ily put together one on the persecution of the Roma.⁴ A permanent exhibition cu-
rated by Judit Molnár then opened in April 2006.
The centre does important work to commemorate the Holocaust, facilitate re-
flection on and stimulate more research about it. The exhibition itself addresses
the issues of the Hungarian perpetrators, portrays Hungarian society as respon-
sible and holds it accountable. The Holocaust is treated as an important topic for
Hungarians in general instead of as a separate one relevant only to Jewish com-
munities. The narrative spans the period from 1920 to 1945 and thus deals with
both the time before and after the German occupation in 1944. It treats the Hol-
ocaust as a historic period of its own merit instead of comparing it to the crimes
committed during Communism. Last but not least the exhibition is dedicated to
both the Jews and Roma persecuted in Hungary, which thereby expresses empa-
thy and solidarity with these victims of the Holocaust.⁵ Hence, the centre coun-
ters a dominant, right-wing discourse that idealizes the Horthy area, externalizes
responsibility, downplays the Holocaust by comparing it to the Communist
crimes and denigrates its victims.⁶
 On its founding see Brigitte Mihok. “Erinnerungsüberlagerungen oder der lange Schatten der
Geschichtsverzerrung.” Ungarn und der Holocaust. Kollaboration, Rettung und Trauma. Ed. Bri-
gitte Mihok. Berlin: Metropol, , –, .
 The exhibition about the Roma was put together by the Romedia Foundation, the Roma Press
Center and the Roma Ethnographic Collection three weeks before. János Bársony and Ágnes
Daróczi. Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma During the Holocaust. Budapest: Idebate Press,
, iv.
 Opening panel “What is the Holocaust”, Section .
 A good overview of the dominant discourse can be found in Randolph L. Braham. “Hungary
and the Holocaust: The Nationalist Drive to Whitewash the Past.” The Treatment of the Holocaust
in Hungary and Romania during the Post-Communist Era. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. New York:
Columbia University, , –; Éva Kovács and Gerhard Seewann, “Ungarn. Der Kampf
um das Gedächtnis.”Mythen der Nationen.  – Arena der Erinnerung. Ed. Monika Flacke. Ber-
lin: Deutsche Historisches Museum, , –.
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The HDKE’s critique of the dominant discourse is unusual for Hungary and
for Hungarian museum representations of the Holocaust.⁷ What the centre pres-
ents reflects the international shift within Holocaust historiography towards per-
petrator history and the representation of the suffering of the victims as tragedy.
The HDKE’s architecture and design cite internationally acclaimed Holocaust
commemorations seen in Washington, Jerusalem and Berlin.⁸ Both historiogra-
phy and references to international museum sites align the HDKE with acclaimed
Holocaust museums, secure its position as a valid site for Holocaust commemo-
ration and accredit its narrative. At its outset, then, the HDKE is positioned be-
tween the Hungarian national discourse on the Holocaust and international
scholarship and commemoration of it. Scholars usually applaud the initiative
to commemorate the Holocaust in Hungary, but the location and design of the
centre have received criticism, as have inconsistencies within the exhibition
and the fact that the museum fails to represent the period after 1945.⁹
The simultaneous presence of international and national Holocaust com-
memoration continues in the exhibition design and the narrative presented.
The exhibition, found in the basement of the centre, develops its narrative
through widely accepted strategies for historical displays. It consists of three hi-
erarchical layers. The first presents the main narrative, the second personalizes it
and the third provides supplementary information about it. The main narrative is
conveyed via text, illustrated with images. The text is the crucial element for con-
veying the main message about the base content and ensuring that the objects
 The most well-known representation of the Holocaust in Hungary is the one in the Terror
House, which denigrates Holocaust history. Regina Fritz and Katja Wezel. “Konkurrenz der Erin-
nerungen? Museale Darstellung von diktatorischen Erfahrungen in Ungarn und Lettland.” Aufar-
beitung der Diktatur – Diktat der Aufarbeitung? Normierungsprozesse beim Umgang mit diktator-
ischer Vergangenheit. Ed. Katrin Hammerstein. Göttingen: Wallstein, , –.
Representation in the National Museum, the Military Museum and the small Holocaust Museum
in Hódmezővásárhely are equally problematic. The Jewish Museum or the Glass House also pres-
ent alternative stories to the dominant discourse.
 Regina Fritz and Imke Hansen. “Zwischen nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Stand-
ards. Der Holocaust im ungarischen Erinnerungsdiskurs.” Universalisierung des Holocaust? Erin-
nerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in internationaler Perspektive. Ed. Jan Eckel and Claudia Moi-
sel. Göttingen: Wallstein, , –, .
 Criticism on the location, the choice of the synagogue and the architecture of the centre has
been voiced by many. For a good overview see Mihok. “Erinnerungsüberlagerungen oder der
lange Schatten der Geschichtsverzerrung,” . Among others Regina Fritz’s diverse works criti-
cize the exhibition. For example Regina Fritz. “Wandlung der Erinnerung in Ungarn. Von der
Tabuisierung zur Thematisierung des Holocaust.” Zeitgeschichte  (): , –, .
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on display are understood accordingly. A main text panel, which also holds one
photo or material object indexical to the theme, introduces each of the eight sec-
tions. Longer text panels then further explicate the content, illustrated by several
photos, documents and sometimes film images. The main narrative is personal-
ized through family histories and biographical panels on the side.¹⁰ Five fami-
lies, four Jewish and one Roma, are presented on TV-screens in most rooms.¹¹
In the videos, a narrator tells the family stories alongside moving and still im-
ages so that text (in this case spoken) again features prominently. The visitor
can find supplementary content on the touch screens and on the less central
panels. The touch screens in part include the same text, photos and documents
shown in the main exhibition area but also provide additional information and
more photos or documents. The most important supplements here are video in-
terviews of survivors speaking on the theme established in a room.
The narrative begins with the presentation of a relatively calm good time be-
fore the Holocaust, covers discrimination and expropriation and reaches a cli-
max with the mass murders. It ends with a description of the liberation of the
concentration camps and the war-trials in Hungary. In this, the exhibition fol-
lows accepted Holocaust historiography, which usually highlights the same
stages of before, during and after the persecution. The national narrative
about the Holocaust in Hungary is presented within this frame, for example
by discussing discrimination through turning to the Horthy Regime and its anti-
semitic laws. The broader European narrative thus runs alongside the national
one. As is the case in most exhibitions, the perpetrators and their actions define
the exhibition outline. The whole exhibition is thus structured through the per-
petrator perspectives.¹²
The visitor encounters a tragic story of the victims. Since tragedy has become
the general mode of Holocaust representation, this is no surprise.¹³ While the
texts and photos make the tragedy overt, the exhibition design foreshadows it.
The visitor steps into a dark and gloomy ambiance dominant throughout the ex-
 The biographic panels, hung on the side and in smaller font, present a famous victim and
parallel her or him with a Hungarian with a similar story. For example Anne Frank is paralleled
with Lilla Ecséri. Panel “Anne Frank” and “Lilla Ecséri”, Section .
 Sections  and  do not present family stories.
 Holtschneider first analyzed this for the Holocaust exhibition at the Imperial War Museum.
K. Hannah Holtschneider. The Holocaust and Representations of Jews. History and Identity in the
Museum. London/New York: Routledge, , .
 Jeffrey C. Alexander brilliantly analyzes the presentation of the Holocaust as tragedy.
Alexander. “On the Social Construction of Moral Universal: The ‘Holocaust’ from War Crime
to Trauma Drama.”
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hibition space. Except for the white seventh Section, the walls, floor and ceiling
of the exhibition are painted black. The panels are grey with the occasional use
of orange to highlight individual texts or panels. Yellow spotlights cast limited
light onto the panels. Along the walls, white neon lights have been inserted
into horizontal lines that lead the visitor from one room to the next and not
only provide light for walking and a sense of direction but also symbolize Jewish
life lines, running out towards the end of the exhibition. Sad melancholic music
runs on repeatedly and fills the whole exhibition with sound. The fixed walkway
that the visitor has to follow forms a circle from the courtyard, through the ex-
hibition, into the renovated synagogue and either out to the memorial wall or
to the café and the museum bookstore. The linear structure, where beginning
middle and end are clearly defined, suggests that the visitor has encountered
the complete story of the Holocaust in Hungary – which displays loss and sad-
ness, climaxes in mass murder and ends with the commemoration of the dead.
Sadness and loss, the death of the victims, are absolute at the HDKE. The
story here diverges from other European victim representations, which do ad-
dress life after 1945. All exhibition elements emphasize the death of the victims,
be it the walkway, the design, the frame, the images or the textual narrative. The
victims die and disappear and no longer challenge post-war society.¹⁴ This is in
part due to the specific history of the Holocaust in Hungary, where most Jews,
especially those in the countryside, were killed. For Roma another story would
need to be told, as a larger group survived.¹⁵ In both groups, however, people
survived and returned to Hungary where they faced serious difficulties. The ab-
soluteness of death depicted at the HDKE excludes those who returned, however,
and hinders the reflection on post-war Jewish and Roma life in Hungary. The ex-
hibition also fails to address the attitude of the general population towards the
survivors, the difficulties to reestablish Jewish communities, the ongoing perse-
 The exhibition represents survivors on the touch screens, in biographic panels and through
family stories. Compared to the stories of the dead, who are given more space, a more prominent
place and whose stories are repeated, the stories of survival remain marginal. The final text
states that “the hundreds of thousands who had been murdered could not be brought back
to life” and “the few who did survive ‘continued dying’ after the liberation even though
‘, deportees had returned home’ “. The opening panel “Liberation and calling into ac-
count”, Section ; the panel “The fate of Hungarian Jews and Roma”; Touch screen “The fate
of Hungarian Jews and Roma”, Section .
 As research on the Roma is still fragmentary, reliable numbers are hard to establish. An es-
timated one in three died. János Bársony. “Hungarian Pharrajimos, the Unexplored Territories of
the Roma Holocaust and Its Aftereffect.” The Holocaust in Hungary: A European Perspective. Ed.
Judit Molnár. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, , –, –.
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cution of the Roma, the question of memory, and continuing Antisemitism and
Racism in post-war Hungary.¹⁶
Fig. 1: Neon lights in the permanent exhibition of the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest.
 Fritz and Hansen. “Zwischen nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Standards. Der
Holocaust im ungarischen Erinnerungsdiskurs,” .
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Defining Jews – the representation of Jewish
victims at the HDKE
Before becoming the mostly dead victims, Jews first are first constructed as a co-
herent group.¹⁷ Taking both text and photos into account, it becomes evident
that Jews living in Hungary are defined as a group whose main characteristics
are national belonging, modernity, urbanity and a bourgeois culture and self-un-
derstanding. The exhibition presents them as carriers of the capitalist enterprise
in Hungary and as such, they are shown as beneficial to the nation.¹⁸ The text
says that Jews made significant contributions to the economy, to culture, to sci-
ence and to the arts in Hungary.¹⁹ It states that they mostly spoke Hungarian and
self-identified as Hungarians. Accordingly, the curator emphasized their national
belonging, so-to-speak nationalizing all Jews, primarily by adding Hungarian be-
fore the word Jew, labeling them as compatriots or by nationalizing names and
places.²⁰ Including Jews within the nation, the museum makes a conscious ref-
erence to the dominant discourse in Hungary that questions whether Jews are to
be regarded as Hungarian or to be excluded from the national body. Questioning
national belonging was essential in the antisemitic discourse in the early nine-
teenth century and continues to be important today.²¹ That Jews are presented as
 For the most part, this is accomplished through the panel “The Jews in Hungary”, through
the touch screens “Jews and Roma in Hungary”, “Our Compratiots” and through the family his-
tories, all presented in Section .
 This is emphasised for example when the text on economic exclusion states that “Hungarian
Jews as a group were among the most successful in Europe. Due to their early participation in
capitalist development, they occupied strong positions in industry, commerce and banking. An
especially great number of Jewish individuals chose economic, intellectual, scientific and artis-
tic careers.” Touch screen “Deprived of Property. The Pauperization and Despoilment of Hungar-
ian Jews, –”, Section .
 See for example the photos on the touch screen labeled “Our compatriots”, Section . Here
the Jews and Roma who contributed to Hungarian society are shown and their profession or con-
tributions listed.
 Panel “Jews in Hungary”, Section ; Touch screen “Our compatriots”, Section ; Opening
panel “Responses”, Section . Nationalization even extends to foreign land, in particular to
Auschwitz-Birkenau, described as “The largest cemetery in Hungarian history”, Opening panel
“Deprived of Life”, Section . This references the speech that Dr. Bálint Magyar, the Minister
of Education, made in Auschwitz on  April . Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum. The Citizens Be-
trayed – In Memory of the Victims of the Hungarian Holocaust. Budapest: MNM, , .
 Fritz and Hansen. “Zwischen nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Standards. Der
Holocaust im ungarischen Erinnerungsdiskurs.” . Aside from proposing an alternative inter-
pretation, this implicitly affirms the projection that Jews might pose a problem to the nation
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beneficial to the nation further situates their persecution as tragedy, suggesting
that capitalist, scientific and cultural development was lost through it.²²
While nominally denying that Jews were a coherent group, the curator has
constructed one nonetheless.²³ The group’s homogeneity is based on the omis-
sion of those who do not fit into the above categories. Not discussed in their
own right are religious Jews, especially of Orthodox faith, the Yiddish speaking
communities and women. Gestured towards but less significant are working
class Jews and those of rural communities. It is striking how little Orthodox
Jewry is addressed explicitly.²⁴ Omitted in the main text and unmarked in
most images, Orthodox Jewry does appear in the story of the Galpert-Ackermann
family, which followed the Orthodox faith. However, alluding to a dichotomy be-
tween traditional and modern, the exhibition implicitly devalues the Orthodox
faith.²⁵ Overall, both the Neolog and Orthodox faiths are treated as private and
individual matters.²⁶ Consequently, the museum does not address the impact
that the persecution had on practicing Jews, the desecration of the synagogues
and scriptures and discrimination based on religion.²⁷
Gender as a social category is also not discussed. Leaving gender unmarked,
the exhibition presents a classic perspective, relegating women to the private or
if they are not Hungarian. A perceived danger posed by those who did not opt for complete as-
similation is defused. István Deák. “Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Hun-
gary.” Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. Ed.
Randolph L. Braham. New York: Columbia University, , –.
 This suggests the problematic notion that the Holocaust was tragic due to the value of the
victims.
 The exhibition states that “The Jewish population of Hungary was diverse both culturally
and socially.” But this is not represented in the exhibition, Panel “The Jews in Hungary”, Section
.
 I am grateful to Dr. Katalin Pécsi who directed my attention to the imbalanced representation
of Orthodox Jews in the exhibition.
 Words such as ‘old’, ‘traditional’, ‘strict’ or ‘ancient rules’ are positioned as a binary to a
modern, less religious life, which is described in more positive terms and characterized as inte-
grated and accepted. For example the “Galpert-Ackermann family” and the “Singer family”, Sec-
tion .
 In the rare cases where religion is represented, it is a private matter of the individual.Where
Jewish communities appear, only the Neolog movement is gestured towards and its contribution
to integration is the reason why. This can be seen in the panel dedicated to the Rabbis Lipót Löw
and Immánuel Löw. Lipót Löw is shown to have modernized the synagogue service and is high-
lighted for delivering his speeches in Hungarian. His son Immánuel Löw is said to have been a
“symbolic figure for the integrated Jews”. Panel “Lipót Löw and Immánuel Löw”, Section .
 An exception is the video showing the history of Antisemitism in which religious hatred
against Jews is the main topic. Video “History of Antisemitism” after Section .
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social sphere and men to the public realm. Men are the active agents of capitalist
Hungary while women appear at their side – this is most evident in the wedding
videos shown in Room one.²⁸ The different status between men and women is
visible but naturalized and thus inscribed as ahistorical. Different experiences
of men and women during their persecutions vanish and the Holocaust is largely
imagined through a male perspective. This remains true, even if, as I will show
later, the victims are largely presented as passive, helpless women.
Visible but less central are notions of class and the differences between
urban and rural structures. Barely representing working class environments,
the exhibition focuses on middle class and upper class Jews. They are the
ones who contributed to the nation, and they appear in most texts, images
and objects.²⁹ However, all class backgrounds are touched upon in the family
stories.³⁰ Again, emphasis is on the upper and middle classes; however, the dif-
ference that class affiliation made for the persecution is indicated in all
sections.³¹ The countryside is part of the main narrative, but the large disparity
between rural and urban structures in Hungary remains obscure. The impact of
rural structures in Hungary on the persecution, the large percentage of Jews in
some villages and the proximity between perpetrators and their victims remain
hidden.
This exclusion of gender and religion and the less prominent discussion of
class and rural structures mean that conflicts between Jews and non-Jews and
within the Jewish communities themselves remain hidden. The personal lives
of Jews – their origin, gender and class, their faith and values, their social
and economic positions, all of which affected the victims and their perception
of the persecutions – disappear in the narrative. Individuality is taken away, plu-
rality denied and Jews are merged into a homogenous group of people.
It is this homogenous group that is victimized as the exhibition continues.
Jews as active agents, as presented in Section one, disappear and instead be-
come objects in the story of their persecution. From Section two onwards, they
at best react to, but mostly silently endure, the measures against them. As the
 Wedding video, Section .
 A sense of bourgeois belonging is produced not only via text. The objects shown are all as-
sociated with a higher or middle class, for example books or binoculars. The photos show peo-
ple with typical bourgeois professions such as doctors, lawyers or journalists.
 The Hatvany-Deutsch, Chorin and Weiss families belong to the upper class, the Braun-
Wechsler and Singer family to the middle class and the Galpert-Ackermann family to the working
class. Their working class background is mentioned, but as the family story continues, it be-
comes less central to their fate. Working poor are represented through the Roma family.
 See, for example, family histories in “Deprived of Property”, Section .
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narrative unfolds, Jews are talked about, the exhibition addresses what has been
done to them, while their own thoughts, actions, and feelings are hardly
represented.³² A central dilemma in Holocaust representations is that this was
the goal of the persecutors: to dehumanize and objectify the victims. In result
many primary sources from the Holocaust do so as well, given that they were
produced by the perpetrators. Holocaust commemorations thus often strive to
give a name and a story to individual victims in order to restore their humanity
to them. To represent the Holocaust through a narrative structured through per-
petrator actions and through primary sources made by them mirrors the objecti-
fication which was the goal of the Holocaust, and also cements these sources as
all-encompassing. To instead represent the victims with agency, even if agency
only means that the people targeted had their own opinions, values and specific
reactions to the violence (that they had a life of their own) helps to present them
as human. To reflect on the objectification of the Holocaust and its reflection in
the primary sources and today’s representations can counter the perpetrators’
success in eradicating the individual traces, a success which unfortunately
still last today, as the examples mentioned above show.
The HDKE tries to counter the objectification it presents but relegates the
counter-elements to a peripheral position. The most obvious counterpoints are
the video interviews of survivors and the responses of Jews described in Section
seven.³³ In the interviews, Jews tell their own stories. These remain subjective
even when told in a descriptive tone. The voice, speech acts, facial expressions
and the fact that there is a first-person narrator make it a subjective and active
account. Unfortunately, there is no information on the survivors or their stories
aside from the brief segments presented. Shown on the touch screens as one
of many elements next to photos, documents and texts, they are presented as
add-ons, as extra information. In the hierarchy of the exhibition, the videos
rank low. They are not central to the narrative, which works equally well without
them. Furthermore, the videos are cut in such a way that the survivor narrates
 For a critique of this display mode see Mieke Bal. Double Exposures. The Subject of Cultural
Analysis. London/New York: Routledge, .
 The family stories are intended to personalize persecution. But due to the representational
mode, the family members remain objects of the measures discussed in the third person. A
few biographies deviate from this, for example the one of Miklós Nyiszli, who managed to sur-
vive serving Mengele’s staff. The panel describes how he survived due to a mixture of luck and
cleverness. Panel “Miklós Nyiszli”, Section .
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what is discussed in the section, so that the accounts are merely there to provide
subjective illustrations of the main narrative of the exhibition.³⁴
The seventh Section presents the Jewish councils, the Kasztner group and
the Zionist Youth groups.³⁵ Jewish responses to their own persecution, left out
elsewhere in the exhibition, are addressed here, but more as an afterthought.³⁶
While the groups described are still talked about, their members are juxtaposed
to “the overwhelming majority of Jews” who “received the increasing persecution
passively”.³⁷ This imagined passive majority best expresses the lack of agency
the exhibition constructs for the victims. Individual agency is limited to a few
particularly brave people. The exhibition further differentiates these few. The
Jewish Council’s members are heavily criticized and the display even goes so
far as to undermine them, explaining they have “usually made the wrong
decisions”.³⁸ The Kasztner group is shown to have been faced with the dilemma
of saving some by sacrificing others.³⁹ The exhibition narrative portrays individ-
ual agency as a complicated and critical matter, at times even making people
complicit in the persecution. The reactions of Jews leave the main narrative of
the persecution untouched. Clearly an exception to the persecution, the curators
relegate agency to the side. Thus while certain elements work against the objec-
tification of the Jews, they are less important than, or an explicit exception to,
the objectifications.
Depicting Jews– photos in museum displays
The objectification of Jewish victims is particularly striking in the visual material
provided. The photographs in Section one are mainly private photos taken by
Jews to represent themselves. They show economic activities, family portraits
or passport images of the individuals in question. In most museums, private pho-
 This is the same for interviews shown at the Imperial War Museum. Holtschneider, The Hol-
ocaust and Representations of Jews, .
 The seventh Section also covers individuals who helped Jews and members of the Sonder-
kommando, who resisted their persecution.
 Design and location of the section communicate that the reactions are less central. The sec-
tion reverses the color scheme and is presented at the very end of the exhibition.
 Touch screen “The Responses of the Persecuted – What They Knew, Why They did not Re-
sist”, Section .
 Panel “Dilemmas: the Jewish Council”, Section .
 Panel “Dilemmas: the Kasztner Group”, Section .
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tos claim to personalize and individualize the macro narrative.⁴⁰ At the HDKE
most private photos instead define Jews as Jews. The people serve as examples
of group characteristics. The personal photo then disappears from Section two
onwards. From then on the photos of victims encountered in the exhibition
can be roughly divided into photos showing discriminatory practices, such as ex-
clusion, humiliation and robbery, and photos capturing the more violent stages
of the persecution from forced labor to ghettoization and deportation to mass
murder. Most common are photos showing groups of people. It is not the individ-
ual, the family or circle of friends the photo portrays, but the people who were
victimized together.
Research has shown that museums mostly use perpetrator images and pho-
tos taken by complicit spectators, closely followed by images taken by the allies
after the liberation.⁴¹ At the HDKE this is also true, with only very few
exceptions.⁴² Because the photographer did not have to hide, these photos are
direct, clear and centered. They present a classic perspective and show the victim
who best serves the intended message. The victim is in the centre, framed by the
perpetrators, who are, in turn, framed by spectators or the landscape.⁴³ Since
these photos are often sharp and of high quality, the museum can edit, enlarge,
cut and transfer them to a different carrier with relative ease. This makes the per-
petrator and liberator photos a seemingly first choice to use.⁴⁴ Pictures taken by
those complicit with the perpetrations are, however, deeply problematic.⁴⁵ All
 This fails, as photos become mute when removed from the private context in which they are
otherwise read. Holtschneider. The Holocaust and Reprentations of Jews, .
 Ibid, .
 The most prominent exception is the photo of inmates burning bodies taken by the Sonder-
kommando in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Photos of people witnessing the persecutions who are not
complicit with the perpetrators are shown on the touch screens.
 Klaus Hesse. “Bilder lokaler Judendeportationen. Fotografien als Zugänge zur Alltagsge-
schichte des NS-Terrors. “ Visual History. Ein Studienbuch. Ed. Gerhard Paul. Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, , –, .
 The few photos taken by the victimized and people who considered the perpetration a crime,
on the contrary, are often blurred, unclear, out of focus and the object might not be positioned in
the centre. Being considered a “bad” photo in the traditional sense, these photos have been
largely ignored within museum displays. Georges Didi-Hubermann. Images in Spite of All.
Four Photographs from Auschwitz. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, .
 Images that reproduce the gaze of the perpetrators are complicit because the photographer
participated in the discrimination against the victims and legitimized the actions by clicking the
shutter. Susan Sonntag. On Photography. New York: Anchor Books, , –. According to
Cornelia Brink photos of spectators or the allies equally represent the gaze of the perpetrators
and so are also complicit. Cornelia Brink. Ikonen der Vernichtung. Öffentlicher Gebrauch von Fo-
tografien aus nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern nach . Berlin: Akademie, ,
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photographs present a perspective which is spatially and temporally specific.
They do not show historical reality, but a fragment in need of contextualization,
critical examination and interpretation.What a photo communicates depends on
its historical context and upon the present situation in which it is used and
perceived.⁴⁶ Despite this, photos tend to be seen as supporting a claim of authen-
ticity and suggest past reality. Photos complicit with the perpetration, then,
claim to show the persecution directly, head on and to depict its full reality.
Taken from the perspective of the perpetrators, however, they only reveal the per-
petrator perspective and reproduce it. If not outright antisemitic, complicit pho-
tos are at least removed from the victim, and they present that victim without
empathy or solidarity, regarding it as the perpetuator’s object. They reproduce
a strategy of victimization through showing only the victims’ persecution and
not what happened before or after. The victims have no agency.
Such photos fit well into an authoritative narrative told from the perpetra-
tors’ perspective that mirrors the chronology of persecution. While the ideologi-
cal baggage of perpetrator images is well known, museum exhibitions usually do
not address this issue and display practices with a different perspective remain
rare.⁴⁷ The photos are not used as an artifact in need of contextualization and
interpretation, but simply as illustrations of the intended narrative. Where cap-
tions are provided, they define what is seen in the picture or give additional in-
formation not directly related, instead of providing information on the photo and
its context.⁴⁸
. I believe this needs to be given a more complex interpretation as spectators and allies did
use different image strategies. For an introduction to this discussion, see Tim Cole. Traces of the
Holocaust. Journeying in and out of the Ghettos. London: Continuum, , .
 John Tagg. The Burden of Representation. Essays on Photographies and Histories. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, .
 Central questions have already been asked in the classic article on perpetrator photos by
Sybil Milton. “Images of the Holocaust – part I.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies  (): ,
–; Sybil Milton. “Images of the Holocaust – part II.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
(): , –.
 Criticism on illustration is given by Janina Struck. Photographing the Holocaust. Interpreta-
tion of the Evidence. New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd., , ; Thomas Thiemeyer. Fortsetzung
des Krieges mit anderen Mitteln. Die beiden Weltkriege im Museum. Padaborn: Ferdinand Schö-
ningh, , .
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Depicting victims – the photos from the
Auschwitz-Album at the HDKE
Iconic images of the Holocaust are used in several European museums, cropped,
enlarged or edited differently and with different captions and annotations.⁴⁹ At
the HDKE, the photos from the Auschwitz-Album are a prime example.⁵⁰ They
constitute a rare pictorial source for the handling of Hungarian deportees in
Auschwitz-Birkenau. The photos from the Album, almost certainly taken by
two SS members in charge of the identification office in the main camp, are
among the most reproduced photos of the Holocaust worldwide.⁵¹
The HDKE uses the photos from the Auschwitz-Album in several sections,
but it is in Section six, where the exhibition narrative reaches its climax, that
they are shown most. This part of the exhibition mainly discusses the violence
of the Arrow Cross in Hungary and the concentration camp system. The photos
from the Auschwitz-Album are part of a video entitled “A Day in Auschwitz”. The
video is shown on five middle-sized TV-screens, hung next to each other along a
long wall with barbed wire painted on it. The room is filled with dramatic, sad,
mourning music, punctuated with drums, which evoke a heartbeat. The video
features a stream of photos interrupted by short telegram-style titles. It begins
by stating the location as “Auschwitz-Birkenau” and informing the viewer that
it is “May 26, 1944 morning”.Within the video, the visitor then sees several pho-
tos of the victims before their selection at the ramp, and is told that this is a
“Hungarian Jewish transport from Beragszász”.⁵² Photos from the ramp are
then shown under the heading “Before lining up”, with photos from the selection
process under the caption “Selection: life is at stake”, and photos of those de-
clared unfit for work under “Doomed to die”. Towards the end of the video peo-
 On iconic images see Brink. Ikonen der Vernichtung. Iconic images are transnational as they
easily transcend national borders. Other photos along side iconic ones share the same iconic
markers, for example showing a cattle car or railroads.
 Serge Klarsfeld. The Auschwitz album: Lili Jacob’s album. New York: Beate Klarsfeld Founda-
tion, . It is still considered the best edition of the album.
 Gideon Greiff. “The ‘Auschwitz Album’. The Story of Lili Jacob.” The Auschwitz Album. The
Story of a Transport. Ed. Israel Gutmann and Bella Gutterman. Jerusalem/Oświęcim: Newton
Ltd, , –. On the album’s reception see Struck. Photographing the Holocaust, –
; Yasmin Doosry. “Vom Dokument zur Ikone: Zur Rezeption des Auschwitz-Albums.” Repre-
sentations of Auschwitz.  Years of Photographs, Paintings, and Graphics. Ed. Yasmin Doosry.
Oświęcim: Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, , –.
 Berhovo in Czech. The area was annexed to Hungary in , which is not clear in the in-
stallation at the HEK. Greiff. The “The ‘Auschwitz Album’. The Story of Lili Jacob,” .
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ple in front of the gas chambers are shown under the title “The last seconds”.
Most photos have individual captions that provide extra information, such as
“Crematoria in the background”, “Dr. Mengele smoking” or “Zyklon B in barrel
on the truck”.⁵³ The captions indicate what is to be seen by stating that the pho-
tograph shows the “Selection” “men”, “women and children”, “Dwarfs” or
“Hungarian Jews at Crematorium IV”.⁵⁴ Some captions label the victims as “de-
fenceless and humiliated”.⁵⁵ While not all photos in the installation are from the
Auschwitz-Album, all those showing victims are, except for the last one.⁵⁶ The
last photo, shown on all five screens, is from the photos taken secretly by mem-
bers of the Sonderkommando to prove the mass murder.⁵⁷ Cropped and enlarged,
the blurred image shows how Sonderkommando members were forced to burn
the bodies of the dead in ditches.⁵⁸ It is with this final photo that the video, last-
ing two minutes and thirty seconds, ends.
The video is one of the highlights of this section. Framed by an introductory
panel on Auschwitz-Birkenau and presented with additional information on the
concentration camps, the video takes up most of the space, alternating between
Hungarian and English.While the overall video is the same when the victims are
shown, different photos appear on each screen. The photos have clearly been
 The information of the caption is highlighted in yellow within the photo.
 While only some of the Album’s captions are referred to in the video, the caption here fol-
lows the antisemitic perspective of the album, highlighting a supposedly unfit character
amongst the deportees by singling out physically different people. For a discussion of the anti-
semitic ideology in the album, see Nina Springer-Aharoni. “Photographs As Historical Docu-
ments.” The Auschwitz Album. The Story of a Transport. Ed. Israel Gutmann and Bella Gutter-
man. Jerusalem/Oświęcim: Newton Ltd, , –, .
 Video “A day in Auschwitz”, Section .
 The photos from the album are also shown on the touch screen, this time in their original
format but with different captions, including the photos of those declared fit for work. The
touch screens “Deprived of Life. The Annihilation of Hungarian Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau”
and “Deprived of Life. Operation Höss”, Section . The captions differ but do not contextualize
the photos.
 For an extensive discussion of the photos from the Sonderkommando, see Didi-Hubermann.
Images in Spite of All.
 The photo was taken through a window, of which the frame is still visible in the original
image. Used as an icon, this window frame is usually cropped and the part where the bodies
are burned enlarged. Struck. Photographing the Holocaust, –. Three of the four photos
taken by the resistance in the Sonderkommando are shown on the touch screen. Only for the
photo of the women is some context provided. Its caption reads “Photograph taken by the resist-
ance movement in the camp: when the dressing rooms were full, the victims had to undress in
front of Crematorium V”. The touch screen “Deprived of Life. The Annihilation of Hungarian Jews
at Auschwitz-Birkenau”, Section .
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edited, most evident when a different frame than in the original is chosen or
parts highlighted in the photo. The camera zooms in on single aspects within
photos or pans over them. Every visitor will see at least parts of this video, as
one has to walk by the screens to get to the next section. It provides movement
and captures the visitor’s attention through the dramatic display mode. Each of
the photos would merit a closer look, but inserted into a tight and fast-paced nar-
rative, the significance of the individual photo is lost. The composition of differ-
ent photos on each screen means that emphasis is laid on their resemblances
rather than their individuality. Clearly, this presentation takes excess of meaning
and agency from the photos.⁵⁹
The photos in the video are not contextualized beyond the descriptions I out-
lined above. The video does not reveal who took the photographs, when they
Fig. 2: Video installation A day in Auschwitz in the permanent exhibition of the Holocaust
Memorial Center in Budapest.
 On excess of meaning see Susan Pearce. “Objects as meaning; or narrating the past.” Objects
of Knowledge. Ed. Susan Pearce. London: Athlone Press, , –. On the agency of the
photo Horst Bredekamp. Theorie des Bildakts. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, .
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were taken or for what reason. As for the persons depicted, their history after
1945 remains unknown, at least at this point. Their role within the video is to il-
lustrate its narrative. A later, less central panel provides a brief history of the
Album, focusing on Lili Meier, an inmate who found the Album after her liber-
ation from Dora-Mittelbau and recognised her Rabbi, members of her family and
herself in the photo. She first kept the album for herself, but donated it to Yad
Vashem in 1980. The panel tells her story and that of the Album. It states that
two SS men took the photos, describes what they show and lists them as “the
most important pictorial documents of the mechanism of extermination at
Birkenau”.⁶⁰ Even in this panel, the accompanying photos are not marked as de-
riving from the Album and it is not possible to identify them anywhere in the ex-
hibition through the information provided. The museum does not address the
problems these photographs pose in presenting the perpetrator perspective.
Using the photos from the Auschwitz-Album, the video sums up the narra-
tive on Jewish victims shown at the HDKE. The video functions at the level of
generalizations, which the “A day in Auschwitz” already indicates. The day de-
picted is an example of a typical day in Auschwitz-Birkenau and the victims por-
trayed represent the typical victims arriving. As their individual stories are not
told – albeit known in part– they appear to have no history.⁶¹ Since we see
them going to their death – neither those declared fit for work are shown nor
is Lili Meier – they equally have no future. They arrive from a collection camp
which has not been contextualized; they are selected at the ramp and go to
their death to be burned in ditches in the last gruesome image.⁶² Here the
HDKE depicts the victims in the same vain as the SS men: as degraded objects
of a well-ordered, highly organized and efficient persecution.⁶³
This, the video claims, is what the victims looked like. The majority of vic-
tims shown are women, children and the elderly. Younger women and men are
not represented. The women, often with many children, stand and wait, walk
along a given path or pause and gaze at the camera. They do as they are told.
 Panel “Lenke Jakab (Lili Jákob)”, Section . The naming of Lili Meier with the family name
she had while living in Capartho-Ruthenia rather than with the name she took through her mar-
riage in the U.S., effectively integrate her into the Hungarian nation.
 Many of the people have been identified. See Israel Gutmann and Bella Gutterman. The
Auschwitz Album. The Story of a Transport. Jerusalem/Oświęcim: Newton Ltd, .
 The visitor also learns nothing about the largely Orthodox and Yiddish-speaking commun-
ities in Carpatho-Ruthenia.
 The SS men who took the photos wanted to portray the victims as having no individuality, as
Yasmin Doosry convincingly shows. Doosry. “Vom Dokument zur Ikone: Zur Rezeption des
Auschwitz-Albums,”.
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The old men stand in groups, equally awaiting their fate. The caption qualifies
them as Hungarian Jews, defenseless and humiliated, indicating how the photos
are to be decoded. Since photos are silent, it appears as if the victims were also
defenseless and humiliated – even though the ramp and the waiting areas were
full of sound. The victims remain silent even though some have their mouths
open in the photos, as if in the act of speaking. The music hides this unusual
silence, drawing attention away from it. Reflecting on silence in a setting of con-
stant noise is difficult. The victims do not speak to the visitor or to each other.
This silence is essentialised through the statement “Most of the Jews who were
declared unfit for work, stripped naked, silently entered the gas chamber they
thought was a shower.”⁶⁴ Again, the silent, passive passage to death is a meta-
phor that deeply affects how we imagine the Holocaust victim.
The victims represented in this display are helpless, inactive, silent and uni-
form. Their bodies are subjected to the perpetrators and the people are represent-
ed as objects. Instead of as specific evidence, the photos in the exhibition gen-
eralize concentration camp victims, who are characterized through their
victimhood. They are the universal European victim, imagined when the Holo-
caust is remembered within Europe.⁶⁵ The HDKE draws on this figure, which,
as a template, can be filled with further messages. The template is broad and
flexible and is adapted to the national discourse. At the HDKE, the national dis-
course surfaces mainly where the national belonging of the victims is addressed.
The Jews shown are Hungarians, from Hungary, who silently and passively went
to their deaths.
Non-universal victims – Roma: the Other on
display
The passive, silent and dead victim is a current archetype in Holocaust
representations.⁶⁶ One dilemma with it is that other victims often cannot com-
pete; they cannot qualify as the universal, passive and dead victim. The HDKE
only addresses one other victim group in detail: the Roma.⁶⁷ The stories of
 Touch screen “Deprived of Live. The Annihilation of Hungarian Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau”,
Section .
 Levy and Sznaider. Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, .
 Ibid.
 Other victim groups are named in passing. The opening panel in Section one states that the
Nazis murdered “millions of Poles, Russians and people of other nationalities in Europe besides
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their persecution in Hungary are not homogenous and cannot be told in the
same way as that of the Jews. They are not silent, not passive and the represen-
tation does not offer identification with them. In the end it is their agency as the
unknown and foreign Other which sets them apart most, disqualifying them as
universal victims. While included in the display, a closer look at their represen-
tation shows that they are not seen in their own right. Sadly, the presentation
also reiterates racist stereotypes. The effect is that the Roma appear as the margi-
nalized Other, the victim named but not accounted for. Their suffering is shown,
which is exceptional in Hungary, but empathy with the Roma remains limited.
The information provided about Roma at the HDKE is cursory and fragment-
ed. A text states that they on the one hand lived in Hungary since the fourteenth
century and that other Roma moved there from Romania in the middle of the
nineteenth century. However, specific information on the different groups of
Roma and their migrations, their cultural backgrounds and their distinct histor-
ies is not provided.⁶⁸ While the text outlines that most lived in permanent settle-
ments and spoke Hungarian, others are portrayed as nomads. The Hungarians
are said to have “welcomed” them or held them “in high esteem”.⁶⁹ The curator
does not address how Roma identified with respect to the Hungarian nation and
does not presented Roma as part of Hungarian society. The Roma and the non-
Roma population are consistently differentiated. Due to this, Roma are set up as
the counterpart to Hungarian citizens. National belonging of Roma is questioned
through an emphasis on the Roma migration to Hungary, their lack of integration
into and their exclusion from Hungarian society. From Jews, who are portrayed
as part of the Hungarian society, the Roma are Othered also. Contrary to the
Jews, Roma do not belong and are not beneficial to the nation.⁷⁰
Jews, in addition to large numbers of Gypsies, homosexuals, mentally ill patients, Jehovah′s wit-
nesses as well as the political and religious opponents of Nazism.” Opening Panel “What is the
Holocaust?”, Section . These groups are listed again in Section six where Soviet prisoners of
war and resistance fighters are added. Panel “Auschwitz-Birkenau” Section . Mentally ill peo-
ple are talked about in Section , but only with respect to German policies against them. Panel
“Deprived of Dignity: Europe”, Section . And touch screen “Deprived of Human Dignity. De-
prived of Dignity in Europe” under “The Reich before the war”, Section .
 Brigitte Mihok. Vergleichende Studie zur Situation der Minderheiten in Ungarn und Rumänien
(–) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Roma. Frankfurt/M.: Lang, , –
.
 Panel “Roma in Hungary”, Section .
 According to the exhibit they might have become beneficial, had it not been for the Holo-
caust. The Bogdán-Kolompár family is presented as ascending from the working poor to the
working and possibly even to the lower middle class. “Bogdán-Kolompár Family”, Section . Es-
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While officially holding an equal place within the narrative, Jews take centre
stage and the exhibition relegates Roma to the periphery. The amount of space
devoted to them is significantly smaller and the placement less prominent.
Where told, their stories are presented after the Jewish ones, almost as an after-
thought, or added onto the Jewish experiences.⁷¹ Less care seems to have been
taken in putting the panels on Roma together, as seen most obviously in the
video interview with Roma women, who are simply described as “Roma in
Auschwitz”. All other interviews were conducted for the exhibition and names
are provided for all.⁷² Roma, the exhibition suggests, were victims of the Holo-
caust but ones that are more marginal. Their specific narratives of persecution
and liberation are silenced or, through the add-on narratives, their stories are
equated with those of Jewish victims. The visitor might assume that she or he
has been informed about the Roma, whilst in fact being left with a very incom-
plete and disjointed image. This marginalization becomes extremely problematic
in the commemoration at the memorial wall. Constructed according to the Jewish
tradition, the HDKE devotes no separate space for the remembrance of Roma
victims.⁷³ The dedication to the Roma uttered in Section one, becomes shallow
here, if it had not already been so.
In addition to this marginalization and as a key part of the process of Oth-
ering, the exhibition iterates racist stereotypes about Roma.While the text states
that Roma were diverse, Roma are in fact divided into two groups: settled and
tablishing the Holocaust as a barrier for integration ignores the fact that racism in Hungary was
also an effective hindrance to this.
 In Sections  and , Roma are not mentioned at all. In the second, fifth and eighth sections,
they are not part of the main narrative and, for example, appear only on the touch screen and in
the family story. In Sections  and , where they are part of the main narrative, their stories are
told after those of the Jews, have significantly less space and are placed in less visible parts of
the room.Where Roma experiences are added after the Jewish ones, the text states, in one or two
sentences, that Roma suffered under the same or similar conditions. The opening panel, “De-
prived of Human Dignity”, Section , panel “Everyday Humiliations”, Section . A similar ap-
proach is chosen in Section . Jews and Roma are talked about together at the start of the
text that then continues including the Roma nominally, but addressing those deported for forced
labour, the residents of the ghettos, the survivors, and the forced military labourers, groups com-
monly associated with Jews and not Roma. Touch screen “Liberation and calling into account.
The fate of Hungarian Jews and Roma”, Section .
 Touch screen “Deprived of Freedom. The persecution of Roma”, Section ; Touch screen “De-
prived of Life. Massacre of the Roma”, Section . The interviews with the Roma were conducted
at different times and have a very different setting.
 The memorial wall uses the Jewish tradition to name the dead. Fritz and Hansen. “Zwischen
nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Standards. Der Holocaust im ungarischen Erinner-
ungsdiskurs,” .
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“vagrant”.⁷⁴ Making this distinction, the narrative turns mostly to Roma without
permanent settlement. They are described as people who “clung to their noma-
dic way of life and permanently lived in tribal, clannish circumstances”.⁷⁵ The
language used implies a backward orientation of the Roma who continued to liv-
ing as nomads. This combines with a continuous representation of dirty clothes,
of Roma sitting on the ground, of children with uncombed hair and poor cloth-
ing. The photos on display evoke an ethnographic iconography of Roma as the
dirty Other. That this image, still dominant today, is in itself racist and violent
is not clarified in the exhibition.⁷⁶ A settled life appears as the norm, while
the vagrant one is problematic, to say the least. Furthermore, Roma are shown
to beg, make music, and work as seasonal laborers or as rural artisans. Not con-
textualizing these professions within the racist limitations Roma experienced,
they appear as inherent characteristics of Roma and not as historically specific
social positions.
The exhibition clearly states that local authorities, executive forces, Germans
and Arrow Cross members persecuted Roma.⁷⁷ The policies against Roma remain
unclear, however. The exhibition states that officials had resentments against
them while at other times the opposite is said.⁷⁸ Officials appear to have mostly
 The Roma are defined as the two groups in Section one, mainly on the panel “The Roma in
Hungary” and the touch screen “Jews and Roma in Hungary”, Section . The word vagrant al-
ready expresses a negative evaluation of nomadic life as it depends on its binary opposite, set-
tled.
 Touch screen “Jews and Gypsies in Hungary. The Roma in Hungary”, Section .
 This is different when mass murder is described. Lice, diseases and epidemics clearly result
from the concentration camp system and ghettos and thus are not shown as inherent character-
istic of Roma.
 As for the murder of the Roma during the Holocaust, the perpetrators that are most ad-
dressed are the Germans and the Arrow Cross Members. At this point Hungarian gendarmes
are mentioned in one sentence only. “Hundreds of them [Roma] were shot into mass graves
by Arrow Cross thugs and gendarmes at Szolgaegyháza, Várpalota, Lajoskomárom, Nagyszalon-
ta, Lengyel and other places.” Panel “The massacre of the Roma”, Section .
 This is due to the diversity of Roma persecution in Hungary but that is not made clear. The
exhibition states that Roma lived in uncertainty and were dependent on the “good or ill-will of
the local authorities”. This suggestion of both positive and negative attitudes side by side rela-
tivizes the real hatred Roma almost always experienced. A little later the same panel states that
“The occasional bitterly anti-Gypsy views and suggestions of low-level public officials and local
civilians were usually not supported by competent authorities in the Ministry of the Interior”,
suggesting that racism happened just occasionally and came from the lower, less competent
groups. Panel “The persecution of Roma”, Section . Similar statements can be found in the
panel “The massacre of the Roma” Section .
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overreacted, using “forced efforts”.⁷⁹ It is not clear whether the attempted “inte-
gration into Hungarian society” might have been acceptable had it not been for
the force with which it was applied.⁸⁰ Not only is the fact that regional officers
targeted Roma, in and of itself, problematic, but that this went too far. Gesturing
vaguely towards racism as the reason for unjust brutality, the exhibition does not
mention it explicitly. When racism against Roma is described words such as
“sometimes” or “occasionally” are often added.⁸¹ Still, that discrimination and
violence was directed against Roma, taking their rights, dignity and life, is clear-
ly conveyed in the exhibition – an exception in Hungary today.
Conclusion
The main problem with the representation of Jewish and Roma victims at the
HDKE is the authoritative narrative through which the stories are imparted.
Claiming to present a full, inclusive account hides the museum’s construction
of victimhood and the characteristics displayed appear as factual truth. The pic-
torial evidence displayed, for example from the Auschwitz-Album, is used as il-
lustration rather than being presented as evidence. Contextualization about the
genesis of the photos is missing, as well as their history and role within the dis-
course about the victims. Not utilizing the photos for what they could communi-
cate, the exhibition uses them instead to construct an authoritative narrative
about victimhood. The Jews and Roma presented are objects spoken about
and inserted into a narrative structured through the persecution. The representa-
tion establishes the Jewish victims as the typical, universal victims of the Holo-
caust. In this imagination, the Jewish victims are a passive, helpless and humili-
ated group, depicted through the perpetrators’ gaze. Deviations from this
presentation remain marginal at best. This archetypical victim is so dominant
that other victims are expected to have similar characteristics and are evaluated
accordingly. If other victims, here the Roma, fail to show these imagined charac-
teristics – due to their own unique history – they are less relevant. As a result,
their persecution is not told in its own right and the Roma are marginalized once
more.
This presentation is not unique to the HDKE or even to Hungary. The Holo-
caust itself is a European event, its historiography clearly has a global dimen-
 Panel “The Roma in Hungary”, Section .
 Ibid.
 Panel “The persecution of Roma”, Section .
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sion, and the primary sources from it are available throughout the world. Muse-
um techniques equally do not end at the national border. This produces repre-
sentations common in Europe, following European and even global trends, in
which specific configurations of how to conceptualize the Holocaust develop.
The construction of agency, for both the perpetrators and the victims, are tem-
plates available for the museum representation, the universal victim being one
of them. European representations provide a general frame in which the specific
story of the nation is then presented. Displaying a national narrative is in itself a
European feature. The narrative about the imagined victim is told via the nation-
al narrative and this hides its European character. The European frame, for ex-
ample the construction of a helpless and passive victim, is broad. Each institu-
tion can apply it to the national discourse and interpret it according to the
specific national context. European and national discourse may merge, depend-
ing on the specific museum and its political position. Accordingly, both national
discourse and institutional evaluation of it determine how the victims are invest-
ed with meaning beyond the universal template. The nationalization of the Jews
as Hungarians is for example unique at the HDKE. By nationalizing the Jews as
Hungarians, the HDKE explicitly positions itself against the perspective domi-
nant in Hungary that excludes Jews from the nation. As a result, the representa-
tion of the victims of the Holocaust in the HDKE is neither European nor nation-
al, but a representation in which European, national and institutional elements
transformed into a new hybrid narrative.
The HDKE counters a conservative and right-wing interpretation of the Hol-
ocaust. This is exceptional among the few institutions that address the Holocaust
in Hungary. Nonetheless, the HDKE presents an authoritative exhibition in a
problematic display mode that even repeats racist stereotypes. While common
in Europe, this display mode needs to be evaluated and improved. A first step
would be to allow diverse subject positions, plural perspectives and transparent
interpretations. The individual victim needs a voice that is differentiated from the
speech act of the curators and tells the victim’s own, personal story. Choosing a
multi-faceted narrative instead of a linear story, would reveal different views,
conflicts, debates and blank spots. Pluralizing the story, it would also make his-
torical interpretations visible. The interpretive frame could explicate the evi-
dence from the Holocaust, enabling the visitor to conduct historical analysis.
The process of contextualizing and then interpreting evidence would reveal
the limitations of primary sources and consequently our ability to define history.
To communicate the limits of perpetrator photos makes the one-sided construc-
tion of victimhood transparent. To know how a photo of a victim came into
being, how violent this depiction was and still is, is crucial in order to display
and view them as partial and very limited representations of the people victi-
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mized. Showing and viewing them with this in mind might even bestow some
dignity back onto the people shown in the photos and restore agency to them.
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Andrej Kotljarchuk
The Memory of the Roma Holocaust in
Ukraine: Mass Graves, Memory Work and
the Politics of Commemoration
Blood and screaming at Babi Yar!
There are thousands of graves over disadvantaged and persecuted victims
No granite stones on the graves of murdered Roma.
Mikha Kozimirenko, Romani–Ukrainian poet (1938–2003)
Thousands of Soviet Roma were killed in 1941–1944 by Nazi Einsatzgruppen and
local collaborators. They were almost never deported to extermination camps,
but instead their bodies were left at the scenes where these crimes were commit-
ted. In the protocols of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission for Investigation of
War Crimes, the Roma were often counted as murdered civil citizens, without
specifying their ethnicity. Despite the existence of a small number of accounts
identifying the victims of these murders as Romani, the Roma part of the Holo-
caust history is still little known in post-Soviet space.¹
In 1976 an official memorial at Babi Yar was erected in Kyiv on the location
of the largest massacre during WWII of Eastern European Jews and Roma. How-
ever, the Soviet leadership discouraged placing any emphasis on ethnic aspects
of this tragedy. The Nazi policy of extermination of Roma was neglected; the war
was depicted as a tragedy for all Soviet peoples.²
The discussion of the Romani identity cannot be isolated from the memory
of the genocide during WWII, which makes the struggle over the past a reflexive
landmark that organizes the politics of commemoration.³ There are 47,000 Roma
 This study was supported by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (Sweden)
and Södertörn University as a part of the research project “The Roma Genocide in Ukraine
–: History, memories and representations”. The author wishes to thank Piotr Wawr-
zeniuk, David Gaunt, Anders Blomqvist (Södertörn University), Matthew Kott (Uppsala Uni-
versity), Mikhail Tyaglyy (Ukrainian Centre for Holocaust Stuidies), Barbara Törnquist-Plewa
(Lund University) and anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on prior drafts.
 Alaina Lemon. Between two fires Gypsy performance and Romany memory. From Pushkin to
Postsocialism. Durham: Duke University Press, , .
 Adam Bartosz. Tabor Pamieci Romow. Tarnow: Regional Museum of Tarnow Press, ;
Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov. “Holocaust and the Gypsies. The Reconstruction of
the Historical Memory and Creation of New National Mythology.” Beyond Camps and Forced La-
bour. Current International Research on Survivors of Nazi Persecution. Eds. Johannes-Dieter Stei-
nert and Inge Weber-Newth. Osnabrück: Secolo, , –; Slawomir Kapralski. “Symbols
in contemporary Ukraine.⁴ The Roma minority is often associated with poverty
and crime, which has in turn converted it into a marginalized social group.⁵ In
1991 the government of independent Ukraine allowed the establishment of
new memorials at Babi Yar that specifically identified the ethnicity of victims.
A Jewish memorial was built in the same year.⁶ A Roma memorial is still
under construction. In addition, about 20 monuments to victims of the Roma
genocide have been erected in Ukraine during the last ten years. However, doz-
ens of Roma mass graves remained unmarked and in need of elementary pres-
ervation and commemoration. The controversial battles over commemoration
of WWII and the Holocaust in Ukraine make this process much more
complicated;⁷ and scholars still do not have a clear picture of what is going
on with post-Soviet politics of commemoration of the Roma genocide.
Sources
The author has used a wide range of sources. Among them are media publica-
tions, protocols of the Extraordinary Commission for Investigation of War Crimes
(ChGK), articles of local historians, and photos. Most of the material for this ar-
ticle was collected during field research in 2010 and 2012. In September 2010 the
author, together with colleagues from the French centre Yahad-In Unum and Sö-
dertörn University, participated in field research in Volhynia. In July–August 2012
an independent expedition to Kyiv, Poltava, Vinnitsa, Sumy and Chernihiv re-
gions was carried out. Field work included interviews with witnesses of geno-
and Rituals in the Mobilisation of the Romani National Ideal.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nation-
alism . (): –; Andrej Kotljarchuk. “World War II Memory Politics: Jewish, Polish
and Roma Minorities of Belarus.”The Journal of Belarusian Studies . (): –.
 All-Ukrainian census .
 Oleksandr Belikov. “Derzhavna politika stosovno tsygan Ukrainy: istoria i suchasnist.” Nau-
kovi zapiski. Zbirnik prats molodikh vchenikh ta aspirantiv. Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences,
, –.
 Tatiana Evstafieva. “K istorii ustanovleniya pamiatnika v Bab’em Yaru.” Evreiskii obozreva-
tel.  ( June ).
 Jeff Mankoff. “Babi Yar and the struggle for memory, –.” Ab Imperio  ():
–; Rebecca Golbert. “Holocaust Sites in Ukraine: Pechora and the Politics of Memoria-
lization.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies . (): –; Wilfried Jilg. “The Politics of
History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine.” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Os-
teuropas . (): –; Omer Bartov. Erased: vanishing traces of Jewish Galicia in pres-
ent-day Ukraine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ; Aleksandr Burakovsky. “Holocaust
remembrance in Ukraine: memorialization of the Jewish tragedy at Babi Yar.” Nationalities Pa-
pers . (): –.
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cide, local experts and agents of memory. The field research also included geo-
graphic and photographic investigation of memory objects. Simultaneously ex-
positions in local museums were investigated.
Aims and theoretical framework
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the Soviet and contemporary pol-
itics of memory regarding the Roma Holocaust in Ukraine with the focus on me-
morials and mass graves. The principal questions are:
– What role does Ukraine’s past dependence on the Soviet period play in the
contemporary politics of the memory of the Roma genocide in Ukraine?
– What are the causes of the active memorial work in contemporary Ukraine
regarding the Roma Holocaust mass graves?
– Who are the agents of memory?
– What external and internal factors play a role in this segment of the memory
policy?
These questions acquire a special interest in a comparative perspective. In Rus-
sia, there are no monuments in the places of the mass executions of Roma that
indicate the ethnicity of the victims. Belarus has only three such sites.⁸ At the
same time more than twenty monuments have been raised over the past ten
years on the places of Roma massacres in Ukraine.What kind of agents of mem-
ory are behind the numerous constructions of new memorials in Ukraine? Roma
communities? The authorities? Ukrainian NGOs? Political parties? The European
Union? Foreign funders?
The theoretical model for this article is based on the concept of “sites of
memory” developed by Pierre Nora and Lawrence Kritzman. They argue that
memory shapes the future by determining our attitude to the past, emphasising
that crystallised memories are extremely powerful factors in the mobilization of
an ethnic group and the strengthening of their identity. The sites of memory, con-
sidered by these scholars very broadly (that is, as images on banknotes or in
movies), are an extremely powerful factor in the consolidation of a nation and
 Andrej Kotljarchuk. “Palityka pamiaci u suchasnai Belarusi. Memaryialy druhoi susvetnai
vainy i etnichnyia menshastsi krainy.” ARCHE  (): –.
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mobilization of ethnic groups. The process of inclusion of an ethnic minority’s
collective memory into a national context takes place through sites of memory.⁹
The authorities are not interested strictly in history but in memory, which al-
ways has a strongly engaged political meaning. In this regard, it is important to
trace the history of sculptural projects for public monuments that did not secure
the approval of the authorities (in other words, failed the contest) and were never
implemented. While history belongs to humanities, the science that associated
with a critical understanding of past events through source criticism, memory
is coupled with contemporary politics and the dedicated creation of a historical
myth capable of uniting different ethnic and social groups in society.
Memorial politics crystallise in sites of memory, amongst which the most in-
fluential ones are monuments, because the physical space of memory is created
through them, connecting a historical event, a remembrance day and the partic-
ipants in the ceremony.¹⁰ The memorial gives sacral meaning to the landscape,
which “helps to create the national iconography of a contemporary state”.¹¹ In a
democratic state, memory politics are a common action field for the authorities
and civil society that, in turn, have important leverage (independent media etc.).
In a totalitarian state, the government has a virtual monopoly over public mem-
ory, deciding what to remember and what to forget. In such states, the inscrip-
tion on a public monument must always be approved by the authorities and is
the ultimate, canonised and embedded in concrete viewpoint of the official
stand on events of the past.
The idea of raising monuments to the dead did not originate with WWII, but
no other war has given birth to so many. A typical war memorial gives the follow-
ing information: a short description and chronology of tragic events, the number
or list of victims, information about the criminals and words addressed to the
victims’ descendants. Not only is the sculptural group important, but also the
place chosen by the authorities for the monument (a central or marginal point
of the cultural landscape). The language or languages of the monument play a
 Pierre Nora and Lawrence Kritzman. Realms of memory: rethinking the French past. . New
York: Columbia University Press, ; Realms of memory: rethinking the French past. . New
York: Columbia University Press, .
 Nurit Schleifman. “Moscow’s Victory Park: A Monumental Change.” History and Memory .
 (): –; Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson. “Unravelling the Threads of History: So-
viet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity.” Annals of the Association of American
Geographers . (): –; Henry Pickford. “Conflict and Commemoration: Two Berlin
Memorials.” Modernism modernity . (): –.
 Michaela Schäuble. “How History Takes Place: Sacralized Landscapes in the Croatian-Bos-
nian Border Region.” History and Memory . (): .
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major role. Thus, a language that the majority of the population does not under-
stand refers to the ethnic meaning of the site of memory, even when ethnicity
cannot be guessed directly. In most cases, an inscription in the language of a mi-
nority is accompanied by an inscription in the official language, which in the
Post-Soviet monuments is Ukrainian.
The Soviet period, 1942– 1991
The author believes that the comprehensive analysis of contemporary Ukrainian
memory politics is not possible without an examination of the Soviet period. The
theory of ‘path dependence’ is suitable for the analysis of contemporary memory
politics with respect to WWII. In accordance with this theory, the scope and lim-
itations of new politics (including memory politics) are determined by the polit-
ical choices made or results attained much earlier by the previous political
regime.¹²
Information in the Soviet WWII media about the Nazi extermination of Roma
was minimal. Roma were not mentioned (unlike Jews) in the well-spread widely-
disseminated note on Babi Yar announced by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov on 6 January 1942.¹³ One can agree with Karel Berkhoff that the absence
of significant foreign or domestic political factors was a main reason for the al-
most complete silence on the part of the Soviets about the killings of Roma by
Nazis. He points out that “in the eyes of the Kremlin, Gypsies, who actually
were subject to the same mass extermination as Jews [Stalin did know about
Roma in 1943], had no political value”.¹⁴
However, in some wartime publications the Soviet media stressed that the
extermination of Roma by the Nazis was motivated exclusively by racial goals.
In June 1944, the front correspondent of the leading military newspaper, Kras-
naya Zvezda Ilya, Konstatinoskii published an article about the forced deporta-
tion to Transnistria of Romanian Roma by the regime of Ion Antonescu and also
about their mass death on the Ukrainian steppes.¹⁵ 29 August 1944 the largest
 Stefan Hedlund. Russian Path Dependence. London: Routledge, .
 “Nota narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR tov. V. M. Molotova ot  ianvaria 
goda.” Nurnbergskii process. Sbornik materialov. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridi-
cheskoi literatury, , –.
 Karel Berkhoff. “Pogolovnoe unichtozhenie evreiskogo naseleniya. Holocaust v sovetskikh
SMI, –.” Holocaust i suchasnist’ . (): .
 Ilya Konstatinovskii. “Zemlia Moldavii.” Izvestia . ( June ): .
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Soviet newspaper, Izvestia, argued that the systematic destruction of Roma by
Nazis was racially motivated: “With particular sadism and cruelty the Germans
shot Gypsies, including women and children living in Vyborg, Pushkino and No-
vorzhev districts. All of them were shot just for the fact that they were Gypsies”.¹⁶
After the war the exceptional nature of the systematic extermination of the
Roma people was not recognised by the Soviet state. Soviet historians had cre-
ated a huge historiography of what they termed the Great Patriotic War, without
using the word Holocaust or the expression the genocide of Jewish and Roma
peoples. The Soviet totalitarian regime kept silent about many aspects of the
war. In addition to the Holocaust, there was little mention of crimes by Soviet
partisans, the history of the non-Soviet Ukrainian partisan resistance, and the
mass collaboration with the Nazi regime on the part of Russians and Ukrainians.
During the Soviet era, the Nazi genocide of Roma was muted. The victory was
seen to be achieved by all Soviet people, and the war was depicted as a tragedy
for all Soviet peoples. Ignoring the ethnic background of the victims, the author-
ities persistently used a vague concept of “peaceful Soviet citizens” (mirnye so-
vetskie grazhdane). The key note of Soviet memory politics was heroisation. For
Soviet leaders, this war was first of all a war of heroes: soldiers, partisans and
members of the underground resistance. Thus hundreds of Roma and Jewish
mass graves have remained unmarked or marked by simple, anonymous obe-
lisks. Without having a public space, the collective memory of the Roma geno-
cide continued, mainly in oral form in Romani family circles.¹⁷
The Soviet policy of forgetting can be described by the formulation of Karl
Jaspers, who called the silence surrounding the Nazi past in Europe
“aggressive”.¹⁸ Those who tried to break taboos on memory were repressed.
For example, in 1968 engineer Mikhailo Kochubievsky was arrested in Kyiv for
talking with people in Babi Yar. Kochubievsky argued that “Babi Yar is not
just a site for a nameless massacre of victims of fascism, but the largest place
of genocide of the Jewish people”.¹⁹ The struggle of the Jewish community and
 “Soobshchenie Chrezvychainoi Gosudarstvennoi Komissii po ustanovleniu i rassledovaniu
zlodeianii nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov i ikh soobshchnikov.” Izvestia . (
August ): .
 Michael Stewart. “Remembering without Commemoration: the Mnemonics and Politics of
Holocaust memories among European Roma.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
. (): –.
 Gilad Margalit. Germany and its gypsies: a post-Auschwitz ordeal. Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, , .
 Mikhail Mitsel. “Zapret na uvekovechivanie pamiati kak sposob zamalchivania Holocausta.”
Holocaust i suchasnist’ . (): .
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Soviet intelligentsia for recognition of the Jewish genocide led to some compro-
mise with the government. In many cases (but not in Babi Yar), the inscription on
the monuments in Russian during the Soviet era was translated into Yiddish. The
letters of the Hebrew alphabet left no doubt about the ethnic origin of the
victims.²⁰
The lack of an educated Roma elite and the poor integration of Roma into
Soviet society did not give Roma a chance for any recognition of their tragedy.
Unlike the Jews, the Roma people did not have a political and cultural diaspora
outside the Soviet Union or an independent state representing their ethnic com-
munity. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia briefly informed its readers that “during
the Second World War in 1939–45 twenty thousand Gypsies were brutally exter-
minated by the Nazis in Central and Eastern Europe”.²¹ However, the number of
victims was underestimated. In addition, the Soviet Union was not mentioned,
and Nazi-occupied territory was not, according to the Great Soviet Encyclopae-
dia, a place of the massacre of Roma people. By 1991 there was not a single
monument to the genocide of Roma in the Soviet Union. In contrast, by 2013,
113 places of mass extermination of Roma were identified on the territory of
Ukraine;²² and 27 mass graves in Belarus.²³ However, dozens of mass graves re-
main unknown or unmarked, many of which were destroyed in the course of
construction and agriculture.²⁴
Ukraine’s past dependence and contemporary
problems of commemoration
Memorialization of the victims of the Nazi genocide of the Roma in Ukraine faces
a number of objective obstacles related to the Soviet period. One of the main
problems of contemporary memory politics is the depersonalisation of the vic-
 Mordechai Altshuler. “Jewish Holocaust Commemoration Activity in the USSR under Stalin.”
Yad Vashem Studies  (): –.
 Tatiana Ventsel. “Tsygane.” Bolshaya Sovetskaya Enciklopedia. . Moscow, , –
.
 Peresleduvannia ta vbivstva romiv na terenakh Ukrainy u chasi druhoi svitovoi viini. Zbirnik
dokumentiv ta spohadiv. Ed. Mikhail Tyaglyy. Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Genocide Studies,
. Table .
 Kotljarchuk. “Palityka pamiaci u suchasnai Belarusi,” –.
 Andrej Kotljarchuk. “Natsistskii genotsid tsygan na territorii okkupirovannoi Ukrainy: rol’
sovteskogo proshlogo v sovremennoi politike pamiati.” Holocaust i suchasnist. . ():
–.
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tims of the Roma genocide. The Roma traditionally avoid contact with the au-
thorities, and the official data and the real number of the Roma can differ great-
ly.
The number of Roma in 1941 on what is today the territory of Ukraine is un-
known. The Soviet census of 1939 gives a figure of 10,443 Roma in Soviet Uk-
raine. However we know that the official census and the actual number of
Roma differ significantly. For example, the All-Ukrainian census of 2001 counted
14,000 Roma in Transcarpathia. At the same time, the regional tax registration
office listed 25,720 Roma in Transcarpathia, which is 55 per cent of all Ukrainian
Roma.²⁵ This of course makes no sense. The situation prior to WWII was even
more complicated. The 1939 Soviet census did not include the Roma population
in the Crimea, which became part of Ukraine in 1954. In addition, this census did
not account for Roma in territories occupied by the Soviet Union during WWII:
Polish Western Ukraine, Romanian regions of Northern Bukovina and Southern
Bessarabia; and Transcarpathia, which before the war was an autonomous part
of the Czech Republic and during the war was occupied by Hungary. These re-
gions, which were settlement areas of the Roma population, were merged into
Ukraine as a result of WWII.
Most Ukrainian Roma were nomadic before WWII and had no passports, and
they avoided any contact with the authorities, including the census scribes. All
this greatly complicates all possible calculations. Aleksandr Kruglov in his quan-
titative study of Roma genocide victims in Ukraine states that there were about
20,000 Roma on the territory of today’s Ukraine at the beginning of WWII. The
total number of victims among the Ukrainian Roma is estimated by him to be
19,000–20,000, of whom more than half were Romanian Roma deported to
southern Ukraine.²⁶ It should be also noted that agricultural and warm climate
Ukraine was a traditional place for the summer migration of North-Russian, Be-
larusian and Baltic Roma agricultural workers.²⁷ Researchers of the Roma geno-
cide also point out that a significant number of mass graves of nomadic Roma
remain unknown. Often the only witnesses were the perpetrators themselves.²⁸
Due to the lack of reliable statistics on the size of the pre-war Romani population
in the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, any exact figure
 Materialy mizhnarodnoi tsyhanoznavchoi konferentsii Romy Ukrainy iz minulogo v maibutne.
Kyiv: Justinian, , .
 Aleksandr Kruglov. “Genocide tsygan v Ukraine –: statistiko-regional’nyi aspect.”
Holocaust i suchasnist’ . (): –.
 Ibid.
 Nadezhda Demetr and Nikolai Bessonov, and Niklolai Kutenkov. Istoriya tsygan – novyi vzgli-
ad. Voronezh: IPF, . .
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of victims is questionable. A recent study estimates the number of the Roma gen-
ocide victims on the territory of Ukraine to vary from 26,000 to 62,500, with the
likely figure to be in excess of about 40,000.²⁹
De-personification of victims is another problem for memory work on the
Roma Holocaust. It also highlights the difference between the memory of the
Jewish and the Roma tragedy. The Jewish community already in the war years
had made an effort to document the tragedy of Babi Yar.³⁰ Some testimonies
were published by Soviet war correspondents already during the war.³¹ The re-
port Black Book, which was prepared by Vasily Grossman and Ilya Ehrenburg,
was banned in the Soviet Union. However, in 1946, it was published in the
USA and has been available to Western scholars and Soviet dissidents.³² In
1991, in Kyiv, the first memory book of the Jewish victims of Babi Yar was pub-
lished. The first list of Jewish victims of Babi Yar was already prepared during the
Soviet period and included more than 7000 names.³³ A new list published later
contains more than 14,000 names.³⁴ The names of Roma victims of Babi Yar still
are unknown.
A number of other factors distinguish the memory work in the Jewish and
Roma tragedies. Unlike the Jews, the Roma to a great extent lack their own cul-
tural landscape. If today the Jewish Holocaust is remembered, not only through
monuments but also through deserted synagogues, the former Jewish ghettos
and cemeteries, the Roma do not have any such cultural markers. With the gen-
ocide, almost all their physical space of memory was destroyed.
In addition, Ukrainian Roma have names and surnames which are typical for
the local population (Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Hungarian and Romanian). The
role of anthroponomy is important. When the protocols of the Soviet Extraordi-
nary Commission for Investigation of War Crimes (ChGK) do not specify the ethnic
origin of the victims, it is still possible to identify Jewish victims by analysing
names. This is impossible in case of Roma victims.
 Andrej Kotljarchuk. “Nazi Genocide of Roma in Belarus and Ukraine: the significance of cen-
sus data and census takers.” Etudes Tsigane  ().
 Jeff Mankoff. “Babi Yar and the struggle for memory, –,” –; Arno, Lustig-
er. Stalin i evrei: Tragicheskaia istoriya Evreiskogo antifashistskogo komiteta i sovetskikh evreev.
Moscow: Rosspen, .
 Aleksandr Avdeenko and Petr Olender. “Babi Yar.” Krasnaya Zvezda . ( November
): ; Vasily, Grossman. “Doroga na Berlin.” Krasnaya Zvezda . ( February ):
.
 The Black Book: the Nazi crime against the Jewish people. Published by the Jewish Black Book
Committee, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, .
 Ilya Zaslavskii. Ed. Kniga Pamiati. Imena pogibshikh v Bab’em Yaru. Kyiv: Oberih, .
 Ilya Levitas. Ed. Babi Yar: Kniga pamiati. Kyiv: Stal, .
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In most cases, the Roma were executed at sites, which were chosen by the
Nazis for the extermination of the Jewish population, POWs and partisans.
Such sites were usually classified by the Extraordinary Commission for Investiga-
tion of War Crimes and marked. None of the monuments, however, referred to the
Roma victims of genocide. In post-Soviet Ukraine in many such places new
monuments have been erected that this time emphasise the ethnicity of the gen-
ocide victims. For example the new Roma memorials at Babi Yar, Pirohova Leva-
da, Koziatyn, Ostroushki and Odessa were designed on this basis.
A further difference between Jews and Roma in Ukraine is that, unlike Ukrai-
nian Jews, Roma are not a homogeneous ethnic group. The Romani community
of Ukraine is divided into a number of cultural and religious groups. Among
them are Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and Catholics. There are
more than ten dialect groups of Roma in Ukraine, each using different Romani
dialects as well as different languages in everyday life (Ukrainian, Russian, Ro-
manian, Hungarian, Slovak, etc). Relations between different groups of Roma
are not always close.³⁵ Until 1956 the majority of Ukrainian Roma were nomadic.
This means that often the emotional (family) link between the Roma community
and local Holocaust mass graves is missing. This is precisely the situation in
Torchyn, Ostroushki, Vilshanka and many others places. For instance an un-
known group of Roma were killed by Nazis near the west Ukrainian town of
Torchyn. However, the local Romani community is represented today by Roma-
nian Roma, the survivors and descendants deported to southern Ukraine. They
lived after the war in Transnistria and moved to Torchyn in 1956 after the Soviet
Act of Settlement of all Nomadic Gypsies. As a result the Roma of Torchyn remem-
ber well the mass deaths of their deported ancestors in southern Ukraine, but
know nothing about the local massacre, which were observed during field stud-
ies (interviews recorded in the author’s archives). This situation is typical. Cou-
pled with the lack of educated strata among the Roma, this means that the Uk-
rainian Roma themselves cannot usually be active agents of memory. This is why,
in contrast to the Jewish situation, the localization of mass graves and initiatives
to raise monuments have come mostly from the non-Romani NGOs and the Uk-
rainian government.
According to the 2004 resolution of the Ukrainian parliament, an Interna-
tional Remembrance Day of the Holocaust of the Roma is held annually on 2 Au-
 Lev Cherenkov. “Tsyganskaya dialektologiya v Ukraine. Istoriya i sovremennost.” Materialy
mizhnarodnoi tsyhanoznavchoi konferentsii Romy Ukrainy iz minulogo v maibutne. Kyiv: Justinian,
: –.
158 Andrej Kotljarchuk
gust and local authorities have to erect memorials on the places of mass execu-
tions in order to commemorate the genocide.³⁶ As a result more than 20 monu-
ments commemorating Roma victims of the Nazi genocide have been erected in
Ukraine since 2005.
The case of Babi Yar (or Babyn Yar in Ukrainian, means Old Woman’s Rav-
ine) is considered to be the single largest massacre in the history of the Holo-
caust and has become a central symbol of the Nazi genocide on the occupied So-
viet territory. While in some regions of Ukraine the active process of
commemoration of Jewish and Roma Holocaust mass graves is going on, in
the capital conflict over memory continues.³⁷
Babi Yar is a chain of seven deep ravines in the north-western suburb of Kyiv.
There on 29–30 September 1941, nine days after the German occupation of the
city began, more than 33,000 Jewish civilians were exterminated by the Nazis in
two days of mass killings. Near Babi Yar the Lukianivka railway goods station is
situated and Jewish victims who were forced to assemble there believed that the
Nazis were going to deport them from Kyiv to another place. The total number of
people murdered in Babi Yar between 1941 and 1943 (Jews, Roma, Soviet POWs
and underground fighters, the mentally ill, Ukrainian nationalists, civilians) is
estimated to be about 100,000.³⁸ Executions of Roma in Babi Yar by the Nazis
continued until the liberation of the city by the Red Army in November 1943.³⁹
According to Anatoly Kuzntesov the mass killings of Jews and Roma caused
alarm among the ethnic Ukrainian majority. “Jews kaput, Gypsies too, and
then Ukrainians, then come you” – was a popular saying in Kyiv during the
war.⁴⁰
During the war the Jewish tragedy of Babi Yar was reported in Soviet
media.⁴¹ The massacre of Jews was mentioned in a diplomatic note by Foreign
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on 6 January 1942 entitled On the widespread rob-
bery, devastation of the population, and the atrocities of the German authorities on
 On the night of  August  the so-called Zigeunerlager in Auschwitz-Birkenau was elim-
inated by the Nazis. In  this day was proposed by the Council of Europe as International
Roma and Sinti Genocide Remembrance Day.
 Burakovsky. “Holocaust remembrance in Ukraine.” –; Ingmar Oldberg. “Both vic-
tims and perpetrators. Ukraine’s problematic relationship to the Holocaust.” Baltic worlds .
(): –.
 Karel Berkhoff. Babi Yar: Site of Mass Murder, Ravine of Oblivion.Washington: United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum, .
 Aleksandr Kruglov. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov ob unichtozhnenie natsistami evreev Uk-
rainy v –. Kyiv: Institut Judaiki, , .
 Anatoly Kuznetsov. Babi Yar. Roman-dokument. Frankfurt am Main: Posev, , .
 Mankoff. “Babi Yar and the struggle for memory, –,” –.
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the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, and published in 1942 by the leading
newspaper Pravda.⁴² Nation-renowned war correspondents Vasily Grossman,
Aleksandr Avdeenko and Petr Olender also published testimonies about the
mass killings of Jews in Babi Yar in 1943– 1945.⁴³ However, the mass murder of
Roma in Babi Yar was not mentioned.
On 29 February 1944, Soviet media published the Extraordinary Commission
for Investigation of War Crimes in Kyiv, a report led by Nikita Khrushchev. The
Commission’s report did not specify the ethnicity of the victims and muted the
racial character of the mass killings, noting that: “In Babi Yar over 100,000 So-
viet citizens were killed, women, children and old folk”.⁴⁴ The decision of the
Communist Party’s leadership to ignore the racial and genocidal nature of the
massacre in Babi Yar was crucial for the Soviet policy of forgetting the Jewish
and Romani Holocausts. The decision was taken despite the Soviet leadership’s
knowledge of the results of investigation by Extraordinary Commission for Inves-
tigation of War Crimes, which contained detailed information on the mass mur-
der of Roma in Babi Yar. A major witness, a professor at the Kyiv Institute of For-
estry Ivan Zhitov, stated that the Germans killed Roma in Babi Yar three months
after the Jewish massacre, meaning at the end of December 1941.⁴⁵ A local
woman, L. I. Zavorotnaya-Grigurno stated that “Roma were shot at the Babi
Yar massacre later than the Jews”. She stated that “during the war she saw sev-
eral gypsy wagons with people drove past her house by Nazis towards Babi Yar”.
One of the witnesses, N. Tkachenko, claimed to see Romani clothes left after the
killings in Babi Yar.⁴⁶ Until 1991 none of the testimonies were available for re-
search, making it impossible to study the mass murder of Roma in Babi Yar.
However, despite the lack of available written sources, the extermination of
 “Nota narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR tov. V. M. Molotova ot  ianvaria 
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Roma in Babi Yar was a well-known oral history for the residents of post-war
Kyiv. In the famous book Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel (1966)
Anatoly Kuznetsov, who grew up in Kyiv noted:
The fascists hunted Gypsies as if they were game. I have never come across anything official
concerning this, yet in the Ukraine the Gypsies were subject to the same immediate exter-
mination as the Jews … Whole tribes of Gypsies were taken to Babi Yar, and they did not
seem to know what was happening to them until the last minute.⁴⁷
In April 1945 Pravda informed the Soviet people about the decision of the gov-
ernment of Ukraine to build in Babi Yar a memorial and a museum “to the mem-
ory of ten of thousand residents of Kiev”.⁴⁸ Despite the announcement there were
no monuments in Babi Yar until 1976 and the site was unmarked until 1966.
Thus, 19 September 1961 Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the renowned Russian poet, pub-
lished the epic Babi Yar in Literaturnaya gazeta, the leading periodical of the
Union of Soviet Writers. The poem, whose first line is “Over Babi Yar there are
no monuments” became a strong public protest against the government’s refusal
to recognise Babi Yar as a Holocaust site.⁴⁹ In March 1963 at a meeting with So-
viet writers Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the country and the former head of
Ukraine and the ChGK on Babi Yar, devoted special attention to Yevtushenko’s
poem. According to Khrushchev “the author of the poem showed an ignorance
of historical facts, he believes that the victims of Nazi atrocities were only the
Jews, in fact there [in Babi Yar] were murdered many Russians, Ukrainians
and other Soviet people of various nationalities”.⁵⁰
In 1966 Anatoly Kuznetsov’s documentary novel, Babi Yar,was published in
the Soviet Union in censored form in the monthly literary magazine Yunost’.
Moreover, the next year the novel was printed in 150,000 copies by the Komso-
mol publishing house Molodaya gvardiya.⁵¹ It should be note that fragments con-
cerning the genocide of Roma were kept in the text. The novel was highly criti-
cised by the leading Soviet newspaper Izvestia,⁵² and both the book and the
monthly literary magazine were confiscated from all Soviet libraries. The totali-
tarian regime ordered the silencing of the tragedy of Roma, an order which was
 Anatoly Kuznetsov. Babi Yar. A documentary novel. New York: The Dial Press, .
 “Pamiatnik pogibshim v Bab’em Yaru.” Pravda ( April ): .
 Zvi Gitelman. “Politics and the historiography of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.” Bitter
legacy: confronting the Holocaust in the USSR. Ed. Zvi Gitelman. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, , .
 “Rech’ tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva.” Pravda  ( March ): , .
 Anatoly Kuznetsov. Babi Yar. Roman-dokument. Moskva: Molodaya gvardiya, .
 P. Troitskii. “Po stranitsam zhurnalov.” Izvestia . ( January ): .
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carefully followed by Soviet officials, historians and media. Moreover the Soviet
leadership, who long sought to monopolise the collective memory of the war, left
Babi Yar out of the official war narrative, and even sought to eradicate the site of
memory physically. On 13 March 1961 as the result of an accident at the Kureniv-
ka brick factory near Babi Yar, the dam securing the loam pulp failed after rain,
releasing large volumes of pulp down to Babi Yar.
On 29 September 1966 on the 25th anniversary of the tragedy, an unauthor-
ized rally in Babi Yar was held for the first time in the Soviet era. The participants
demanded the recognition of the Jewish genocide and the construction of a
monument at Babi Yar. The rally was attended by famous Soviet writers and dis-
sidents among them Viktor Nekrasov, Boris Antonenko-Davidovich, Ivan Dziuba,
Petr Yakir, Sergei Paradzhanov,Vladimir Voinovich and Sergei Dovlatov. Howev-
er, the Roma tragedy was not discussed.⁵³ Soviet authorities gave in to the pres-
sure of civil society and in 1966 a foundation stone was placed in Babi Yar with
the inscription in Russian: “There will be erected a monument to the Soviet peo-
ple – victims of fascist crimes in the period of temporary occupation of Kyiv in
1941– 1943”. Finally in 1976 a typically Soviet monument in heroic style was
erected at the Babi Yar site with the inscription in Russian: “Soviet citizens,
POWs, soldiers and officers of the Red Army, were shot here in Babi Yar by Ger-
man Fascists”.⁵⁴ Despite the silence on the Holocaust, the memorial legitimised
the practices of memory. Every year, on 29 September the monument has been
visited not only by Jews but also by local Roma. It was during these years that
the Romani tradition was born to bring to the monument the photos of relatives
murdered by the Nazis.⁵⁵ This practice continues to this day. By this ceremony
the Roma community is trying to overcome the problem of de-personalization.
The Soviet policy of forgetting complicated the contemporary documentation
of the Roma genocide. The result of this long-term government policy was the de-
personification of victims of the Roma genocide. As a result, it remains unknown
when, how many, and what groups in Babi Yar of Roma were killed. Roma of
Kyiv state that their relatives were shot in Babi Yar in 1941.⁵⁶ The archival sources
support their testimonies. In 1937, a Romani craft cooperative, Trudnatsmen,was
established in Kurenivka near Babi Yar that united 27 Roma families. In 1941 an
administrative building for the Romani cooperative was situated in Babi Yar in
the former NKVD shooting range. There is no evidence about the existence of Ro-
 Rafail Nakhmanovich. “Babi Yar-: kak eto bylo.” Maidan  September .
 Tatiana Evstafieva. “Babi Yar vo vtoroi polovine XX veka.” Babi Yar: chelovek, vlast’, istoriya.
Dokumenty i materialy. Kyiv: Vneshtorgizdat, , –.
 Kotljarchuk. “Natsistskii genotsid tsygan na territorii okkupirovannoi Ukrainy,” –.
 Ibid, –.
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mani craft cooperative in Kyiv after WWII.⁵⁷ However, neither scholars nor Roma
of Kyiv are able to compile a list of the victims.
With glasnost and perestroika, new interpretations developed in Ukraine re-
garding the significance of the Roma and Jewish victims of the Nazi occupation.
The Soviet monopoly on memory ended and the significance of the Roma geno-
cide underwent a substantial change. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
government of independent Ukraine allowed in 1991 the establishment of a new
memorial at Babi Yar, specifically identifying the victims as Jewish and Roma. In
1989 the Soviet monument was completed; however, the plaques in Yiddish and
Russian only provided information about the Jewish genocide. On September 29,
1991 on the 50th anniversary of the tragedy, the Jewish memorial Menorah was
opened in Babi Yar. In 1992, a monument to Ukrainian nationalists was erected.
For the last decade a number of monuments have been built in Babi Yar devoted
to the memory of murdered children, the mentally ill, POWs, Soviet underground
fighters, Orthodox priests, and Ukrainian nationalists, Ostarbeiters, Dynamo
Kyiv football players and victims of the Kurenivka accident of 1961. As a result
a competition of victimhood was created in Babi Yar. The Roma memorial is
still under construction.
In 1995, an initiative to erect a Roma monument in Babi Yar was taken by the
sculptor Anatoly Ignashchenko (1930–2011). One of the most famous Ukrainian
sculptors and half-Roma by origin, Ignashchenko is the producer of more than
200 monuments around the world. He was also the chief-sculptor of a Soviet
monument in Babi Yar. Ignashchenko admitted that an idea to raise a monument
at Babi Yar came to him after talking with Romani activists Mikha Kozimirenko
and Vladimir Zolotarenko.⁵⁸ In 1996 Ignashchenko produced a model of the
monument, which was a gypsy wagon made of wrought iron. The author came
up with an original solution to overcome the de-personification of victims. He
attached to the tent photo frames in which relatives are encouraged to insert
photos of victims. The inscription on the monument was completed both in Uk-
rainian and Romani: “To the memory of Roma exterminated by the Nazis in
1940– 1945. We remember!”
Roma activists, students and members of the Catholic Community in Kyiv
participated in fundraising for the monument and in volunteer work in Babi
Yar. The monument was completed, and the ground prepared in 1997. However,
in the end, the raising of the monument was forbidden by City architect Serhij
 State Archives of the City of Kyiv (DAMK). Fond R-, opis , sprava .
 Vladimir Platonov. “Babiy Yar: Tragedia o tragedii.” Zerkalo Nedeli  (); Serhii Yarmo-
luk. “Kvitok do Romanistana.” Den’  May ; Natalia Zinchenko. “Baron i kosmos.” Aratta
 February .
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Babushkin with the motivation that it did not fit with the general design of the
Babi Yar memorial. As a result the monument was transported to western Uk-
raine and awarded to the town of Kamyanets-Podilsky.
On 29 September 1999 at the cost of Roma organizations a simple foundation
stone was put in Babi Yar with an inscription in Ukrainian: “In this place will be
build a memorial to the victims of the Roma Holocaust”. On the night of 4 July
2011, a few weeks before the International Day of the Roma Holocaust, a foun-
dation stone dedicated to the Romani victims was vandalized. On 13 July 2011
the Roma Congress of Ukraine sent an open letter of protest to Prime Minister
Mykola Azarov, who was the chair of the committee for the 70th anniversary of
Babi Yar. Roma called for an end to “the discrimination of their memory by
the state” and required the inclusion of Romani representatives in the committee
and dialogue with the government regarding the construction of a memorial in
Babi Yar.⁵⁹ In 2012 a new foundation stone was built on the same site, this
time sponsored by the state. A new inscription in Ukrainian appeared: “In mem-
ory of the Roma who were shot in Babi Yar”. Romani activists point out the in-
scription can be interpreted as a final version of the monument. Romani activists
are outraged by the fact that they have been waiting almost 25 years for a memo-
rial in Babi Yar while a number of other memorials have been built during this
period of time.⁶⁰ Monuments dedicated to various groups of victims are scattered
in different places in Babi Yar at a considerable distance from each other. There
is neither a central memorial for all groups of victims, nor a museum. The exist-
ing public map of Babi Yar is not easily accessible and to find the Roma memo-
rial stone is rather difficult.
The creation in 2007–2012 of the public agency the National Historical Me-
morial Preserve Babyn Yar is an important stage in the Ukrainian politics of
memory.⁶¹ This agency is responsible for the development of the memorial
site. The staff of The National Preserve organizes a ceremony on the International
Day of the Roma Holocaust and informs the public about the Remembrance Day
on their Webpage. On 12 April 2012 the “Concept of development of the National
Historical Memorial Preserve” was approved by the Ukrainian government. The
 “Romi vimahaut′vid Azarova vshanuvaty i ikhni Holocaust.” Ukrains’ka Pravda  July
.
 Kotljarchuk. “Natsistskii genotsid tsygan na territorii okkupirovannoi Ukrainy,” –.
 Decree  of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine On the establishment of Memorial Reserve
Babyn Yar,  March . http://www.kby.Kyiv.ua/komitet/ru/documents ( October );
Decree / of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko about the National status of Me-
morial Preserve Babyn Yar. http://www.kby.Kyiv.ua/komitet/ru/documents ( October ).
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curator of a new memorial project is Larysa Skoryk.⁶² She is a renowned architect
and a producer of Bykivnia Graves – a National memorial dedicated to the vic-
tims of Stalin’s terror.
Despite all the conflict over the past, Babi Yar is step by step becoming a na-
tional pantheon of all the groups of Nazi victims. Today this place is regularly
attended by Romani activists, official Ukrainian and foreign delegations. The
Roma tragedy of Babi Yar is well represented in the media space of Ukraine. A
simple Google search gives over 15 thousand references to the phrase “Babi
Yar and Roma” in Ukrainian. However when in August 2001, Pope John Paul
II visited Babi Yar he did not mention the Nazi atrocities committed against
the Romani victims of the genocide in his speech. Actually the ex-president of
Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, is the only head of state who frequently mentioned
Fig. 1: Romanis at the foundation stone in Babi Yar on the International Roma Genocide Re-
membrance, 2012. Photo by Andrej Kotljarchuk.
 Official website of Larysa Skoryk. http://www.skoryk.net.ua/sakralna-arhitektura-mon
umenty/babyn-yar ( October ).
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the Roma tragedy of Babi Yar and issued a special statement on the memory of
the Nazi genocide of Roma people.⁶³
Recent trends in commemoration politics
Andrii Portnov argues that humanization is the basic strategy of contemporary
Ukrainian memory politics regarding WWII, a switch from the memory of heroes
to the memory of the suffering of ordinary people.⁶⁴ Topics prohibited during So-
viet times such as the Holocaust, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the
Ukrainian-Polish ethnic cleansings in Volhynia became themes for public de-
bates. In 2003, 60 years after the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, 59 prominent Uk-
rainian intellectuals wrote an open letter “Open Wound of Volhynia”. Public de-
bates were initiated and on 11 July 2003, the presidents of Poland and Ukraine,
Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma, inaugurated in the village of Pav-
livka/Poryck the first monument of reconciliation.⁶⁵
New trends created opportunities for inclusion of the Roma collective trau-
ma into the national context. The 2004 parliament’s resolution certainly gave
a powerful impetus to the memory work. In particular the parliament instructed
the “Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, together with local authorities to identify
mass graves and to investigate Hitler’s ethnocide of Roma during WWII, in
order to commemorate deported and executed representatives of this national
minority”.⁶⁶ Indeed, since 2005 the Ukrainian government has supported a num-
ber of Roma Holocaust memory projects.⁶⁷
Another strong argument for the intensification of memory work is the inte-
gration of Ukraine into the EU.⁶⁸ The European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (ECRI) continuously monitors the implementation of the 2004 parlia-
mentary resolution in order to determine the extent of actual implementation of
 “Address of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko devoted to the International Day of
the Roma Holocaust.” Forum Natsii . (): –.
 Andrii Portnov. “Uprazhneniya s istoriei po-ukrainski.” Ab Imperio.  (): .
 Yaroslav Hrytsak. Strasti za natsionalizmom. Kyiv: Krytyka, , –; Alexander Osi-
pian. “Ethnic Cleansings and Memory Purges: The Ukrainian-Polish Borderland in –
in Modern Politics and Historiography.” Ab Imperio  (): –.
 “Resolution –IV of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the International Day of the
Roma Holocaust.”Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy.  (): .
 Tatiana Gabrielson. Propaganda of Romani Culture in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Unpublished PhD
dissertation. The University of Texas at Austin. , –.
 Anders Nordström. The interactive dynamics of regulation: exploring the Council of Europe’s
monitoring of Ukraine. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, , –.
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the program of commemoration of the Roma genocide.⁶⁹ Ukraine is a member of
the EU program “Roma Decade 2005–2015”. Following many European coun-
tries, Ukraine abandoned the official use of the word ‘Gypsies’ in favour of the
more politically correct name ‘Roma’. As known this term was recommended
by the First World Congress of Roma in London in 1971. Today Ukraine is the
only country in post-Soviet space that has replaced the official nomenclature,
using ‘Roma’ in official documentation and media. Substantial support to com-
memoration projects in Ukraine has been given by foreign institutions, in partic-
ular the German Federal Foundation for Remembrance, Responsibility and the
Future, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the George Soros Foundation “Ren-
aissance”. The Soros Foundation has a special Roma of Ukraine Program,
which has supported exhibitions on the memory of the Roma genocide, scientific
conferences, and publication of documents. In order to overcome the de-person-
ification problem the Romani organization of Odessa signed in 2011 an agree-
ment with the oblast archives of Odessa. The intended result of the cooperation
is to produce a memory book with a list of Romanian Roma deported to Trans-
nistria. A number of scientific conferences on the genocide of Roma people held
in Ukraine was organized by the Ukrainian Centre for Holocaust Studies, which
also accumulated a considerable bibliography.⁷⁰ Recently the All-Ukrainian Asso-
ciation of Teachers of History published with the financial support of the EU a
textbook for secondary schools. A chapter of the textbook is about the Nazi gen-
ocide of Ukrainian Roma. As usual the link between the Nazi genocide, Axis
powers and Ukrainian collaborators is missing and all responsibility is placed
exclusively on the Germans.⁷¹
There is one more difference between the memorialization of Roma and Jew-
ish mass graves. Monuments to the Jewish Holocaust are usually funded from
abroad with the assistance of local Jewish communities. The Roma Holocaust
memorials as a rule are initiated and funded by Ukrainian NGOs and local or-
ganizations. In Vilshanka (Poltava region), it was the local Cossack organization;
in Pirohova Levada (Pyriatyn, Poltava region) – a local historical association,
district authorities and private persons; in Kozatyn (Vinnitsa region) – a local
veteran’s organization, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the municipality, a sub-
sidiary of the Ukrainian Railways; in Ostroushki (Sumy region) – the village ad-
ministration and private persons. The contemporary memorial work is carried
 Stan dotrimannia Ukrainoiu evropeiskikh standartiv z prav i svobod ludyny. Kyiv: Verkhovna
Rada Press, , –.
 Kotljarchuk. “Natsistskii genotsid tsygan na territorii okkupirovannoi Ukrainy,” –.
 Petro Kendzior, Ed. Razom na odnii zemli. Istoriya Ukrainy bogatokul’turna. Lviv: ZUKTs,
.
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out by a wide variety of different mainly non-Roma actors. Only three out of
twenty memorials were initiated and partly funded by Romani organizations.
New memorials on the places of mass executions of Roma are often motivated
by the example of the capital. Thus, at the opening ceremony of 2011 in Os-
troushki the deputy head of Sumy oblast Oleg Boyarintsev said: “the place
where they were killed, thousands of our countrymen should be known by every-
one in the Sumy region. Ostroushki is our Babi Yar”.⁷²
Today Ukraine shares with Germany the honorary first place in Europe re-
garding the number of Roma genocide memorials. However, a number of prob-
lems remain. Not all local authorities have implemented the 2004 decision of
parliament. There are a number of regions (for example Crimea) where the Inter-
national Day of the Roma Holocaust does not give a rise to any commemoration
efforts. On 2 August the central TV channels of Ukraine did little to recall the
 Official News Portal of Sumy region. http://sumyinfo.com ( October ).
Fig. 2: The Cossacks of Lubny and the author at Roma Holocaust Memorial Cross in Vilshanka
(Lubny district). 2012. Photo by Vadim Udod.
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tragedy of the Roma people. Some new genocide memorials (for example in
Malyn and in Kopyli) despite the available data include no reference to the vic-
tims of Romani origin. As Michael Tyaglyi states the genocide of Roma is still
considered by the researchers as “a second-class genocide which is located on
the periphery of contemporary Ukrainian historical research”.⁷³
Differences at the local level are significant but inexplicable. In Mykolaiv,
Odessa and Lutsk regions, exhibitions dedicated to the genocide of Roma were
held, International Remembrance Day celebrated and new memorials erected.
In Mykolaiv the local authorities involved non-Romani pupils in the memory
work.⁷⁴ At the same time in the eastern autonomous republic of Crimea, occu-
pied in 2014 by Russia, despite many identified mass graves of Roma victims,
there are still no monuments on places of mass executions indicating that the
victims are of Roma origin and the Remembrance Day is not celebrated.
An acute problem is that a large number of Roma genocide mass graves re-
main unmarked. They are situated in remote rural areas (for example in Kysylyn,
Lutsk region), which was not mentioned by the Extraordinary Commission for In-
vestigation of War Crimes. Because of the privatization and high cost of agricul-
tural lands, only memorialization can preserve unmarked graves from destruc-
tion. Today many mass graves are preserved by the owners of lands
representing the older generation– the last witnesses of the genocide. That is
the case in Ratne.
Conclusion
Post-Soviet Ukraine is a region of dynamic politics of the commemoration of the
victims of the Roma Holocaust. The country is actively constructing a unifying
model of collective memory capable of integrating all minority groups into a sin-
gle national project. It is important to stress that the Roma Holocaust memorials
are being built in both in the Western and Eastern parts of the country.
The major reasons for the intensification of memory work on the Roma Hol-
ocaust in Ukraine are:
– A new official strategy regarding the memory of WWII.
 Mikhailo Tyaglyy. “Babyn Yar yak mistse masovogo vynishchennia ukrainskikh romiv: typo-
va model?” Unpublished paper presented on the international conference Babi Yar: mass killings
and its memory. Kyiv,  October .
 Olena Hrynevich. “Romi Ukrainy i Mikolaevshchyna.” Naukovi zapiski. Zbirnik prats molo-
dikh vchenikh ta aspirantiv. Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences, , –.
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– A higher level of democratization in comparison with neighbouring Russia
and Belarus.
– A process of integration into the EU, leading to some adjustments of the Uk-
rainian memory politics to comply to European standards.
The revising of the Soviet myth of WWII opened the once closed floodgates of
memory. Fast-paced memorialization of the Roma genocide confirms the fact
that the realignment of Soviet history around new narrative axes is taking
place in the memory politics of today’s Ukraine. For a long time the Roma minor-
ity was not included in Ukrainian nation building. The commemoration of the
Roma Holocaust has the possibility to change this situation, boosting the inclu-
sion of Roma in contemporary Ukrainian society. In the situation of the absence
of a native Romani state, common territory, language, culture and religion, a
shared memory of the genocide brings together different groups of Roma, mobi-
lizing their national movement. As Slawomir Kapralski points out:
Romani Holocaust is already the main element of the Roma identity and the centre piece of
their historical memory. Through the rituals of remembrance Roma focus on their common
past in order to create a better future.⁷⁵
The problems related to commemoration of the genocide of the Roma on the ter-
ritory of Ukraine are limited, as this study confirms, mainly by the ‘path depend-
ence’ factor and not by deliberately discriminatory politics towards the Roma mi-
nority.
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Part 3: Local and Marginal Memory

Anna Wylegała
Forced Migration and Identity in the
Memories of Post-War Expellees from
Poland and Ukraine
Although it is difficult to speak about a common European memory, during the
twentieth century many communities in Europe were subjected to certain univer-
sal experiences, which in some cases might have resulted in similar (yet not
shared) memories. Such experiences include the mass and forced population
transfers which occurred during and immediately after the Second World War.
Millions of Europeans lost their home countries and had no other choice but
to re-establish their identities in another place and under different socio-political
circumstances. Historians and demographers have attempted numerous compa-
rative analyses of these events¹; however insufficient attention has been devoted
to the way forced migration is remembered in collective memory, and to how it
has shaped the identities of the expelled. There is also a noticeable shortage of
studies comparing these memories and the different and/or similar ways they
function among groups of exiles from different countries.
Therefore, I would like to attempt a comparative analysis of the memories of
exiles from Poland and Ukraine. My study is based on empirical data collected
from two small, local communities: Krzyż, a German town that became part of
Poland, and Zhovkva, a Polish town that was integrated into Soviet Ukraine.
Due to the qualitative nature of this analysis and the complexity of social circum-
stances in specific cases, I believe that a study with a local focus presents more
opportunities for in-depth conclusions.² Despite differences in pre-war history,
the post-war situation of exiles is similar in both of the communities chosen.
Krzyż was a German town before the War, inhabited by Germans as well as
an assimilated Jewish minority, but the latter were deported towards the end of
the 1930s. The town lay near what at that time was the Polish border. After the
war the Polish border was moved west, and Krzyż lost almost all of its popula-
 See, e.g. the German historian Philipp Ther’s comparative study: Philipp Ther. “The In-
tegration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical Reassessment.”
Slavic Review  (): –.
 For an example of analysing collective memory by juxtaposing two case studies, see Małgor-
zata Melchior’s study about the cultural differences between neighbouring villages with different
histories: Małgorzata Melchior. “Przeszłość jako czynnik zróżnicowań kulturowych dzisiaj –
przypadek dwóch sąsiadujących wsi.” Kultura i Społeczeństwo  (): –.
tion – the Germans either fled from the coming front in 1945, or were forcibly re-
located to Germany within the first year after the end of the War. The largest
group of Krzyż’s new inhabitants consisted of “repatriates”³ from the former
Eastern Borderlands of Poland (referred to hereafter as the Borderlands), while
the remainder included groups of Poles who had lived on the other side of the
border near Krzyż before the War, and settlers from Greater Poland and Central
Poland.
Zhovkva lay within the borders of the 2nd Polish Republic before the war, and
was a multinational and religiously heterogeneous Borderland town: its popula-
tion consisted of comparable numbers of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians. The war
deprived Zhovkva of its Jews and some of its Poles; most of the survivors of
the Holocaust and the remaining Poles left for Poland after 1945, when the
area was finally included in the Soviet Union. Due to post-war Soviet repres-
sions, which in large part targeted sympathisers of the underground Ukrainian
independence movement, the town also lost many of its Ukrainian inhabitants.
The new population of Zhovkva consisted of Ukrainians deported from Poland in
the years 1944–46, arrivals from Eastern Ukraine and other Soviet Union Repub-
lics, as well as Ukrainian migrants from nearby Galician villages.
The situation of the forced migrants in both Krzyż and Zhovkva was very dif-
ficult: both the Poles being “repatriated” to Poland and the Ukrainians “return-
ing” to Great Ukraine had lost their homes and regional homelands, and were
forced to adjust to new social, political and cultural circumstances. They also
had to participate in the reconstruction of social relations with the other groups
of settlers, all within the framework of undemocratic political systems.
The aim of this article is to analyze the way in which forced relocation is re-
membered by expellees now living in Krzyż and Zhovkva. I would also like to
determine whether, despite the respective differences in historical trajectories
and political circumstances, these memories share any similarities.When differ-
ences are found, I will attempt to explain them. Further, I would like to consider
how these memories affected the post-migrational reshaping of identity. In my
analysis of the phenomenon of forced relocation I will discuss its various stages:
the journey itself (and an evaluation of its causes); the ensuing first stage of cul-
tural and material adaptation (first impressions, settling down, economic ar-
rangements), as well as psychological adaptation related to living in a new
place (the emotions accompanying the entire process). Due to my interest in
the reconstruction of identity among forced migrants I will also consider the be-
 Due to the ideological connotations of this word, I will always use it in parenthesis, along
with the phrase “reclaimed lands”.
178 Anna Wylegała
ginning steps of long-term processes of social integration within a new commun-
ity. Although I will analyze the accounts of particular members belonging to
each group, i.e. instances of individual and biographical memory, I agree with
Halbwachs that the memory of each individual is by its very nature social, or
at least its individuality is grounded in a social framework.⁴ Collective memory
provides, as Kaja Kaźmierska suggests, a certain type of “code” that is necessary
for interpreting ones’ personal biographical experience and transforming it into
an element of identity that is congruent with the culture of memory within which
the individual functions.⁵ With these principles in mind, I treat my analysis, from
a theoretical point of view, as a search for the collective within the individual,
and as an attempt to explain the mutual connections between these two realms.
The data collected in Krzyż and Zhovkva include over 150 interviews record-
ed with individuals from various groups of inhabitants and their families; how-
ever for the purposes of this article I selected only the interviews with the oldest
generation of forced migrants: the “repatriates” from the Borderlands living in
Krzyż and the Ukrainians resettled from Poland in Zhovkva. The interviews




The Journey is the point of departure for the entire experience of forced resettle-
ment, and for the migrants it marks the beginning of a trajectory that robs them
of the control they had previously had over their lives.⁶ In his study of post-war
processes of social integration in Lubomierz in the “reclaimed lands”, Zdzisław
Mach compared migration to a ritual of passing. Utilising van Gennep’s classic
theory, Mach underlined three phases of migration: the phase of separation (ex-
clusion), the liminal (marginal) phase, and the phase of aggregation (inclusion).⁷
 Maurice Halbwachs. On collective memory. Chicago (IL): The University of Chicago Press, .
 Kaja Kaźmierska. Biografia i pamięć. Na przykładzie pokoleniowego doświadczenia ocalonych z
Zagłady. Kraków: Nomos, .
 Fritz Schütze, and Gerhardt Riemanan. “’Trajectory’ as basic theoretical concept for analyzing
suffering and disorderly social processes.” Social Organization and Social Process. Essays in Hon-
our of Anselm Strauss. Ed. David R. Maines. New York: De Gruyter, , –.
 Zdzisław Mach. Niechciane miasta. Migracja i tożsamość społeczna. Kraków: Universitas,
.
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For forced migrants, leaving their family homes constitutes a very clear begin-
ning of the phase of separation, an experience of exclusion. What the tales of
the “repatriates” who came to Krzyż and Zhovkva have in common is the emo-
tional recollection of the journey itself as long and arduous:
We went to Ukraine. It was 1946, the end of February, beginning of March. It was very cold.
They gave everyone two carts, to each family, so that we could go in these carts, and we
went. To the station in Uhnow. There’ a train station two kilometres from Uhnow, they
took us there … They took us to Ternopil province, to Berezhany, that’s a nice county
town – Berezhany … There was a whole host of people there, with animals if someone
had taken any, with little children – with everything, horses and livestock. They unloaded
us on the sidetrack. I was still a little boy but I remember that mum wrapped me up in a
shawl because it was very cold, with fierce wind and horrible weather.We spent a month in
that backwater. (Z., m., b. 1934)⁸
We sang “Lulajże Jezuniu” [a Christmas carol] in boxcars in Lubań Śląski. And, ma’am, and
we discovered in Lubań that my father’s family was living in Legnica. So back we went from
Lubań to Legnica. No food, no – well, there was drink, because there was water, but no
food. Frozen potatoes and onions for Christmas, because we didn’t have anything when
we came from Russia, you know, we barely had clothes. That was life, it wasn’t so easy.
(K., m., b. 1930)
What differentiates the Polish interviews from the Ukrainian ones is the length
and amount of detail in the narratives about the journey. One can find long de-
scriptions in almost every Polish account, with variations depending on the au-
thor’s narrative skill and the level of emotionality involved. The stories of Poles
from the Borderlands abound in tales of the makeshift nature of everyday life
during the weeks of forced train transportation: cooking outside during stops
and various ways of acquiring food. In the Ukrainian accounts lengthy descrip-
tions of the journey are much more rare, with the deportation itself often receiv-
ing only a token description:
How did it look? Well, they gave us carts, then there was a train in Lubaczów, so we got on
the train… We got to the train in carts, they packed us in the train and we went. We got
here… how far is it from Rawa, not too far, some 30 kilometres. We got here and father
was already waiting, and he somehow picked us up, and we stayed here. (Z., f., b. 1923)
Why these descriptions are brief is easy to understand, considering the fact that
most of the Ukrainian migrants coming from Poland (with the exception of those
 The reader can find information concerning the respondent and the town in which the inter-
view was conducted beneath every quotation: Z. stands for Zhovkva; K. for Krzyż; m. for male; f.
for female; and b. for year of birth.
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who first went to Eastern Ukraine) travelled several dozen, or at most a little over
100, kilometres to Zhovkva; the deportees from the Borderlands, on the other
hand, had to travel several hundred, and in some cases in excess of a thousand,
kilometres. Although in post-war conditions even a small distance could trans-
late into a long journey, the discrepancy in distances travelled becomes apparent
in the Poles’ vivid memories of their exodus.
The Polish descriptions are lengthier, adorned with more detail, and weave
more threads. Many of these threads, which appear in the majority of the Polish
interviews (e.g. separation from the family, getting lost during the train journey),
are not present in Ukrainian interviews at all. There are several reasons for this
situation: first of all, the Polish “repatriates’” journey was not only longer but it
also abounded in various events and adventures. In addition, the Poles’ aware-
ness of the distance they travelled contributed to a stronger sense of finding one-
self in a threshold situation, with an increased sense of danger and uncertainty,
as evidenced by the following quote:
Finally we had to go. And it was like this – we lost all we had, all that my mother and father
had worked for throughout their lives. I was 15 years old when we left Czortków … This very
moment was awfully heavy.We all cried, and everything was so… The children didn’t know
why we were crying so they cried as well. It was horrible, I mean, can you understand – all
your life’s belongings, it’s like watching it all burn, and maybe even worse than that, be-
cause if it actually burned it would’ve been gone. But we had to leave everything behind,
whatever you set your eyes upon, you were leaving it behind. It was truly horrible. (K., f., b.
1930)
An additional factor differentiating the Polish and Ukrainian narratives is the
collectively shaped narrative moulds, which are dependent on the language
and culture in which they are rooted. Harald Welzer describes these moulds
as the second most significant, next to experience, of the “material out of
which biographies are constructed”.⁹ What today shapes the biographical narra-
tives of the former inhabitants of the Polish Borderlands – a factor that is miss-
ing in the case of the Ukrainians – is the collective retelling of the memories of
forced migration, which began to take place in Poland as early as the 1970s due
to more lenient censorship policies.¹⁰ Popular culture, although controlled by the
 Harald Welzer. “Materiał, z którego zbudowane są biografie.” Transl. Magdalena Saryusz-Wol-
ska. Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka. Ed. Magdalena Saryusz-
Wolska. Warszawa: Universitas, , –.
 An analysis of the image of the “repatriate” in Polish popular culture, on the basis of press
releases and editorials, is offered by Maria Tomczak in: Maria Tomczak. “Obraz osadników w
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government, broke with previous political taboos against mentioning the reloca-
tions. One of the best examples of this practice is the film Sami Swoi (All Friends
Here or Our Folks). A brief period of thaw in Polish politics allowed for an at least
partial release of Borderland narratives. In Ukraine similar expression was im-
possible until the beginning of the 1990s. Due to the possibility of emotional re-
lease in Poland, the stories told today by “repatriates” from Krzyż include hu-
morous elements, which show that years of “retelling” have created some
distance between the storytellers and their traumatic experience:
We were riding all together, sleeping on some straw, which was padded, and if someone
had mattresses they slept on mattresses … [laughter] There was this tub in our car. You
know the type, round, made out of wooden planks, used for laundry back in the day [laugh-
ter]. And there was this older lady, and she’d been affluent, but then they took her estate
and she was impoverished. And I won’t forget [laughter], how she stirred in her sleep on the
straw, and somehow climbed into that tub. And she’s sitting in the tub and can’t get out
[laughter]. And she’s mumbling to herself, but we can all hear her: “Lord, oh Lord, what
has it all come to. There I was, sleeping in fine duvets and now I’m going to Poland in a
tub” [laughter] Everyone in the car was laughing. So she climbed out and went on normally.
(K., f., b. 1915)
How strongly biographical memory is shaped not only by the experiences of a
given individual, but also by the way he or she communicates with other actors
in social roles, and by the influence of factors such as the media, is evidenced by
the fact that in several narratives from Krzyż the reader can find direct references
to the protagonists of the film Sami Swoi. The interviewees use scenes appearing
in the film to describe their personal experience; it can only be speculated
whether such scenes have become a part of the reality of their memories:
And so we arrived in Poland – without a clue, we didn’t really know where. We just went
where the place was, where they pointed us to. We travelled for three weeks. We left our
home, Kazimierz, I will remind you, in 1946 on the 4th of March, from the station… the sta-
tion… it was… the Oszmiana station, because it was a ways from Oszmiana. And then they
drove us around, just like that, in those boxcars, to be sure. Three… three weeks we trav-
elled west, to get here. Just like… just like in the film, like Karguls and Pawlaks, that’s
how we travelled, with those cows. (K., f., b. 1922)
prasie i publicystyce polskiej.” Ziemie Odzyskane –.  lat w granicach państwa pol-
skiego. Ed. Andrzej Sakson. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, , –.
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Coercion and agency
What strongly differentiates Polish and Ukrainian memory is the matter of re-
sponsibility for the forced resettlement and the place of the individual within
the context of larger historical events. Both the Poles and the Ukrainians recall
the transfers as acts of repression, forced upon them and inflicted by someone
from the outside. However, this coercion varies in character and constitutes a dif-
ferent threat to the identity of the Poles and the Ukrainians. For the latter group,
the transfers are more often remembered as acts of direct violence – Ukrainian
narratives feature the brutality of Polish and Soviet troops as well as the help-
lessness and fear for one’s life present among the migrants.
But the most important thing was that the Poles used brute force to make us leave. Because
at first they just told us to go, there was a soviet committee prepared, and to resettle… Folk
didn’t go, because why would they leave whatever they had, their fields and whatnot, and
go somewhere, no-one even knew where… Later though, when they started killing, things
became unbearable, folk had to leave. They were forced to… (Z., m., b. 1929)
Poles speak rather about voluntary “repatriation”, although they frequently em-
phasise that, in fact, there was no real choice – there were threats of repression,
hostile Ukrainians, or simply the need to be where Poland was. In particular this
last factor is entirely absent from Ukrainian narratives. It is visible here how
strongly the civic and patriotic stances of the inhabitants of the Borderlands
were shaped by the experience of living in the Second Polish Republic, in
their own country. The Ukrainians were deprived of such an experience, with
“Greater Ukraine” being far more of an abstraction to them than a new Polish
state was to the Borderlanders.
In 1945, as a result of treaties signed, the eastern parts of Poland were incorporated into the
USSR. They sold us out in Potsdam and earlier in Yalta! Unfortunately, eastern Poland was
now a part of the USSR and we were given a choice – sign up for soviet citizenship or leave.
Obviously, we didn’t even think about it – we chose the latter … Of course, on the one hand
we felt regret, the experience of being driven out of our homeland – because we were driven
out, there’s no treaty here, a treaty is a piece of paper, while the people were driven out.We
were forced to go away, there were no other possibilities. What, were we supposed to sign
up as Russian citizens, us being Poles? You couldn’t just do that, simply change, or as the
Ukrainians said, switch sides. (K., m., b. 1929)
As a matter of course, the patriotic motivation is remembered alongside coercion
– direct or indirect. Words such as “decree”, “evacuation” and “population
transfer” are used. However, such opinions are decidedly fewer, and they usually
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appear in a political context – everything is happening because Poland no longer
exists in the interviewee’s homeland.
For the Ukrainians then, a population transfer is always synonymous with
deportation, and for Poles it is more of a forced migration. While such differen-
ces in the interpretation of the event of resettlement are slight, they do have a
significant influence on the possibility of rebuilding one’s identity in the new
place of residence. The Poles retain a degree of agency in the mechanism of
the forced transfer, which allows them to ascribe meaning to their loss and
their lack of choice, thus helping them to partly neutralise the destructive influ-
ence of these circumstances. The Ukrainians are deprived of their homeland and
their home through deportation, without receiving anything in return. The Poles
who leave do so because they are forced to; however they are also making a de-
cision: they choose between staying at home and living in the USSR, being po-
tentially threatened with repressions in the future, and between the necessity of
leaving home to be allowed to live in Poland. Despite the poignancy of the sit-
uation, this choice allows them to keep or construct a sense of individual agency,
of which the Ukrainians are deprived from the very beginning.
Both the Poles and the Ukrainians point to the guilty parties responsible for
their plight. Ukrainian migrants most often blame the Poles and the Soviets in
equal measure. However, for many Ukrainian respondents the blame does not
rest on any particular group, and is not even a category essential for the experi-
ence of deportation. Impersonal phrasing is a characteristic feature of their nar-
ratives, and sometimes, as in the case of the following quotation, the migrants
are unable to select words appropriate for describing what they lived through;
they either do not know such words, or their understanding of what happened
is insufficient for a categorised description.
They resettled us. (And when was that, during the war still?) In 1945.When the war ended,
there was this Polish… I don’t know what to call this, it was like they [people] went away.
(And you were forced to do this? They told you to go?) They forced us, the whole family.
Many Ukrainians here left. (Could you take your animals and everything?) We took every-
thing, they put us on trains, and we all went like animals. The animals went and we did. (Z.,
f., b. 1922)
The common denominator for all the Polish narratives is the conviction that the
Soviets are to blame for the loss of the respondents’ homelands. Sometimes they
are called Ruskies, sometimes Soviets, at other times they appear as “reds” or
“communists”. Occasionally, other groups share the blame: in the case of re-
spondents originally from contemporary Ukraine, the Ukrainians. In the case
of interviewees more interested in, or knowledgeable about, the political situa-
tion at the end of the war, it is the Allies, who “sold Poland out”. Of particular
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interest is that even in the case of uneducated respondents, with rural back-
grounds, the impersonal phrasing so characteristic for the Ukrainian descrip-
tions never appears in Polish accounts. There is no indication of an inability
among the Poles to situate themselves within the larger context of forced reset-
tlement as part of a greater political process. Once again, it is clear how advanta-
geous the years of working with the memory of this specific experience – in fam-
ilies, in the local community, and, especially after 1989, in public discourse –
proved for the Polish inhabitants of the Borderlands. The Polish respondents
have no trouble with clearly judging their past, because they have done it numer-
ous times before. In comparison, the Ukrainians, who were deprived of similar
opportunities, seem lost and helpless in the face of their own, untold experience.
Chaos and rebuilding
Adaptation
After arriving at their new place of residence both the Ukrainians and the Poles
faced the necessity of gradually reorganising their lives, especially on its most
basic, everyday level. Many respondents speak about the difficulties of finding
a house or apartment, of wandering from one homestead to another, and of
weeks of waiting at the train station for promised help. The reluctance to live
in someone else’s house is also mentioned – people who had just been expelled
from their own homes were often offered the homes of those who had met a sim-
ilar fate:
We arrived here, in Zhovkva. And spent, what, three weeks at the train station, on the plat-
form? So they chased us all around the place. We went to Dobrosyn, folks from Dobrosyn
were taken away to Siberia? and these young girls had stayed. They cried and wandered
around that house where we were supposed to go… “I don’t want this house, it is full of
tears”, said I. (Z., f., b. 1921)
When we arrived here in Krzyż it was early Spring. There were still no leaves on the trees.
We didn’t have a place to live because German women were still living in these here houses.
So they put us in the school, or where the school is now. Before the war the place had been
a hospital, or during the war. That’s where the repatriates lived, in rooms with several fam-
ilies in them. That’s how it was. How long did we live there? A couple of weeks to be sure,
and only then people went out to look for places where they could stay … When we were a
bit bigger, me and J. [interviewee’s sister] would always ask our father why he had chosen
the run-down shack he did … And he always said: “There were still German women with
children living everywhere”, he would say, “and I’m not one for forcing them out.” (K.,
f., b. 1940)
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The deported were at the mercy of their new authorities, who were often indiffer-
ent to the plight of the newcomers. To this day, their accounts contain bitterness
and the conviction that they were betrayed by the authorities and left without
help. The “repatriates” in both towns also harbour grudges against other groups
of settlers, chiefly those who lived near Zhovkva and Krzyż before the war. The
inhabitants of Krzyż who came from the Borderlands complained that it was the
“Poles from Poland” who had the easiest time settling in the abandoned German
town, primarily by shamelessly looting property intended for the deportees. The
deportees from Zhovkva resented the fact that, in contrast to the economic mi-
grants from villages near Zhovkva, who “came for the Polish and Jewish estates”,
they were forced to obtain everything through hard labour:
We stayed outdoors for three weeks in Poland, here in Krzyż. There, ma’am, on Marchlewski
street stood this, this big barn, and we stayed in that barn for three weeks, before we got an
apartment, because everything was already taken by “Poles”. But it wasn’t taken by Poles,
it was taken by thieves… And we stayed until we got this place, in this here house. (K., f., b.
1929)
Although adaptation in both cities was made even more difficult by wartime
damage, the situation of Krzyż’s new citizens was far worse. The town, which
had been 50% demolished by the Soviets, took a long time to recover, and the
necessity of participating in the process of rebuilding constituted an additional
burden for many. However, in numerous accounts, the post-war rebuilding of
Krzyż is portrayed as a patriotic and lofty deed, generating energy and the
most positive of emotions, instrumental in cementing the new community:
When we arrived, we had to start from scratch. Firstly – for example I remember that us
scouts, we cleared the debris, because here, where the John Paul II park is now located,
there was once a town square, and it was completely ruined, so we – the youth – cleared
the debris, and we took the bricks to some square, and it was said that these bricks would
be used to rebuild Warsaw. That was a grand aim: all of society was building its capital city.
That was the slogan. But then it turned out that the bricks went to Drawsko village [near
Krzyż], and elsewhere, to other construction sites, and all this public effort was wasted.
The enthusiasm was great, people wanted to do a lot of things, but nobody controlled it,
and that’s what happened to the public effort … Of course, the people were not discour-
aged, because it was a time of need. So we cleared the debris, and maybe the bricks weren’t
used for some lofty purpose, but there was some order, and you were doing something.
(K., m., b. 1928)
Despite knowing that such lofty ideals often diverged from dreary reality, for
many interviewees the participation in the rebuilding of a city to which they
were tied for life became a constructive experience, both for their own identities
and for creating bonds among Krzyż’s new inhabitants. In comparison to Zhovk-
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va, the inhabitants of Krzyż gained striking advantage from rebuilding their town
after the war. In the minds of the Poles, the memory of the difficulties associated
with the first period of adaptation is balanced by the joy of rebuilding their
homeland – both locally and, on a larger scale – ideologically. The building
blocks for this ideological homeland consisted of the bricks from Krzyż that
were supposed to go to Warsaw. Even if these building blocks were wasted be-
cause the bricks were pilfered, the public effort cemented a common bond
and gave the inhabitants of Krzyż the strength stemming from a sense of agency
and of the ability to change the surrounding reality, if only on a local scale.
The new population of Zhovkva had no such experience. Although also re-
covering from the passing of the front, Zhovkva suffered much less, and this was
certainly a positive factor. Yet, paradoxically, the lack of need for extensive re-
building in a material sense translated into a lack of the community-bonding ex-
perience that arises from rebuilding in a material sense. This in turn led to yet
another lost opportunity to create a sense of community. In addition, while
the people of Krzyż were united in the hope of forging a new reality (although
not on the level of politics) in the first period of post-war restoration, the total-
itarian regime enforced upon the inhabitants of Zhovkva a passiveness that was
the only assurance of relative safety.
Fear
A very important element of the memory of forced resettlement consists of the
fear experienced during the first days in the new town. The tales of the first im-
pressions of Krzyż and Zhovkva sound almost apocalyptic even today. The reality
which the migrants encountered at the end of their journey was shocking and
frightening, primarily due to the still-prevalent wartime violence that permeated
the towns. For many of the Krzyż and Zhovkva “repatriates”, the first human
being encountered in the town was a machine gun toting soldier (usually a So-
viet), and the first sight – bodies strewn across the streets. Regardless of whether
these bodies belonged to UPA guerilla fighters executed by the Soviets (in Zhovk-
va) or slain Germans (in Krzyż), they made a shocking impression on the new-
comers.
The first weeks in both towns resembled living in a minefield – in a figura-
tive, socio-political, and literal sense. Krzyż was a classic example of the Polish
“Wild West in the Reclaimed Lands”, with all the entailing lawlessness and vio-
lence; Zhovkva witnessed the painful consequences of the raging conflict be-
tween the UPA and the Red Army. The memory of the first period of adaptation
is thus pervaded by a sense of danger; in secondary literature concerning the
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post-war situation in the “reclaimed lands”, this sense is enumerated as among
the primary factors influencing the instability of settlement.¹¹ The danger stem-
med from the martial nature of everyday life – the Red Army governed both
towns immediately after the war, and this was painfully palpable each day.
The settlers from Krzyż and Zhovkva remember the gunfights, brawls and
havoc caused by Red Army soldiers.
And when we already got to Zhovkva, just in the evening, there was a light drizzle… Further
away was a grain silo, and we were closer to here, and the silo was guarded.We arrived…
The first night – nothing, the second night – shooting.We didn’t know what was happen-
ing, we had got out of the frying pan and into the fire… And those bandits that guarded the
grain had some laughs and started shooting, scaring people… (Z., m, b. 1929)
The most troublesome for the railway were the Ruskies, because they came through here,
either going from Berlin or to Berlin, since there is a junction here. Things happened at the
station, but I didn’t go there since I was young. When I went anywhere, then it was either
with dad or mum, always under some protection. I was afraid of them, very afraid … You’d
prefer to avoid them at a distance, never deal with them. (K., f., b. 1930)
A specific type of fear felt upon arrival was fear of the authorities. In the narra-
tives from Krzyż, fear was usually exceeded by animosity, sometimes mingled
with contempt; the new communist authorities had their powerbase outside Po-
land, and were thus considered unwanted and dangerous, but at times also ridi-
culed. In the accounts of the people from Zhovkva there is no irony or ridicule. It
is clear from the interviews that in Krzyż the authorities were a real threat only to
those who actively opposed them, while in Zhovkva everyone was potentially in
danger, guilty or not. The migrants from Poland came under particular suspicion
in post-war Zhovkva, partly due to having relatives abroad. One can imagine the
magnitude of the fear inspired by the Soviet government, considering the fact
that the oldest generation of interviewees is still today too frightened to speak
about their opinions of the regime. It can only be deduced from vague hints
that the declared stance of not caring about politics is, in fact, a manifestation
of a still-existing fear.
What I’m saying is, we’ve never dabbled in any politics, at all, and that’s why we were able
to survive, no-one’s ever touched us. No one gave us any medals, and no one locked us up
 Jędrzej Chumiński. “Czynniki destabilizujące proces osadnictwa we Wrocławiu (–
).” Studia nad procesami integracji i dezintegracji społeczności Śląska. Ed. Władysław Mis-
iak.Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, , –; Macin Zaremba. Wiel-
ka Trwoga. Polska –. Ludowa reakcja na kryzys. Kraków:Wydawnictwo Znak, Institute
of Political Studies PAN, .
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in any prisons. Because there were some that got involved… these Ruskies that they’ve sent
here… Say one of them saw Lenin, so what, he’d go to work for the regional committee…
Nope, we did our work on the side, we did everything on the side. (Z., f., b. 1928)
The memories of the first moments in both Krzyż and Zhovkva are characterised
by an extreme sense of insecurity, even in one’s own home. The interviewees re-
count their constant fear of being attacked – by Germans, Ukrainian nationalists,
Muscovites, the Red Army, or “regular” bandits. The fear was not limited to out-
side threats, but also included neighbours.
We were afraid. At first we didn’t want to go out. They took some of our families to Osieczno
village. The clearings were empty.We were near the road.We went through the forest. There
was nothing but forest for 11 kilometres. We stopped for the night. There was no light, no
lamp, nothing. And the Germans were still around. The next day: “We’re going back!” (K.,
f., b. 1922)
I still remember how they walked around near our house. They were wrapped up in cloaks
and wore huge trench-coats. Their hands were hidden. Over there, where our garden is now,
near the forest, they always came out of the woods and wandered in our orchard. As soon
as it got dark they would be in our orchard. And we would immediately lock ourselves in
the house, like that. (So you were afraid of them?) Of course we were afraid. Because who
knows who these people are, and what’s out there? (Z., f., b. 1944)
Both fragments illustrate the level of fear, but also the mutual distrust – the set-
tlers, strangers to each other, were afraid of a sort of undefined “others”. They
did not want to check who was wandering through their garden at night. On
the one hand, living among other people was a guarantee of safety, offering pro-
tection from the Germans and guerillas hiding in the woods; on the other hand,
even the neighbours could prove to be dangerous. The fear of the new neigh-
bours suggests the level of animosity that became one of the most important fac-
tors impeding, and often halting, the process of building a new community. In
the majority of the narratives, everyone who does not belong to a narrowly-de-
fined group of “us” is a potential enemy. In such cases, the stories about various
“bandits” are accompanied by a sense of alienation and loneliness, of being able
to rely only on oneself. In time, such feelings combined with the perceived, con-
stant hostility of one’s surroundings can result in an inward retreat, a conscious
withdrawal from the community, as in the case of the woman quoted below.
All sorts of things happened here. They told us: “You didn’t want to work so you came
here.” The locals were very aggressive. They called us names. You don’t know… I can’t ex-
plain… There was a period here when all the Greek-Catholic churches were closed down
and turned into Orthodox churches. Some people didn’t want that… All sorts of things hap-
pened. People were so angry. The locals were all Banderovtsy. But there were others here…
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the Krasnopaganshchiks, the Red Army, those who… It was terrifying. But I’m telling you,
we didn’t get involved in anything, we didn’t see anything, not a thing. (Z., f., b. 1928)
The burden of animosity
Establishing new relations with other migrants was also an important challenge
faced by the settlers. After the war both towns included a mixture of various
groups, as well as individuals, whose wartime stories were far too divergent
and unique to provide mutual understanding based on a common plight. All
of these people were faced with the necessity of establishing new relations
with each other.
In the memories of both groups of migrants, the Ukrainians and the Poles,
the difficulty of beginning to build relations with locals who lived in the com-
munities surrounding Krzyż and Zhovkva is particularly apparent. The dominant
motif in the tales of the “repatriates” is negativity, and above all, the lack of help
and basic human compassion. Situations in which the migrants were refused a
symbolic glass of water or milk by the better-off locals are still painful to recall.
We were [treated] like dogs, ma’am. My sister-in-law had a baby of seven months when she
came here, and she had no milk, nothing. There was no goat, no one here had a goat yet.
We only earned enough for one later.We bought an old goat, to get milk. Ma’am, when we
came to Drawsko, three kilometres on foot, I remember walking as well, they drove us off
with dogs, like that: “Go, go away, go, there’s no milk for you.” That’s how it is you know,
this is still with us, it stayed with us. (K., f., b. 1929)
The lack of understanding on the locals’ part, along with their accusations that
the “repatriates” came to Krzyż/Zhovkva in order to take the German/Polish es-
tates, are also strongly remembered. The migrants were offended by the accusa-
tions of greed that illustrated a complete lack of understanding of their tragic
plight, and by being treated like foreigners by their fellow countrymen.
Well, anyway, these weren’t… We weren’t greeted or accepted like friends. Rather like foes,
which was the unexpected part, because not only were we deprived of our homes, it turned
out that we came here to steal and that we were the enemy. Because we came from across
the Bug you see, so I say, after I gathered up the courage, I say: “Lady, do you even know
where the Bug is? I’m not from across the Bug, I’m from across the San. And do you know
where that is? No, and where’s the Bug? No, then what are you going on about, what’s that
about being from across the Bug, is it supposed to be something worse? And where are you
from?” Afterwards I had to speak like this, because they treated us like nobodies, the locals.
(K., f., b. 1930)
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(And when you came here, to Zhovkva, in ’45, how were you received? Did they treat you
like locals, or like outsiders?) Like outsiders! “Shits”, they said. These locals didn’t accept
us. (Local Ukrainians?) Local Ukrainians, local folks, not one bit, no! … (But you spoke the
same language…) Yup. In the beginning they didn’t accept us. I don’t know why they didn’t.
Did they understand that we were forced to leave? They said we came for the Polish houses,
Polish land. (Z., f., b. 1928)
A difficult memory, still thriving among the “repatriates”, is a feeling of being
inferior due to their economic situation. Both the Poles from the Borderlands
in Krzyż, and the Ukrainians from Poland in Zhovkva formed a kind of economic
sub-class¹² in their new towns. From the start, they were not only objectively
poorer than the settlers from Greater Poland and Central Ukraine, but more im-
portantly, unlike the locals, they could not count on the support of their families.
In addition, their poverty, combined with cultural differences and the fact that
most of the “repatriates” came from rural areas, inspired the locals to brand
them with the humiliating tag of “hicks”.
And that stung me,when we came there, to Poland, it was our Poland as well! But when we
arrived here, in the west… Also here in Poznań province, the people weren’t really honest
either. They called us “Ukrainians”… And what could you do? Tough luck. People didn’t
understand how it was … Because we did, in fact, arrive poor. What could we have had?
You couldn’t take everything, only the things you could carry, nothing more … They had
everything prepared for them, but we’ve had to leave everything behind. So they should
have understood that this was not right. They laughed that we arrived in paper bags.
That’s what you could hear, it was unpleasant. But you didn’t pay attention, because
what could you do, you had to keep on living … We were always the ones who were
worse. (K., f., b. 1930)
The respondents who were at least in their teens when they experienced resettle-
ment are now able to contextualise their past emotions, and search for a rational
explanation for the locals’ behaviour. Those who were only children at the time
are left with a painful sense of wrongdoing,which still causes negative emotions.
They greeted us with irritation, they called us “shits”. (Why?) Shits, meaning that we came
from a “Shit-hole”.We had these neighbours, who were rich. There were two girls there, like
me and my sister, from the same year. So we would come over to their house to play. We
lived in poverty. And they had white bread. For us, mum would bake bannocks, she fed
 Ther. “The Integration of Expelees”; Volodymyr Kitsak. “Deportovanii z Polshchi ukraintsi:
rezultaty pershoho etapu vhodzhennia v socium ta ekonomichnoho prystosuvannia u –
 rr.” Ukraina-Polshcha: istorychna spadshchyna i suspil’na svidomist’, vol. : Deportatsii
–. Lviv: Natsional’na Akademia Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypia-
kevycha, .
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us as best she could. So over at their place L., the rich girl, would sometimes give us some
bread, and we ate… [with trembling voice]. Our parents wouldn’t stand it, they always yell-
ed at us for it. (Z., f., b. 1944)
The theme above of objective differences between the “repatriates” and other set-
tlers is present in interviews from both towns, but in very different forms. In
Zhovkva, mutual judgements are vague, lacking in detail, and usually limited
to a simple (although very confident) statement that the others were “different”.
Based on the interviewees’ accounts, it is impossible to determine what the dif-
ferences between the Ukrainians from Poland and those living near Zhovkva
were. One reason for this might be that – apart from the Orthodox creed shared
by some of the settlers from the Chełm region – the objective differences between
these two groups in Zhovkva were factually minuscule, and ethnographic in
character at most. The other reason might be that the image of the migrant
from Poland did not become a part of shared memory in Ukraine; it was not fil-
tered through mass culture like the image of the “repatriate” from the Eastern
Borderlands was in Poland. The inhabitants of Zhovkva branded each other
with names suggesting foreignness, but the social imagination did not aid
them in creating a topos of the migrant as someone with definite traits. The sit-
uation was different in Krzyż. Firstly, the objective differences between the set-
tlers from the Borderlands and the other settlers were definitely great. Addition-
ally, the shared narratives about the forced migrations created clear images of
the Borderland-repatriate and the “settler from the Central” (the aforementioned
film “Sami Swoi” provides examples of both), which shaped the biographical
memories of the inhabitants of Krzyż ex post. According to Kaja Kaźmierska, bi-
ographical memory is fused with the shared memories of the community which a
person inhabits, and the latter provide context for the former, at the same time
enabling the interpretation of one’s own experience.¹³ It is because of the rich-
ness of this context that the images of the “repatriate” and the “Centralak”
(“Centralite”) feature so strongly in the interviews with the inhabitants of Krzyż.
In summary, although both the Poles and the Ukrainians struggled with sim-
ilar problems after arriving in their new towns, a closer look at their accounts
reveals significant differences in the situations of the settlers from each group
– as well as on their outlook on rebuilding their identities. The first difference
concerns the period of difficulties associated with the initial stage of adaptation.
Fear and mutual distrust permeate the memories recounted by the Polish and
Ukrainian settlers in a similar fashion; however, in the Polish narratives these
feelings are swiftly replaced by tales of a gradual befriending by initially hostile
 Kaźmierska. Biografia i pamięć.
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people, and an equally gradual creation of a relatively stable and safe life in a
new political reality. The Ukrainian narratives show that the fear of the commu-
nist regime was a part of everyday life long after the “repatriates” from the Bor-
derlands began to feel free to tell each other political jokes in Krzyż. In Zhovkva,
on the other hand, the distrust of other people which was the product of that
fear, long continued to paralyse the process of social bonding. This had signifi-
cant consequences for the issue that interests me, namely the rebuilding of iden-
tity. To say that a prolonged, intense experiencing of fear has a negative impact
on the psyche is a truism. Yet a factor of equal importance is the fact that in a
post-migrational period, when recent migration is potentially stigmatising, pro-
longed fear leads to the migrants’ eschewing all attempts to establish a new
identity, which prevents the trauma from being addressed. As a result, the diffi-
cult experience of a break in the continuity of one’s identity can become too
powerful to overcome.
The post-migrational reconstruction of identity
Homesickness
If we compare the journey itself to the separative phase of the migrational rite of
passage, then the first period of adaptation becomes the liminal phase, a time of
crossing, in which the individual is suspended – they have not severed their
bonds with the old reality, nor have they established a connection with the
new one. For nearly all of the interviewees, the most important emotion associ-
ated with this period is an overbearing feeling of homesickness. The respondents
recall that for a notable period of time after their arrival they lived in the past,
focussing on what they had left in their previous homes, rather than on their
present lives.
We reminisced, of course. Mum always did, because she was a Lviv lifer, constantly going
on about Lviv, living in Lviv, Lviv songs… Mum always reminisced. In any case, when we
came here in the beginning, in 1945, everyone said that this was temporary. Initially, we
all thought that the Americans would come again and that there would be world war
three and that we would return to our homes. This lasted for a long time, no-one believed
that we would have to stay here … So mum was fixed on the idea, it kept her going. (K., m.,
b. 1928)
Although homesickness was a universal emotion among the migrants from Krzyż
and Zhovkva, the Poles and the Ukrainians were in fact longing for different
things. The settlers from the Borderlands speak mostly about their hometown
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or village, about land understood as a “small fatherland”, but also about the
specific type of Polish identity unique to the Borderlands region, which they
did not manage to bring west. It seems that their tragedy lay in the forced inter-
ruption of the coherence and integrity of their – borrowing a term from Stanisław
Ossowski – “ideological and private homeland”.¹⁴ The force of this homesick-
ness and its destructive influence on the functioning of settlers in their new
hometown is evidenced by the accounts of people who never got over the loss
of their old homes, never grew accustomed enough to their new homes to call
them their own. In their cases, the process of adapting to life’s new conditions
failed, the migration led to a defeat, particularly on the level of personal identity.
Even if these interviewees acclimated themselves to their new geographical and
cultural conditions, they never managed to reach the phase of aggregation, the
stage of identity assimilation.
You still wish you could return to your home. I would like to see it one more time before I
die, but I certainly won’t… These days I can’t go very far. My husband would go with me, if
he had come from the east, but he’s from around here, so he never felt the urge. The chil-
dren also got used to this place … Only I keep collecting what I can, whatever souvenirs I
can, so that the children, and then the grand-children might know how it was. Difficult
memories. It’s hard to forget, we were too big. We remember everything. If I had been
younger, I wouldn’t remember so much, it wouldn’t hurt me so much. But here I am, walk-
ing around, walking down the streets in Czortków, and often I feel as if I’m back home, in
the east. (K., f., b. 1930)
The Ukrainians deported from Poland were homesick as well, but for them home
meant their family’s land, farmed by past generations, and homesteads sur-
rounded by safe and familiar neighbourhoods. Sometimes they sorely missed
the people they had left in their old country, from whom they became separated
by the border for many years. The differences between the feelings of homesick-
ness experienced by the Polish and Ukrainian deportees are amply illustrated by
their stories of trips to their old countries, which they undertook in the 1990s.
Both the Poles and the Ukrainians realise during their visits that there is nothing
left for them in their old homelands. The Ukrainians claim, with a sense of dis-
appointment, that their relatives who avoided deportation became Polonised;
the Poles on the other hand complain that they cannot find their place, which
in the case of the interviewee quoted below means firstly his native village,
which was razed, and secondly, in a metaphorical sense – the Polish Border-
 Stanisław Ossowski. “Analiza socjologiczna pojęcia ojczyzny.” Dzieła, vol. ,Warszawa: PIW,
, –.
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lands, which no longer exist in the shape remembered by the exiled “repatri-
ates”.
At first, everybody wanted to [go]. I went as well, a couple of times, to my old place, to, uh,
Lubaczów … Well, it seems fine, but what’s there for us…? Well, they have, their children
are already Poles. You understand, they’re no longer Ukrainians. My younger [sister] mar-
ried a Pole, so they’re Polonised, that’s that …. You can’t do anything about it. Let them be
Poles then, if they remain friends with the Ukrainians, if they agree, if there’s… Well, what
can you do. (Z., f., b. 1928)
So I went ma’am, I’ve been to Dubno, I’ve been to Ptyt, I went to see that little church. The
Ukrainians burned that church down, there’s nothing left but a cross. The church is burnt.
It’s gone. So recently I went to Volhynia, and God forbid, when I saw all of this, pure horror,
you want to, you wanted to cry … So now I can’t say how they could’ve done this.Where our
home, where our estate stood, not only ours, but also where those Ukrainians lived, the
grand landowners, there’s no trace of any of it, ma’am. I searched for my place, where
my pa had his cottage, the cottage, the barn, the pens. I searched for it all. So I say to my-
self, maybe I’ll find a stone, maybe a piece of wood, but no. There was nothing. They lev-
elled it all. (K., m., b. 1930)
The complexity of the differences between Polish and Ukrainian homesickness
appears amplified in the migrants’ reaction to the necessity of finally accepting
their loss: the Ukrainians are able to accept it, albeit with bitterness and regret;
the Poles cannot.
Uncertainty and temporariness
The second strongest emotion, further reinforcing liminality and the suspension
of the first period after arriving in Krzyż and Zhovkva, is the sense of temporari-
ness and instability. In part, it is a natural extension of the same homesickness
that caused the people to hope for a swift return to their former home and that
prevented them from accepting the change in their lives. Another factor that con-
tributed to the persistence of these emotions was the belief that the post-war po-
litical reality was not final, and that all it took was a small change in global pol-
itics and the borders would change again. Nearly all of the migrants claim that
they were convinced for a very long time that their stay in Krzyż or Zhovkva was
not permanent.
When repatriation came, no-one believed that it would be permanent, either there, in the
east, or here. Many people believed that it was just a pause, to calm everyone down and
stop the war. When we arrived here there was this rumour going around for, I don’t
know, two years, that we wouldn’t stay long, that in a couple of months, or a year at
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most, we would return east. … Some folks even kept on to their property there, to have a
place to go back to. (K., m., b. 1931)
And what were the attitudes among the people? “We’ll stay here for a year. We won’t stay
here for long.” (You thought you’d be coming back?) Yes, that we’d return. (That you’d re-
turn to Lubaczów?) Yes. There was this policy back then that they’d come back to their
homes, the owners, that they’d be able to punish you somehow. That caused fear. I gave
up on that house, I told you about that Polish woman. … Then I bought it officially, legally,
and I’m not afraid of anyone here. (Z., m., b. 1917)
As the second quotation illustrates, the sense of temporariness was often com-
bined with the fear that the previous owners of the newly occupied houses
would return. Despite the authorities’ copious efforts to convince the settlers
that such a threat was unrealistic, the migrants were afraid that their new
homes might turn out to be only temporary living quarters. A recurring theme
within this context is the striving for “legalising” or “securing” the new property
by gathering the necessary documentation, or simply by purchasing the proper-
ty, foregoing the state as an intermediary.
A careful analysis of the Zhovkva and Krzyż deportees’ narratives shows that
temporariness and uncertainty constituted a comparable burden only during the
initial stage of adaptation. For the Ukrainian migrants, these feelings were swift-
ly superseded by fear and the general despondency associated with the repres-
siveness of the Soviet political system. For the deportees from the Borderlands,
the situation was different, and it seems that the lasting sense of instability as-
sociated with their new surroundings had more long-term consequences. There
were two essential causes for this. Firstly, after the war the Polish migrants
were convinced, to a far greater degree than the Ukrainian migrants, that a
turn in international politics would return the lost eastern territories to Poland.
The people had high hopes for Władysław Anders,¹⁵ the Polish government in
exile in London, and waited for the Allies to “snap out” of their mind set regard-
ing Poland. The interviewees from Krzyż speak about listening to Radio Free Eu-
rope, participating in anti-government organisations and the general spirit of re-
sistance present among the inhabitants of the “reclaimed lands” who came from
 Władysław Anders – Polish military, general and politician. After the Soviet invasion of Po-
land in  he was imprisoned by the Soviets, and after the Sikroski-Majski treaty in  he
was released and formed the Polish Army in the Soviet Union (consisting of Polish citizens de-
ported to the USSR in –). Finally, the so called Anders Army left USSR and fought
alongside the Western Allies, capturing Monte Cassino. After the establishment of the commu-
nist government in Poland Anders stayed in exile, as most of his soldiers. Immediately after the
war, many Poles hoped for his comeback and fight against the communist rule in Poland.
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the Borderlands. It seems that this stubborn hope was the result of the status
that their lost Borderlands homeland held in their minds: it was, as I mentioned
before, not only personal, but also integral to the ideological, “grand” home-
land. In the post-war period, the Ukrainians did not have an exiled political rep-
resentation on a comparable scale to Poland; therefore the Ukrainian deportees
had a harder time hoping for a change originating from abroad. In addition, the
bloody conflict between the Ukrainian independence underground and the Red
Army, which took a heavy toll on the civilian population, caused many deportees
to simply hope for stability and peace – at all costs.
The second cause lies in the character of post-war propaganda in Poland and
Ukraine.Whilst in the Ukrainian SRR the subject of any border changes after the
war was usually avoided, the propaganda in the People’s Republic of Poland
made the return of the “reclaimed lands” one of its leading themes. On the
one hand, the settlers were being convinced that the Western and Northern Ter-
ritories had always belonged to Poland. On the other hand, the fear of the Ger-
mans was fuelled and exploited, and the spectre of German vengefulness was
constantly brought up.¹⁶ In principle, this was a means of procuring the loyalty
of the new inhabitants of these lands: the settlers were supposed to be thankful
to the communist authorities for guarding the western border and providing
them with safety. The narratives from Krzyż show the strength of the combined
influence of the state-spread fear of the Germans’ return and the hope of reclaim-
ing the Borderlands cultivated by the “repatriates”. The interviewees from Krzyż
speak about the years of living in a state of readiness to leave and waiting for
“Anders¹⁷ to arrive on a white horse”, about their intentional refusal to set
down roots in the new town. This refusal had two aspects – the aspect of person-
al identity and the communal aspect. On the level of identity, it stalled psycho-
logical adaptation, making it impossible to accept the finality of migration and
the lack of the option to return. On the social level, it negatively impacted the
formation of a new community, also in its most basic, material sense: for
many years after the war, the deportees from the Borderlands did not renovate
the houses and estates left by the Germans, and did not construct new buildings.
This phenomenon is perfectly conveyed by the following quotation from a re-
spondent born near Nowogródek (presently in Belarus): why invest in something
that is “not ours”, without being certain that it will become ours?
 Andrzej Sakson. “Procesy integracji i dezintegracji społecznej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Pół-
nocnych Polski po  roku.” Pomorze – trudna ojczyzna? Kształtowanie się nowej tożsamości
–. Ed. Andrzej Sakson. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, , –.
 See note .
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Yes, everyone thought that they would go back. Not only that, I worked in construction.
And when I went to work in 1960 in Krzyż, no-one was building anything. “Because it’s
not ours”. Who wanted to live here? Just the railway workers, due to this junction, and
then the factories. But to get too attached to Krzyż – not really. Only in the beginning of
the 60s did things budge a little. And later, what with the plots of land, towards the end
of those 60s, people really started building. So you could say that when I went to work
they started building, in 1963. (K., f., b. 1942)
Foreignness and cultural adaptation
The third important challenge for rebuilding the identities of the deportees was
the necessity of adapting to new cultural and geographical conditions and the
associated feeling of foreignness, as well as the difficult relations with the
still-remaining Polish population in Zhovkva and the German population in
Krzyż. Once again, the interviews conducted in Krzyż and Zhovkva suggest
that these problems affected both groups of settlers to a very uneven degree.
The sense of foreignness does not appear strongly in accounts about the first mo-
ments in Zhovkva, and neither does contact with the Poles. This is easy to under-
stand when one remembers that the Ukrainians deported from Poland largely
had not witnessed the departure of Polish inhabitants of the town. The urban
landscape of Zhovkva was also hardly very different from what the Ukrainians,
who had previously lived tens of kilometres away, had been used to previously.
The type of architecture, the furnishings, the way of farming or organising a
workshop were all similar, and the natural environment remained largely the
same. Hence, the process of cultural adaptation does not form a separate thread
in the narratives from Zhovkva.
The town that the new inhabitants of Krzyż arrived in, in addition to being
still dangerous due to military activity, was tangibly and painfully foreign – and
therefore even more threatening. Not only was the space, still saturated with an
entirely foreign German atmosphere, the people were foreign as well – for the
migrants, very often the first people encountered in Krzyż after the railway work-
ers were Germans. Both the physical space and the German population who had
a negative attitude towards the Polish settlers made the newcomers uneasy.
Everything seemed strange to us here. The signs were still in German everywhere at the
train station. (K., f., b. 1915)
Father went to town here in Krzyż and I jumped into the street. Today this is Staszic street. I
don’t know what it was called back then, but I do know that there was a German woman in
a window and when she saw me she yelled: “Polnische Schweinerei!” That’s how she greet-
ed me here – there were still some Germans around. I’m not very surprised by her reaction,
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because they were being expelled – we knew how it was – but still, it was an unpleasant
event. “First time in Krzyż – I think to myself – that’s some greeting.” (K., m., b. 1929)
After the first difficult contact it was necessary to establish some sort of relations
with the Germans. In many cases, the Polish settlers shared apartments with
them for several months, and they also worked together. The relationships be-
tween the former and current owners varied – some were steeped in animosity,
others were formally proper, and others still were cordial and resulted in contact
being maintained via mail for many years. These latter relationships favoured
working on one’s memory and identity, by enabling the transfer of local know-
how and by reducing the sense of being an intruder in a new place. Far more
important than the direct, yet short-lived, contacts with Germans was the matter
of adapting to life in a post-German cultural milieu. The foreignness of the nat-
ural environment, economy, material culture and climate was a significant bar-
rier to adaptation for many of the interviewees in Krzyż.¹⁸ Aside from the difficul-
ties associated with settling down, the foreignness redefined cultural adaptation
as a wholesale process of changing one’s symbolic universe.¹⁹ The German cul-
tural and geographical landscape was a hostile, alien environment for the embit-
tered and unhappy deportees from the Borderlands, requiring the additional ef-
forts of assimilation and discovery. The vast majority of the interviewees
remember the process as a sorrowful experience. Many of these people are
prone to idealising their original homeland at the expense of the unwanted,
“not our” reality in which they were forced to live after the war; this is especially
true for those who never got to see their homeland again. In the east “everything
was better”, from land through housing up to the very air; contrary to the insin-
uations of getting rich off of German estates, honest people lost out on the reset-
tlement, in a material sense.
How can you even compare the soil in Volhynia to the soil over here. Over there, when you
plant wheat, you get a head this big, and over here? This wheat doesn’t have a head. Over
there, there’s land and there’s wealth. This place was so wild, nothing would grow, so, we
hadn’t any horses or even a cow or anything, yea, we wanted to go back. (K., f., b. 1935)
 For an example of a discussion on this matter, see Andrzej Brencz, who employs the collec-
tive category of a “cultural landscape”. Andrzej Brencz. “Oswajanie niemieckiego dziedzictwa
kulturowego. Z badań etnologicznych na Środkowym Nadodrzu.” Wokół niemieckiego dziedzict-
wa kulturowego na Ziemiach Północnych i Zachodnich. Ed. Zbigniew Mazur. Poznań: Instytut Za-
chodni, , –.
 I employ the terms ‘cultural adaptation’ and ‘symbolic universe’ as they are understood by
Józef Niżnik in: Józef Niżnik. Symbole a adaptacja kulturowa.Warszawa: Centralny Ośrodek Me-
todyki Upowszechniania Kultury, .
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Different buildings. Back home there were no brick houses, there were wooden houses.
These were beautiful homes, really beautiful, and all of them topped with red tiles, plate
and red tiles. But they were nice buildings, and they were very well-kept buildings, over
there a householder cared for his house. And over here, we came and everything was
just bricks and bricks, we couldn’t get used to it. Over there you could leave a sausage
or something lying around, and that sausage could lay there for a week and it wouldn’t
turn white, wouldn’t spoil. Here you put it in the fridge and it’s completely off in a week.
Everywhere there’s this humidity, well maybe not humidity, but the air is different,
humid, back there the air was dry. (K., f., b. 1934)
An additional barrier to rebuilding identity and social life in a post-German town
was the strong, negative sentiment that persisted after the war towards every-
thing that was German. The new environment that the settlers were forced into
was not only alien, unwanted and unknown – it was primarily hostile, because
it reminded one about the recent horrors of war. The interviewees from Krzyż re-
member their dislike of everyday items, German books, signs on buildings and
even church furnishings.
There was a hostile tendency in the people towards German things, tools, even German
buildings. We have a church here that was constructed in 1774. It was an Evangelical
church. Inside, there was an altar and two rows of benches. … We had to renovate the
church, we had to rebuild some parts. In 1945 and 1946 people came here from my
parts, from Stanisławów province, also known as Kołomyja, from Tarnopol province,Volhy-
nia, Belarus, Lithuania, as well as Krakow, Warsaw and Poznań provinces. There was this
gathering of people and everyone was against these German appliances, these German re-
mainders, even if it was antique architecture, no-one cared. (K., m., b. 1934)
The German “patina”, as all German material heritage was called by the propa-
ganda of the People’s Republic of Poland, reminded the new inhabitants of
Krzyż for a very long time that they were foreigners in the town. This was an ob-
vious obstacle for social and psychological adaptation.
Conclusions
An analysis of the material collected allows for the claim that, despite the differ-
ent historical contexts and cultures of memory in Poland and in Ukraine – both
past and present – the experience of forced resettlement is universal enough to
enable one to find shared traits in the narratives told about it today. I believe that
these traits are best called, drawing upon Harald Welzer and his associates, the
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topoi of memory.²⁰ Examples of the topoi present in the narratives of both groups
of deportees include: the journey, the fear of strangers, a sense of temporariness,
poverty. The emotional similarity of the recounted experiences is in some cases
striking: if, as an experiment, one were to remove the factual elements from the
accounts and switch the quotes around their significance would remain equally
authentic.
At the same time, the biographies of individual interviewees and the cultures
of memory which they inhabit, affix the topoi in diverse narrative structures, and
in various cultural “shells” – causing them to function differently. Thus, in the
Polish accounts the topoi of the journey and homesickness take the leading
roles, while the Ukrainian accounts are centred around the fear of strangers
(and especially of the authorities) and poverty. There are also issues which ap-
pear only in the narratives of one of the groups – e.g. the extended sense of tem-
porariness and the fear of the Germans’ return in the memories of the Poles.
Analysing the narratives of the Polish and Ukrainian migrants also illus-
trates how hard, and at the same time how varied – due to the political, social
and cultural contexts – the post-migrational processes of rebuilding identity
really were. What constituted an opportunity for one group was often a burden
or an insignificant factor for the other. For the Polish interviewees, the largest
barrier to adaptation was their relationship with their own homeland (its status
as an integral part of their ideological homeland), as well as the lingering, post-
war sense of temporariness and uncertainty, amplified by objective cultural dif-
ferences between their old and new homes. For the Ukrainian deportees, the fac-
tors which most destabilised the process of rebuilding identity included the re-
pressiveness of the political system and the ensuing fear and lack of trust,
which also delayed the formation of social bonds in Zhovkva. It appears that,
in an initial balance of opportunities and dangers for the reconstruction of iden-
tity immediately after the migration, the Ukrainians faced slightly better odds –
primarily because of the similarities between their old and new homelands, and
the nature of their relationship with the former. In the end however, the condi-
tions became roughly even. Although the Polish deportees got off to a worse
start, these initial conditions were later replaced by better opportunities for re-
working traumatic experiences: a relative (in comparison to the Ukrainians)
ideological liberty, and the easier formation of new social structures.
 Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller and Karoline Tschuggnall. “‘Dziadek nie był nazistą’. Narod-
owy socjalizm i Holokaust w pamięci rodzinnej.” Transl. Paweł Masłowski. Pamięć zbiorowa i
kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka. Ed. Magdalena Saryusz-Wolska.Warszawa: Uni-
versitas, , –.
Forced Migration and Identity in the Memories of Post-War Expellees 201
References
Brencz, Andrzej. “Oswajanie niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego. Z badań etnologicznych na
Środkowym Nadodrzu”. Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Północnych
i Zachodnich. Ed. Zbigniew Mazur. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1997. 191–216.
Chumiński, Jędrzej. “Czynniki destabilizujące proces osadnictwa we Wrocławiu (1945–1949)”.
Studia nad procesami integracji i dezintegracji społeczności Śląska. Ed. Władysław Misiak.
Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1993. 55–78.
Halbwachs, Maurice. On collective memory. Chicago (IL): The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Kaźmierska, Kaja. Biografia i pamięć. Na przykładzie pokoleniowego doświadczenia ocalonych z
Zagłady. Kraków: Nomos, 2008.
Kitsak, Volodymyr. “Deportovanii z Polshchi ukraintsi: rezultaty pershoho etapu vhodzhennia v
socium ta ekonomichnoho prystosuvannia u 1944–47 rr”. Ukraina-Polshcha: istorychna
spadshchyna i suspil’na svidomist’, vol. 2: Deportatsii 1944–1951. Lviv: Natsional’na
Akademia Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha, 2007.
Mach, Zdzisław. Niechciane miasta. Migracja i tożsamość społeczna. Kraków: Universitas, 1998.
Melchior, Małgorzata. “Przeszłość jako czynnik zróżnicowań kulturowych dzisiaj – przypadek
dwóch sąsiadujących wsi”. Kultura i Społeczeństwo 4 (1996): 109–118.
Niżnik, Józef. Symbole a adaptacja kulturowa. Warszawa: Centralny Ośrodek Metodyki
Upowszechniania Kultury, 1985.
Ossowski, Stanisław. “Analiza socjologiczna pojęcia ojczyzny”. Dzieła, vol. 3, Warszawa: PIW,
1967. 201–226.
Sakson, Andrzej. “Procesy integracji i dezintegracji społecznej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i
Północnych Polski po 1945 roku”. Pomorze – trudna ojczyzna? Kształtowanie się nowej
tożsamości 1945–1995. Ed. Andrzej Sakson. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1996. 131–154.
Schütze, Fritz and Gerhardt Riemanan. “‘Trajectory’ as basic theoretical concept for analyzing
suffering and disorderly social processes”. Social Organization and Social Process. Essays in
Honour of Anselm Strauss. Ed. David R. Maines. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1991.
333–358.
Ther, Philipp. “Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical
Reassessment”. Slavic Review 55 (1996): 779–805.
Tomczak, Maria. “Obraz osadników w prasie i publicystyce polskiej”. Ziemie Odzyskane
1945–2005. 60 lat w granicach państwa polskiego. Ed. Andrzej Sakson. Poznań: Instytut
Zachodni, 2006. 45–58.
Welzer, Harald. “Materiał, z którego zbudowane są biografie”. Transl. Magdalena Saryusz-Wolska.
Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka. Ed. Magdalena
Saryusz-Wolska. Warszawa: Universitas, 2009. 39–58.
Welzer, Harald, Sabine Moller and Karoline Tschuggnall. “Dziadek nie był nazistą”. Narodowy
socjalizm i Holokaust w pamięci rodzinnej’. Transl. Paweł Masłowski. Pamięć zbiorowa i
kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka. Ed. Magdalena Saryusz-Wolska. Warszawa:
Universitas, 2009. 351–410.
Zaremba, Macin. Wielka Trwoga. Polska 1944–1947. Ludowa reakcja na kryzys. Kraków:
Wydawnictwo Znak, Institute of Political Studies PAN, 2012.
202 Anna Wylegała
Inge Melchior
Forming a Common European Memory of
WWII from a Peripheral Perspective:
Anthropological Insight into the Struggle
for Recognition of Estonians’ WWII
Memories in Europe
Meelis, a medical doctor born in Estonia in 1922, shows me a small, black box.
When he opens it, I see a piece of dry mud. “I had the possibility to go to the
place where my parents were killed. […] I brought some mud from that place
[…], and here is the mud. […] This is one of the relics with which I live.” The
mud is all Meelis has left in memory of his mother. Both his parents were killed
in 1942 by agents of the NKVD, the secret police of the Soviet Union, responsible
for much of the political repression under the rule of Stalin. After probing my
stance towards World War II (WWII), Meelis reveals that the particular NKVD
agent who killed his mother was a Jew. It is obvious that he does not feel com-
pletely comfortable telling this story to a Western European:
Meelis: I don’t know whether you want to hear this, or whether you are not allowed to lis-
ten to this at all, but among those who committed crimes against humanity were
also Jews.
I: Yes this is very…
Meelis: But we don’t speak about it!
I: … this is a very difficult topic, but…
Meelis: This is a very difficult topic, but I think, that you don’t dare to… I am afraid, that
you don’t dare to listen to what I am telling you.
I: No, I…
Meelis: Because then they can immediately accuse us of anti-Semitism.
I: Yes some people do that.
Meelis: Yes some people, but in the world is such general sentiment. In Estonia one is
caught in this question, but this is considered undesirable. Thus, for you I am
now an undesirable person, a suspicious type, about whom you should inform
the Estonian defence police.
Meelis has formed a clear conceptualization of how Western Europeans remem-
ber WWII: for “them”, the Holocaust is politically a very sensitive question,
which one is not allowed to speak about in ways that mention Jews as perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity. In Estonia, Meelis implies, people’s experiences
are different from those of Western Europeans since many Estonians suffered
from Soviet, rather than Nazi repression. However, Estonians lack the sort of
clear-cut and incontestable interpretation of WWII that has been formulated in
Western Europe.
Until the late 1980s, historiographies of WWII were mainly national under-
takings; every nation-state singled out its own victims and heroes.¹ This began
to change in the 1990s. The Soviet Union fell and the European Union (EU)
changed from an economic union into a more political one. The Balkan war
awakened horrific memories of WWII, and brought these memories back to
the European stage. Moreover, an EU decision on restitution of Holocaust era as-
sets was pending at that time, which too raised new debates. In this transnation-
al context, the meaning of the Holocaust changed from being merely a question
of Jews and Germans to being a question of humanity: it became a universal
symbol of human rights violations.² These discussions have resulted in a Euro-
pean institutionalization of WWII memories: common commemoration days and
even common accounts in history textbooks.³
This aim of institutionalizing a common evaluation of Europe’s past has not
come without problems. In 2004, several post-Communist countries – such as
Estonia – entered the European Union, where people have other historical expe-
riences: most of them suffered not just from Nazi regimes but also from Commu-
nist regimes. This led for example to a political clash of memories in 2005, when
European countries commonly celebrated 60 years after the end of WWII.⁴ The
Baltic presidents argued that for them WWII did not end in 1945, but only in
1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. The Estonian and Lithuanian presidents
decided not to attend the commemoration. This lack of a mutual understanding
of WWII memories in Europe was all the more sensitive for the Baltic people be-
cause the commemoration was held in Moscow:Western Europe and Russia were
collectively commemorating WWII in a ceremony from which the Baltic States
felt excluded.
 Tony Judt. “The past in another country: myth and memory in post-war Europe.” Memory and
power in post-war Europe. Ed. Jan-Werner Müller. Cambridge: University Press, , –.
 Bernhard Giesen. Triumph and trauma. London: Paradigm Publishers, , –; Daniel
Levy and Natan Sznaider. “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopoli-
tan Memory.” European Journal of Social Theory . ().
 Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger. “Contours of a critical history of contemporary
Europe: a transnational agenda.” Conflicted memories: Europeanizing contemporary history.
Eds. Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Linderberger. New York / Oxford: Berghahn Books, .
 Maria Mälksoo. “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns
and the Collective Memory of Europe.” European Journal of International Relations . ().
See also: Eva-Clarita Onken. “The Baltic States and Moscow’s  May Commemoration: Analysing
Memory Politics in Europe.” Europe-Asia Studies . ().
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International Relations’ scholar Maria Mälksoo has argued that this decision
of the Baltic presidents to voice their conflicting perspective on WWII memories
is part of the politics of becoming European.⁵ She argues that the Baltic States, as
new EU members, do not feel ‘fully European’, and their different WWII memo-
ries also prevent them from becoming so. The decision not to attend the 9 May
2005 commemoration is therefore both a search for recognition of their different
WWII memories and a way to resist the hegemonic ‘European WWII memory’. In
other words, although the decision reflected a spirit of independence, it actually
expresses feelings of insecurity. The central question of this chapter goes beyond
these memory politics. It concerns how ordinary Estonians perceive these trans-
national encounters between different ‘mnemonic communities’.⁶ What are the
emotions of ordinary Estonians as regards European memory disputes? An un-
derstanding of European WWII memories in Estonians’ everyday lives can pro-
vide new insight in these types of insecurities, which often come with life in a
globalizing world.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia has increasingly become
part of this globalizing world due to the opening of borders, new communication
technologies and the increased mobility of people, things and ideas. This process
also includes growing intercultural dialogue, which, as several social scientists
have argued, has often gone hand in hand with the growth of insecurity. Accord-
ing to Anthony Giddens, people who live in a ‘post-traditional society’ can no
longer take their own traditions and histories for granted, but have to defend
them vis-à-vis the alternatives.⁷ In a similar vein, Zygmunt Bauman has argued
that the increasing encounters between people with different frames of reference
have brought about more ambivalent and volatile identities, values and social
structures, which come at the expense of a sense of security.⁸ In traditional so-
cieties, people “tended to belong to a community by default. Nobody challenged
their group membership […]”.⁹ Therefore, people just knew which/whose cultur-
al ‘rules’ to adhere to.
 Mälksoo. The Memory Politics of Becoming European.
 Eviatar Zerubavel. “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past.” Qualitative Sociology
. (): .
 Anthony Giddens. Modernity and self-identity. Cambridge: Polity, . As a sidenote, those
alternatives have of course always existed but were not that visible previously.
 Zygmunt Bauman. Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity, .
 Thomas Hylland Eriksen. “Human security and Social Anthropology.” A World of Insecurity:
Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security. Eds.Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ellen Bal and
Oscar Salemink. London/New York: Pluto Press, , .
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Such insecurity could be seen in the intercultural encounter between Meelis
and me, where the ‘rules’ were not that obvious. In telling me his story, Meelis
was very cautious and insecure. Should he tell me the story about his murdered
mother according to the ‘Estonian rules’ or according to what he sees as my
‘Western European’ frame of reference? Not choosing the ‘right rules’ might re-
sult in misunderstanding on my side (for example silencing him by calling
him an anti-Semite), which would be extremely painful for him. The interesting
question is why Meelis invoked WWII as a topic of discussion in the first place;
he ignored my questions and took the lead to start a dialogue on WWII. The in-
securities invoked in ordinary Estonians by contemporary European WWII mem-
ory disputes and WWII analogies (Nazism versus Communism, Jewish victim-
hood versus Estonian victimhood, etc.) will be the focus of this chapter. Its
(relatively) recent accession to the EU and the contested WWII memories in Es-
tonia make Estonia the perfect lens through which to explore this issue.
Methodological reflection
In order to understand everyday encounters with ‘European WWII memory’ from
the Estonians’ point of view, I conducted in total two years of in-depth ethno-
graphic field research (four brief periods and one long period between August
2007 and August 2012). From April 2010 to April 2011, I lived in Tartu (100,000
inhabitants), a cultural and university city of Estonia,where I attended commem-
orations, participated in cultural events,went folk dancing twice a week, and vis-
ited people in their homes. Most data have been collected within informal net-
works that developed from these events and that grew more extensive
throughout my fieldwork. I have both conducted interviews (with an interview
guide and recorder) and participated in more spontaneous informal conversa-
tions (where I made notes and transcribed them afterwards).¹⁰ It might go with-
out saying that the ethnographic data I gathered is not representative for the
whole Estonian population, not in the least because I only focused on Estonian
speakers and left the Russian speaking population – about 25% of the total pop-
ulation – out of my research. However, I did participate in the activities of a wide
range of informal social networks in Estonian society: ‘memory activists’, ‘young
intellectuals’ and people from the countryside.
 All data was gathered in the Estonian language. The quotes in this article have been trans-
lated by the author.
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Meelis belongs to the group ‘memory activists’: active citizens who contrib-
ute to the production of memory.¹¹ I met these informants mainly through com-
memorations, which many of them attend and/or organize. Tartu’s memory acti-
vists, mainly male and between the ages of 40 and 95, can be characterized by
their devotion to contribute to historical justice and contemporary society. Some
of them had been political prisoners of the Soviet regime. Others were active par-
ticipants in the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s. Others only joined the ‘group’
after 1991, convinced of the importance of remembrance and of the development
of Estonians’ knowledge about their history as a small and young nation-state.
Although these memory activists have a fairly extreme view of society, in general
their convictions are shared by a large part of society since they are rooted in the
Singing Revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their active contribution to
the regaining of state independence in 1991 is also why their claims are taken
rather seriously by political officials and their narratives are generally not con-
tested in the media; for instance, their request to institutionalize a ‘Freedom
Fighters’ commemoration day, or to officially recognize the Estonian men who
fought in WWII in the German army. A slightly related group with which I
spent much time consists of the ‘victims of history’: Estonians who were re-
pressed (mostly deported to Siberia) during the Soviet period and who have or-
ganized themselves into a group they call ‘Memento’.¹² Compared to the memory
activists, those in this group see the importance of remembering as more person-
al (in terms of a mourning process) and less political.
Through my contacts in Tartu University, I have also participated in and ob-
served an informal network of more highly educated, mainly young Estonians:
young intellectuals. Most of them grew up in a city (Tallinn or Tartu) during
the period of the ‘Singing Revolution’: the anti-Soviet demonstrations in the
late 1980s and the rebuilding of the Estonian nation-state in the 1990s. Their ed-
ucation makes them critical citizens, aware of the power of memory politics and
nationalism. At the same time, their upbringing in a nation-state in the making
creates a sense of patriotic duty, which comes with the notion that independence
is not something to take for granted. I met a particular part of this group through
my participation in Estonian folkdance classes. In that context I collected my
data mostly through observation and participation, rather than conversations.
 I borrowed this concept from: James W. Booth. “Kashmir Road: Some Reflections on Memory
and Violence.” Millennium – Journal of International Studies . ().
 Website of the organization of repressed: http://www.memento.ee/.
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Another group that can be distinguished among my informants is people
from the countryside. The memories of the Soviet period (and with them of
WWII) I have encountered in the south-Estonian village are completely different
from those of my informants in Tallinn or Tartu. In these cities, the concept of
‘rupture’ is very prevalent the discourse about the Soviet period (thus the ‘natu-
ralness’ of the Estonian period and the ‘unnaturalness’ of the Soviet period are
emphasized).¹³ In the countryside, on the other hand, stories express nostalgia
about the Soviet period, and thus criticize contemporary Estonian society.¹⁴ In
order to understand these stories as well, I lived for two months in the country-
side (May–June 2011). Because my countryside informants felt less represented in
the ‘Estonian memory discourse’, they had a certain distance towards Estonian
memories of WWII – and with that the possibility for a more critical (or even op-
posing) stance.
Of course it is possible to distinguish even more subgroups among my in-
formants, and obviously, the groups distinguished here are not homogenous ei-
ther. The distinction here is only made to serve as a way to give insight into the
variety of stories that I have included in my analyses. This variety is not only im-
portant for methodological but also for theoretical reasons. My focus is not solely
on Estonians who have a particular historical experience – in other words, who
have lived through a particular historical period. Thus, when I speak of ‘memo-
ries’ in this chapter, I refer not only to ‘autobiographical memory’ or ‘individual
memory’,¹⁵ but also to ‘post-memory’ or ‘vicarious memory’.¹⁶ The latter two be-
 For an extensive elaboration on the ‘rupture’ discourse in Estonia, see: Ene Kõresaar. Mem-
ory and History in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University, . (PhD
thesis)
 A comparable argument is made based on the case of Lithuania investigated by anthropol-
ogist Neringa Klumbyte. “Memory, Identity, and Citizenship in Lithuania.” Journal of Baltic Stud-
ies . ().
 Different terms are used to distinguish between the memories that individuals have and the
memory that is passed on within communities. For example, French sociologist Maurice Halb-
wachs distinguishes between ‘autobiographical memory’ –the memory of events during one’s
own lifetime – and ‘historical memory’ – the memory of an event that happened before one’s
lifespan and which is passed on through historical records: Jeffrey K Olick. “Collective Memory:
The Two Cultures.” Sociological Theory .  (): . What Halbwachs means by ‘autobio-
graphical memory’ is similar to what Aleida Assmann means by ‘individual memory’: Aleida
Assmann. “Four Formats of Memory: From Individual to Collective Constructions of the Past.”
Cultural History and Literary Imagination. Eds. Christian Emden and David Midgley. Oxford:
Peter Lang, .
 ‘Post-memory’ is a concept introduced by Marianne Hirsch in “The Generation of Postmemo-
ry.” Poetics Today . (): –. ‘Vicarious memory’ refers to a rather similar phenom-
enon, a term used by Jacob J Climo. “Memories of the American Jewish Aliyah: Connecting the
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long to the category of ‘collective memory’ and entail specifically the memory of
people who did not live through a particular historical event, but who identify
closely with those who did. As members of the same ‘mnemonic community’,
they have been socialized through family memories, political memories and/or
cultural memories.¹⁷ Members of a mnemonic community not only share a histo-
ry, they also share what Jan Assmann calls ‘mnemohistory’; that is, they are not
“concerned with the past as such, but only with the past as it is remembered”.¹⁸
Applying this understanding of memory, not only do my old informants have
memories of WWII, but those in their twenties do as well.
This focus on memory beyond the political and autobiographical levels re-
quires in-depth anthropological fieldwork; it is not sufficient to study media rep-
resentation and memory politics, and to read biographies of or do interviews
with cultural/political figures and ‘survivors’. In this study it was thus important
to form a diverse social network and invest in forming long-term relationships of
trust. The beginning of my fieldwork showed that it is difficult to get beyond the
‘official’ history discourse during a first interaction. Especially since I am a West-
ern European researcher, people felt the need to explain first – or sometimes
even defend –why Estonians remember WWII differently from Western Europe-
ans. Building trust thus proved essential for moving beyond that official repre-
sentation; first I had to prove that I was not judgmental towards Estonian histor-
iography. Ethnographic data is obviously gathered in ‘dialogue’; reflection on
this dialogue has given me direct insight into the fears and insecurities that
come to the fore in an intercultural dialogue, where one party perceives the
other to have different memories. The ethnographic method has also allowed
me to follow the stories of my informants, rather than my own assumptions. Es-
pecially in the context of a chapter like this, which deals with contested collec-
tive memories and memories ascribed to certain groups, anthropological field-
work makes it possible to go beyond only comparing and contrasting
‘European memory’ with ‘Estonian memory’, and to consider different percep-
tions and emotions within mnemonic communities as well.
In order to be able to place the perceptions and emotions of my informants
in the broader context of society, I also make use of survey data from the survey
‘I, the world and the media’ (Mina, Maailm ja Meedia). These data were gathered
Individual and Collective Experience.” Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives.
Eds. Jacob J Climo and Maria G Cattell. Oxford: Altamira Press, , .
 Zerubavel. Social Memories; Assmann. Four formats of memory.
 Jan Assmann. “From ‘Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism’ and
‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’.” The Collective Memory Reader. Eds. Jeffrey K Olick,
Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy. Oxford: University Press, , .
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by the department of Journalism and Communication of Tartu University from
among a representative sample of the Estonian population (N = 1583, N of ethnic
Estonians = 1076). The survey was conducted in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011. In
this chapter I use the most recent data (the same questions were also posed in
2005). The quantitative data provided a means of contextualizing the in-depth
and personal (ethnographically gathered) stories about WWII in contemporary
everyday life.
Estonia’s (contested) WWII history
The beginning of the Estonian history of WWII goes back to 23 August 1939,when
Stalin and Hitler signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and divided Europe into
two spheres of influence. Estonia was allocated to the Soviet Union. After Hitler’s
attack on Poland, the Soviet Union began the establishment of military bases
and the stationing of Soviet troops in the three Baltic States. Estonia was de
facto incorporated into the Soviet Union on the 17 June 1940, the same day
that France surrendered to Germany. The Soviet Union took over all political de-
cision making.¹⁹ Those who were seen as a danger to the new regime were arrest-
ed, deported, imprisoned or even shot. In this first Soviet occupation, Estonia
lost 94,000 people, of which 40,000 had fled the country and 54,000 were mo-
bilized, executed or deported.²⁰
In the summer of 1941, the front moved into Soviet Russia, and Estonia fell
under German rule. This time, Jews and Communists had to fear for their lives.
Since only 1200 Jews had remained in Estonia by the beginning of the war, the
territory was already declared Judenfrei in January 1942. During the German oc-
cupation,which lasted until 1944, Estonia lost 7798 of its citizens by execution or
perishing in prison camps: 70% of them Estonians, 15% Russians and 12%
Jews.²¹ An additional 100,000 Estonians fled to the West at the end of the Ger-
man occupation when the Soviet army again approached Estonian territory.²²
When the German army surrendered in 1944, Estonia was reincorporated into
 Jaak Kangilaski,Virve Kask, Kalev Kukk, Jaan Laas, Heino Noor, Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Rein Ratas,
Anto Raukas, Enn Sarv and Peep Varju. “The white book: losses inflicted on the Estonian nation
by occupation regimes –.” Ed. Riigikogu Estonian State Commission on Examination
of the Policies of Repression, the Government of the Republic of Estonia and Ministery of Justice.
Republic of Estonia: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, , –.
 Toivo U Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, Stanford: Hoover Press, , .
 Kangilaski. The white book, .
 Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, .
210 Inge Melchior
the Soviet Union. This time the Soviet occupation would last until 1991. Being a
strategically located and small population, Estonia suffered many losses in
WWII. In total, Estonia lost 23.9 percent of its pre-war population (271,200 out
of 1,136,400), of which almost one third (about 81,000 Estonians) died – includ-
ing victims of the Soviet deportations and genocides and of the German depor-
tations and the Holocaust.²³
Two subjects in Estonian WWII historiography are controversial in the cur-
rent European context: (1) the interpretation of the Estonian men who joined
the German army as freedom fighters, (2) the absence of a Holocaust memory.
To understand contemporary historiography, it is important to take a closer
look at how these two themes were interpreted in the official history that was
promoted during the Soviet period. In Soviet historiography, the Soviet victory
in the defeat over Nazism was very central. The Soviet soldier was the hero of
WWII and the liberator of Europe, and fascism was the undisputed evil.²⁴ The
German soldier was thus the henchman of evil. Hence, the Estonian men who
had joined the German army were said to been brainwashed by the Germans:
they were fighting against their ‘own’ (Soviet) army. They were portrayed as crim-
inals and a threat to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) that was final-
ly restored and they had therefore to be removed from society. Many of them
were imprisoned in Siberia. The question of the Holocaust was not discussed
in Soviet historiography.²⁵ The Soviet citizens were said to have suffered the
most of all people in WWII, and therefore, the number of Soviet Jews killed
was hidden in the total number of Soviet losses. Fascism was portrayed as the
ultimate enemy of Communism, not of the Jewish population.
After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, history was drastically re-
written, with the idea – as new Prime Minister Mart Laar put it – ‘to give the peo-
ple back their history’.²⁶ It was a complete mirror version of the Soviet history,
and based – especially in the beginning – on very personal stories. These person-
al accounts were believed to contain the historical truth that had managed to
 Kangilaski. The white book.
 Siobhan Kattago. “Agreeing to disagree on the legacies of recent history: memory, pluralism
and Europe after .” European Journal of Social Theory  (). See more on the interpre-
tation of WWII in Russia: Amir Weiner. “The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War
and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity.” Russian Review . ().
 Karel C. Berkhoff. Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda During World War II. Harvard:
Harvard University Press, .
 Mart Laar. “When will Russia say ‘sorry’?” The Wall Street Journal. Tallinn, . Quoted in:
Ene Kõresaar, ed. World War II and Its Aftermath in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories. Amsterdam/
New York: Rodopi, , .
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stay unpolluted from the Soviet lies. For these reasons, Estonia’s new history was
an emotional, nationalistic story about suffering during the Soviet period.WWII
was not seen as a separate period in itself, but rather as the beginning of the So-
viet occupation. The war years only began to be questioned at the end of the
1990s, when negotiations about EU accession started. The EU and NATO voiced
their concerns about Estonia’s policies toward the Russian minority and about
Estonian historiography: the history of the Russian Estonians had to be (more)
included, WWII and the Soviet period needed to be disentangled, Estonian col-
laboration and Jewish victimhood had to be investigated.²⁷
From a Western European perspective on WWII – which by the end of the
1990s had shifted from a focus on the guilt of the perpetrators to the collective
responsibility of people to prevent injustice from repeating itself ²⁸ – the Estonian
way of dealing with the past was criticized as lacking in self-reflection. From a
historical perspective, though, it is not so surprising that Estonian veterans
have been thanked by Estonian officials for their struggle for independence
while in German uniforms. Nor is it surprising that the Holocaust is lacking
from Estonians’ ‘collective memory’. With regards to the former, these men
had been requested in 1944 by former Estonian Prime Minister Jüri Uluots to
join the German army to defend their home country against the approaching
Red Army and not to fight for the Nazi ideology. As relates to the latter, Jews
were a very small ethnic minority in Estonia, their WWII story was absent
from the official Soviet historiography, and in the stories that circulated in
close circles of trust, the focus was on the suffering during the Soviet rather
than the German occupation.²⁹ Despite these historic reasons, the question re-
mains whether European societies generally should be able to acknowledge
the suffering of other people than one’s own in the name of liberal and demo-
cratic values, as was decided at the Stockholm Conference in 2000.³⁰
 Doyle E. Stevick. “The Politics of the Holocaust in Estonia: Historical Memory and Social Di-
visions in Estonian Education.” Reimagining Civic Education: How Diverse Societies Form Dem-
ocratic Citizens. Eds. E. D. Stevick and B. A. U. Levinson. Lanham. Maryland: Rowman & Little-
field Publishers, .
 Bernhard Giesen. Triumph and trauma, –.
 Stevick. The politics of the holocaust in Estonia.
 See for more information on the discussion of the Stockholm Conference: Levy and Sznaider.
Memory unbound.
212 Inge Melchior
The perceived superiority of the Western
European memories of WWII
At the Stockholm Conference in 2000, representatives of 46 nations came togeth-
er to discuss education, remembrance and research on the Holocaust: to make
“the commemoration of the Holocaust a foundation myth of the European
Union”.³¹ Scholars have argued that in practice though, rather than having a Eu-
ropean memory, Europe is divided into different ‘mnemonic communities’:
‘Western Europe’ and ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Central Europe’ and ‘Russia’.³² Although
these categories are simplifications that do not exist in reality (in other words,
Ideal types), they may exist in people’s perceptions.³³ In the stories of my inform-
ants, both a ‘Western European’ and an ‘Estonian’ memory of WWII do exist, as
social constructs that are “real in their consequences”.
From my very first encounter with Estonian society, it was clear that Western
Europeans are perceived as having different memories. First of all,Western Euro-
peans are perceived as having no negative memories of Communism at all. For
that reason, secondly, Western Europeans are seen to consider Hitler to be the
cruelest dictator ever, not comparable to any other, not even to Stalin. This
form of memory means that for Europe Germany was the main enemy in
WWII, not Soviet Russia. Thirdly, the Jews are considered, according to my in-
formants, the victims of the twentieth century in Western Europe, which leaves
no room for the memory of other people who also suffered tremendously. Fourth-
ly, Europe was considered to be liberated in 1945 when Nazi Germany was de-
feated. These are just four elements that return in the stories of literally all my
informants as constituting understandings of WWII in Western Europe that are
different from their own: this is what they (other Europeans) remember, but
not what we (Estonians and other Baltic people) remember.
The Estonian ‘memory activists’ with whom I hung out a great deal, not only
perceive Western Europeans as remembering differently in content, but also as
treating the past differently. Firstly, people in Western Europe are perceived as
being very politically correct, at the expense of the truth. The story of Meelis il-
lustrates this with regard to the Holocaust: “Among those NKVD and KGB people
 Malgorzata Pakier and Bo Strath. Eds. A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics
of Remembrance. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, , .
 Pakier and Strath. A European Memory?
 See for Thomas’ famous words on this:W. I. Thomas. “The definition of the situation.” Socio-
logical Theory: A Book of Readings. Eds. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg. New York: The
MacMillan Company, .
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who actually committed crimes against humanity, mass murders, shootings, ar-
rests, deportations, who sent people to camps, to death camps, many were Jews.
But we are not allowed to stress this.” In this context, Meelis and several other
memory activists argue, political correctness precludes justice, since the perpet-
uators cannot be punished. Western European political correctness is thus per-
ceived as sustaining and creating injustice, and this also holds for those Western
European soldiers who are not commemorated because they died in Nazi uni-
forms: “In the West they do not dare to speak about their own history”,³⁴ said
one of the speakers on the annual commemoration of the Estonian men who
fell on the eastern front in German uniforms.
Secondly,Western Europe is perceived as having a more individualistic than
collectivistic approach towards history. There, “nationalism is a bad thing”, Lem-
bitu (memory activist, born 1943) explained, and Andres (memory activist, born
1941) added: for them “where they come from (their roots) becomes less impor-
tant”, because they are too involved in making money. The young intellectuals in
my research are generally less critical about the political correctness and individ-
ualistic approach in Western Europe – as they understand it as part of the dem-
ocratic value system they support – but they do agree with the memory activists
that Western Europeans should make a greater effort to understand the specific
historical situation of Estonia and its current status as a young and small nation-
state.
In other words, European memories of WWII are perceived as based on ‘his-
torical memory’ and a ‘settled past’, which has its strength in its openness to-
wards individual interpretation and discussion, while at the same time taking
a clear, incontestable moral stance. This stands in clear contrast with Estonian
WWII memories, which are much more based on still unsettled, highly dynamic
and diverse ‘communicative memories’. This Western European memory of WWII
and the way of dealing with the past are seen as hegemonic, as ‘the European’
understanding of the past. ‘European WWII memory’ is not the sum of national
memories, nor is it a ‘new’ memory; it is rather seen as the memory of the core
member states imposed upon the ‘extended European family’ (the periphery).
Before I can discuss how this difference in perceptions engenders feelings of in-
security among my Estonian informants, I first explore the perceived ambiguity
and inferiority of Estonian memories of WWII.
 Speech of a representative of the Estonian Legion Friends’ Club at the Sinimäed commem-
oration,  July .
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The perceived ambiguity and inferiority of
Estonian memories of WWII
Estonian collective stories of WWII are of course much closer to the emotional
and family life of Estonians than are the collective WWII memories of Western
Europeans. It is in the Estonian mnemohistory that the family memories of suf-
fering during the Soviet era find meaning, and that relatives who fought in a Ger-
man uniform are not accused of being fascists. At the same time, it is because
this mnemohistory is much closer and people have more informal knowledge
of local experiences, that Estonian memories are perceived as much more ambig-
uous, scattered and contradictory.
Firstly, in terms of historical experiences, the Estonian population was div-
ided by the different relations with the forces fighting in WWII. Estonians as a
people cannot be featured as having been on either ‘the German side’ or ‘the So-
viet side’. More than one in four ethnic Estonians (27.1%) reports having had an
acquaintance or relative in the German army. One in three Estonians personally
knows someone who was in the Soviet army (34.3%).³⁵ One in six Estonians
(15.9%) had a loved-one fighting in both uniforms and having been torn apart
by WWII’s main sides.³⁶
My Estonian language teacher Tiina (born 1970) once explained to me that:
“My father was first in the German army, then in the Soviet one. This is complete-
ly normal for an Estonian man.” Moreover, many families faced the fact that
some relatives were fighting in or suffered by wearing the one uniform and oth-
ers in/by the other. As is the case in the family history of former Prime Minister of
Estonia Mart Laar, born 1960:
 Since my ethnographic material concerns only ethnic Estonians, the data I have presented
here are only valid for those who have identified themselves as ‘Estonians’ (N = ). In
order to give the reader more context, I have analyzes as well of the total Estonian population
(including Russian speakers, N= )): .% of the respondents knew someone who had
fought in the German army (lower than the average among Estonian speakers) and .%
knew someone who had participated in the Soviet army (higher than the average among Esto-
nian speakers).
 It is important to note here that these figures do not present historical facts; not necessarily
one in every four Estonians was in the German army. These figures say something about the pres-
ent: they point towards memory rather than history. My point of departure here is that it does
not matter to people’s ‘post-memory’ whether someone in his/her family was factually in the
German or Soviet army. What matters is whether they believe this to have been the case or not.
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[M]y grandfather was shot by the Nazis. Two of my great-uncles were sent to Siberian death
camps by the Soviets. My father-in-law was deported to Siberia as a nine-year-old boy,
where he struggled to survive against death by starvation. Unknown to him, his hopes of
seeing his father alive again were in vain; his father was shot early in 1941 by the KGB
in Moscow’s Kirov prison for the crime of being an ordinary policeman in independent
Estonia.³⁷
Clearly, it is not possible to characterize Estonians as a people – and as a mne-
monic community – as having been on or suffered by either the one or the other
side.
Secondly, these kinds of family stories reveal contradictions in the Estonian
narrative of WWII in terms of content. On the one hand, they imply that ordinary
Estonians were forced by the regime in power – as innocent victims – to be on
either one side or the other; in other words, it was not an ideological choice.
On the other hand, it is commonly understood that the Estonian men in the Ger-
man army fought for the right cause as ‘freedom fighters’. These seeming contra-
dictions exist in one and the same story. Sirje (a young intellectual, born 1982)
explained to me back in 2008:
Estonians were mobilized, forced to join the German army as they were forced to join the
Soviet army. Of course, there were people who volunteered. But – as Estonians joined the
German army – they were fighting for the liberty of their homeland – Estonia – not for the
ideals of Nazi-Germany.
One of the ambiguities in the Estonian narrative of WWII thus lies in the crucial
question: did Estonians passively endure the war or did they actively defend their
home country? According to the survey data, 50.3% of ethnic Estonians agree
with the first statement, 37.9% find it hard to say, and 11.7% agree with the sec-
ond statement.³⁸ On the political level, these contradictory narratives coexist as
 Laar. When will Russia say ‘sorry’?
 Respondents were asked whether they agreed more with statement A or statement B: A) Es-
tonians who either fought on the German or Russian side should be treated equally as having
been forced by the occupant. (meaning Estonians passively endured WWII).
B) Estonians who fought on the German side fought for independence, those on the Russian side
for the reestablishment of Soviet occupation. (meaning Estonians had an active role in WWII
and fought for ideological reasons). People could answer: (1) I agree completely with A, (2) I
agree more with A, (3) difficult to say, (4) I agree more with B, (5) I agree completely with B.
Again, for the sake of the argument on ethnic Estonians I have left the Russian speakers out
of the analysis. For the total population (N = 1583) the figures are as follows: 42.6% agrees
more with A, 46.3% thinks that is hard to say (most favourable category for the Russian speakers
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well and the question still lacks a clear answer. Despite these different historical
interpretations, I should stress here though that my informants’ stories are unit-
ed in the belief that none of the Estonian men in the German army were fighting
for the wrong cause.
Another paradox in the Estonian narrative in terms of content comes forward
in the stories about which occupation was worse. To continue the story of Sirje,
she argued: “Estonians had suffered a lot from the crimes committed by Red
Army. For us, the deeds and the crimes of the Nazis and the Communists are
BOTH “bad”. But “Western Europe” isn’t very eager to comprehend it.”³⁹ [sic]
Sirje, among other informants, stresses that both occupations and dictators
(Hitler and Stalin) were equally bad. At the same time, these same stories narrate
that the German occupation was much less terrible. For instance, it is a common
story that the German soldiers knocked on the door, asked for honey and bread,
and gave something in return. They were polite, in contrast to the Russians, who
rushed into the house, and just took what they wanted. Tiina, whose father had
been both in the German and Soviet army, explained: “During my life I have al-
ways been told that the German period was not as bad as the Russian one. ’42
and ’43 were better than ’44 and ’45.”
Thirdly, the way of dealing with WWII in Estonia is perceived as inconsistent
and at times too timid, especially by memory activists. The Estonian state takes
contradictory stances. On the one hand the Estonian men who served in the Ger-
man army are thanked for their fight for their home country. On the other hand
they are denied official acknowledgement as freedom fighters. Annika (born
1960), one of the memory activists, explains that state representatives were al-
ways present at the Sinimäed commemoration to honor the Estonian men who
had lost their lives in WWII in German uniforms. After EU accession, Estonian
officials suddenly did not dare to show up anymore. These memory activists
would rather see the Estonian state straighten its back: defend the ‘historic
truth’ against the Western European political correctness.
The young intellectuals in my research see the situation from a bit more
nuanced perspective. On the one hand, they agree that it is a duty of Estonians
to commemorate one’s own victims and evaluate the Estonian soldiers in Ger-
man uniforms from within their own historical circumstances. On the other
hand, they acknowledge the importance of adjusting to the democratic values
prevalent in Western Europe, meaning to pay tribute also to non-Estonian
to answer – the statements are clearly designed within the Estonian discourse and do not fit
closely with the Russian mnemohistory), and 11.1% agrees more with B.
 Personal email correspondence with Sirje in .
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WWII victims (such as Jews) and to take the sensitivity of the soldiers in German
uniforms into account. Young intellectuals understand the difficult situation in
which Estonian politicians find themselves, having to balance between the wish-
es and memories in Western Europe and in their own society.
My informants in the countryside, on the other hand, do not seem particu-
larly concerned about the representation of Estonia’s WWII history in Europe.
They consider Europe to be far removed from their personal lives. In addition,
they feel less national duty to present one ‘Estonian (hi)story’ to the outside
world. As many of them do not see their personal experiences reflected, especial-
ly when it comes to the Soviet period, they generally feel some distance towards
the ‘national story’. Priit (born 1950) complains that Estonian politicians should
rather take care of the representation of diverging historical experiences within
Estonian society than within Europe.
After decades of political repression, in which an ‘Estonian’ WWII story was
impossible, most of my informants (also those on the countryside) express the
need for a nationally unifying rather than dividing memory of WWII. In practice,
however, discussions on a common European memory of WWII provoke the het-
erogeneity of stances within Estonia.⁴⁰
Emotions of insecurity
The perceived hegemony of a (Western) European memory and a sense of inferi-
ority about the Estonian memory of WWII, challenges Estonians’ feeling of group
membership in the ‘European family’. This situation has led to a sense of ‘exis-
tential insecurity’, often expressed in the stories of my informants in the form of
two questions:⁴¹ (1) Are we Estonians fully European? (2) How can we Estonians
be European and also stay true to our Estonian traditions? This connection be-
tween the memory of WWII and European identity does not fall out of the
clear blue sky. WWII was not a significant period in Estonian historiography in
the early 1990s; all historical eras were subordinate to the traumatizing Soviet
experience, which was number one of which one was trying to make sense.⁴²
 Once more, I solely refer here to heterogeneity within the Estonian speaking part of the pop-
ulation, not paying attention to the Russian speakers at all. Other scholars such as Siobhan Kat-
tago have focused on the ethnic differences when it comes to WWII memories. See Kattago.
“Agreeing to disagree on the legacies of recent history.”
 See Eriksen. Human security and social anthropology, , for more information on the relation-
ships between globalization, identity and insecurity.
 Kõresaar. World War II and Its Aftermath in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories.
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Only with negotiations for EU accession in the late 1990s, did WWII enter the
public stage in Estonia.
It was in this same period that the Estonian people were ‘returning to Eu-
rope’ in their construction of a national identity, and away from Russia. For
this reason, “West and East have been antipodes for Estonian-self-construction,
reflecting the dichotomy of Europeanisation and Russification, goodies versus
baddies”.⁴³ Even those people I have spoken to who do not support Estonia’s po-
litical integration into Europe, do not question that Estonia is culturally European
(the antipode of ‘Soviet’). This strong will to be European has led to a fear of not
being acknowledged by other Europeans as ‘fully’ European; identification re-
quires recognition by others.⁴⁴ The encounter with the (significantly different) ex-
perience and mnemohistory of WWII in Western Europe plays into this fear.
In this context, how can we understand the spontaneous invocation of WWII
in informal conversations that I had with Estonians? The first time I encountered
this was during fieldwork in 2007. The Bronze Soldier – a Soviet WWII memorial,
of importance at that time to the Russian minority – had just been relocated from
the city center to the outskirts. This led to violent riots in Tallinn and interethnic
tensions grew in society generally. I wanted to understand what this relocation
meant to ethnic Estonians. I have argued elsewhere that its meanings were close-
ly related to feelings of uncertainty.⁴⁵ In several instances, I was answered by
means of an analogy: what would you think if there were still statues of Hitler
in The Netherlands? How would you feel if 30% of your population were Ger-
mans who had stayed after the war? In this analogy with WWII – comparing a
Soviet soldier with Hitler, and the Russian minority with German occupiers –
WWII serves as an interpretative ‘anchor’. By invoking WWII, my informants
could translate their feelings about the Communist period to my frame of refer-
ence of something similarly cruel (WWII). Moreover, to draw WWII analogies in
such intercultural encounters created a dialogue, a first step away from insecur-
ity by claiming a voice as Europeans.⁴⁶
These emotions of insecurity about one’s identity are very widespread in Es-
tonia. Even young, more highly educated Estonians who have a relatively secure
 Eiki Berg. “Local resistance, national identity and global swings in Post-Soviet Estonia.” Eu-
rope-Asia studies . (): .
 Jocelyn Maclure. “The politics of recognition at an impasse? Identity politics and democratic
citizenship.” Canadian journal of political science . (): –.
 Inge Melchior and Oane Visser. “Voicing Past and Present Uncertainties: The Relocation of a
Soviet World War II Memorial and the Politics of Memory in Estonia.” Focaal – Journal of Global
and Historical Anthropology  ().
 Maclure. The politics of recognition at an impasse?
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position in society long for recognition within Europe. Katre (a young intellectu-
al, born 1985) feels that Western Europeans have trouble understanding why the
Soviet repression completely overshadows the cruelties of WWII for Estonians:
“They do not know what it is not to have a state.” This perceived misunderstand-
ing is problematic in building a fruitful relationship between people:⁴⁷ If Western
Europeans cannot understand our history, then how can we ever belong to the
European family? This is not just because of having different historical experien-
ces. Linda (a close relative of deportees, born in 1942) explains:
Many [Western Europeans] do not know about the Soviet period and the deportations and
about those politics. Many do not even know that Estonia exists. […] If I am honest, I think
they are not interested in what has happened here.
But there is more to this than a lack of knowledge and interest: will Estonians
ever become equal partners of Western Europeans? This fear of having to
adapt again to an ‘other’ whereas the ‘other’ is not prepared to adapt as well,
was clearly apparent in one of my conversations with Kaie (born 1975), a history
teacher living in Estonia’s northern countryside.When I asked her about the idea
of creating a common European history, she answered:
I am curious whether that means that France is going to learn about Estonian history as
well then. Did you learn anything in school about Estonian history? [..] It is just not fair.
Why do we need to learn about France and England and The Netherlands, and no one is
learning about us?
Again this raises the question: Do we really belong to Europe? In the case of Es-
tonia – a small country with a strategic geopolitical location – this reveals not
only insecurity about questions of belonging, but also about security as such.
Can we trust Western Europeans in case of need? The ‘return to Europe’ in the
1990s was a way to secure Estonia’s independence, to create allies in the
West. The differences in WWII memories are however still in the way of complete
trust. Not the least because the Russian mnemohistory coincides with the West-
ern European one in the sense that fascism is seen by both as the biggest evil of
WWII (Kattago 2009).With the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, not only Russian
activists but also the Russian state drew upon this correspondence in mnemohis-
tory, which excluded the Estonian point of view. During my fieldwork at that
time, the fears were omnipresent: Will Western Europe support the decision of
 See also Maclure. The politics of recognition at an impasse?
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the Estonian state and with that, have respect for our historical experience?
Linda expressed this view:
At that time we were afraid that this turn would not stop, that Russians would take back
power. This support [by the EU] showed that we are not alone. We were afraid that no
one would care about us in Western Europe.
This fear reflected Estonia’s historical experience of Western Europe not bother-
ing to free the Baltic States from Soviet oppression at the end of WWII, which is
still an open wound. The ‘white boat’ is an everyday expression that shows up
from time to time in conversations of Estonians. It refers to an anticipated and
expected salvation that might never come.
The second insecurity is closely related to the paradoxical question of how
to belong to Europe without neglecting one’s Estonian duties. This is exactly
what happened in the conversation with Meelis: he felt he needed to adapt
the story to my Western European frame of reference, and at the same time
did not want to cause damage to the honor of his mother (and other compatriots
whose story he felt he needed to put forward). To act upon one’s local duties is
considered very important in Estonia; it keeps the culture alive. According to
Katre, this has to do with the realization that independence is not something
that can be taken for granted: it has to be won again every day. The fear of ex-
tinction – being a people of only one million – is very real in Estonia. Peeter
(born 1950), an Estonian chemistry professor, explained this feeling as follows:
A small people are very much aware of the realistic situation that their culture can be de-
stroyed in no time.We Estonians, all Estonians have this feeling.We just know from history
that we can be overruled so easily. During the Soviet period so many small peoples died
out. […] [Our pride] is a defense mechanism.We realize how important it is for a small peo-
ple to defend its culture, its values, its customs, its language, because this is what keeps us
alive.
Andres agrees with Peeter and relates this to Estonians’ relationship with West-
ern Europeans:
I think that European values start to gain ground [in Estonia] and that the individual is get-
ting more important. But Estonia is small, so in order to protect and keep our culture, the
community [rahvas] has to be at least as important as the individual.
These duties towards what is seen as ‘real Estonian’ – as Estonian experiences –
are difficult to reconcile with the will to be European if the latter involves the
need to respect a contradicting and ‘foreign’ mnemohistory of WWII. Ideally,
therefore, Estonia would like to be a member of the European family and have
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its particular understanding of WWII recognized by the other members (which
would allow them to ‘keep’ it). The feeling of misrecognition, which is central
to the insecurity described above, “can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its vic-
tims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe
people. It is a vital human need”.⁴⁸ Struggles for recognition are thus struggles
over ‘who we are’, in order to enhance self-respect and dignity. They appropriate
‘safe spaces’ in which people can tell their life stories without being judged. In
this reasoning, I argue that the invocations of WWII in many of my conversations
with Estonians have been an attempt to create a dialogue. Through these dia-
logues, my interlocutors have appropriated a voice, which is a crucial step in
the struggle for recognition. To be engaged in a dialogue is a way to get out of
the position of passively enduring humiliation and thereby restore a bit of the
lost self-respect.⁴⁹
Concluding remarks on a common WWII memory
from a peripheral perspective
The ‘return to Europe’ of Estonia has created insecurity in this tiny state in the
north-eastern corner of Europe. Estonia had the image of being a ‘western
state’ in the Soviet Union, but with the return to Europe it has become an eastern
country on the periphery. The fear of not being acknowledged as ‘fully European’
and of not being equal partners in Europe has created an insecure feeling about
Estonia’s national identity. Since the historical experiences of WWII in Estonia
are so different from those in Western Europe, debates about WWII evoke Esto-
nians’ fear of not belonging to the European family because of a lack of mutual
understanding. In some other post-Communist countries such as Croatia, there
actually is an anti-fascist discourse, which (ironically) makes WWII in those
countries less of a significant marker of European belonging.
The story of Meelis is a clear example of an intercultural encounter where
WWII is invoked to create a dialogue and to claim a voice for oneself. Meelis
is in search of intercultural recognition of the right to his family story: that his
mother was an innocent victim and that he is allowed to blame the perpetrator,
even though he was a Jew. A closer look at the everyday encounter with the idea
 Charles Taylor. “The Politics of Recognition.” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Rec-
ognition. Ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, , –.
 Axel Honneth. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, , .
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of a common European memory reveals that the invocation of WWII is not a con-
scious, rational decision; it is rather a response to emotions of insecurity and a
way to make sense of one’s contested personal stories.
Listening to such stories allows one to gain in-depth insight into emotions of
insecurity and also helps one to better understand the WWII analogies invoked
in Estonian politics. As in many other post-Communist countries, “the wheels of
communicative memory are [still] turning” in Estonian society. Lacking a “coher-
ent, condensed narrative of communism”⁵⁰ makes Estonian memory politics
highly emotional.⁵¹ In some cases, political decisions are based on the idea of
increasing solidarity with the rest of Europe. But Baltic politicians increasingly
dare to take a clear stance in which they defend their ‘national memories’, for
instance in 2005, when the Estonian and Lithuanian president decided not to at-
tend the 60th anniversary over the defeat of Nazism. At that time, they drew an
analogy between the experience of Soviet repression in the Baltic States and
the tragedies of WWII in the rest of Europe. Maria Mälksoo has argued on the
basis of foreign policy speeches that “Polish and Baltic calls for equal remem-
brance of their pasts emerge as an essential part of their individuation process
as European, of their becoming a European subject.”⁵²
Analogies between Soviet terror and WWII terror create dialogue and dia-
logues are a first step in the direction of mutual understanding. Dialogue can
lighten the burden of insecurity; an insecurity which life in a globalizing
world inevitably brings along.
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Red Carnations on Victory Day and Military
Marches on UPA Day? Remembered History
of WWII in Ukraine
This chapter seeks to investigate the reception of visitors to the monument to
Klym Savur, the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a national-
ist military units formed in 1942 in Western Ukraine. “Klym Savur” is an alias of
Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi, who was born in 1911 in the town of Zbarazh, Eastern Ga-
licia (now Ternopil’ Oblast’). In the 1930s he became involved in the nationalist
underground of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was
founded in 1929 with the aim of fighting against the Polish state in order to
gain Ukrainian independence. ¹ In the beginning of its activities, the OUN carried
out sabotage against Polish landlords. This led to a wave of new repression
against Ukrainians, called “pacification” by the Poles. In response, the OUN
started terrorist attacks on representatives of Polish authority.² This led to arrests
and the imprisonment of OUN leaders in the end of the 1930s. Kliachkivs’kyi was
arrested, first by the Polish police in 1937 and later by the Soviets in 1940, who
sentenced him to death.With the beginning of the German-Soviet war, Kliachkiv-
s’kyi escaped from prison and in 1943 became a leader of the UPA units in Vol-
hynia, the UPA-North (1943–45). During the time when Kliachkivs’kyi was a
commander of UPA-North, mass killings of Poles took place in Volhynia. Grze-
gorz Motyka contends that Kliachkivs’kyi was one of those responsible and
that he most probably took the decision concerning the “replacement” of
Poles that led to ethnic cleansings. This belief is based on the fact that Klym
Savur submitted an order in September 1943 which states that former Kolkhozes,
real estate and industries of “Polish colonizers” would be distributed among
landless and poor Ukrainian peasants. These orders found sympathizers
among the Ukrainian peasants, who supported the UPA in killing their Polish
neighbours.³
 On the history Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists see: Franziska Bruder. “Den ukraini-
schen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!”: Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) –
. Berlin: Metropol, .
 Taras Hunchak. Ukraina: persha polovyna XX st. Narysy politychnoi istorii. Kyiv, .
 Grzegorz Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji Wisła. Kraków: Wyd. Literackie, , .
In the summer of 1944 Western Ukraine was defeated by the USSR. On 21
April 1945 a Soviet-Polish treaty of Friendship was signed. It was amended by
a border agreement in August to include Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in the
UkrSSR with some reservations regarding Poland. Towards the end of the war
the UPA intensified their attacks on Poles on the Polish side of the border.
This led to the repression and deportation from Poland of the Ukrainian civilian
population, and caused about 780,000 Poles to leave for Poland in 1944–46.⁴ In
1945 about 208,000 Ukrainians were deported from South-Eastern parts of
Poland.⁵ These deportations of Ukranians were planned to bring an end to the
“Ukrainian question” on Polish territories once and forever. Deportations and
forced resettlement of population culminated in 1947 as a result of an operation
titled “Vistula” (operacja “Wisła”). In such a way, operation Vistula formally
ended the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict.⁶
Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi was killed near the village Sus’k in Rivne oblast’ in 12
February 1945. After his death Kliachkivs’kyi became a hero in the OUN mythol-
ogy, cherished in the circles of OUN-B members in exile.⁷ Posthumously he was
awarded the title of Colonel of the UPA. In 1952 he was decorated with the Order
of the Golden Cross, the highest decoration in the UPA. In post-war Ukraine,
though, he was hardly known, as the history of the OUN and the UPAwas mainly
suppressed during Soviet times because it contradicted the monolithic heroic
image of the Great Patriotic War and Great Victory which functioned as a funda-
mental myth in the formation of the identity of homo Soveticus.⁸ On the remem-
bered history of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, Russian historian Osipian com-
mented: “In the after-war epoch any mentioning of the Ukrainian-Polish
armed conflict was stamped by a ‘worker-peasant’ taboo. All the crimes commit-
ted during the war were ascribed to Nazis.”⁹ With the beginning of perestroika
 Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji Wisła, –. See also: Grzegorz Motyka and Dariusz
Libionka. Antypolska Akcja OUN-UPA –. Fakty i interpretacje. Warszawa: Wyd. IPN,
.
 Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji Wisła, .
 Ihor Ilyushyn. Ukraiins’ka Povstans’ka Armiia i Armiia Kraiova: protystoiannia u Zahidnii Uk-
raiini (– rr). Kyiv: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, .
 Per A. Rudling. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of His-
torical Myths.” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies  ( ).
 On the role of the Great Patriotic War in the identity of the Soviet people see: Amir Weiner.
Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, ; Nina Tumarkin. The Living and the Dead: The Rise And Fall Of
The Cult Of World War II In Russia. New York: Basic Books, .
 Aleksandr Osipian. “Etnichiskie chistrki i chistka pamiati: Ukrainsko-Polskoe pogranichie
– v sovremennoi politike i istoriografii.” Ab Imperio  (): –, .
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and the declaration of glasnost in the mid 1980s, the situation changed. A great
deal of attention in public discussions was devoted to the “blank spots” of his-
tory. Topics came to light which had been taboo within the Soviet ideology.
Among these topics were the OUN, the UPA, operation Vistula, and the Ukraini-
an-Polish armed conflict. However, whereas the topics of the OUN and UPA fight
against the Germans and Soviets were foregrounded, the wrong deeds of these
organisations found little attention in memory space.
In Poland, on the other hand, the Volhynian conflict became one of the cen-
tral themes in discussions of ‘blank spots of history’, with the main focus on the
tragic fate of the victims. The exhortations to remember the victims of the Ukrai-
nian-Polish conflict were institutionalized in organizations founded by former
victims or their relatives, e.g. the organization of the Armija Krajowa (AK) veter-
ans or organizations of victims of forced deportations (including Ukrainian vic-
tims of Operation Vistula). In 2000 the two-volume book Genocide of Polish pop-
ulation committed by Ukrainian nationalists in Volhynia in 1939– 1945 written by
W. Siemaszko and E. Siemaszko was published (5000 copies, 1434 pp.) Its pub-
lication was financed by the President’s administration, Ministry of Culture and
Historical Heritage and the Council for Preservation of Memory of Fight and Mar-
tyrdom of Poland. The book was recommended teaching at schools. The fact that
one of the authors of the book,W. Siemaszko, is a veteran of the AK, significantly
influenced the tone of the book. Although, the selection of exclusively Polish tes-
timonies in the book and the lack of critical distance from the material under-
mine its scientific value (Iliushyn 2003), the detailed accounts of thousands of
testimonies of the victims and witnesses cannot be ignored. The constant pres-
sure of right-wing parties and victims’ organizations on the Polish Parliament
to recognize the conflict as an act of genocide has continued for decades.
In the Summer of 2013, the year of the 70th anniversary of the Volhynian con-
flict, Poland’s parliament was about to adopt an amendment to describe the
events in Volhynia as genocide. This caused a torrent of debates on both sides
of the border. The Ukrainian right-wing party, Svoboda, asked Bronisław Komor-
owski, the Polish president, to cancel a visit on 14 July to Lutsk, the region’s cap-
ital, for a 70th anniversary commemoration. In contrast, the ruling Party of the
Region together with the Communists asked the Polish Parliament to pass the
amendment, in this way demonstrating their position to Svoboda rather than
their attitude regarding the problem of the anniversary as such. In the Polish Par-
liament the opinions also diverged. In the end, a compromise amendment was
adopted which stated that the events in Volhynia in 1943–44 were “ethnic
cleansing with features of genocide” (czystka etniczna nosząca znamiona ludo-
bójstwa). The tense atmosphere around the anniversary in both countries dem-
onstrates that in dealing with the past conflict, the two nations concentrated
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mainly on their national histories. In Ukrainian public discourse, the Volhynian
conflict was presented as one of the steps towards national independence,
whereas in Polish public discourse the killings of Poles were depicted as the
“Volhynian tragedy”: the Volhynian conflict in 1943 was presented as the quin-
tessence of the long-lasting Ukrainian hatred of Poles that culminated in the
massacre. The Polish terms for the ethnic conflict include the “Volhynian massa-
cre”, “genocide”, or “ethnic cleansing”. Hence, these “tragedy” and “massacre”
narratives cannot be reconciled in a historical framework that can be shared by
both nations.
In 2002, the year when the monument to Klym Savur was erected, the Ukrai-
nian-Polish relations regarding the Volhynian conflict were no less tense than in
2013. The then Ukrainian President, Kuchma, held more pro-Polish views, where-
as then opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was more pro-UPA. Despite the ten-
sion in relations between Poland and Ukraine, as well as between the ruling
party and the opposition within Ukraine, the monument to such a controversial
leader as Klym Savur was finally built shortly before the 60th anniversary of the
tragic events. The building of the monument was discussed for almost the entire
decade of the 1990s. A growing anti-Kuchma campaign that started in 2000 con-
tributed to the favourable conditions that made the monument possible in the
region, which was strongly saturated with anti-Kuchma forces. Keeping all
these conflicts and tensions in mind, one can ask why the monument was need-
ed at all? Robert Musil famously contented: “There is nothing in this world as
invisible as a monument. They are no doubt erected to be seen – indeed, to at-
tract attention. But at the same time they are impregnated with something that
repels attention, causing the glance to roll right off, like water droplets off an oil-
cloth, without even pausing for a moment”.¹⁰ Thus, even when finally built, is
the monument seen? Does anyone pause for a moment and glance at it? And
when they do so, what does this monument say to the viewer about the history
it represents? In short, what is the reception of the monument among the public?
 Robert Musil. Posthumos Papers of Living Author. Transl. Peter Wortsmann. Hygiene: Erida-
nos Press, , .
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The Reception of Monuments
The study of the reception of monuments is grounded in the reception theory
that originated in the literary studies of Hans-Robert Jauss in the late 1960s.¹¹
The present work strives to engage in the dialogue about the critique that studies
on memory do not adequately reflect the role of audiences. As the student of
memory Kansteiner contended: “Most studies on memory focus on the represen-
tation of specific events within particular chronological, geographical, and
media settings without reflecting on the audiences of the representations in
question.”¹² Likewise, James Young proposed that the study of memory as repre-
sented in public monuments should focus on “the constant give and take be-
tween memorials and viewers, and finally the responses of viewers to their
own world in light of a memorialized past – the consequences of memory.”¹³
Studies of reception stress that meaning is produced both by the speaker
and the reader (listener, viewer, visitor, etc). Hence, meaning arises only through
the interaction between these two poles. In his theory of encoding and decoding
Stuart Hall drew our attention to the fact that there is a discrepancy between a
message encoded and a message decoded.¹⁴ The size of the discrepancy depends
on the shared codes, previous knowledge and the values of the encoders and de-
coders. The reception of monuments includes reception both of the materiality of
the monument located in the landscape and of the history which this monument
represents. The latter is the main concern of the present paper.
This chapter presents the results of participant observation and interviews
conducted near the monument to Klym Savur. A monument may remain unno-
ticed for many, but when people are asked to reflect on its meaning they start
making sense not only of the monument but also of the history embodied in
that monument.
 On reception theory see: Robert C. Holub. Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction. London:
Methuen, ; Hans Robert Jauss. Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. Transl. Timothy Bahti.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, .
 Wulf Kansteiner. “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective
Memory Studies.” History and Theory ,  (): –, .
 James E Young. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, , IX.
 Stuart Hall. Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse. Birmingham: Centre for Con-
temporary Cultural Studies, .
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Klym Savur Remembered
The first commemorations of the OUN and UPA started already in the beginning
of the 1990s. Although Klym Savur has not become as popular a figure for cele-
bration as such leaders of the OUN as Stepan Bandera or Roman Shukhevych, he
is definitely an important local hero who is celebrated regularly in the places re-
lated to his biography. Thus, on 16 February 1992, just in the third month of Uk-
rainian independence, the first commemoration of Klym Savur took place near
the village of Sus’k, where he had been killed. The commemoration included a
church mass and a series of speeches of local activists and concluded with
the erection of a wooden cross commemorating the killed commander. This com-
memoration had been initiated by the regional committee of the right-wing party
Rukh, UPA veterans, and the youth organization “Plast”. The wooden cross was
consecrated by the priests of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
Units of the newly formed Ukrainian Army were also present and saluted the
event. The meeting was opened by the head of the Rivne Committee of National
Rukh of Ukraine,Volodymyr Omel’chuk, who positioned the death of Klym Savur
in the space of victimhood, sacrifice, heroism, and greatness that has to be re-
membered with gratitude by present generations:
Dear community!
We came here today to the place where in winter 1945 fell in the unequal battle together
with his two brethrens the devoted son of the nation, the unbreakable fighter for independ-
ence and freedom of Ukraine, the commander of UPA-North Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi.We were
led here by the feeling of deep sorrow for those endless sacrifices which Ukrainian nation
put on the altar for its freedom in fight with its oppressors.We came here with the feeling of
great respect to these knights, feeling of deep gratefulness for their sacrifice, for they did
not kneel in front of oppressors and paid with their lives for the idea of Independence
and Unity (Sobornist’) of Ukraine.¹⁵
It should be stressed that the above rhetoric, which is close to that of liturgical
speeches, is repeated in many celebrations of the OUN and UPA, thus complicat-
ing any expression of critical views since the person commemorated is presented
not only as a hero but is also worshiped as a martyr or a saint. The mode of com-
memoration creates an atmosphere in which one is invited to take part in a ritual
that presupposes unanimous support and excludes questioning or debating. The
presence of Ukrainian Church clergy at all the unveilings of monuments to OUN
and UPA members associates the commemorations with Christian rituals prac-
 Volodymyr Omel’chuk cited in the newspaper Volyn,  February , .
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ticed in commemorations of dead relatives; thus they create a special, intimate
atmosphere where nothing bad can be uttered about the dead.
Another monument to Klym Savur was unveiled in July 5, 1995 in a small
town of Zbarazh, the town where Klym Savur was born. It took almost another
decade before the monuments to the OUN and UPA figures began to appear in
the larger towns of Western Ukraine.¹⁶ The monument in Rivne became one of
the first monuments to the OUN and UPA built in a larger city, the administration
center of the oblast’ (an administrative unit in Ukraine). The monument was con-
secrated in October 2002 on the 60th anniversary of the Day of the Creation of the
UPA. The Day of the UPA has been broadly celebrated since the 1990s in many
West Ukrainian towns when UPA veterans and their sympathizers gathered for
marches. In the 2000s the celebrations expanded into other cities of Ukraine
as well. The first mass celebrations of the Day of the UPA in Kyiv took place in
2005. Probably the victory of Viktor Yushchenko in the events known as the “Or-
ange Revolution” legitimized such celebrations in the capital of the country,
which was actually divided by its memory.
The monument in Rivne is placed in one of the central streets, Soborna
Street, that faces the main building of the largest University in the city. The
monument is located on the same street where the City Council and the city’s
largest church (Sviatopokrovsky Sobor) are situated. From this perspective, the
site is strategically well-selected, as it is almost impossible to visit the city
and not to see the monument. However, the place was selected not only because
of its favorable location. This place is allegedly the location where the command-
er was buried, as during war-time the street was adjacent to the main prison of
the city, where thousands of Jews and political prisoners were killed. In such a
way, the place is not only connected to the death of one person, it is linked to the
deaths of thousands of victims. It should be stressed that behind the monument
to Klym Savur there is a monumental stone in memory of “five hundred Soviet
citizens tortured by Hitler’s killers”. The memorial plaque on a building nearby
that served as a prison during the war states “thousands of Ukrainian patriots
were incarcerated and tortured here during the years of Nazist occupation”. It
should be mentioned that in 2001 a small chapel in memory of “Klym Savur
and heroes of national-liberation struggles 1918– 1950” was consecrated in
Rivne (the architect V. Kovalchuk). By this, the memory of Klym Savur and
 The tendency to build monuments to the OUN and UPA did not extend into other regions of
Ukraine. In the capital city Kyiv e.g. there is no monument to the OUN or UPA. The memory of
these organizations remains mainly linked to the areas where the organizations were active –
Halychyna and Volhynia.
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other “heroes of national-liberation struggles” were positioned in a sacred space
which presupposes not only remembering but also worshiping.
The monument’s appearance reminds one of the well-recognized visual
forms of Soviet monuments and bas-reliefs dedicated to WWII, where the sol-
diers’ courage and bravery are celebrated, as in well-known bas-reliefs near
the Rodina (Motherland) statue in Kyiv. Although the monument to Klym
Savur is dedicated to a single person, it not only embodies the heroism of one
individual, it also symbolizes the collective effort of a great many other men
of arms who were fighting for the same cause,which is embodied in the elements
of the monument. As will be argued below, the well-recognized features of the
monument made it easier for the onlookers to read it as a monument to a
hero, a military man who sacrificed his life for the motherland.
Fig. 1: Monument to Klym Savur in Rivne, built in 2002. Sculptor V. Sholudko, architects T.
Mel’nychuk and V. Koval’chuk. Photo: Yurchuk, 2011.
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Fig. 2: Fragment of the Klym Savur monument in Rivne. The fragment symbolizes the collective
effort of a great many other men of arms who were fighting for the same cause. Photo: Yurchuk
Fig. 3: Fragment of the “Dnieper Offensive” sculptural complex at the Motherland statue in Kyiv.
Sculptor Vasyl’ Borodai. Photo: http://kievbum.com/rodna-mat/. ]
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James Young claimed that “how and what we recognize in the company of a
monument depends very much on who we are, why we care to remember, and
how we see”.¹⁷ In my study, I was most interested in what people thought
about the history the monument represents as they passed by it. What did
their ways of seeing, thinking, and remembering tell me about these “recipi-
ents”? Reception theory applies the notion of “reader” when referring to the
public consumption of a text (where text is understood in a broad semiological
sense). Scholars who investigate people’s responses to archeological sites tend to
speak about “recipients” instead of “readers”.¹⁸ I will follow this tradition while
speaking about the people whom I interviewed. I am fully aware that it was I
who drew the attention of passers-by to the monument and that they otherwise
might have passed by without even noticing it. It was I who triggered the recep-
tion process itself, and indeed made the passer-by into a recipient. Still, I con-
tend that when their attention is drawn to it, the monument can evoke emotions,
reflections, and thoughts on the history represented by the monument. As soon
as the monument becomes visible, it begins to matter. As a result of seeing it, the
recipients shared not only their thoughts about history but also their emotions,
values, hopes, and disappointments. Furthermore, monuments not only “immor-
talize the dead” they also “mark… the values they [particular personalities] rep-
resented and the ideals of political regimes”.¹⁹ In the discussions about the UPA,
the predominant themes are the self-sacrifice and victimhood of the whole Uk-
rainian nation.²⁰ National independence is presented as the highest value, one
that can even justify the wrong deeds committed in the name of the nation.
The adherence to the heroic narrative of the UPA is often equated with a “real
Ukrainian-ness”, as one of the main sponsors of the Klym Savur monument ar-
gued at the city council meeting where the building of the monument was dis-
 James E. Young. “The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History.” Cultural Memory
Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Eds. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, in
collab. with Sara B. Young. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, , –, .
 Cornelius J. Holtorf. “‘Object-orientated’ and ‘problem-orientated’ approaches of archaeo-
logical research – reconsidered.” Hephaistos  (): –.
 Cathrine Moriarty. “Review Article: The Material Culture of Great War Remembrance.” Jour-
nal of Contemporary History ,  (): –, .
 See: John-Paul Himka. “War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Uk-
rainian Diaspora.” Spaces of Identity ,  (): –; David R. Marples. Heroes and Villains:
Creating national History in Contemporary Ukraine. Budapest: CEU Press, ; Johan Dietsch.
Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture. Lund:
Media Tryck Lund University, .
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cussed: “not honoring them (the UPA) is simply not being Ukrainian. Our history
is as it is, and we have to be proud of it”²¹ (author’s emphasis).
In this paper, I deal with the ‘response’ of those to whom these monumental
representations were addressed: the public, the “common people”, who just pass
by the monument. In total, fifty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted
(with fourteen female and thirty-eight male respondents). The interviews were
conducted on 15 and 16 October 2011 at the monument to Klym Savur with pass-
ers-by who were willing to spend a couple of minutes to share their thoughts on
the monument and on the history embedded in it. The interviews took place on
the two days immediately after the Day of the Foundation of the UPA, tradition-
ally celebrated on 14 October, which is also holiday of the Orthodox Church –
Pokrova (Intercession of the Theotokos) celebrated in honor of the Virgin
Mary. This fact might have made the “memories” about the UPA more vivid, as
it was more probable that people occasionally had heard about the holiday on
the radio or TV, or had seen or even taken part in the celebration near the monu-
ment. Every year the memory service takes place there, with right-wing parties
holding meetings with national banners and solemn speeches, wreaths being
placed at the foot of the monument, and with Ukrainian clergy holding a litur-
gy-like service. From my observations, however, it became obvious that the mem-
ory service had not become a practice shared collectively by most of the city res-
idents. Despite such thoroughly planned celebrations that had been repeated
from year to year for two decades, most of the passers-by I met near the monu-
ment the day after celebration did not know whom the monument depicted (only
four people knew who he was), although almost all of them said that they had
seen the monument many times (only four visitors said that they had never no-
ticed it before). Having analyzed the interviews, I distinguished several main
themes that re-appeared from one interview to another and functioned as
topoi in weaving the entangled texture of the narrative about the history of
the OUN and the UPA.
Ukrainian Heroes, Real Patriots, and the
Opposition
When recipients were asked to identify the person depicted by the monument
only judging from the monument’s appearance, most of them guessed that it
 Vasyl Chervoniy. Excerpt of Minutes No.  of the nd meeting of th session of Rivne City
Council of nd call dated  November, .
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was a soldier (11), a military hero or a hero of war (9), a Ukrainian/national pa-
triot (5), someone connected to Ukrainian independence (3), one of Bandera’s
men (‘banderivets’) (1), Stepan Bandera himself (2), or a UPA hero (7). Some
thought that it represented a poet or a writer (12). Although these responses
are rather diverse, all of them indicate that people predominantly connected
the monument to the period of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine
and in their ponderings they often added that if this monument was quite a
new one it meant that it was built in memory of someone who had fought for
independence – either a person connected to the UPA or the UNR (the Ukrainian
People’s Republic, the proclaimed independent state which existed from 1918 to
1920). Only two respondents thought it was a monument to a Red Army soldier.
When informed that it was a monument to Klym Savur, most recipients said that
they were hearing his name for the first time. Nevertheless, when asked to guess
who the person could be, people again linked this name either to the UPA (most
of the cases – 26) or the UNR (14). Thus, people tended to associate the monu-
ments built in independent Ukraine with specific episodes of history represented
as the periods of struggle for independence.
The interviews demonstrated that state independence, national liberation
and the struggle against occupiers are the foci from which the history of the
UPA is perceived by most people. Although, recipients had trouble giving any
precise details on the UPA, they all agreed that the UPA fought for independence
(42), was a liberation army (32), was composed of Ukrainian patriots (12), con-
tained fighters against the Soviet and fascist occupiers (40), and stood up in op-
position to the Soviet regime (4). Curiously, in three cases out of four where the
UPA was described as the “opposition”, the respondents expressed their expect-
ations and hopes for the present and for a future where Ukrainians would ben-
efit if they had the kind of “opposition” the UPA represented. Younger people
tended to express sorrow when they were speaking about the UPA, the sorrow
that there is no UPA-like opposition now:
They were a kind of opposition, active opposition which we do not have now. They were
fighting for independence against the Soviets and fascists.²²
In such a way memory links reflections on the past with present needs and wor-
ries as well as with hopes and fears about the future. Speaking about the past,
people are not oriented exclusively to the past. They position the past within the
context of the present wherein their evaluations and attitudes are shaped by ex-
 Respondent G. Interviews. Rivne ... Author’s private archive.
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pectations for the future. In the excerpt cited above, we can perceive a sense of
nostalgia for a strong opposition against the ruling authorities of the present.
In the answers to the question of whether it is necessary to commemorate
the UPA, in particular in the form of monuments, the visitors expressed their
evaluation of the past which was highly valuable for understanding the recipi-
ents’ attitude to the UPA. Having died in the war and in the struggle for inde-
pendence was perceived as a sacrifice, an expression of “real patriotism”, and
as a good reason for remembrance and commemoration in the monuments:
They were fighting for independence, we must commemorate them.²³
It was during the war. But I think that if there had been no war, there still would have been
the UPA. We always wanted independence…. Patriotism and heroism have to be remem-
bered and commemorated. They were fighting till the death, they knew they would be kil-
led, but they were fighting. We must remember their sacrifice.²⁴
The Role of Family Stories in Recipients’
Responses
Although most of the respondents said that they had never celebrated any event
related to the UPA, most of them replied that they celebrated Victory Day (43):
either by going to parades or watching parades on TV (21), giving flowers to vet-
erans (12), going to demonstrations or meetings (4), laying flowers at the monu-
ment (1) or simply having time with friends and family (3). People in their 50–
60s said that on Victory Day they went to cemeteries and put flowers on the
graves of relatives who had fought in the war (7).²⁵ Strikingly, people were
eager to speak about their families and related the questions asked during the
interviews to their family experiences. Almost all of the respondents in their
40–60s said that they had lost someone in the war, or mentioned a relative
who had been in the war. They said that Victory Day was the day that they re-
membered these relatives. Some said that they celebrated Victory Day by going
to church and praying for the souls of those who had been killed in the war
or died afterwards. Only nine respondents said they did not celebrate the Day
of Victory. Sometimes people stressed that the holiday meant the victory over
 Respondent G. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent O. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Only  people said they celebrated the Day of the Foundation of the UPA; others knew about
such a day but said that they celebrated the religious holiday Pokrova on that day, not the day of
the UPA.
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fascism for them although they did not celebrate the day in any special way: “It
is a holiday for me, because I know that it is a day of victory over fascism. But I
do not do anything special on this day.”²⁶
Although none of the respondents who shared their family stories said that
they had any relatives in the UPA, some of them seemed positive about the com-
memoration of the UPA soldiers while linking their family members’ beliefs to
those of the UPA:
My grandfather was in the Red Army. My grandmother told me horrific stories about how
the Soviets killed hundreds of the UPA soldiers in the village nearby. It was terrible. Now, it
is good that there are such monuments, because these UPA people were also killed… for
somebody it is very important to honor them. But it is important for all of us to know
our history.²⁷
Sometimes the evaluations of history became more complicated in instances
where people referred to their family memories involving negative experiences
with the UPA:
My mother told me a lot about banderivets [Bandera’s men]. They were for independence,
but they killed a lot of Ukrainians. She said they were afraid of them.When Soviets killed
some banderivets in their village the villagers were afraid to bury them. Even the relatives
of the killed… Either they were afraid or thought it was a disgrace to have such relatives
who killed their own folk.²⁸
They (UPA) were fighters for independence, but their methods were questionable. My
grandparents had different stories about them. You know, they killed Ukrainians too.²⁹
Such instances show that people have trouble dealing with difficult knowledge
about the past which they learned from their families. They had to face contra-
dictions and accommodate them within the generally glorious picture of the UPA
which is promoted in the region. The fact that the UPA were killing “their own
folk” arouses questions and doubts. In these instances people make their own
decisions about how to relate their subversive “private” knowledge to establish-
ed public representations: “Maybe there are people who need these commemo-
rations, I can understand it. But I do not support their (UPA) methods. Their
methods of fighting are unacceptable.”³⁰ Elsewhere in the interview the respond-
 Respondent O. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent K. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent Nn. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent Y. Interviews, Rivne ..
 Respondent J. Interviews. Rivne ...
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ent explained: “They (UPA) were fighting for the independence of Ukraine but
they were killing everyone like fascists.”³¹
Another respondent expressed his views in the following way:
Why not have such monuments? It is very difficult to say now who was right who was
wrong. It is all our history. My grandpa was in the Red Army… I know it was a difficult
time.³²
Time and again, the independence of Ukraine functions as a lifeline in taking a
decision on how to evaluate wrong deeds presented with an aura of sacrifice for
the nation. Noteworthy, in the above mentioned responses, the bereaved are
those who belong to their “own folk”, whereas there is no explicit mention of
the suffering of other nationalities. The UPA heroism is mainly questioned
when it is related to attacks against other Ukrainians. Thus, the space of victim-
hood is predominantly occupied by Ukrainians in imagination of the recipients.
The Space of Victimhood
The theme of victimhood is another focal point through which the history of the
OUN and UPA is narrated in the interviews. Indeed, about one fifth of the re-
spondents placed the UPA struggle within the years of the Holodomor³³ (10).
Such a link between the UPA and the Holodomor leads us to think that the his-
tory of the UPA is placed by the recipients within the space of the victimhood of
the Ukrainian people as whole. Remarkably, this placement is also realized
through commemorative practices, where the Holodomor and the monument
to Klym Savur have become linked together on the anniversaries of the Holodo-
mor. As a respondent, who happened to be a history teacher, replied:
It (the monument to Klym Savur) was built in 2002. I often bring my school children here. I
am a history teacher. On the Holodomor anniversary we come here to tidy up and clean up
 Respondent J. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent S. Interviews. Rivne ...
 The Holodomor is the man-made famine in – in the Ukrainian SSR. For the rep-
resentations of the Holodomor in memory culture in contemporary Ukraine, see insightful stud-
ies: Georgiy Kasianov. Danse macabre: Holod – rokiv u politytci, masovii svidomosti ta
istoriografii (-pochatok ). Kyiv: Nash Chas. ; Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering.
On the rememberance of the Holodomor in the Ukrainian Diaspora; Vic Satzewich. The Ukrainian
Diaspora. New York: Routledge, , –.
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near the monument.We also meet with veterans, both Red Army and UPA veterans. I come
here to participate in meetings organized by the Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP).³⁴
Positioning the UPA in the same space of meaning as the Holodomor makes it
easier to accommodate difficult knowledge about the wrong deeds of the UPA
together with the glorious representations of their deeds in the monuments.
What we can also conclude from the kind of responses cited above is that the
acceptance of a new portrayal of the past does not always presuppose the denial
of the old one. As the case cited just above demonstrates, the respondent’s oc-
cupation and affiliation with the UNP engaged her in memory work and in the
shaping of new remembrances, but it did not exclude adherence to other
kinds of remembrances, such as meeting with Red Army veterans. These two
seemingly opposite kinds of war remembrances mutually reinforce each other,
with the fact of fighting and dying in the war making both the Red Army and
UPA equally worthy of remembering and commemorating. Importantly, family
history strengthens this connection:
They (the UPA) were fighting for the independence of Ukraine, against both fascists and the
Soviets. My father was killed in Warsaw on the 5th of May, 1945, and I understand that we
have to remember both Red Army veterans and UPA veterans.³⁵
Thus, death on the battlefield renders equal the UPA and the Red Army and
thereby diminishes the ideological differences between these rivals. Indeed, as
Reinhard Koselleck contended: “Whether dressed in hope or cloaked in grief,
symbols of death last longer than any individual case. Although the individual
case of death may fade, death is nonetheless still in store for every observer.”³⁶
The only identity that matters is that of the dead fallen in the war. Put bluntly,
even in the instances the recipients had no idea about who the UPA was, the
mere fact that the monument depicted a fallen soldier, as easily identified
from the visuality of the monument, made them think that he was worth remem-
bering and commemorating. In such a way, “[t]he formal language specific to
war memorials is obsolete without ceasing to speak. Evidently, this language out-
 Respondent Kk. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Respondent Kk. Interviews. Rivne ...
 Reinhart Koselleck. “War Memorials: Identity Formation of the Survivors.” The Collective
Memory Reader. Eds. Jeffrey Olick,Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, , –, .
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lives its unique, politically and socially determined causes, so that the signs are
no longer understood politically but remain comprehensible nonetheless.”³⁷
Conclusion
To sum up, through the analysis of the interviews I came to the conclusion that
independence and liberation are the the main thematic foci in the narration
about the UPA. Furthermore, the UPA is situated in the space of victimhood
closely connected to such an unquestionable symbol of victimhood for many Uk-
rainians as the Holodomor. This imagined connection makes it problematic to
have a critical and non-emotional distance to the UPA. It covers up “unpleasant
knowledge” about atrocities committed by the UPA against other nationalities as
well as against Ukrainians who did not support the UPA’s cause. At the same
time such an emotional charge enables history to function as a building block
in the formation of national and regional communal identities.
Remarkably, in their reflections on history people refer to the glorious pasts
of the Soviets and the UPA wherein both traditions of remembering do not ex-
clude each other but rather reinforce each other. In such a way, victimhood
and national sentiments reconcile the Soviet and the UPA heroic narratives. In-
deed, the interviews showed that on the grassroots level discussion about the
UPA goes beyond the binary polarization, Soviet vs. anti-Soviet, Ukrainian vs.
anti-Ukrainian representations and remembering of the war. The long-ago
formed picture of WWII have a decisive impact upon respondents in their under-
standing of the UPA. The mere fact of war and death in the battlefield makes the
fallen soldier into a hero, while other more troublesome details of history are
shifted out of the memory space. These disturbing details are not repressed, cen-
sored or silenced explicitly; they are rather overshadowed by the emphasis on
independence, sacrifice, struggle, and liberation. Indeed, the heroic memory
of WWII informs the memory of the insurgency. The well-known forms of remem-
bering the great victory provide moulds where celebrations, monumental forms
and rituals connected to insurgency are forged. The present peaceful co-exis-
tence of parallel memories does not, though, imply that there is no potential
for conflict that can be ignited at certain points in time and in certain contexts.
Exhortations to past historical injustices were not the last things used for mobi-
lizing and perpetrating other injustices. History has enough evidence of people
 Ibid.
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who, having lived together for decades, were seemingly instantaneously turned
into bitter enemies who fought each other to the death.
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Part 4: Memorial Media Spaces

Mārtiņš Kaprāns
Framing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and
the Latvian Legion:
Transnational History-Writing on Wikipedia
In the past decade, social networking sites (SNS) have become a crucial frame of
remembrance and history writing in post-communist societies. These societies,
as Rutten and Zvereva suggest, are a major player on the digital map today, form-
ing “a new topography with special places of memory discussions, commemora-
tion and fights.”¹ To be sure,Web 2.0 has provided new opportunities for discus-
sing history, particularly the history of the twentieth century, a period which
prompts troublesome collective memories.
Not only has SNS reinforced the will to discuss a controversial history, but
more importantly, it has established a transnational platform where full-fledged
and reconciliatory narratives can be elaborated. Along with what Kasianov calls
the nationalization of history in post-communist societies, one may, however,
ask whether these virtual platforms facilitate the coming to terms with the
past.² In order to answer this question, this chapter looks at Wikipedia, an exem-
plary case of transnational and collaborative knowledge creation. Specifically,
the chapter addresses the representation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
(UPA) and the Latvian Legion (LL), two historical topics which still generate ten-
sions in Ukraine and Latvia. Both military entities were established in 1943. UPA
was the military wing of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN), and its
ultimate goal was to liberate Ukraine from the Soviet as well as Nazi dictator-
ship. The LL, on the other hand, was established as an ostensibly voluntary
unit of Waffen SS, but, arguably, some of the legionnaires indeed saw in the cre-
ation of the LL an opportunity to regain the freedom of Latvia.
The controversy emerges from different frames applied to the UPA and LL in
popular discourse as well as in historiography. On the one hand, they are seen as
the supporters or auxiliary forces of the German army during the Second World
War and have thus been associated with the Nazi crimes. On the other hand,
 Ellen Rutten and Vera Zvereva. “Introduction: old conflicts, new media: post-socialist digital
memories. Memory, Conflict and New Media:Web Wars in Post-Socialist States. Eds. Ellen Rutten,
Julie Fedor and Vera Zvereva. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, , –.
 Georgiy Kasianov. “‘Nationalized’ History: Past Continuous, Present Perfect, Future…” A Lab-
oratory of Transnational History Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography. Eds. Georgiy Ka-
sianov and Philipp Ther. Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, , .
both military groups are linked to anti-communist resistance and the fight
against Soviet aggression.³ These diverging narratives about the UPA and LL
are decisive elements of fractured memory regimes vis-à-vis the Second World
War. Such memory regimes, as Kubik and Bernhard suggest, emerge when
major memory actors turn into warriors who tend to draw a sharp line between
their “true” vision of the past, and “wrong” versions of history.⁴ Yet, domestic
actors are not the only ones on the frontline of this war. Equally important are
warriors in Russia, which constantly exploits the commemoration of the UPA
and LL as sufficient evidence for its claims of the rebirth of Nazism in Ukraine
and Latvia. Moreover, in its memory war against Latvia and Ukraine, Russia
has looked for allies among other European countries.⁵ In a nutshell, Russia
criticizes any attempts to reinterpret the UPA and LL as acting within the context
of two evils, i.e. the Soviet and Nazi totalitarian regimes, which were similarly
criminal and aggressive towards Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.⁶
Although formally it would be more appropriate to compare the Wikipedia
representations of the LL and the 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division where
many Ukrainians from Galicia were enrolled, the UPA has become a more mean-
ingful lieux de memoire in the Ukrainian mnemonic landscape. Thus the UPA and
LL are compared as two primary and salient figures of collective memory and
persistent sources of “memory events” of the Second World War.⁷ Nevertheless,
one should acknowledge the differences of the memory regimes of Ukraine and
 Andrievs Ezergailis. Ed. The Latvian Legion: Heroes, Nazis, or Victims? Riga: Historical Insti-
tute of Latvia, ; Per A.Rudling. “Theory and Practice: Historical Representation of the
War Time Activities of the OUN-UPA (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army).” East European Jewish Affairs . (): –.
 Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik. “The Politics and Culture of Memory Regimes: A Compara-
tive Analysis.” Twenty years after Communism. Eds. Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik. New York:
Oxford University Press, , –.
 Eva-Clarita Onken. “The Baltic states and Moscow’s  May commemoration: Analysing mem-
ory politics in Europe.” Europe-Asia Studies . (): –; Nils Muižnieks. Ed. The Geo-
politics of History in Latvian–Russian Relations. Riga: Academic Press of the University of Latvia,
; Georgiy Kasianov. “‘The Nationalization’ of History in Ukraine.” The convolutions of his-
torical politics. Eds. Alexei Miller and Maria Limpan. Budapest/New York: Central European Uni-
versity Press, , –.
 For the recent scholarly discussion on this paradigm see Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick.
Eds. Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared. New York: Cambridge University
Press, ; Timothy Snyder. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic
Books, .
 Alexander Etkind. Memory Events in the Transnational Space. Paper presented in Memory at
War Inaugural Workshop, King’s College, Cambridge, June . http://tinyurl.com/mvwaao (
March ).
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Latvia. The Latvian political elite has officially sought for the past 15 years to ab-
stain from using the memory of LL to boost national pride or strengthen collec-
tive identity. In 2000, Latvia’s parliament removed 16 March, the commemorative
day of Latvian legionaries, from the official calendar. Regardless of the annual
conflictual discourse that revolves around 16 March until today, the majority of
Latvian politicians avoid attending the unofficial commemorative events of 16
March in Riga. Many of them, however, admit the tragedy of legionaries in the
war and after that.
Ukrainian politicians, in contrast, have used the commemoration of UPA as
political currency during the presidencies of Yuschenko and Yanukovych.⁸ Un-
like his predecessors, the current president, Petro Poroshenko, has refused to ex-
ploit the history of UPA for political purposes. On 16 May 2015, however, Poros-
henko signed a controversial law that along with other organizations qualified
the UPA as “fighters for Ukrainian independence”. This law makes it a criminal
offense to deny the legitimacy of “the struggle for the independence of Ukraine
in the twentieth century” and public denial of the same is to be regarded as an
insult to the memory of the fighters (see Draft law no. 2538– 1). Thus, as critics
have pointed out, questioning this claim, and implicitly questioning anything
“fighters for independence” did, is being made a criminal offense.⁹
Differences between Latvia and Ukraine can also be observed on the societal
level: the attitude towards the LL is clearly divided along the ethno-linguistic
lines (Latvians vs. Russian speakers), while the social memory regarding the
UPA is divided on a regional basis (East vs. West). In the 1990s and 2000s,
one could observe a rather syncretic commemoration of the Second World War
rivalries in Ukraine.¹⁰ These contradictory attitudes were also evident in history
teaching, where different narratives of the Second World War were taught in dif-
ferent parts of Ukraine, thus reinforcing the confrontation with respect to the
UPA.¹¹ Conversely, syncretism and uncertainty are less characteristic of Latvia’s
 Nils Muižnieks and Vita Zelče. Eds. Karojošā piemiņa. . marts un . maijs. Rīga: Zinātne,
; Yuliya Yurchuk. Reordering of Meaningful Worlds Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Doctoral Dissertation.
Stockholm University, .
 Marples, David R. “Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine Re. the So-Called ‘Anti-
Communist Law.’” Krytyka April (). http://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-
and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law ( May ).
 Andre Liebich and Oksana Myshlovska. “Bandera: memorialization and commemoration.”
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity . (): –.
 Lina Klymenkoa. “World War II in Ukrainian school history textbooks: mapping the dis-
course of the past.” Compare . (): –; Korostelinaa, Karina. “Constructing na-
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mnemonic landscape, where the Russian-speaking minority systematically chal-
lenges the relatively strong consensus of Latvians on the Second World War and
to some extent also on the LL; this consensus corresponds to the official histor-
ical interpretation.¹² Namely, unlike the triumphant narrative of Russian speak-
ers, the Latvian narrative suggests that the war did not bring freedom to Latvia
and legionnaires were largely victims of the war. Hence one may argue that Lat-
via’s mnemonic culture has been more bipolar than the Ukrainian one in terms
of WWII.
Taking into account communalities and actual dissimilarities, one might ex-
pect somewhat different representational practices regarding the UPA and LL on
Wikipedia. Yet, Wikipedia resembles a Habermasian coffeehouse of the eight-
eenth century, where universal and rational guidelines are supposed to define
discussions and lead to consensus.¹³ That is, general principles rather than
the nationally defined imperatives of political or social memory should prevail
in the historical representations generated through Wikipedia. In practice, how-
ever, Wikipedia challenges the ideals of the Enlightenment by creating a digital
heterotopia “which juxtapose[s] many otherwise incompatible spaces, online
and offline, experts and amateurs, science and popular culture”.¹⁴ In such con-
ditions, as this chapter suggests, a comparative analysis of Wikipedia is a useful
tool to decipher the interaction between consensus building and nation-building
contexts with respect to controversial history in general and to the UPA and LL in
particular.
Wikipedians as a community of practice
The paradigmatic transformation of the media landscape in the 2000s and the
emerging participatory culture has tremendously changed media consumption,
shifting “from individualized and personalized media consumption towards con-
tion: national narratives of history teachers in Ukraine.” National Identities . (): –
.
 Mārtiņš Kaprāns and Olga Procevska. Latvijas sociālās atmiņas monitorings. Riga: Latvijas
Universitāte, . http://tinyurl.com/pjkok ( March ).
 Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a cat-
egory of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: Polity, .
 Jutta Haider and Olof Sundin. “Beyond the legacy of the Enlightenment?” First Monday .
(). http://firstmonday.org/article/view// ( March ).
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sumption as a networked practice”.¹⁵ Along with many other consequences
caused by these changes, this transformation has certainly expanded the under-
standing of the mediality of memory. As Hoskins admits, “the increasingly digi-
talized networking of memory not only functions in a continuous present but is
also a distinctive shaper of a new mediatized age of memory.”¹⁶ Memory here
and elsewhere is understood in its broadest sense as a culturally shaped repre-
sentation of the past.
The idea of SNS is embedded in the maximalist understanding of media par-
ticipation which highlights heterogeneity and multidirectional engagement in
creating and consuming media content. It certainly intensifies the remediation
of history and enables a greater participation in public discourse about the
shared past. Likewise, SNS foster the development of a new (trans)national com-
municative space where knowledge and attitudes towards history can be exhib-
ited, discussed, refined, and reinterpreted. One may even argue that SNS have
increased the role of agency, thereby expanding the Halbwachsian conception
of collective memory where an individual has a rather marginal role. Yet, SNS
are far from perfect, and they reflect more general issues related to using the In-
ternet. These problems are related to reflexivity, listening to others and working
with difference, identity verification, processes of domination and exclusion,
and the expansion of economic interests.¹⁷ Similar shortcomings arise in the on-
line remediation of history: daily discourse about history is often sporadic, su-
perficial, fragmented, polemic, obtrusive, and anonymous.
History is a widely demanded topic on Wikipedia. Spoerri, for example,
found that articles in the combined category of politics and history received
more visits than science or computer-related topics.¹⁸ Perhaps Wikipedia is
also the most popular and visible place of transnational history writing. Critics,
nevertheless, admit that the articles are “narrowed by a limited historical imag-
ination that gives precedence to political and military history, especially the feats
 Henry Jenkins. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. New York: University
Press, , .
 Andrew Hoskins. “Digital network memory.” Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of
Cultural Memory. Eds. Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney. Berlin: De Gruyter, , .
 Lincoln Dahlberg. “The Internet and democratic discourse: Exploring the prospects of online
deliberative forums extending the public sphere.” Information, Communication and Society .
(): –.
 Anselm Spoerri. “What is popular on Wikipedia and why?” First Monday . (). http://
tinyurl.com/ogkhrwe ( March ).
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of great men, over social, economic, or environmental history”.¹⁹ On the other
hand, Wikipedia is not just a communication tool or knowledge repository, it
is also a cultural system in its own right.²⁰ The Wikipedia guidelines accompa-
nied by everyday participation practices and a common communication style de-
fine Wikipedians as a particular community of practice whose members have a
joint enterprise, mutual engagement and shared repertoire.²¹ However, as Weng-
er argues, not only unity, but also disagreements, challenges, and competition
may be an essential component of such communities; therefore “a community
of practice is neither a haven of togetherness nor an island insulated from polit-
ical and social relations.”²² Wikipedia facilitates the competition of historical
narratives and furthers collisions and conflicts, the flipside of participatory cul-
ture. Clearly, such a community of practice can entail different mnemonic agents
who are located in the same consensual universe, sticking together through
shared negotiation practices, but not necessarily through shared representations
of the past. At the same time, Wikipedians coming from different cultural back-
grounds, (inter)act along the culturally specific behavioral norms.²³ Hence it
seems more appropriate to categorize Wikipedians as culturally bounded com-
munities of practice who, regardless of a shared understanding of collaborative
work, can significantly differ on the level of participation and interaction.
Talk pages and editing are the milestones of Wikipedia’s culture. This culture
embraces collaboration as well as the fight for meaning and authority. The Wi-
kipedian’s authority, as Bender et al. demonstrate, is usually established through
external claims which are based on outside authority or sources of expertise,
such as books, magazine articles, websites, written laws, etc.²⁴ Likewise, in
 Brendan Luyt. “The Inclusivity of Wikipedia and the Drawing of Expert Boundaries: An Ex-
amination of Talk Pages and Reference Lists.” Journal of the American Society for Information
Science and Technology . (): .
 Christian Pentzold. “Fixing the floating gap: The online encyclopaedia Wikipedia as a global
memory place.” Memory Studies . (): –; Michela Ferron and Paolo Massa. “Be-
yond the encyclopedia: Collective memories in Wikipedia.” Memory Studies . (): –.
 Wikipedia: List of guidelines. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_guidelines (
March ).
 Etienne Wenger. Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, , .
 Noriko Hara, Pnina Shachaf and Khe Foon Hew. “Cross-cultural analysis of the Wikipedia
community.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology .
(): –.
 Emily M. Bender, et al. “Annotating Social Acts: Authority Claims and Alignment Moves in
Wikipedia Talk Pages.” Proceedings of the Workshop on Language in Social Media. Oregon: Asso-
ciation for Computational Linguistics, , –.
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order to construct authority,Wikipedians often use forum claims or codified rules
of behavior, e.g. that one should use reliable sources or avoid imposing personal
opinion. It has been argued that unlike external claims which might lead to rec-
onciliation, forum claims are more likely to cause negative alignment between
Wikipedians.²⁵ Yet, both types of establishing authority may create exclusionary
conditions that constrain engagement. For instance, the requirement to prove the
reliability of sources or to apply the rules of behavior appropriately may discour-
age from creating the content of Wikipedia. Moreover, the number of actual edi-
tors also casts doubts on Wikipedia’s heterogeneity: fewer than 10 per cent of the
authors are responsible for more than 90 per cent of all contributions. As a re-
sult,Wikipedia is more and more often characterized as a hierarchical platform.
König insists that in light of authority claims and gate-keeping, which are intrin-
sic to Wikipedia’s participatory architecture, “exclusion cannot be avoided,
which leaves Wikipedia in a dilemma”.²⁶
Linking these general observations to the actual research field, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the different roles that English and Russian Wikipedia
play in Latvia and Ukraine. Russian Wikipedia is definitely an important site
for Ukrainian editors as well as users. In 2014, more than half (55,5%) of all Wi-
kipedia views from Ukraine were registered in Russian Wikipedia; English Wiki-
pedia, on the other hand, received only 10% of views from Ukraine.²⁷ The editing
practices also exemplify the central role of Wikipedia.ru: 43,8% of the Wikipedia
edits from Ukraine were made in Russian Wikipedia, which falls just slightly be-
hind Ukrainian edits in Ukrainian Wikipedia (48,7%).²⁸ Dounaevsky explains
this interest in Russian Wikipedia by Ukrainian linguistic and cultural duality
and ambiguity.²⁹ Conversely, in Latvia, English Wikipedia is the most popular
site, which received 43,2% of views from Latvia in 2014, while Russian Wikipedia
attracted a significantly smaller viewership (20,2%). Nevertheless, Latvian edi-
tors are more active in Russian than in English Wikipedia, contributing 37,8%
and 12,8% of edits, respectively. These data suggest that Russian and English Wi-
kipedia most likely have a different impact on the countries in question; howev-
 Ibid, .
 René König. “Between lay participation and elite knowledge representation.” Information,
Communication & Society . (): .
 Wikimedia Traffic Analysis Report. http://tinyurl.com/ohzfgvt ( March ).
 Wikimedia Traffic Analysis Report http://tinyurl.com/phoy ( March ).
 Helene Dounaevsky. “Building Wiki-History: Between Consensus and Edit Warring.” Memo-
ry, Conflict and New Media: Web Wars in Post-Socialist States. Eds. Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor and
Vera Zvereva. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, . .
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er, Russian Wikipedia is perhaps a more salient site of ideological struggle in
both countries.
Methodology
In order to understand how the reconciliatory potential of Wikipedia is used, this
chapter explores four Wikipedia articles on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
and the Latvian Legion (LL).
To demonstrate how the articles on the UPA and LL were created, this chap-
ter deals with both English and Russian Wikipedia. Both versions can be seen as
transnational sites of history writing. Arguably, the English Wikipedia is a rather
global platform which attracts diverse editors, whereas the Russian Wikipedia
has a more regional character and largely appeals to the users of post-Soviet
countries where the Russian language is still the lingua franca. Hence the empir-
ical material includes different transnational realms,which might mean different
practices of consensus building on controversial historical topics.
In this chapter, two different versions of each Wikipedia article (2010 and
2014) are explored, which helps to better understand the dynamics of
consensus.³⁰ To conduct a comparative analysis, I have examined different data-
sets related to Wikipedia articles: edit histories, users’ profiles, and talk pages. I
have also used various external data collection tools to obtain quantitative infor-
mation about editors and revision history. Likewise the qualitative research soft-
ware Nvivo 8 was used to extract additional data fromWikipedia articles and talk
pages and to map relations between the most active editors. Nvivo facilitates the
analysis of large amounts of text by providing various techniques for obtaining
qualitative (e.g. open coding) as well as quantitative data (e.g. word frequency,
tag clouds). The collected data are analyzed on two levels: narrative and agentic.
On the narrative level I focus on the structure of Wikipedia articles and dominant
themes that recur in talk pages. On the agentic level the most active Wikipedians
are explored. In particular, I shall look at interaction patterns that emerge among
the Wikipedia editors. For the sake of clarity, particular abbreviations are used to
designate each Wikipedia article: EnUPA (English Wikipedia article on the UPA),
 See Ukrainian Insurgent Army, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_In
surgent_Army; Latvian Legion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latvian_Legion; Украинская
повстанческая армия, http://tinyurl.com/omdb; Латышский добровольческий легион
СС, http://tinyurl.com/jvuqxe ( March ).
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RuUPA (Russian Wikipedia article on the UPA), EnLL (English Wikipedia article
on the LL), and RuLL (Russian Wikipedia article on the LL).³¹
Wikipedia Narratives
Although formally Wikipedia articles provide encyclopedic representations of
history, these analytical texts retain narrative qualities, putting forward particu-
lar constellations of events, characters, and images. In Wikipedia, as Page puts
it, “the burden of narration is distributed between different contributors, who in
turn may include citations from materials authored by others and quotations at-
tributed to various protagonists represented in the narrative in question.”³² In
addition, articles’ talk pages are often used by editors to coordinate narration,
so as to make an article comprehensible to a layman.
The Wikipedia articles analyzed in this chapter show considerable structural
variation which illuminates the diverse framing strategies that editors have
agreed upon. EnUPA depicts the UPA’s relations with numerous nations and
countries, also pointing to the UPA’s criminal or morally undermining activities
(the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, ambiguous relations with
Nazi Germany and Jews). To be sure, the first paragraphs of EnUPA link the
UPA’s activities to the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization’s main goal: to re-es-
tablish a united, independent national state on Ukrainian ethnic territory.
Thus, the violence of the UPA is primarily seen as a political tool. Notably, the
national and political marker ‘Ukrainian’ has become more salient over time
and is used more frequently in the 2014 version than in 2010. The editors of
the English article have also agreed to use neutral titles for sections that deal
with the most problematic issues (e.g. “Germany”, “Poland”, “UPA and
Jews”). Yet, EnUPA emphasizes the uneasy memory work with respect to the
UPA in today’s Ukraine (reconciliation, commemorative places for victims and
combatants, recognition of the UPA). The visual material of EnUPA has been ex-
panded over the years, particularly stressing the military nature of the UPA and
commemorative sites dedicated to the UPA.
Conversely, RuUPA is more prone to outlining the prehistory of the UPA, its
nationalist origins and motivation for collaborating with the Nazis. The opening
paragraphs of the article stress the militant character of the UPA and its antag-
 The first version of EnUPA was created in , RuUPA in , EnLL in , RuLL in
.
 Ruth Page. “Counter narratives and controversial crimes: The Wikipedia article for the ‘Mur-
der of Meredith Kercher’.” Language and Literature . (): .
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onism toward Soviet partisans and the Polish underground army (i.e. those who
fought against the Nazi invasion) during and after the Second World War. In such
a way the Russian article highlights the UPA’s violent activities, simultaneously
downplaying the underlying political intentions behind that violence. However,
the word frequency analysis suggests that the UPA’s violence against Poles and
Jews is more prominent in EnUPA than in RuUPA. This shows the varying sali-
ence of transnational contexts in both articles: while RuUPA accentuates the ag-
gression towards the Soviets, EnUPA is more inclined to stress the UPA’s violence
toward ethic groups. In addition, the editors of RuUPA have decided to use more
emotional and sensational section headings (“Collaboration with Wehrmacht,
German police and SD”, “The activities of the UPA against civilians”, “Collabo-
ration of the UPA with foreign secret services”). A separate section describes the
liquidation of the UPA, emphasizing various tactics used by Soviet institutions to
destroy the UPA. The Soviet measures taken against the UPA are framed as “the
liberation of the Soviet lands”, thus repeating the Soviet interpretative scheme of
history. The vocabulary of RuUPA has largely remained the same over the years.
The same persistence applies to the visual material, which again focuses on the
UPA’s violence.
To sum up, one may argue that the editors of EnUPA have reached a certain
consensus by agreeing on a syncretic perspective. Namely, the UPA is character-
ized as a group of combatants who were ready to fight for their cause by any
means during and after the Second World War. Although the crimes committed
by the UPA are not downplayed, they are definitely not used as a dominant rep-
resentational context. The editors of RuUPA, in contrast, have reached a narrow-
er consensus. The Russian article only emphasizes the criminal character of the
UPA, which thus legitimizes the liquidation of this military organization by the
Soviets. In other words, the narrative of RuUPA overlooks alternative interpreta-
tions of the UPA’s errant activities. It is noteworthy that the visual material also
conveys these different representations.While the embedded pictures in EnUPA
brings forward the symbolic dimension (commemorative sites, military symbols,
stamps), RuUPA’s visual material illustrates the victims of the UPA.
Similar patterns emerge within articles on the Latvian Legion. EnLL draws
attention to conditions that led to the formation of the LL and explains the mo-
tivation of people who were involved in the LL. The English Wikipedia persistent-
ly defines Latvian legionnaires as conscripts who were by and large forcefully
recruited by Hitler. Unlike the Russian article, the English article draws attention
to a post-war incident in 1946 when the government of Sweden extradited sol-
diers from the LL who had fled to Sweden from the USSR. This story and the
Swedish apology after Latvia regained independence stress the tragic destiny
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of the legionnaires. The narrative of EnLL has not changed significantly over the
years, thus demonstrating a somewhat rigid consensus among editors.
The Russian Wikipedia, on the other hand, emphasizes the voluntary basis
of LL, even though it simultaneously admits that the voluntary nature of their
service was a rather formal pretext exploited by Nazis to mobilize Latvian con-
scripts. Notably, legionnaires in RuLL are also called Hitlerians (Gitlerovci), the
ideological label inherited from the Soviet historical discourse and widely
used in the Russian popular parlance nowadays. In a nutshell, these Wikipedia
articles highlight a different understanding of the locus of control vis-à-vis the LL
(as established by Nazis vs. established by Latvians and Nazis). The basis of this
juxtaposition is much broader, i.e. it stems from a fundamentally different inter-
pretation of the guilt for Nazi crimes. While EnLL admits that some members of
LL were indeed involved in Nazi crimes, it states that these crimes happened be-
fore the LL was actually established in 1943. Moreover, the English Wikipedia ar-
ticle insists that “many Latvian historians maintain that the Latvian Legion itself
was a front line combat unit and did not participate in any war crimes”. In con-
trast, RuLL refers to several poorly sourced and rather unreliable cases related to
Poland and Belarus, which allegedly prove the criminal nature of the LL; and a
research-based conclusion that the absolute majority of the LL soldiers were not
involved in Nazi crimes is presented as merely the opinion of Latvian historians.
Nevertheless, all four articles point to the Nuremberg trials, which concluded
that the UPA and the LL were not involved in committing Nazi crimes.
Sources are yet another important element in Wikipedia articles. They deter-
mine the quality of articles and hence are regularly discussed on talk pages. As
Sundin argues, “There is a hierarchy of trustworthy genres in Wikipedia, which
often mirrors hierarchies of sources as they are treated outside Wikipedia”.³³ An
obligation to use authoritative sources is a rule that is regularly applied by Wi-
kipedia editors. Verification of sources is thus “one mechanism by which a dom-
inant narrative can be established or a counter narrative excluded from a Wiki-
pedia article”.³⁴ However, when Wikipedians have conflicting opinions on the
credibility of a particular source – which happens quite often – this leads to ed-
iting wars.
The editors of EnUPA and RuUPA have used various sources to create a re-
liable text about the UPA (Table 1). The bibliography of EnUPA entails 91 units.
They are dominated by books and news media, while academic journals and var-
 Olof Sundin. “Janitors of knowledge: constructing knowledge in the everyday life of Wikipe-
dia editors.” Journal of Documentation . (): .
 Page. “Counter narratives and controversial crimes,” .
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ious Internet sources are used less frequently. Similar pattern can be observed in
RuUPA, where the reliance on books and ignorance of ongoing scholarly discus-
sions in academic journals is even stronger. Archival or video materials are rarely
used in the analyzed articles and that shows a heavy dependence on secondary
sources.
Table 1: The ratio of different sources³⁵
Books News Media Academic Journals Internet Other*
EnUPA % ,% ,% ,% ,%
RuUPA % % % % %
EnLL %  % % %
RuLL ,% ,% ,% % ,%
* Government and NGO reports, PhD thesis, archives etc.
Table 2: The publication year of sources
s s s s s s s s NI* Total
EnUPA          
RuUPA          
EnLL          
RuLL          
* Impossible to identify the publication year
Regardless of structural similarities, the sources used in articles on the UPA re-
veal that dissimilar informative backgrounds have formed the editors’ knowledge
about the topic. If EnUPA is based on English and Ukrainian sources, the editors
of RuUPA have preferred Russian and Ukrainian sources. There are only 10 (11%)
bibliographical units which are used in both articles and they are published
mostly in English. In other words, English rather than Ukrainian sources create
a shared ground for both articles which, otherwise, have dissimilar origins. Yet,
the topicality of UPA as regards Ukraine’s memory politics in the past 15 years
have obviously played a role in selecting sources, i.e. the bulk of sources have
been published in the 2000s (Table 2).³⁶ Hence the recency of sources makes
the political context more salient in Wikipedia articles and increases, particular-
 The data represents the Wikipedia articles as they were on  September .
 The sources of EnUPA, however, represent a more dispersed timeframe than RuUPA.
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ly in RuUPA, the likelihood that editors have remediated rather biased discourses
about the UPA. It is also important to point out that many sources used have
been published in the last five years. This evidently demonstrates that the
work on writing the history of the UPA is ongoing, but also highlights the fragil-
ity of the consensus reached by Wikipedians in 2007–2009,when the most active
editing and discussions occurred. The data show, though, that the updating of
sources is more characteristic of EnUPA, which again suggests the limited infor-
mative background of RuUPA.
The number of information sources for EnLL and RuLL is significantly small-
er than for both EnUPA and RuUPA. This shows, among other things, a correla-
tion between the number and activity of editors and the number of sources used
in a Wikipedia article. For example, EnLL has the lowest number of edits among
all four articles (Table 3), and correspondingly it has the lowest number of sour-
ces. The narrative of EnLL is based on books, whereas RuLL’s sources are domi-
nated by news media, where sensationalism and biased assessment is more
characteristic. Essentially, the English article on the LL can be seen as more re-
liable than the Russian article, whose accusatory perspective is principally
grounded in the often superficial discourse of media and the Internet. One
can again notice a considerable differentiation of sources: EnLL is dominated
by English, while RuLL is based on Russian sources. Yet, both articles assign Lat-
vian sources an auxiliary role. Furthermore, both articles have just two common
sources thus having a completely different informative background. Similarly to
articles on the UPA, the majority of sources are published in the period when the
controversy around the LL evolved and when it became a regular topic in the bi-
lateral relations of Latvia and Russia (from 1998 onwards).³⁷ In light of this con-
troversy, a juxtaposition of the Latvian national, pro-Russian (often also pro-So-
viet) and the Western European representations of the Second World War reveals
an exacerbation of differences.
The selection of sources reveals that the predominance of English or Russian
sources leads to a decreased interaction as well as to a stronger consensus which
largely excludes counter narratives, as can be seen in the case of EnLL and RuLL.
Conversely, competition of sources increases interaction and leaves room for
counter narratives. This, however, can be used for different purposes, as can
be seen in EnUPA and RuUPA. While the editors of EnUPA strive to integrate
 Kārlis Kangeris. “Western pressure in the writing of Latvian history.” Inheriting the s:
The Baltic Countries. Studia Uralica Upsaliensia No. . Ed. Baiba Metuzale-Kangare. Uppsala:
Uppsala University Press, , –; Nils Muižnieks. “History, Memory and Latvian For-
eign Policy.” The Geopolitics of History in Latvian–Russian Relations. Ed. Nils Muižnieks. Riga:
Academic Press of the University of Latvia, , –.
Framing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Latvian Legion 261
counter narratives in a common picture, the editors of RuUPA are ultimately in-
clined to establish the hegemony of a pro-UPA or anti-UPA narrative.
Agentic level
The editing history of Wikipedia articles reveals an already familiar participatory
pattern: all four articles are created by a small group of editors and the top 10%
of editors have made more than half of all edits (Table 3). The data suggest that
RuLL has the lowest potential of pluralism, as the top five editors have made
63% of edits and have added 93.6% of the text.³⁸ RuUPA, in turn, has the
most decentralized and scattered ‘editing staff ’; this diversity is also projected
on the RuUPA’s talk page, where some editors are even more tended to discuss
than to edit the article (Table 5).







Edits made by the
top % of editors
% edits made by
top five editors
% of text added by
top five editors
EnUPA   .% .% ,%
RuUPA   % .% ,%
EnLL   .% .% ,%
RuLL   .% % ,%
Since many editors maintain a high level of anonymity, the assessment of in-
dividual Wikipedians is a more complicated task. Yet, the available information
on user pages and talk pages provides sufficient data to describe the most active
editors and their mutual relations. There are up to three leading editors in each
article who usually also dominate on talk pages. The editors of EnUPA largely
avoid using an accusatory rhetoric in their discussions (Table 4). The two editors
most critical towards the UPA are Xx236 and Jo0doe. While Xx236 is related to
Poland (Polish is indicated as his native language),³⁹ Jo0doe imposes somewhat
pro-Russian interpretations, trying to frame the UPA as merely a Nazi collabora-
tor. Moreover, Jo0doe has constantly vandalized articles and incited edit warring,
both on EnUPA and RuUPA. It is also interesting to note that the most sizable
 The top five editors in both categories do not necessarily overlap.
 Ethnic cleansing of Poles in Galicia and Volynia is often mentioned as the most striking evi-
dence of UPA’s criminal activities.
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contribution among anonymous editors comes from Poland, whereas the contri-
bution of anonymous editors from the Russian Federation is insignificant.⁴⁰ This
suggests that Polish editors of EnUPA have provided the most important input
for the critical appraisal of UPA. Nevertheless, it is striking to see how editors
who take nominally opposing sides try to reach a certain consensus, even if
still disagreeing on crucial aspects of UPA. The editors who attempt to create a
comprehensive article invite other Wikipedians to ignore Jo0doe’s aggressive be-
havior and concentrate on the article.
I think we are all better off if we simply integrate the info into an article if it is sourced and
valid and correct the Jo0Doe’s English. His own credibility matters little. It is his sources
that matter. I find his sources valid even though his interpretation is one-sided. I deal
with his edits to Holodomor in exactly same way. The sources he brings in are excellent.
As for his attacks on credibility of other editors, those are best ignored. Articles’ content
is all that matters in the end of the day. – Irpen, 23 December 2007
Believe me, this personal attitude (‘you (OUN)’, ‘why do you lie’ etc.) is not going to be
healthy to either of you. Why don’t you both stick to the article and try to avoid making
the remarks directed at other editors ? – Lysy, 29 January 2008
This ongoing consensus building, as the communicative activity on talk
pages suggests, is particularly characteristic of EnUPA. The content of the EnU-
PA’s talk page emerges to a large extent from the polemic discourse between
Faustian and Jo0doe, and other editors act as the supporters or opponents of
these two leading editors (see Chart 1). As Faustian’s position attracts more sup-
porters, his balanced approach to the UPA prevails in the talk page as well as in
the Wikipedia article.










Faustian Pro-Ukrainian attitude   B
Jodoe Blocked in EN and RU versions.
Accused of vandalism and falsification of sources,
pro-Russian/pro-Soviet
  C
Lvivske Pro-Ukrainian attitude   B
Lysy Ukrainian   B
 Wiki Trip. http://sonetlab.fbk.eu/wikitrip/#|en|Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army ( March ).
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Xx Polish is native language   C
Bobanni   B
Irpen Russian   B
Volunteer
Marek
Scholar from USA, member
of Eastern European Mailing List   B
Iryna Harpy Descendant of the Zaporozhian
Cossacks, lives in Australia
  B
Bandurist Pro-Ukrainian attitude   S
* This information is obtained from user’s profiles as well as from discussions on talk pages.
** B – balanced, C – critical, S – supportive
Conversely, the RuUPA’s talk page displays interaction between various equally
active editors. Yet, this ostensibly pluralistic pattern is, in fact, based on a highly
conflictual discourse that evolves amongst the supporters of pro-Ukrainian and
pro-Russian interpretations of UPA.
I’m completely sure there was no particular ‘Banderovites’ violence’. That is to say, of
course there was one most likely. […] But I don’t place the UPA on the same plaque
where the SS and the like are placed. People [of UPA] were ultimately fighting for freedom.
– Harding, 6 December 2006⁴¹
One wants to hide the other side of the real history of one’s fathers and relatives: how the
families of the Red Army officers were betrayed to the SD and SS; how hundreds of thou-
sands of Jews were ‘released’ to another world; how Poles were cleansed with the assis-
tance of the Ukrainian SS.Well, of course, in one’s own eyes, it’s better to be the offspring
of fighters and the victims of the regime than that of war criminals. – Jo0doe, 7 August 2008
Remarkably, two of the leading RuUPA editors (Jo0doe and Chobitok Vasilii
[Чобиток Василий]) who indiscriminately condemn the UPA have been banned
from Wikipedia because of their constant vandalism and violation of Wikipedia
rules. To be sure, RuUPA demonstrates how a scattered and dispersed interaction
of profoundly bias editors hampers consensus building as regards historical top-
 All quotes taken from Russian Wikipedia were originally published in Russian. The transla-
tion to English was done by me.
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ics. That is to say, conflicting representations make consensus more fragile par-
ticularly in terms of the Russian article.
Table 5: The top 10 editors of RuUPA
Editor’s
name





Martin From Ukraine   S
Jodoe Blocked in EN and RU Wikipedia. Accused of
vandalism and falsification of sources,
pro-Russian/pro-Soviet stances
  C
Crow Russian, pro-Ukrainian attitude, jurist, born in
, real name: Ivan. Has lived in Eastern Uk-
raine.
  S
Wulfson Born in Russia, real name: Sergey, currently lives
in Russia, but has lived in Ukraine for long time,
administrator of the article
  B
Viggen Pro-Ukrainian attitude, jurist   S
Nordri-
midgard








Klip game Supporter of communist ideas, offline name:
Pavel Liahovsky (Ляховский Павел Юрьевич)
  B
The relations between the editors of EnLL and RuLL significantly differ from
those of editors of Wikipedia articles on the UPA. The most visible dissimilarity
is a tremendously low participation in Wikipedia talk pages about the LL. If the
talk pages regarding the UPA articles reveal attempts to create transnational his-
torical narratives by including controversial interpretations of the UPA, the edit-
ing of articles on the LL is not accompanied by such discussions. In particular,
this inactivity can be observed on the EnLL’s talk page, where even the most ac-
tive editors (Vecrumba and Zalktis) have made just a few entries. Perhaps, the
missing discussions have resulted in a somewhat quick consensus, thus leaving
it unchallenged over the years. The majority of the editors (including anonymous
editors) of EnLL are either living in or are closely related to Latvia. Hence the
transnational background of this Wikipedia article is somewhat limited. It
should be noted, however, that EnLL and RuLL advocate completely divergent
representations of the LL.While EnLL is intertwined with a balanced and slightly
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justificatory perspective, the Russian article is again dominated by a critical and
accusatory tone. This contrast between interpretations is more conspicuous than
the one observed between EnUPA and RuUPA.
Table 6: The top 10 editors of EnLL




Vecrumba Related to Latvia, lives in New York   B
Zalktis Related to Latvia   B
Andris Latvian  
Nug Related to Estonia   B
Paul Sie-
bert
PhD   B
Nedrutland  
Darouet Student of evolutionary biology with interests in
history, literature and philosophy
 
Philaweb An active member of WikiProject Latvia  
Xil Constantly improves and develops WikiProject
Latvia
  B
GBE Proud to be a European  
Table 7: The top 10 editors of RuLL




Zac Allan From Moscow, Zionist, supports pan-Slavic
ideas
  C
Abols From Latvia   B
Knyf   C
Doomych From Moscow, works in IT, also has a
username Викискладе
  B
Scriber Russian  
Gaujmalnieks  
Silent From Novosibirsk, currently has changed
the username to Andrey FCSN
  B
... IP is registered in Latvia  
... IP is registered in Fairport (NY), USA  
Gweorth  
Numerous editors have also co-edited other articles on the history of Eastern Eu-
rope in general and on Ukraine and Latvia in particular. For instance, the data
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provided by Editor Interaction Analyzer⁴² show that Faustian and Lvivski, the ed-
itors of EnUPA, have participated in the talk pages of other English Wikipedia
articles related to Ukraine (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian
right-wing party “Svoboda”, etc) and Vecrumba and Nug have co-edited and dis-
cussed topics from Soviet history on English Wikipedia, particularly with respect
to the Baltic states. This means that the most active editors are rather determined
and knowledgeable Wikipedians, whose interactions have a longer history and
whose arguments have been tempered in various contexts. Nonetheless,
among the ten most active editors only Knyf, Silent1936 and Jo0doe have contrib-
uted to more than one of the Wikipedia articles analyzed in this chapter which
means that the transnational communities of practice are isolated from each
other.⁴³
The data also show groups of Wikipedians who are tied together not just be-
cause of a shared interest in writing articles, but also because of national or re-
gional origins. Taking into account this background, one may notice that EnUPA
is largely written by a scattered transnational community (Table 4), whereas the
 Editor Interaction Analyzer, available at https://tools.wmflabs.org/sigma/editorinteract.py
( March ).
 Knyf has edited both Russian articles, being more engaged in RuLL than in RuUPA. Knyf’s
attitude varies from somewhat indifferent towards the UPA to explicitly critical towards the
LL. Silent, in contrast, demonstrates a balanced attitude towards both topics of Russian
Wikipedia.
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bulk of RuUPA is largely created by Russian and Ukrainian editors (Table 5).
Hence, RuUPA emerges from regional rather than global discussions on history.
The most active editors of EnLL and RuLL, are related to Latvia and Russia, re-
spectively (see Table 6 and 7). On the one hand, this local perspective has obvi-
ously reduced the level of controversies on the LL, helping to cement a shared
representation already dominating in each offline community. On the other
hand, there have been limited transnational efforts to build the Wikipedia con-
sensus on the LL.
Wikipedia has for long time been a battlefield for editors interested in Cen-
tral and East European history. The Digwuren case is a good example to epito-
mize this ongoing struggle. In 2007, Wikipedia user Irpen submitted a case for
the Arbitration Commission of English Wikipedia against user Digwuren. Irpen
accused a group of active Wikipedians of vandalism and of blocking alternative
views on the Baltic and East European history of the twentieth century. Many
members of this group who took part in these editing wars were allegedly work-
ing behind the University of Tartu firewall and were members of the East Euro-
pean mailing list (EEML).⁴⁴ This well-coordinated group of Wikipedia editors, as
it was argued, advocated anti-Russian, anti-communist and nationalist views
and “attacked” those who disagreed with such a perspective. The Arbitration
Commission decided to warn the involved editors that future attempts to use Wi-
kipedia as a battleground by making generalized accusations that persons of a
particular national or ethnic group are engaged in Holocaust denial or harbor
Nazi sympathies may result in the imposition of summary bans (for more details
on this controversy see Wikipedia: Arbitration). Several editors (e.g. Vecrumba,
Nug (also Martintg), Irpen) of EnUPA and EnLL were also involved in the Digwu-
ren case and EEML. Presuming that there are also other and not necessarily ex-
plicitly coordinated collaboration practices behind Wikipedia articles, one may
argue that the clashes with respect to the UPA and LL to a considerable extent
can be seen as the rivalry between well-established, but very small, groups of
editors.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have sought to show how Wikipedia as a transnational social
networking site is involved in dealing with controversial episodes of the Second
 See Wikipedia: Arbitration/Requests/Case/Eastern European mailing list, retrieved from
http://tinyurl.com/lynv f ( March ).
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World War which are still sensitive issues in the collective memory of Latvia and
Ukraine. The analysis of various datasets has revealed differences that help us
understand and explain the potential of transnational history-writing in Wikipe-
dia.
This research suggests that transnational conditions in English and Russian
Wikipedia are used for diverse purposes. The leading editors of English Wikipe-
dia have mainly addressed historical issues of the UPA and LL in a balanced and
collaborative manner, producing a comprehensive narrative on controversial top-
ics. Notwithstanding their attempts to follow the best practices of Wikipedia, the
most active Russian Wikipedians, on the other hand, prefer a conflict oriented
interaction. Apparently, Russian Wikipedia is more often seen as a battlefield
where Russian, Ukrainian, and Latvian editors can impose their national histor-
ical narratives. This inevitably generates polemical rather than pluralistic and
transnational history-writing. Therefore RuUPA and RuLL and behind the
scene activities on talk pages reveal a more rigid juxtaposition of dominant
and counter narratives.
The varying relations between competing narratives, in fact, show the con-
ditionality of the argument that Wikipedians are prone to generate more neutral
points of view as time goes by.⁴⁵ English Wikipedians are indeed more inclined to
reach global consensus on the UPA and LL by bringing forward complexity rather
than by reducing the essence of both military organizations to representatives of
nationalism or perpetrators of Nazi crimes. These sites are also open to addition-
al or new information and sources. Russian Wikipedians, however, tend to rein-
force/criticize the national consensus of Ukraine or Russia and to a lesser extent
that of Latvia. To be sure, the Russian language invokes power relations between
Russia and other post-communist nations. This language formed the hegemonic
representation of the Second World War in the Soviet era. And today the most
assertive arguments that challenge the narratives of a “subaltern European
past” are expressed in Russian.⁴⁶ In a nutshell, my research demonstrates that
English Wikipedia advances a somewhat inclusionary narrative whereas Russian
Wikipedia is seen as the site for exclusionary history-writing. This finding corrob-
orates the argument that the English Wikipedia is more useful as a neutral
 Ferron and Massa. “Beyond the encyclopedia: Collective memories in Wikipedia,” .
 Maria Mälksoo. “The memory of becoming European: The East European subalterns and the
collective memory of Europe.” European Journal of International Relations . (): –
.
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ground where local discussions can be revived and brought to the attention of
the Anglophone Internet audience.⁴⁷
Along with the exclusionary and inclusionary dimensions of Wikipedia, it is
also important to take into account the differences in editing activity which are
caused by the size of a particular nation. By referring to the cases of UPA and LL,
it can be argued that one may expect a higher variety of sources, discussions and
narrative complexity in those Wikipedia articles which deal with the controversial
historical topics of larger nations.⁴⁸ In other words, the effect of the nation’s size
should be integrated in media literacy programs and should be emphasized when
teaching critical thinking about Wikipedia as the source of historical knowledge.
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Volodymyr Kulyk
Negotiating Memory in Online Social
Networks: Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian
Discussions of Soviet Rule and Anti-Soviet
Resistance
Although collective memory is widely associated first and foremost with state-
controlled ceremonies, monuments and history textbooks, scholars have become
fully aware of the fundamental role of the media in its production and mainte-
nance. Moreover, while television is still considered the most important medium
in terms of its impact on collective memory, memory studies increasingly turn to
the so-called new media, which fundamentally change memory in general and
collective memory in particular. The “accessibility, transferability and circulation
of digital content”¹ extend the production of collective memory well beyond the
state and its authorized agents and, no less importantly, free this production
from its traditional containment within national borders. It is the combination
of globalization and digital technologies that creates what Reading calls the
“globital memory field” as, on the one hand, the circulation of mediated mem-
ories that “are less costly, globally connected, and reproducible across different
media” and, on the other, as a “struggle by memory agents over the assemblage,
mobilization, and securitization of memory capital.”²
At the same time, in their fascination with the novel features of the digital
production of memory, scholars often neglect more familiar but no less impor-
tant aspects. Most theoretical and empirical studies focus on the new media’s ca-
pacity to publicize and memorialize current and often private events. However,
these media also contribute to the transmission and transformation of memories
of events from the more distant past, which are widely recognized as part of col-
lective memory (usually called history) but whose interpretations continue to be
contested. As Jakubowicz argues, stories presented in various Internet reposito-
ries and forums “have become increasingly potent elements in wider socio-polit-
 Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading. “Introduction.” Save As … Digital
Memories. Eds. Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading. Houndmills and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
 Anna Reading. “Memory and digital media: Six dynamics of the globital memory field.” On
Media Memory: Collective Memory in the New Media Age. Eds. Motti Neiger, Oren Meyers and
Eyal Zandberg. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
ical struggles over legitimacy, authenticity and claims to truth.”³ Similarly, schol-
ars seem to be more interested in the global flow of visual images and English-
language texts than in the circulation of products in less widespread languages
whose capacity to transcend national borders is limited to migrant communities
and post-imperial entities. While transnational diaspora networks on the Web
have received considerable attention,⁴ little research has been carried out into
the online communication between people who have found themselves in differ-
ent states due to geopolitical changes but who continue to speak the same lan-
guage and, in many cases, to consider themselves members of the same nation.⁵
Last but not least, the dominance of the Western perspective results in a focus on
the globalization-induced erosion of the national framework in established
states, thus leading to the neglect of attempts to create such a framework in
newly independent countries, which must compete both with old imperial per-
spectives and new global tendencies.
This chapter contributes to filling in these gaps by examining social network
discussions of two historical phenomena crucial to the production of collective
memory and national identity in independent Ukraine, namely Soviet rule and
anti-Soviet resistance. Although the inherently transnational interaction in on-
line networks precludes the containment of the discussions within the Ukrainian
national borders, the participation is limited to people who believe that they
have a stake in the collective memory of post-Soviet Ukrainians. Apart from Uk-
rainians themselves, this includes residents of other countries of the former
USSR, first and foremost Russia, many of whom consider the countries’ shared
past to be a basis for a shared future.While the use of local languages, Ukrainian
and Russian, significantly contributes to the exclusion of outsiders, it also re-
flects the participants’ perception of their primary addressees (and, of course,
their own linguistic skills). At the same time, the participation of non-Ukrainians
ensures that the Soviet past is discussed not only from the Ukrainian national
perspective but also from the post-Soviet transnational one. The contestation
thus concerns not only specific content of the Ukrainian collective memory
 Andrew Jakubowicz. “Remembering and recovering Shanghai: Seven Jewish families [re]-con-
nect in cyberspace.” Save As … Digital Memories. Eds. Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins
and Anna Reading. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, , .
 See e.g. Vinay Lal. “The politics of history on the Internet: Cyber-diasporic Hinduism and the
North American Hindu diaspora.” Diaspora . (): –; Brenda Chan. “Imagining the
homeland: The Internet and diasporic discourse of nationalism.” Journal of Communication In-
quiry . (): –.
 Among exceptions, see Shih-Diing Liu. “Undomesticated hostilities: The affective space of In-
ternet chat rooms across the Taiwan Strait.” positions . (): –.
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and national identity but also its salience vis-à-vis a competing supranational
perspective positing a common past and future of all peoples of the former
USSR.⁶
Historical memory in “old” and “new” media
As with many other media effects, the production of collective memory is medi-
um-specific. It depends heavily on the composition of the audience of a partic-
ular type of media, the technology of production and distribution, and the state’s
policy with regard to the type in question. All of these are, of course, specific to a
particular country with its political regime, the ethnolinguistic composition of its
population, and the tradition of relations between the media, state and society.
The analysis below focuses on the specific case of Ukraine⁷ but similar features
in the production of memory in certain media types are to be found in many
other countries.
Newspapers, historically the first type of what came to be known as the mass
media, combine relatively cheap production and relatively slow delivery. On the
one hand, newspaper editors can usually afford to commission an original text
aimed at giving their audience what they think it wants, rather than republishing
what they hope their readers will find acceptable. On the other hand, in order to
give the readers a new issue as soon as possible, it is preferable to publish or at
least print newspapers regionally rather than nationwide, which also makes pos-
sible the supply of regionally adjusted texts, published either in separate outlets
or in regional varieties of national ones. In multilingual countries, therefore,
newspapers can also accommodate the linguistic preferences of their audiences,
which means publishing primarily in the main language of a given locality or re-
gion. In Ukraine, the territories of two predominant languages are delineated
both by region and type of settlement, with Ukrainian prevailing in the centre-
west and the countryside, and Russian in the south-east and in large cities.
The lead of Russian over Ukrainian on the newspaper market is due to the prev-
 On the content, salience and contestation of identity, see Rawi Abdelal et al. “Identity as a
variable.” Perspectives on Politics . (): –; Volodymyr Kulyk. “The media, history
and identity: Competing narratives of the past in the Ukrainian popular press.” National Identi-
ties . (): .
 For more detail, see Volodymyr Kulyk. “War of memories in the Ukrainian media: Diversity of
identities, political confrontation, and production technologies.” Memory, Conflict and New
Media: Web Wars in Post-Socialist States. Eds. Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor and Vera Zvereva. Lon-
don: Routledge, , –.
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alence of urban readers, who are easier to reach for distributors and more attrac-
tive to advertisers. Moreover, while both languages are largely understood
throughout the country, Ukrainian-speakers are more ready to consume media
products in the familiar Russian than Russian-speakers are to accept Ukrainian,
which most of them had no need to use in Soviet times. Nevertheless, the avail-
ability of outlets in both Ukrainian and Russian allow the overwhelming major-
ity of westerners and easterners to read in their respective languages of
preference.⁸
While the newspaper market as a whole is characterized by considerable
ideological pluralism, each individual outlet often embodies a rather narrow
range of ideological propositions. It is only elite (quality) newspapers that en-
gage with different views of the issues under discussion, including those pertain-
ing to history, and these are presented in overtly ideological genres such as opin-
ion articles and letters to the editor. At the same time, elite newspapers also
represent historical matters in less expressly ideological genres such as historical
calendars, personal memoirs and news reports on anniversaries and commemo-
rative dates. In tabloids, which are dominant on the newspaper market, such un-
contested representations and seemingly non-ideological genres clearly prevail.
Disguised as ideologically neutral descriptions of events or individual lives, tab-
loid texts embody one of the competing historical (meta)narratives⁹, as their
choice of topics and interpretative frames more or less consistently imbue Ukrai-
nian history with particular content and salience vis-à-vis the histories of other
nations and non-national collectivities. Since apparent neutrality is easier to
achieve in texts implicitly embodying assumptions that the audience perceives
as common sense rather than those challenging such assumptions, tabloids usu-
ally adhere to the dominant historical narrative, which in the case of Ukraine
means the narrative continuing, albeit with some modifications, the Soviet inter-
pretation of the past.¹⁰
On television, in contrast, the production is much more expensive and the
delivery is virtually instantaneous, which makes it preferable for commercial
broadcasters to buy domestic and foreign products that can be expected to at-
 Volodymyr Kulyk. “Language policy in the Ukrainian media: authorities, consumers and pro-
ducers.” Europe-Asia Studies . (): –.
 A metanarrative is a “global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains
knowledge and experience”. See John Stephen and Robyn McCallum. Retelling Stories, Framing
Culture: Traditional Stories and Metanarratives in Children’s Literature. New York: Garland ,
. Usually such schemata are simply called narratives, e.g. narratives of Ukrainian history, and it
is to this prevalent use of the term that I will adhere.
 Kulyk. “The media, history and identity,” –.
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tract a broad audience. As in many countries across the globe, television is the
most popular medium in Ukraine, meaning that television audiences are inclu-
sive both socially and geographically, and thus also linguistically and ideologi-
cally. The most popular channels broadcast nationwide and, therefore, must pro-
vide content acceptable for people in all parts of the country, although they are
particularly interested in urban residents, who are more attractive to advertisers.
Linguistically, this means a combination of Ukrainian and Russian on each
channel, a practice that has been used since Soviet times, first with the heavy
dominance of Russian and then with an increasing share of Ukrainian as re-
quired by post-Soviet legislation. The greater readiness of the audience to
watch in Russian and the higher economic effectiveness of such products,
which can be consumed without translation in many post-Soviet countries, en-
courage most channels to fill the prime time with Russian-language films and
series, while scheduling the Ukrainian-language products in less popular time-
slots. Moreover, both Russian and Ukrainian producers tailor their films, serials,
and game and reality shows primarily for Russian audiences, since Ukrainian
viewers are fewer and supposedly less demanding. These products are usually
shown on Ukrainian channels in Russian, while most Western products are
translated into Ukrainian, a practice both reflecting and shaping viewer prefer-
ences. Most channels limit their own production to news, talk shows and occa-
sional documentaries, while filling the lion’s share of the air time with films and
series purchased from Russian, Ukrainian or Western producers.¹¹
While Western movies, documentaries and other products influence the Uk-
rainian viewers’ memory and identity by turning their imagination and empathy
to foreign places and people, Russian and Russian-oriented Ukrainian products
can also affect the viewers’ beliefs regarding their own country. They portray
events in Russia or, less frequently, Ukraine or other parts of the former USSR,
which are almost completely cleansed of any linguistic, ethnocultural and ideo-
logical features other than Russian and, at the same time, presented as common
to the whole post-Soviet space (thus, in effect, equating this space with Russia).
As far as historical memory is concerned, most movies and series deal with the
Soviet or Russian imperial past, which is portrayed as a time of East Slavic com-
monality. These products thus covertly present the Ukrainian identity as compat-
ible with or even subordinate to the Russian one.¹² In contrast, those domestical-
ly-tailored products that embody a clearly non-Russian Ukrainian identity
 Volodymyr Kulyk. Dyskurs ukraїns’kykh medii: identychnosti, ideolohiї, vladni stosunky. Kyiv:
Krytyka, , –; Kulyk. “Language policy in the Ukrainian media,” –.
 Kulyk. Dyskurs ukraїns’kykh medii, –.
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usually do so much more conspicuously, which largely results from genre con-
ventions, as in political talk shows where memory-related issues are discussed
if they happen to have caused political controversies. Even in the less obviously
ideological genre of news, stories on historical matters usually draw clear con-
nections between past and present, which makes underlying ideological propo-
sitions more visible and increases the likelihood that the audiences perceive as
partisan the embodied versions of memory and identity. Moreover, the cumula-
tive share of these more visibly ideological products in the daily broadcasting of
most Ukrainian channels is much smaller than that of the seemingly neutral
products, and the average rating is considerably lower.¹³
The Internet combines very low production cost and very fast delivery of
products which cannot be hindered by state borders or effectively controlled
by the authorities. Moreover, the unprecedented ease of access to the production
and transmission of verbal and audiovisual texts radically democratizes the
mediated communication. The broadcast-era “mass-produced, mass-disseminat-
ed content mass-consumed by a large audience” is supplemented and increas-
ingly replaced by “peer-to-peer, horizontal, personal communications”¹⁴ be-
tween millions of people, often separated by thousands of miles, political
borders and socioeconomic gaps,which results in a high level of ideological, cul-
tural and linguistic pluralism. At the same time, the online communication per-
petuates, and in some cases exacerbates, inequalities within and between coun-
tries. On the one hand, better-off and technologically savvy people are more
likely to get access to the Web and use it more actively, which means that profes-
sionals, urbanites and the youth are often overrepresented among the producers
of Internet content.¹⁵ On the other hand, while the participation in online com-
munication has extended to the most distant parts of the world, the production
of truly popular and influential texts is still largely concentrated in the few coun-
tries with high technological capacity, vast financial resources and populations
possessing good skills in transnational languages. Accordingly, it is the ideolog-
ical perspectives favoured by the producers in these countries that prevail in
global communication. Although the spread of the Internet increases the online
use of dozens of languages, English remains the main means of transnational
 Ibid, –.
 William Merrin. “Understanding me-dia: The second reformation.” Media Studies .. http://
mediastudiespoint.blogspot.com. Personal blog.  March  ( December ).
 For evidence from Ukraine, see “KMIS: Chyslo internet-korystuvachiv v Ukraїni zroslo do
%.” Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraїna,  December . http://news.dt.ua/TECHNOLOGIES/kmi-
s_chislo_internet-koristuvachiv_v_ukrayini_zroslo_do_–.html ( December ).
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communication, which affects the users’ language proficiencies and, eventually,
preferences even in purportedly “domestic” interaction. However, in the former
colonial/imperial peripheries, their metropolitan languages successfully com-
pete on the Web both with English, which remains much less known, and
with local languages, which cannot boast adequate production in many genres,
all the more so because many active users are not sufficiently proficient in or at-
tached to these languages.¹⁶
In Ukraine, both internal and external disparities contribute to the predom-
inance of the Russian language: that is, given the much larger scope of the Rus-
sian compared to the Ukrainian segment of the Web, Ukrainian users are often
tempted to read and post in Russian, which thereby exacerbates the linguistic
disparity within Ukraine’s online community due to the overrepresentation of ur-
banites and well-to-do strata. Since Russian sites appear more prominently in
the results of Internet searches, even those made in Ukrainian, Ukrainians
tend to use Russian resources for various purposes, except for those having to
do with exclusively domestic affairs. Moreover, ostensibly Ukrainian sites heavily
republish texts from Russian ones, thus further blurring the line between the two
segments. Even in the Ukrainian segment, most sites operate in Russian or in
both languages (some use three, adding English, while many others offer it in-
stead of Ukrainian). Purely Ukrainian-language resources are limited to few por-
tals, blogs and specialized sites.¹⁷ Accordingly, a 2012 survey revealed that re-
spondents read Internet material exclusively or predominantly in Russian four
times as often as they read exclusively or predominantly in Ukrainian, a much
greater disparity than for newspapers and television.¹⁸
Discourse on historical memory is one important manifestation of the Ukrai-
nian Internet’s peculiar combination of diversified production and truncated
post-imperial transnationality, or rather continued reproduction of imperial
quasi-nationhood. In contrast to the “old” media, Ukrainian online outlets
have been relatively free from state control and are thus able to pursue topics
 David Chrystal. Language and the Internet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ;
The Multilingual Internet: Language, Culture, and Communication Online. Eds. Brenda Danet
and Susan C. Herring. New York: Oxford University Press, , ch. –.
 Lesia Chornopys’ka. “‘Zruchna’ mova ukraїns’kykh internet-ZMI.” Slovo Prosvity, – Sep-
tember . http://slovoprosvity.com.ua/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= (
July ); V. B. “Shcho take ’ukraїnomovnyi Internet’?” Ukraїns’kyi Prostir,  June .
http://ukr-net.info////scho-take-ukrajinomovnyj-internet ( August ).
 The nationwide representative survey (N=) was conducted in February  by the Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology. It was made possible by a grant awarded to me by the Shev-
chenko Society in America (from the Natalia Danylchenko Endowment Fund).
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of their choice. Moreover, because of the low production cost, online media, in
principle, can afford not to care much about advertisements and ratings which,
in turn, makes it possible for many outlets to focus on political and cultural is-
sues and employ analytical formats that are marginalized in more commercial
media. These factors make the Internet a particularly suitable medium for ex-
pressing the preoccupation with memory and other aspects of identity, all the
more so because interactive communication encourages discussion of various
perspectives on the topic under consideration. Not only do many online news
media pay close attention to matters of history and memory, but numerous ar-
chival or discussion-oriented websites also deal primarily with these matters.
Perhaps the most prominent online media contributor to the production of Uk-
rainian historical memory is the website called Istorychna Pravda (a subsidiary
of one of Ukraine’s leading Internet publications, Ukraїns’ka Pravda), which fea-
tures original and republished texts on various aspects of Ukrainian and other
countries’ history.¹⁹ The editors consciously assume the role of public historians,
which manifests itself in their presentation of the outlet as “a site of scholarly
and journalistic discussions of the politics of history and memory” as well as
a “source of news” on relevant topics and “storage of artefacts.”²⁰ Most partici-
pants in memory-related discussions on this and many other Ukrainian websites
seem to be residents of Ukraine or Ukrainian migrants abroad, but some posters
declare or otherwise reveal their identity as foreigners, in most cases Russians.
Although the use of Ukrainian in many original publications and responses
thereto impedes the participation of people with inadequate knowledge of the
language, many Russians understand enough Ukrainian to express their opin-
ions and/or care too much about the topic under discussion to refrain from
doing so.²¹
Soon after blogs and social networks became popular in Ukraine, they came
to be used for, among other purposes, discussions on history and the politics of
memory, which also mainly engage Ukrainians and Russians. Many blogs pre-
sented as outlets of organizations and localities limit their history pages to ref-
erence-based information, which is usually taken from encyclopaedias or other
normative publications. Local history and tourist blogs, while seeking to give
the audience interesting information on particular localities, buildings or per-
 Istorychna Pravda. http://www.istpravda.com.ua.
 Vakhtanh Kipiani and Pavlo Solod’ko. “Pro proekt.” Istorychna Pravda, (), http://
www.istpravda.com.ua/about ( December ).
 In occasional discussions of the matter in various Internet outlets, many users with inade-
quate knowledge of Ukrainian report using Google Translate, similarly to what they do to
read texts in other foreign languages.
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sonalities, likewise tend to adhere to the dominant narrative of the past. Even a
collective blog that focuses on little-known events and unusual interpretations
and thus claims to present an “alternative history” , while sometimes mentioning
sympathetically the Ukrainian struggle for independence, otherwise implicitly
denies its legitimacy by portraying the Russian imperial past as common to all
East-Slavic peoples.²² However, some blogs unequivocally undermine the estab-
lished post-Soviet narrative, either in occasional comments reflecting on current
events or, as in a collective blog, Ukraїns’ka istoriia, by purposefully disseminat-
ing “correct” interpretations of various episodes of the past, first and foremost
those that the Soviet regime allegedly silenced or falsified.²³
Much more popular than topical websites or blogs, however, are social net-
works, the interaction in which is one of the most important uses of the Internet
in Ukraine (reported by 46% of all users in 2011), second only to emailing (51%)
and surpassing even information searching (38%), let alone communication in
forums, chats and blogs (14%). In contrast to most parts of the world, in the
post-Soviet space Russian-based networks intended as a local response to Face-
book (FB) quite successfully compete with the global giant. The largest of these
networks, VKontakte (VK), is the most popular network and one of the most pop-
ular Web resources in Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries, particu-
larly among young people.²⁴ As of late 2011, this network encompassed 67%
of Ukraine’s Internet users, compared to 43% for Facebook and 6% for the
most popular of the blog platforms, Livejournal.While VK is particularly popular
with the youth (95% of Internet users between 16 and 25 years reported having
registered), the use of FB is rather evenly distributed among all age groups.²⁵
The two most popular social networks, VKontakte and Facebook, contribute
to the production of collective memory in several main ways. To begin with, the
participants’ personal pages may contain texts, pictures or links to other Web re-
sources. Some quasi-personal pages are established in the name of prominent
historical personalities or organizations. In addition, there are topical pages fea-
turing particular historical events or commemorative initiatives. But perhaps the
 Al’ternativnaia Istoriia. http://alternathistory.org.ua.
 Ukraїns’ka istoriia. http://history-ua.livejournal.com.
 Facebook. http://www.facebook.com; VKontakte. http://vk.com.
 “Issledovanie: samymi populiarnymi sredi ukraintsev sotssetiami iavliaiutsia Vkontakte i
Odnoklassniki.” Korrespondent,  November . http://korrespondent.net/business/mme-
dia_and_adv/-issledovanie-samymi-populyarnymi-sredi-ukraincev-socsetyami-yav-
lyayutsya-vkontakte-i-odnoklassniki ( November ); “VKontakte”, “Odnoklassniki” ta
Facebook lidyruiut’ sered sotsial’nykh merezh v Ukraїni, (). http://www.gfk.ua/public_rela-
tions/press/press_articles//index.ua.html ( December ).
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most important of the memory-related practices are participation in topical
groups or communities which facilitate a rather equal exchange of information
and opinions (even though the group administrators often have the power to
“ban” those participants seen as violating the rules). A group can be started
by any user with an opinion, a question, a link or another means of suggesting
a topic for discussion, thereby provoking responses in the form of answers to the
question, comments on the opinion, or links to publications more or less loosely
related to the suggested topic. In VK, the interaction can also be continued by
suggesting a new “topic” within the same group, which often results in dozens
or even hundreds of separate exchanges with little interaction among them.
Some administrators limit the membership in their groups to prevent abuse by
ideologically hostile or simply irresponsible people, but most groups remain
open to all users of the network and, therefore, to all views on the issues
under discussion. Given the predominantly Russian-speaking profile of the Uk-
rainian users and the predominant practice of conducting transnational interac-
tion in a commonly understood language, most discussions take place in Russi-
an, particularly in VK. However, many original or later posters use Ukrainian,
either presupposing primarily domestic, communicative partners or refusing to
accommodate foreign ones, particularly those with opposing views. Among
the millions of groups on VK, thousands focus on issues of history and historical
memory in Ukraine, with group memberships ranging from dozens of thousands
to the initiator alone and the number of posts in specific discussions ranging
from thousands to a single entry. Particularly popular are the groups focusing
on controversial episodes of history and contemporary commemorative initia-
tives, the latter contributing to the discussion and contestation of the former.²⁶
Discourse on twentieth-century Ukrainian history
on Facebook and VKontakte
Of all the differences between the historical memories of different groups in the
Ukrainian population, the most dissimilar and divisive are the perceptions re-
garding twentieth-century developments. Although the evaluations of the Russi-
an-dominated entities of the more distant past also vary considerably across re-
gional, ethnolinguistic and ideological groups, it is the interaction between
 Cf. Vera Zvereva. “Historical events and the social network ‘V Kontakte’.” East European
Memory Studies  (). http://www.memoryatwar.org/enewsletter-nov-.pdf ( March
).
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public representations and personal or family memories that makes the attitudes
toward the Soviet rule particularly hard to change and, therefore, to reconcile. In
fact, rather than seeing such reconciliation as imperative for national unity, Uk-
raine’s political elites have often exploited the differences for their own electoral
purposes. This was particularly the case after the Orange Revolution, when the
confrontation between two main political groupings manifested itself, among
other things, in a stronger emphasis on their respective versions of the national
past presented as important elements of the identities of their core
constituencies.²⁷ As many media outlets not only provided a discursive arena
for confrontation but also supported the position of their political patrons, pub-
lic discourse was characterized by the competition of the two contrasting views
of the Ukrainian past, which also implied very different choices for the present.
The competition of memory discourses within Ukraine was also exacerbated by
representations of history emanating from Russian politicians and media who
believed they had a stake in the debate about the identity of the neighbouring
population, and did not lack channels to make their opinion heard, all the
more so because of the above-mentioned heavy presence of Russian media prod-
ucts in Ukraine.²⁸
These two versions, or (meta)narratives, of Ukrainian history differ first and
foremost in their interpretations of certain periods of interaction between Uk-
raine and Russia. One of these narratives I call East Slavic or Soviet, the former
name referring to an emphasis on East Slavic commonality and the latter to the
embodiment in the Soviet official discourse, from which this narrative was
adopted by its post-Soviet adherents. This narrative continues the Soviet view
of a common history uniting the East Slavic peoples and treats the Russian Em-
pire and the USSR as voluntary unions of Russians and Ukrainians. In contrast,
the nationalist or anti-Soviet narrative sees Ukraine’s incorporation in Russian-
dominated entities as imperial subjugation established and sustained largely
by force. The two narratives contest in particular the interpretation of two sym-
bolically important phenomena of the twentieth century. While the nationalist
narrative considers the Great Famine of 1932– 1933 (Holodomor) genocide against
 Andrei Portnov. Uprazhneniia s istoriei po-ukrainski. Moscow: OGI, Polit.ru, Memorial, ,
–; Tatiana Zhurzhenko. “‘Capital of despair’: Holodomor Memory and Political Conflicts
in Kharkiv after the Orange Revolution.” East European Politics and Societies . (): –
; Volodymyr Kulyk. “Natsionalistychne proty radians’koho: istorychna pam’iat’ u nezalezhnii
Ukraїni.” historians.in.ua,  September . http://historians.in.ua/index.php/istoriya-i-pa-
myat-vazhki-pitannya/-volodymyr-kulyk-natsionalistychne-proty-radianskoho-istorychna-
pamiat-u-nezalezhnii-ukraini ( December ).
 Kulyk. Dyskurs ukraїns’kykh medii, –.
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Ukrainians, its competitor views it as a tragedy of all Soviet peoples and a crime
of the Stalinist regime rather than of Russian imperialism.²⁹ Even more contrast-
ing are the views of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraїns’ka Povstans’ka Ar-
miia, UPA), the nationalist military organization of the 1940s and the early
1950s, which appears as a force struggling for national independence in the
anti-Soviet narrative and as a collaborator with the Nazi occupiers in the East
Slavic one.³⁰ It is the East Slavic version of the Soviet past in general and of
these two controversial phenomena in particular that have been clearly favoured
in Russia since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, which has been reflected
in Russian political and media discourse constantly spilling over into Ukraine.³¹
While the views of Russian elites are explicitly or implicitly presented in all
kinds of media, ordinary Russians can reach their Ukrainian counterparts pri-
marily through social networks, which are also the main site of ideological dis-
cussions within each country. Given the huge differences of views, both within
Ukraine and across the Ukrainian-Russian border, it is little wonder that the dis-
cussion of memory-related matters often becomes tense or outright hostile, par-
ticularly with regard to symbolically charged phenomena such as the Holodomor
and the UPA. Discussion is often intentionally provoked by the use of opinion-
eliciting genres such as surveys and quizzes, by an offensive style or an overly
radical position. Moreover, many participants enter the interaction not only for
the sake of seriously discussing the topic at hand but also, or even primarily,
for expressing their ethnocultural identity or simply having fun. Such diverse
uses and abuses are facilitated by the generally liberal politics of “befriending”
other network users (eager to have many online friends, people often send
friendship requests to – and accept them from – complete strangers who have
little in common with themselves) and by easy access to topical groups (most
such groups are open, and administrators rarely ban anyone for misbehaviour).
The confrontation and hostility seem to be more characteristic of VK,where ideo-
logical discussions tend to involve larger numbers of people who, moreover,
often remain anonymous and are thus less constrained by the perceived
norms of interpersonal interaction. This manifests itself, in particular, in the
 Mykola Riabchuk. “Holodomor: The Politics of Memory and Political Infighting in Contem-
porary Ukraine.” Harriman Review . (): –; Portnov. Uprazhneniia s istoriei po-ukrain-
ski, –.
 Mykola Riabchuk. “Kul’tura pamiati i politika zabveniia.” Otechestvennye zapiski .
(): –; Wilfried Jilge. “Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf: Die Umwertung des
Zweiten Weltkriegs in der Ukraine.” Osteuropa . (): –.
 See e.g. Boris Dubin. “Pamiat’, voina, pamiat’ o voine. Konstruirovanie proshlogo v sotsial’-
noi pamiati poslednikh desiatiletii.” Otechestvennye zapiski  (): –.
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widespread phenomenon of “trolling” i.e. intentionally frustrating the interac-
tion in groups or on personal pages perceived as hostile. While a nuisance to
those participants primarily interested in substantive discussion, trolling is
often tolerated as contributing to more lively interaction and fun. In addition
to trolling opposing groups,VK users frequently complain to the network admin-
istration about those groups’ allegedly inappropriate functioning (including the
fomenting of ethnic hatred), which sometimes leads to their being blocked, par-
ticularly if complaints become numerous.
One way to assess the level of contestation of memory and identity in a
group or on a page is by comparing the frequencies of two prevalent responses
to its (memory-related) posts over a considerable period of time (long enough to
level post-to-post variation). In contrast to likes, which signal the reception of
and general agreement with a statement made in the post, comments can be
both supportive and critical. Moreover, even support is often expressed in com-
ments with either a qualification or elaboration, thereby more or less modifying
the original proposition. Therefore, the comments to likes ratio can be seen as a
rough estimate of the degree of contestation in particular online arenas or with
regard to particular kinds of statements (by topic, genre, author, etc.). Table 1
presents the ratios for assorted groups and pages in the two networks (FB and
VK) that feature posts having to do with twentieth-century Ukrainian history
and collective memory. In addition to three groups, all related to the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army, and a quasi-personal page established in the name of the UPA
and its core political grouping, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),
the table includes a personal page by a prominent Ukrainian journalist Vakhtang
Kipiani who has, among his other roles, been the editor of the Istorychna Pravda
website (in the last case, I only analyze those posts having to do with history or
memory). To give the reader some idea of what these groups and pages are like, I
also indicate the number of members for the groups and the number of friends or
subscribers for the pages (as of 1 May 2012), the number of posts in the month of
April 2012 (for which the likes and comments were counted), and the share of
posts having to do exclusively or partially with Ukraine. Notwithstanding the
great variation within each network, it is clear that contestation is much stronger
in VK groups, where participants comment on posts they have read at least as
frequently as they express their liking thereof. In contrast, the two collective en-
tities on FB, while differing greatly in the scope of participation and posting,
have equally low levels of commenting, which demonstrates the primarily ritual-
istic nature of most people’s association with them as members or subscribers.
At the same time, Kipiani’s public prominence and posting inventiveness ensure
significant readership of and rather active response to his posts, although more
often with likes than comments.
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Table 1. Contestation of memory in assorted memory-related groups and pages on Facebook and
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Turning to qualitative analysis of particular discursive practices, I would like to
begin with a characteristic example of a confrontation which does not leave any
chance for a compromise between staunch supporters of the opposing narra-
tives. Such confrontations often result in one party quitting the discussion, usu-
ally with a newcomer to the group leaving the terrain that turned out to be do-
minated by the “enemy.” The example comes from a group that defines itself as
being “Against the OUN-UPA and other Nazi collaborators” and, accordingly, is
dominated by supporters of the East Slavic narrative. In early April 2012, a rou-
tine reference to a Ukrainian nationalist publication intended to evoke the group
participants’ indignation was met, among expected responses, by a voice of
strong condemnation of the prevalent view, thus provoking a heated exchange
 Included are the following: Facebook page under the name of OUN-UPA. http://www.face-
book.com/profile.php?id=&fref=ts; Facebook group “Novyny pro OUN-
UPA” [News on OUN-UPA], http://www.facebook.com/groups//?fref=ts;
Facebook page by Vakhtang Kipiani. http://www.facebook.com/vakhtang.kipiani?fref=ts; VKon-
takte group “OUN-UPA, Stepan Bandera ta Novitni Natsionalisty” [OUN-UPA, Stepan Bandera
and Modern Nationalists], http://vk.com/novitninatsionalisty; VKontakte group “Protiv OUN-
UPA i prochikh posobnivov fashizma” [Against OUN-UPA and other Fascist collaborators],
http://vk.com/club. Posts were counted in early May  and some of them have
since been removed, particularly on FB. The names and addresses of the pages and groups
are listed as at the time of my last accessing them for this writing ( December ).
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between supporters of that view and the dissident. The latter soon left the group
in protest, accompanied by another participant who only took the floor to an-
nounce his departure. While most of the defenders of the East Slavic narrative
did little more than strongly condemn the dissenter and thereby assert their
own identity and legitimacy, one discussant referred to unspecified documents
that would supposedly back his view of the UPA combatants as Nazi collabora-
tors, a reference obviously intended to lend more authority to his claim to truth.
Most of the participants used the language primarily associated with the narra-
tive they stood for, namely Russian, but one of them resorted to Ukrainian, per-
haps in order to make his words more persuasive to his Ukrainian-speaking op-
ponent. At the same time, one of those protesting against the dominant position
started his departure announcement in Russian but then switched to Ukrainian,
which he must have viewed as more appropriate for such a statement.Whatever
the language, most posters make explicit or implicit claims to true Ukrainian
identity (in this case, none reported coming from another country) and, by the
same token, deny the legitimacy of such claims by their opponents. One discus-
sant countered the perception of the UPA combatants (also called Banderites,
after the name of a OUN leader, Stepan Bandera) as Ukrainian heroes by refer-
ring not just to their allegedly criminal deeds but more specifically to their
crimes against fellow Ukrainians. The following is a shortened version of the ex-
change (in Russian and Ukrainian, Ukrainian-language parts italicized):
OP: … School children in Lviv painted Easter eggs in the Nazi colours [this is the title of a
publication followed by a link thereto]
PKh: Schoolchildren are not to blame. They have been taught to do so by Nazi remnants.
YaA: Yeah. But in about ten years they will grow up and become the most active part of
society.
PKh: Will they live that long? It is dangerous to be a Nazi.
SB: If one does not like Ukraine and the UPA, then there are two options: either this person
is mad or an enemy. These people contradict themselves, live in Ukraine, communicate
in Russian, ridicule its [Ukraine’s] language and history. Think who you are. Who has
imposed [on you] this way of thinking and living?
PKh: Why are you, a bunch of freaks, sticking your UPA to our Ukraine? For us Ukrainians
they were and remain Nazi. Just like you are Nazi for us, a bunch of defective heroi-
zators of the criminal Banderite gang. And besides, it is funny when a bunch of
freaks is calling the country to think)))) …
DZ: If a person views as heroes those people who carried out their antihuman ideas, this
person is a moral freak.
OI: If you do not like Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet troops which liberated almost entire
Europe, then you can separate from Ukraine and make your heroes anybody including
Hitler!!!!!!
SB: The Soviet regime, by safely concealing everything, made it impossible for those who
lived not in the west to learn the true history. I was deceived too when I was studying,
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and although I am from central Ukraine I did not lack brains to learn history first-hand
from a UPA soldier.
PKh: Don’t mind the Soviet [regime]… German, American, Polish documents and even
confessions of the UPA bastards themselves, did the Soviet regime made them impos-
sible too? One who is not up in the clouds but studies everything thoroughly, knows
history!… in contrast to your bunch of brainless idiots. A soldier? Since when has a
Nazi slut become a soldier???? Did they have any fights or win any great battles? A
terrorist cannot be a soldier. This is stupid. There are many mummers too. You better
read documents rather than listening to gossiping grannies.
AK: I am leaving the group, good bye!
PKh: Well, good bye… It is even strange you did not bark ‘Glory to Ukraine!’³³ It means you
are still having doubts… My advice to you is to read documents and to think for your-
self without listening to anybody. There is no one else in this [Ukrainian] state to help
you with this. Think for yourself. …
PKh: The lost generation of the five Orange years manifests itself. I pity them.
SB: I pity that part of people who are affected by the ‘Russian ideology’. A Ukrainian is one
who loves Ukraine and its language, one who respects its history. And one who vilifies
the history of people who fought for independent Ukraine is an enemy and a traitor, in
other words, a khokhol [derogatory word for a Ukrainian]. Good bye. …
DZ: for the likes of [SB] the words ‘independent Ukraine’ has already become an exhor-
tation; one can do whatever one wishes, kill, rob, rape and once you are doing all
these vile things with the words ‘Glory to Ukraine’ you have an absolution!! Do
they have any squeamishness to prevent them from receiving and being proud of
how these ‘heroes’ fought for independent Ukraine?? I do not want anything that
was obtained in such a criminal way. By the way, it would be worth knowing that
those fighters for Ukraine killed with equal ease similar fighters for Ukraine who
just happened to be in rival organizations and that was sufficient [crime to be
killed].³⁴
Sometimes, however, adherents of the same narrative may disagree with a mem-
ory proposition made in a certain post. Right after the above-quoted exchange
with Ukrainian nationalists, the anti-OUN-UPA group was thrown into a debate
about the final episodes of World War II as represented in a recent Russian-Ger-
man coproduced movie called 4 Days in May. The movie makers’ portrayal of an
 This traditional greeting of the OUN-UPA is a ritual expression used by their followers to de-
clare their identity and, in conflicting situations, to antagonize ideological opponents, which is
why it is often employed for trolling. Since the Euromaidan protests of –, this greeting
was embraced by large masses of supporters of Ukraine’s independence and redefined as per-
taining to all heroes fighting for it in the past and present. See Volodymyr Kulyk. “Ukrainian na-
tionalism since the outbreak of Euromaidan.” Ab Imperio  (): .
 VKontakte group “Protiv OUN-UPA i prochikh posobnivov fashizma.” Posts dated  and 
April  ( December ). Here and in the following quoted exchange, names are abbre-
viated.
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attempted rape of a German girl by a Soviet officer in May 1945, even though pre-
sented as an isolated event rather than a widespread case (which such rapes ar-
guably were in those days) was perceived by defenders of the iconic view of the
Red Army as a distortion of historical truth, a slander. But not all group members
shared this view: one participant called for accepting this black spot on the gen-
erally bright image of the army and, by extension, the state it fought for. In this
case, the defenders of the established Soviet narrative aimed their indignation
not at Ukrainian nationalists but at Russian “liberasts”, a label made by combin-
ing the words “liberal” and “pederast” and thereby presenting liberalism as in-
separable from or even identical to (the support for) homosexuality, in other
words, as a perversion. For staunch supporters of the established East Slavic nar-
rative, any critic thereof, either Ukrainian or Russian, was a “stinker.” In con-
trast, moderate supporters of East Slavic commonality were not only ready to
recognize some Soviet sins but also believed that it was such recognition that
set them apart from their Ukrainian nationalist opponents, whom they viewed
as flatly rejecting any critique of the anti-Soviet position. In the passage quoted
below, the adherence to the same narrative and the same identity is reflected in
the use of the same language, Russian, except for the word “Ukrainophobes”,
which is rendered in the original language to mark it as a term of the Ukrainian
nationalist discourse:
AG: Once again, lousy liberasts vilify our grandparents… [included is a link to the mov-
ie’s trailer]
PKh: There are a lot of stinkers in Russia, too.
SS: Why stinkers? There were no rapists and bandits in the Red Army or what?
PKh: No there weren’t. Rapists and bandits were tried by a [military] tribunal and after
that they were no longer Red Army soldiers.
PKh: They [the movie’s makers] just took out an old tale of raped German women and
begin to harp on it. What else can one say about them? Stinkers, nothing else.
SS: It is not a tale but a fact. You are making saints out of the Red Army. There were
among them rapists, marauders and robbers. One must look at both sides. Otherwise,
you are no different than the Ukrainian nationalists. They too, if one has a different
view than theirs, start howling stinkers, Ukrainophobes. …³⁵
Surveys occasionally initiated in VK groups are interesting not only as triggers of
discussion that highlights nuances of opinions but also as an indication of the
degree of disagreement about a given issue among group members. While
most respondents give answers in tune with the prevalent mood in the group,
the share of opposing answers can be seen as a rough estimate of the strength
 Ibid. Posts dated  April  ( December ).
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of (any) dissent, at least when the general number of responses is fairly large.
Another, somewhat discordant estimate is the ratio of comments to votes, similar
to the comments to likes ratio discussed above. In particularly controversial
cases, more participants express their opinions, not only by choosing one of
the suggested answers but also by elaborating on their choice in comments,
which often trigger responses from others. Some surveys also encourage com-
ments by inviting the respondents to specify some options or add their own.
For example, the same anti-OUN-UPA group quoted above featured the fol-
lowing question in April 2012: “Still, what do you believe the UPA did for Ukraine
(Little Rus’)?” The author implicitly guided the respondents toward the East Slav-
ic view by using two names for Ukraine, with the second one derived from the
imperial Russian tradition, which was thereby presented as perfectly legitimate.
At the same time, the list of options included not only two negative evaluations
but also four various positive answers and one that allowed the respondents to
suggest their own version of the UPA’s “merits.” Although the unequivocal deni-
al of any merit (“They did nothing good, they were losers, traitors and enemies”)
turned out to be the most popular, with 30% out of nearly 10,000 responses, this
combined with the other critical view (“When they failed [to achieve their goals],
they hid, robbed and killed in order to survive”, 13%) did not get the support of a
majority of those who chose to respond. Considerable portions thereof opted for
positive evaluations such as “They liberated [their] land from the enemies”
(14%), “They have other merits (to be specified in comments)” (11%) and
“They created a new state” (7%). Rather surprisingly, the disagreement did
not in this case lead to a long debate, as demonstrated by a rather low number
of comments on the matter (70). With just one exception, the dissident respond-
ents refused to elaborate on their opinions, so the supporters of the prevalent
negative view were left to debate among themselves, not so much on the UPA
as on the Soviet regime against which the nationalist movement had fought.³⁶
In contrast, a survey on the attitude toward the former USSR in a group of
OUN-UPA supporters and “modern nationalists” provoked a long stream of com-
ments (290) traded over a period of eight months, despite a much lower number
of respondents (119) and a prevalent support for the negative attitude (63%).
Only 9% declared the outright positive attitude, 12% defined their position as
combining “the positive and the negative” and further 16% opted for the view
of the bygone state as “just the past.” While some comments were limited to un-
equivocal condemnations, others reflected on both negative and positive aspects
 Ibid. Post dated  April  and responses dated  to  April  ( December
).
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of the Soviet rule, with nuances of the positions being discussed no less actively
than radical differences.³⁷ These examples suggest that while the ratio of com-
ments to votes indicates the degree of any disagreement among the group mem-
bers, the distribution of responses shows how radically their views differ, that is,
whether the disagreement primarily takes place between or within distinct nar-
ratives.
However, the production of collective memory in social networks is by no
means limited to overt debates among adherents of the opposing historical nar-
ratives or even between different versions of the same narrative. Many posts in
history-related groups, let alone on personal pages of network users, contribute
to this production by history-related statements that remain almost or completely
unopposed. This pertains in particular to commemorative statements such as
those reminding one’s readers (other group members or friends/subscribers hav-
ing access to one’s personal page) about an anniversary of a certain event or a
certain person’s birth or death. Although in the case of most controversial figures
critical comments may question the legitimacy of (any) commemoration thereof,
in many other cases commemorative acts are met with few if any comments, a
reaction which can be seen as a sign of tacit support or indifference, with a
large number of likes increasing the likelihood of the former interpretation.
For example, the group of OUN-UPA supporters responded lukewarmly to a num-
ber of posts by one participant commemorating prominent figures of the Ukrai-
nian nationalist narrative. Even a post about the anniversary of the assassination
of Yevhen Konovalets, the founding leader of the OUN, was met with only four
likes and not a single comment.³⁸ Although he was killed by a Soviet agent
(which the post did not mention), Konovalets was not nearly as prominent or
controversial a figure as Bandera, who led the organization at a later stage
and became a symbol of its fight against the Soviet regime. This makes the for-
mer figure less known, less interesting and less strongly felt about than the lat-
ter, which helps explain the otherwise surprising silence following this affirma-
tion of the Ukrainian nationalist narrative. Much more enthusiastic was the anti-
OUN-UPA group’s response to a commemorative post about an anniversary of the
1944 Soviet “liberation” of Odesa from the German troops, featuring a picture of
the main war memorial in the city highlighted with the candle-formed words
“Motherland remembers” and a red flag of the former USSR which indicated
 VKontakte group “OUN-UPA, Stepan Bandera ta Novitni Natsionalisty.” Topic “Shcho dlia
vas oznachae SSSR?” Posts dated  May  to  January  ( December ).
 Ibid. Post dated  May  ( December ).
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what motherland they referred to.³⁹ There were no comments but as many as 71
likes and 13 shares (reproduction of the post on readers’ own pages, another pos-
sible response to posts in both networks), which shows that the act of commem-
oration was supported by the bulk of the group and thus can be considered quite
successful. Although such commemorations primarily engage people who al-
ready lean to the historical narrative featuring the event or person in question,
the unopposed reaffirmation of the high value of this episode reproduces not
only the narrative itself but also an identity it ascribes to contemporaries through
their posited relation with the past.
It is such unopposed reaffirmation that prevails on Facebook, where groups
and personal pages are more likely than in VK to be sites of the respectful ex-
change of opinions and emotions between like-minded people. Even on much-
visited pages such as that of Vakhtang Kipiani, there appear few voices radically
disagreeing with posts pertaining to history and memory. When Kipiani harshly
criticized in August 2012 the Ukrainian communist leader Petro Symonenko’s
suggestion to hold a referendum on the state symbols since those currently in
use were allegedly discredited due to having been employed by Ukrainian na-
tionalists collaborating with the Nazis, the poster’s attitude was shared by an
overwhelming majority of those who expressed their opinions in comments.
Out of 94 comments, only one voiced a clearly dissenting opinion on the matter.
Even more indicative of the prevalent support were 588 likes and 87 shares.⁴⁰
The only cases of heated debate on Kipiani’s history-related posts in 2012 were
those triggered by his approving reference to a text on Istorychna Pravda that
raised the issue of ethnic Ukrainians’ involvement in anti-Jewish pogroms in
western Ukraine under the Nazi occupation and by his opinion on the inap-
propriateness of using a traditional Ukrainian word for Jews, zhydy, which
many Jews view as derogatory and anti-Semitic, all the more so because of its
use by the Nazi occupiers and their Ukrainian collaborators. These challenges
to the Ukrainian nationalist narrative were vehemently opposed by many of Ki-
piani’s nationalist-minded friends, although some supported his call for the re-
appraisal of certain factually or ethically problematic tenets of the narrative. The
relative frequency of different responses confirms that the level of disagreement
was much higher than with regard to the state symbols: for the post on the Uk-
rainian participation in the pogroms, there were as many as 237 debating com-
ments, many more than tacitly supportive likes (70) or shares (40).⁴¹ In other
 VKontakte group “Protiv OUN-UPA i prochikh posobnivov fashizma.” Post dated  April
 ( December ).
 Facebook page by Vakhtang Kipiani. Post dated  August  ( December ).
 Ibid. Posts dated  December and  November  ( December ).
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cases, most of his friends seemed to be in agreement on the issues of history and
memory.
That people supporting Ukraine’s Western orientation and distinctly non-
Russian national identity seem to prevail in most FB discussions is partly be-
cause their ideology and identity have influenced their choice of social network
in the first place. Rather than debating the past and its implications for the pres-
ent with fellow post-Soviets, many Facebook users (myself included) tend to dis-
cuss memory-related and various other issues within the global/Western context,
with people in Ukraine and across the globe who are linked by personal ac-
quaintance, professional or leisure interest and/or ideological affinity and
often rely on English for transnational communication.⁴² Although nationalist
agendas sometimes clash with the Western-dominated cosmopolitan perspec-
tive, the interaction between more or less liberal nationalists from various coun-
tries is generally less contentious than that between adherents of the opposing
versions of Ukrainian identity. However, the prevalence of the nationalist/West-
ern version on Facebook can only be ascertained among those users who engage
in the production of a clearly Ukrainian identity, albeit in interaction with other
civic, cultural and social ones. At the same time, many Ukrainians having an FB
account (often in addition to one in VK) may contribute to the reproduction of
the East Slavic transnational commonality and thus remain largely invisible to
research focused on the discussions of distinctly Ukrainian history and memory.
Conclusion
In the words of Erll and Rigney: “Fighting about memory is one way of keeping it
alive and […] the history of cultural memory is marked as much by crises and
controversies running along social fault lines as it is by consensus and canon-
building.”⁴³ The above analysis has shown that in contemporary Ukraine, the
 A good example of such a cosmopolitan memory-oriented community on Facebook is the
Memory at War forum (http://www.facebook.com/groups/memoryatwar), a group founded by
the eponymous research project at the University of Cambridge which focuses on the politics
of memory in Russia, Poland and Ukraine. As of early , the group comprised about
 scholars, journalists and other interested people from a number of Western and post-com-
munist countries, including several dozen Ukrainians. The main language of interaction is Eng-
lish, although many posts refer to texts in various languages of the post-communist region and
beyond.
 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney. “Introduction: Cultural memory and its dynamics.” Mediation,
Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory. Eds. Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney. Berlin:
De Gruyter, , .
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memory of Soviet rule and anti-Soviet resistance is very much alive and anything
but consensual. The controversy along the regional and ethnolinguistic lines
within Ukraine is exacerbated by a Ukrainian-Russian trans-border gap in the
perceptions of the formerly common state. While both intra- and international
differences are sustained to some extent by purposeful efforts of the political
and cultural elites, it is primarily through the social networks that ordinary Uk-
rainians and Russians perform and assert their memories and identities to peers
in other parts of their own country and across the border. Easily transcending the
newly drawn border, but largely contained within the established linguistic
realm, the interaction in the social networks and other new media contributes
to the preservation of the post-imperial framework of collective memory and
the frustration of the effort to replace it with the national one. At least this
was true before the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 instigated
unequivocal loyalty to Ukraine and alienation from Russia, which resulted in se-
vering of many trans-border lines of discursive interaction and a more pro-
nounced orientation toward dealing with “ones’ own people.”⁴⁴ While many
people opposed this preservation of post-Soviet ties, their opposition was articu-
lated in the very transnational space they sought to compartmentalize. Much of
the memory discourse on the Internet was a fierce confrontation between the two
irreconcilable narratives, a “memory war” impeding the development of a coher-
ent view of the past that would facilitate national unity in the present. Although
confrontation between opposing views is to be found in the social network inter-
action across the globe, in a deeply divided post-imperial society such as Uk-
raine, it challenges the very foundation of national identity, which has not yet
been secured by political and cultural institutions. At the same time, many net-
work participants engage in more constructive debate over particular aspects of
collective memory within the confines of a shared narrative. Last but not least,
many people participate in various inconspicuous practices of the reproduction
of a certain version of memory and identity, often without being aware of the
process to which they contribute.
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Football and Memories of Croatian Fascism
on Facebook
On 19 November 2013, when Croatia’s national football team defeated Iceland
and thus secured Croatia’s participation in the World Championship 2014 in Bra-
zil, Croatian defender Josip Šimunić celebrated by leading a chant associated
with the fascist Ustasha regime that governed Croatia and Bosnia during the Sec-
ond World War. As a result, Šimunić was fined by Zagreb’s county court for in-
citing racist hatred, and the International Football Association, FIFA, banned
him from participating in 10 international matches including the World Cham-
pionship. By late November 2013, a Facebook page set up in defence of
Šimunić had received 150,000 likes and many lengthy comments. Moreover,
the page promoted an online petition, which soon gathered more than 30,000
signatures, aimed to convince FIFA that Šimunić had been misunderstood.
Both the Facebook page and the petition and its comments were evidence of a
deep engagement in negotiating the meaning of Šimunić’s chant, and in ques-
tioning its connection to fascism. Attempts were made to rethink Croatia’s fascist
past and to reframe history to emphasize Croatia’s victimization through the
crimes of others.
This chapter investigates the types of memory transmission and negotiation
taking place on the Facebook page supporting Šimunić and on the petition web-
page. The Šimunić affair is an example of a pop-cultural event actualizing mem-
ory through a highly charged symbol, the chant, and of social media distributing
it quickly and widely, engaging an unusually large and varied group of memory
actors, who were then able to contribute, comment and retransmit the posts on
the Facebook page and beyond. Yet, as the chapter seeks to explore, perhaps
these engagements are rather short-lived and superficial. Indeed, social media
allows for fast and unbounded sharing of memory mediation, and they invite in-
teractivity and reactions in the forms of likes, comments and signatures. But this
type of participation also raises questions: What happens to the content and the
memory narrative in these highly fluid and interactive types of memory media-
tion? And what can we learn from these digital forms of interacting and such
minimal participatory acts as clicking the ‘like’ button?
Šimunić and the ‘Za dom spremni’ chant
In a highly unusual act to celebrate the victory of the Croatian national football
team over Iceland and the much-wanted ticket to the World Championship 2014
in Brazil, Croatian defender Josip Šimunić grabbed a microphone and conducted
the remaining spectators in a chant. Four times Šimunić yelled ‘In battle’ (u boj)
to which the audience answered ‘For your people’ (za narod svoj), and after-
wards the player shouted four times, ‘For the home(land)’ (Za dom), to which
the audience replied ‘Ready’ (Spremni).¹ While both phrases are obviously na-
tionalistic appeals, ‘Za dom spremni’ is especially problematic because of its
close association with the fascist Ustasha regime that governed Croatia and Bos-
nia during the Second World War. The Ustasha and their leader, Ante Pavelić, are
known for their extreme violence, their assistance to Nazi extermination policies
and their death camps and genocidal campaigns against Serbs, Jews, Roma and
regime opponents in general, policies which caused the deaths of several hun-
dred thousand civilians in Croatia and Bosnia.² ‘Za dom spremni’ was the official
greeting of the Ustasha regime and its armed forces.
Šimunić’s celebration was quickly and widely condemned. Croatia’s Minister
of Education and Sports, Željko Jovanović, wrote on his own Facebook page “Oh
my Šimunić, you need a history lesson. If you wish, I will personally help you to
find a good professor and to understand what kind of yell ‘Za dom spremni’ is”.
Jovanović then officially notified the heads of the Croatian Football Association
and the Croatian Olympic Committee, calling on them to react.³ International
media also reacted to Šimunić’s celebration, referring to it as involving a “pro-
Nazi chant”.⁴ To Šimunić himself, however, the Ustasha connotations of his cel-
ebration were unproblematic. After the match, he allegedly defended his act,
stating that “I have always wanted to do that. Who is going to punish me? I
 See for example this video clip and article: Graeme Yorke. “Croatia’s Josip Simunic slapped
with  game ban and will miss the World cup because of Nazi chanting.” Mail Online 
December . http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/worldcup/article-/Croatias-
Josip-Simunic-slapped--game-ban-miss-World-Cup-Nazi-chanting.html ( August ).
 See eg. Jozo Tomasevich. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, –. Occupation and col-
laboration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, .
 Ivica Kristović. “Jovanović: E moj Šimuniću, tebi treba lekcija iz povijesti.” Večernji list  No-
vember . http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/jovanovic-e-moj-simunicu-tebi-treba-lekcija-iz-
povijesti- ( August ).
 Anon. “Croatia’s Josip Simunic defends ‘pro-Nazi’ World Cup celebration chant.” The Guard-
ian  November . http://www.theguardian.com/football//nov//croatia-josip-si
munic-defends-apparent-pro-nazi-chant ( August ).
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have done nothing wrong. I support Croatia, my home, and if that bothers any-
one that is his problem”.⁵ As a result of the chant, Šimunić was taken to trial and
fined by the Croatian state a few days after the Iceland match. In mid-December
2013 the International Football Association, FIFA, insisted that ‘Za dom spremni’
is a wartime salute of the fascist Ustashe movement and thus against the asso-
ciation’s disciplinary codex. FIFA therefore banned Šimunić from participating in
10 international matches, which included the matches at the World Champion-
ship, thus practically ending the Croatian defender’s international career.⁶
Šimunić protested, but his appeal was turned down in May 2014 by the Court
of Arbitration of Sports in Lausanne, which upheld the original judgement.
Šimunić, however, insisted on a different meaning of his celebration chant.
Commenting on the final verdict in Lausanne, Šimunić stated that “to me, home
(“dom”) is a symbol of love and fatherland, of community”, and that “the greet-
ing “Za dom” I experience as patriotic and I said it exclusively for that reason … I
am a man who loves his fatherland and I think you judge me unfairly”.⁷ In an
exclusive interview with the journal Hrvatski tjednik, Šimunić again expressed
his love for his homeland and insisted that he would not have behaved different-
ly had he known of the consequences. About the chant, he said: “Someone has
written that no one in the whole world has a greeting so valuable, beautiful and
inspiring to dignity, no one has an informatively richer, patriotically and family-
wise more attractive greeting than the one we Croats have: Za dom- spremni! It
isn’t clear to me why some think that we should renounce this one. Unfortunate-
ly, some people deliberately misinterpret this old Croatian patriotic greeting.”⁸
Thus, to Šimunić, the Ustasha connotations of ‘Za dom spremni’ were apparently
irrelevant in comparison with what he saw as the chant’s patriotic meaning.
There are several aspects of this disagreement between Šimunić and his critiques
from the football organizations and on the part of official Croatia. On the surface
the question seems to be whether ‘Za dom spremni’ is in fact an Ustasha symbol.
But below this, and, somehow more disturbingly, lie the questions of whether
 Kristović. “Jovanović: E moj Šimuniću.”
 Bojan Arežina. “DORH Šimuniću izrelao maksimalno novčanu kaznu.” Večernji list  Novem-
ber . http://www.vecernji.hr/crna-kronika/drzavno-odvjetnistvo-simunicu-izreklo-maksi
malnu-novcanu-kaznu- ( August ); Hrvoje Delač. “Šimuniću  utakmica suspen-
zije zbog ustaškog pozdrava!” Večernji list  December . http://www.vecernji.hr/nogomet/
simunicu-velika-kazna-dobio-deset-utakmica-suspenzije- ( August ).
 Hina. “Šimonić: Pozdrav s’Za dom spremni’ je patriotski; Sud u Lausannei: ‘Ne, to je ratni
poklič ustaša”, Jutarnji list,  May . http://www.jutarnji.hr/simunic-pozdrav-za-dom-do
zivljavam-kao-patriotski-cas-ne-to-je-bez-sumnje-ustaski-uzvik-// ( August ).
 Vjekoslav Magaš. “Eksklusivni intervju.” Hrvatski tjednik  June , .
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the chant’s Ustasha connection is at all problematic, and whether Croatia’s Us-
tasha history should in fact be condemned. These issues, as well as the role and
character of Šimunić as a person and football player, were also at stake in the
debates in electronic and other media following Šimunić’s chant and the result-
ing penalty.
Šimunić’s own attitude to the chant ‘Za dom spremni’ and its history and
connotations are strongly influenced by his personal background. Josip
Šimunić was born in Australia in 1978 to Croatian parents who had emigrated
from Hercegovina. Šimunić played as a central defender for the Melbourne
Knights before moving to German football in 2001 and in 2011 on to Dinamo Za-
greb, where he was captain in 2013. Until the Iceland match, Šimunić had also
been an experienced key player on the Croatian national team with a record
of 103 matches.⁹ According to sports sociologist John Hughson, Šimunić and
his actions should be understood within the context of his experience from Aus-
tralian football in the 1990s, where extremist fans of Croatian immigrant clubs
such as Sidney Croatia were highly nationalistic and subscribed to a certain ver-
sion of Croatianness, with a view on Croatian history based mainly on oral tra-
ditions, which the fans often took over from fathers or uncles.¹⁰ In this version of
Croatian history, an idea of a “Croatian struggle” featured prominently. The ex-
tremist fans saw Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Ustasha, as a historical hero
and “freedom fighter”, and they paid lip service to fascism, paraded Nazi and
Ustasha symbols or chanted about violence and atrocities. Hughson sees these
practices as acts of defiance by a marginalized Croatian community, which
used football terraces as stages for unhindered expression of ethnic identity.¹¹
Thus, the Croatian-Australian football sub-culture, where Josip Šimunić had
learned the rules of the game, was influenced by a passionate, long-distance na-
tionalism, which was inevitably accentuated by the war in Croatia and the fight
for an independent state in the 1990s.
 See the description on the webpages of Dinamo Zagreb, http://gnkdinamo.hr/hr/-momcad/
igraci/obrana/josip-simunic/ ( April ) and FIFA’s webpage, “Josip Šimunić.” http://
www.uefa.com/worldcup/season=/teams/player=/profile/ ( April ).
 In  the club was renamed Sydney United, during the Australian Soccer Federation’s
campaign in the early s to de-ethnicize Australian football culture. See John Hughson.
“Football, folk dancing and fascism: diversity and difference in Multicultural Australia.” Journal
of Sociology  (): –; and also the webpage of the club, “About Sidney United 
fc.” http://www.sydneyunitedfc.com/history/sydney-united--fc/ ( April ).
 Hughson, “Football, folk dancing and fascism”, see also Centre for South East European
Studies, Graz, Interview with John Hughson (University of Central Lancashire). “Josip Šimunić
and his Australian context”. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFvavWNUzDs ( August ).
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Yet, Šimunić spent most of his adult years in European football and was by
2013 an experienced player in both the European and the Croatian football are-
nas. He must have had some ideas about what the effects would be of leading
this particular chant at Zagreb’s main stadium after a significant victory. Indeed,
as several commentators have pointed out, the really problematic matter is not
that Šimunić as an individual expressed an ignorant and worrisome personal
take on Croatia’s darkest history, but rather that a large part of the crowd re-
sponded enthusiastically to his chant, apparently sharing his point of view.¹²
As suggested by Dario Brentin, the message sent at the stadium in Zagreb
seems to say something much more sinister about views on Croatia’s darkest
past and about right-wing historical revisionism and flirting with fascist history
in Croatian sports culture and in Croatian society more generally.¹³
Josip Šimunić is certainly not the first to have an ambiguous relationship to
Ustasha memory in Croatia. In the 1990s, the Croatian state’s history politics
questioned the Yugoslav communist version of Croatian history, which had thor-
oughly condemned the Ustasha regime. Though the Ustasha was never officially
rehabilitated, the Croatian government in the 1990s followed a somewhat ambig-
uous line, never properly condemning the Ustasha as such, while allowing the
renaming of streets in honor of high-ranking members of the Ustasha. President
Franjo Tudjman, himself a historian and the author of several revisionist publi-
cations aimed at lowering the estimation of the number of the victims of the Us-
tasha, promoted reconciliation between the left and the right (that is the Commu-
nists and their opponents, including the Ustasha) in Croatian politics.¹⁴
Moreover, the government accepted the Croatian political far right’s open flirting
with Ustasha symbols and values.¹⁵ But after the change of regime in Croatia in
early 2000, followed by a wave of liberalization of Croatia’s political system,
 See e.g. Florian Bieber. “Ready for the Homeland? Simunic and a bit of normal fascism.”
Balkan Insight,  November . http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/ready-for-the-home-
land-simunic-and-a-bit-of-normal-fascism ( October ).
 See also Dario Brentin. “Fascist Groundhog day? The issue with ‘Za dom spremni’ in Croatian
football.” Balkan Insight,  April . http://balkanist.net/fascist-groundhog-day-issue-za-
dom-spremni-croatian-football/ ( May ).
 Tea Sindbæk. Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s difficult past, –.
Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, , –.
 Vjeran Pavlakovic. “Flirting with Fascism: The Ustaša legacy and Croatian politics in the
s.” The Shared History. The Second World War and National Question in Yugoslavia. Novi
Sad: Centar za Istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje, , –.
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steps were taken to curb the use of Ustasha symbols, both in the public sphere
and among youth groups, for example at rock concerts.¹⁶
Yet, football fan groups have remained difficult to control, given their noto-
riously defiant attitude and consciously provocative use of symbols. And as the
enthusiastic response to Šimunić’s chant on 19 November 2013 in Zagreb
showed, a significant group of the football audience had a sufficiently positive
or playful attitude to this symbolism to be willing to sing along. However, as
the chant and the case against Šimunić became widely known through both Cro-
atian and international media coverage, a much larger audience reacted on the
Internet through social media. In this electronic public forum, Šimunić gathered
ample support and various other reactions, which in the end constituted a com-
plex and open negotiation of the historical symbol of ‘Za dom spremni’ and its
connected memory narratives.
Šimunić on facebook
Šimunić’s chanting brought to worldwide attention the question of a specific his-
torical symbol, ‘Za dom spremni’, and the related memory of the Ustasha. This
occurred initially on one of the biggest stages of international popular culture,
the football World Cup, and subsequently also in political discourse, as Croatian
ministers and other public figures reacted to the incident. Šimunić thus very ef-
ficiently actualized a rather problematic part of Croatia’s collective memory. To
which extent, then, did the use of Facebook and the online petition pages influ-
ence the presence and negotiation of this memory?
Šimunić’s chant and the public condemnation of it certainly caused a great
many reactions on the Internet. Several Facebook pages were set up to gather
support for Šimunić. The most popular one, ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ (Potpora
Josipu Šimuniću), was created on 20 November 2013 and received within the
same day 50,000 expressions of support in the form of a click on the button
‘like’. Three days later, on the 23 of November, the page had received 150,000
‘likes’ and many lengthy comments. Moreover, the page promoted an online pe-
tition, which by late November 2013 was signed by more than 30,000, with the
aim to convince FIFA that Šimunić had been misunderstood.¹⁷ Both the Facebook
 On Croatian politics, see for example Sabrina P. Ramet, “Politics in Croatia since .” Cro-
atia since independence. War, politics, society, foreign relations. Ed. Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad
Clewing and Reneo Lukić. Munich: R. Oldenbrug Verlag, , –.
 See the petition webpage on: http://www.change.org/p/fifa-support-for-josip-%C%Aimu
ni%C% ( August ).
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page and the petition and its comments revealed a deep commitment to negoti-
ating the meaning of Šimunić’s chant, questioning its connection to fascism and
to tying the chant to pure patriotism. After the final verdict against Šimunić in
Lausanne, the Facebook page ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ remained active, but
gradually transformed into a fan page for Šimunić. By August 2014 the explosive
growth in support and reactions had definitely stopped; the page had by then
received 160,776 likes, that is, an increase of a little more than 10.000 since 23
November 2013. Even though the page remained active and still discussed foot-
ball, fandom and the meaning of nationalist chants, the amount of attention it
received was on a different and much less significant scale.
Through the Facebook page and the petition, as well as other media sites,
such as electronic newspapers and Youtube, Šimunić’s actualization of the Us-
tasha memory thus had a significant electronic afterlife. This afterlife of wide-
spread electronic reactions is indeed a new possibility opened up by Internet
and social media.
The difference in the situation caused by social media may be illustrated by
comparing the digital reactions in the Šimunić case with a somewhat similar in-
cident that took place 9 years earlier. In November 2004 Milan Gurović, a basket-
ball player for the Partizan club in Belgrade and a star of the Serbian national
team, was banned from playing a game in Croatia, because he refused to
cover a tattoo on his left shoulder showing the face of the Serbian Chetnik leader
Draža Mihailović. The Croatian Ministry of the Interior denied Gurović’s entry
into the country, since the tattoo was seen as violating a Croatian law prohibiting
the display of symbols that may inspire hatred or violence on the basis of racial,
religious or ethnic affiliation. During the Second World War, Chetnik militias col-
laborated with the Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia and committed war crimes and
large scale massacres of Muslims, Croats and other groups of civilians in Croatia,
Bosnia and Serbia. Moreover, Serbian paramilitary groups adopted Chetnik sym-
bols and language during the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s. In Croatia, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and other formerly Yugoslav states, Draža Mihailović is there-
fore regarded as a war criminal, and Chetnik symbolism is highly offensive. To
Gurović, however, Mihailović was the opposite of a Fascist and a war criminal.
The incident featured prominently in Serbian media. For days, Gurović’s portrait
covered the front and back pages of Serbian tabloids, while journalists and edi-
torials expressed offense and disbelief at the Croatian stance. Moreover, Serbian
ministers felt compelled to comment on what they saw as unnecessary problem-
making and an undemocratic decision directed against “individual iconogra-
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phy”.¹⁸ Thus, as in the Šimunić case, a sports hero actualized a controversial and
potentially highly offensive historical symbol, creating a significant media reac-
tion and a debate that reached a wide public and the highest political level. Yet,
little was said after November 2004, and no Facebook movement or online peti-
tion was created in support of Gurović. Clearly, digital and social media have
opened new possibilities for transmitting and recycling news, as well as for en-
abling significantly different forms of participation in debates or media events.
A main aspect of various types of social media on the Internet is the ena-
bling of various forms of audience participation. The level of participation may
vary significantly. According to media sociologist Simon Lindgren, Internet
users may treat an Internet service such as YouTube as an expanded version
of television, or they may engage in small communities sharing a certain enthu-
siasm, contributing viewpoints and knowledge. A study from 2008 showed that
while some users are mainly consumers and others primarily produce, the larg-
est group consists of users who are both consumers and producers, thus consti-
tuting an active participatory audience.¹⁹ Internet and social media also function
as sources of information and as news channels where major events are broad-
cast. Reactions on social media are quick, but unlike the coverage of sensational
events in traditional media, online discussion fora may remain active for years,
discussing the events in question and relating them to other events.²⁰ Online fora
can thus create an active electronic archive of events and debates, thus ensuring
an electronic afterlife to media events. Moreover, by commenting and sharing,
Internet users create forms of community. Internet services such as YouTube,
while facilitating large technical networks, also serve as spaces for developing
networks of enthusiasts or various types of electronic communities and interest
groups. The Facebook page in support of Šimunić created an electronic interest
group, which, through the ongoing debate about the ‘Za dom spremni’ chant,
also became a forum for memory negotiation, or, perhaps, a very loosely con-
nected memory community.
 Tea Sindbæk. “The Fall and Rise of a National Hero: Interpretations of Draža Mikailović and
the Chetniks in Yugoslavia and Serbia since .” Journal of Contemporary European Studies
. (): –.
 Simon Lindgren. “Collective problemsolving and informal learning in networked publics.
Reading vlogging networks on YouTube as knowledge communities.” Interactive Media Use
and Youth: Learning, Knowledge Exchange and Behavior. Ed. E. Dunkels, G. Frånberg & C. Hällg-
ren. Hershey: IGI Global, , –.
 Simon Lindgren. “Youtube gunmen? Mapping participatory media discourse on school
shooting videos”. Media, Culture and Society . (): –.
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Facebook, which hosts the support page for Josip Šimunić, was specifically
designed as a social networking site enabling self-representation and global con-
nection with friends and colleagues. Moreover, as the Šimunić page exemplifies,
it also connects and helps to create interest groups. The discussions on the Face-
book page link to other Internet services, but also to older types of media. It is
thus part of a much wider media landscape that is heavily drawn upon and
linked to. As Lindgren points out, social media enable ‘many to many’
communication.²¹ In the case of a Facebook page, this may take the form of
the owner of the page making entries, which then receive likes, comments, or
even chains of comments. An essential feature of Internet communication is
that users can decide to be anonymous, or, if they want, identify themselves,
or, indeed, invent a completely new identity for the purpose of online activities.
Another characteristic of online interaction is the lack of control and reprisal,
which may explain the widespread and unconstrained use of abusive and racist
language in some fields and fora.
The characteristics of Internet communication influence the ways in which
history and memory may be represented and debated online. Memory debates
can be fast, unbounded, anonymous and unregulated.²² According to Ellen Rut-
ten and Vera Zvereva this has significant implications: while the Internet offers
many new possibilities of memory communication and negotiation, it also caus-
es a semantic shift in the basic concept of memory. Users, they argue, are not pri-
marily preoccupied with recollections but rather with basic concepts such as
group solidarity, emotions and belonging.²³ Indeed, memory has always been
about identity creations in the present, but in the case of memory debates on
the Internet this becomes even more apparent – and more dominant. This was
certainly the case with the Šimunić discussions on Facebook.
 Simon Lindgren. “The Sociology of Media and Information technologies”. Introduction to So-
ciology: Scandinavian Sensibilities. Ed. G.C. Aakvaag, M. Hviid Jacobsen & T. Johansson. London:
Pearson, , –.
 Andrew Hoskins. “/ and connective memory: international trajectories of remembering in
post-scarcity culture”. Memory Studies . (): –.
 Ellen Rutten & Vera Zvereva. “Introduction. Old conflicts, new media: post-socialist digital
memories.” Memory, Conflict and New Media. Web Wars in Post-socialist States. Ed. Ellen Rutten,
Julie Fedor & Vera Zvereva. London: Routledge, , , .
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Facebook memory narratives
The character of material and texts – or the content – on digital social media is
different from that in printed media, and so is the relationship of the media users
towards the content. According to media scholar José van Dijck, “user-generated
content is considered unfinished, recyclable input”.²⁴ This makes authorship un-
clear, and it also makes texts and narratives less linear, more fragmented and
sometimes even collagelike in their compilation of different bits of content. In-
evitably, this influenced the types of debates and memory narratives created
and distributed on Facebook in connection to Šimunić and ‘Za dom spremni’.
The Facebook page ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ was established on 20 No-
vember 2013, the day after Croatia’s victory over Iceland and Šimunić’s infamous
chant.²⁵ The very first entry was a link to a YouTube clip on which former Pres-
ident of the Croatian football association Vlatko Marković states on TV that the
greeting ‘Za dom spremni’ is “completely normal” and not necessarily connected
to the Ustasha movement. The clip was several years old. Marković, who was
known for controversial statements against gay rights, had retired from his
post in 2012 and had died in September 2013.²⁶ The entry received 1,038 likes
and 64 comments. The vast majority of the comments were supportive of Markov-
ić’s statement and of Šimunić. Most users expressed this through a simple ‘bravo’
or ‘Za dom spremni’. Yet, the entry also received a number of more lengthy com-
ments. A handful of comments reacted to the official critic of Šimunić from the
Minister of Education and Sports, by suggesting in abusive and sexualized lan-
guage what to do with Minister Jovanović, and also with Serbs in general.
A few comments were explicitly political, suggesting that the minister must
go or that Šimunić must have the right to free speech. A couple of comments
were explicitly supportive of the Ustasha and Ante Pavelić, and some even cele-
brated Ustasha atrocities. A handful of comments specifically related to public
understandings of history, suggesting that journalists and politicians have no
understanding of history, if they considered Šimunić’s chant offensive; and
one asked why the Ustasha are always treated as the bad guys, while the Serbian
 José van Dijck. The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media. New York: Oxford
University Press, , –.
 https://www.facebook.com/josip.simunic.officialfanpage?fref=ts ( August ).
 See e.g. the UEFA webpage, “Croatia mourns Vlatko Marković.”  September . http://
www.uefa.com/memberassociations/association=cro/news/newsid=.html ( April
) and Anon. “Croatia football chief Vlatko Markovic hit by gay group’s backlash.” Guardian,
 November . http://www.theguardian.com/football//nov//gay-backlash-croatia-
football-chief ( April ).
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Chetniks are not. Finally two comments were critical of Šimunić and the original
entry, pointing out that the Ustasha were indeed evil. In general, the chain of
comments expressed extremely fragmented and rather diverse points of views
that did not really relate to one another. The vast majority of participation
took the form of a click on Facebook’s ‘like’ button.
The second entry, also made on 20 November, was simply a picture of
Šimunić during his chant. It received 342 ‘likes’ and 9 comments of the same
type as to the first entry. Apparently the Facebook page was now well established
and started to attract attention. The third entry, a statement from the authors of
the page explaining its purpose, received 9,228 likes and 1,028 comments. This
entry certainly represents a contribution to the debate about the meaning of
‘Za dom spremni’ and the memory of Croatia’s Ustasha past. The authors (the
text makes it clear that there is more than one) state that the page was set up
to back Šimunić because of his chanting and the attacks from media and politi-
cians: “On this page we do not wish to politicize nor to glorify anyone… We only
wish to show the real truth of the greeting ‘Za dom spremni’”, the authors claim,
suggesting a somehow naïve and one-sided view on the question of historical
symbols. The authors rather lengthily argue that expressions almost similar to
‘Za dom spremni’ were used on Croatian battlefields and in literature in the six-
teenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the authors claim, the Us-
tasha salute was slightly different, and it was only in the communist period that
the link between the Ustasha movement and ‘Za dom spremni’ was created, thus
making the salute synonymous with a Croatian version of ‘Heil Hitler’. The entry
thus seeks to discredit the official and mainstream historians’ view by describing
it as based on communist – and Serbian dominated – propaganda. Finally, ac-
cording to the authors of this entry, ‘Za dom spremni’ was widely used by Cro-
atian forces during the war in 1991– 1995, and the expression is now a popular
salute among Croatian football fans. Clearly, the main strategy of the authors’
statement is to distance ‘Za dom spremni’ from Croatia’s Ustasha past and tie
it to other parts of Croatian history, thus turning it into an ‘innocent’ and purely
patriotic greeting. At the same time, the entry suggests that this is the current
popular meaning of the chant in Croatia. How did Facebook users react to
these strategies?
With more than 9,000 likes and more than 1,000 comments, this second
entry certainly called forth quite a reaction. Indeed, the chain of comments to
this particular entry constitutes a text of more than 200,000 words. Yet, the char-
acter of the comments seems quite as fragmented as in the case of the first entry.
They span from the occasional call to “hang the Serbs” to plain praise of Šimunić
or simply stating ‘Za dom spremni’, sometimes even abbreviated as “ZDS”; and
they span from critique of Minister Jovanović to critique of the page itself. Never-
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theless, the vast response also allows for some examination of which types of
comments were most likely to create reactions, at least in the form of ‘likes’.
By far the most popular reaction to the second entry was a plain picture of
Šimunić with the statement “Za Dom”, which was ‘liked’ by 1,327 people. Anoth-
er popular response stated: “It is shameful that the Minister of Education seeks a
history teacher for our Šimunić, but when at Marakana the Croatian flag was
burned, he accidentally didn’t notice”, thus suggesting that the minister is
busy hunting down his own player, while ignoring assaults on Croatian national
symbols in the famous Belgrade stadium. This comment created its own sub-
chain of 9 comments, primarily suggesting in various ways that the Minister of
Education rather than Šimunić needed a history teacher. Most of these entries
received a handful of ‘likes’, while no one ‘liked’ a comment abusing the minis-
ter in highly sexualized, homophobic and anti-Serbian terms. Thus, the com-
ments in this sub-chain manifestly questioned the minister’s right to intervene,
but even more fundamentally, they questioned the official interpretation of the
salute ‘Za dom spremni’ and thus implicitly the official position on Ustasha his-
tory.
Many comments framed the debate within an idea of a Serbian-Croatian con-
flict. In this context, it also served to delegitimize Jovanović, emphasizing his al-
Fig. 1: The Facebook page “In Support of Josip Šimunić” on 28 November 2013, proudly boasting
of its more than 150,000 supporters
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leged Serbianness. The question of Jovanović’s proposed pro-Serbian or anti-Cro-
atian leaning was also linked to the government’s politics regarding the rights of
the Serb minority in Slavonia and around Vukovar to write place signs in their
own language and alphabet, which was severely criticized and condemned.
While the dominant tone in the many comments was one of supporting what
was presented as Šimunić’s patriotism, the discussions about Šimunić and the
nature of his chant also morphed to include general debates on the nature of pa-
triotism, Croatian history, relations to Serbs, the unpatriotic line of the govern-
ment and the economic crisis in the country. And next to it all were the recurring
pro-Ustasha statements, but also the almost as regularly repeated comment criti-
cizing the ignorance and cruelty of other comments.
At this point, the communication spread quickly. Indeed, the vast majority of
comments to the authors’ statement were left on 20, 21 or 22 November. More-
over, the life span of the commenting activity was apparently quite limited;
the most recent comment in the above-mentioned chain was left on 28 of Novem-
ber 2013. Interaction between commenters was usually rather limited.While the
first 50 comments did cause some reaction, at least in the form of ‘likes’, the re-
maining 978 hardly ever received more than one or two likes,which seems to sug-
gest that they were rarely attracting particular attention and probably rarely
read. Rather than an ongoing debate, this appears to be a long series of personal
statements, somewhat like tagging one’s name on an important wall, leaving a
stone on top of a pile marking a mountain track, or perhaps just identifying one-
self as belonging to a group. Indeed, basic expressions of in-group solidarity and
group belonging seem to be the main point of most of these comments.
Nevertheless, the negotiating of Croatian and Ustasha history on the Face-
book page was constant and took many forms. One very frequent practice was
to contest the official interpretation and invest ‘Za dom spremni’ with different
meanings. A quote from Šimunić himself in an entry on 20 November stated
that: “Those who are bothered by the shout ‘Za dom spremni’, let them learn
some history. Any FARE [the international organization Football Against Racism
in Europe], whichever accusation, penalty, I have nothing to be ashamed of.”
This entry proudly contested the views of the Croatian Minister of Education
and Sport and the international football world, suggesting that they were the
ones who got history wrong. The same defiance was expressed by the authors
of the Facebook page. An entry on 20 November called out: “Thank you everyone
for the support for our Šimunić! JOSIP HANG ON! WE ARE WITH YOU! Za dom :
SPREMNI ”. The eerie positioning of this particular expression next to the sym-
bol of a heart boldly challenged the usual association of the greeting with Usta-
sha fanaticism and cruelty. Moreover, in a number of entries, starting on 23 No-
vember, the authors of the Facebook page systematically referred to “the old-
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Croatian cry ‘Za dom spremni’”, thus again seeking to connect the Ustasha greet-
ing to different associations.
Moreover, the authors of the page as well as numerous comments repeatedly
argued that Croatian history was characterized by Croats being victims of others,
mainly communists and Serbs, and often the posts and comments did not distin-
guish between these two parties. The accounts of communist and Yugoslav/Ser-
bian crimes were often connected to descriptions of anti-Croatian chants by Ser-
bian football fans and abuse of Croatian symbols in Serbian football stadiums.
Rather than justifying the Ustasha or Šimunić, this rhetoric seems to suggest that
others were much worse and used more offensive symbols, so why should Jova-
nović and the Croatian government criticize and persecute Šimunić. Inevitably
this led to relativization of Šimunić’s chant, but also of the crimes and violence
of the Ustasha movement as such. The authors of the Facebook page supporting
Fig. 2: A post from 20 November 2013 proudly announces that the Facebook page has suc-
ceeded in attracting attention from the media and calls to support for Šimunić. By situating a
heart next to the Ustasha greeting, the post apparently seeks to associate that greeting with
love rather than violence and cruelty.
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Šimunić were involved in a difficult balancing act when they tried to justify Ši-
munić’s use of the chant as pure patriotism while simultaneously rethinking Cro-
atian history from a victim perspective, tying the Ustasha symbol of ‘Za dom
spremni’ to a distant past, and comparing it to ‘worse’ crimes committed by
Serbs, Communists and Chetniks. Often they came close to justifying Ustasha
crimes by foregrounding the crimes of others.
While the relativization of historical crimes and the attempts to distance ‘Za
dom spremni’ from the Ustasha movement were quite popular, especially if they
criticized Minister Jovanović (one such post received 11,652 ‘likes’ and 507 com-
ments), the absolutely most popular posts seem to be the ones that simply sup-
ported Šimunić himself. One entry on 22 November quoted a press release from
the Croatian Football Association which stated that Šimunić was shocked that
anyone would connect him with “the darkest period in Croatian history”. The
entry then suggested that one ‘like’ equaled one ‘support’ for Šimunić, thereby
gaining 17,674 likes.
Rather than coherent texts, the content on the Facebook page in support of
Šimunić constituted chaotic compilations of material. While some posts and en-
tries transmitted memory narratives and symbols, others added new aspects,
sometimes completely changing the direction of the communication, and very
many simply signaled support or, much less frequently, disapproval. Among
the interesting trends on the Facebook page is the use of other media. The au-
thors of the page as well as the commenters often inserted clips or links in
the entries, in order to underline, substantiate or illustrate a point, or just to im-
press and entertain. Sometimes this was done without any explanation, leaving
the reader to establish a meaningful link between posts on the Facebook page
and the clips and sequences from other media. Especially clips, links and pic-
tures that include the personal appearance of Josip Šimunić were usually very
popular and seemed to need no context. The Facebook page thus interacted
with other sources and served as a nucleus in the debate. This practice certainly
expanded the scope of what went on, but it also contributed to the fluid and frag-
mented character of the communication and commenting on the page.
Another feature characterizing this Facebook debate is the systematic and
very frequent recycling of pieces of text. The long entry by the authors explaining
the aims of the page was regularly copied and reused in other posts, both by the
authors and by commenters. Sometimes bits were cut out and others inserted,
but long sequences of the text, if not all of it, are literally word-for-word identical
to the original entry, sometimes with a new short introduction or a brief invita-
tion to “read the truth”. On the one hand, this seems to suggest a presumption
that this ‘truth’ will be more convincing by being frequently repeated. On the
other, it may also reflect the assumption that the original entry will be very
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quickly gone from the eye of the public, and that it therefore needs to be refresh-
ed and kept present. Also, it reveals an interesting view on text and authorship:
apparently the moment this entry was posted, it also became public and shared
property, free for anyone to adopt and repost in their own name with no speci-
fication of ownership or original source. It seems an underlying premise that if
one shares the views expressed by another, one also has ownership of the text.
And substantiation of any kind of the claims and arguments made in the text is
seemingly quite unnecessary. Yet, users and contributors may add different types
of substantiation, for example a link to a news service or a clip with a person
publicly making similar claims. Parts of the audience thus contribute to a collec-
tive creation of a kind of community knowledge with its own community-internal
rules of validation.
Yet, the participation and contribution from Facebook users also caused
problems. The somehow anarchic character of the Internet and Facebook
meant that it was very difficult to control comments and statements, and the po-
sitions expressed by the authors behind the Facebook page inevitably appealed
to members of Croatia’s extremist right-wing groupings, and apparently also at-
tracted highly offensive comments. The regular use of curses and abusive, ob-
scene language seemed to challenge the aims of the Facebook page. The fact
that from the very beginning this was indeed a problem for the authors behind
the page is clear from an entry posted on 20 November, in which the authors stat-
ed: “We ask you to restrain unsuitable comments, curses, because we do not
wish that the page be reduced to curses and insults! We ask you not to glorify
any regime, because that is not suitable and we do not wish that!” There was
clearly a fear that the cause may be tainted or hindered by both obscene lan-
guage and pro-Ustasha statements. Furthermore, it is clear from other entries
that there was a risk that the page might be closed or banned. Thus, while the
medium of Facebook allowed the authors of the page to reach a large audience
very quickly and invite them to participate in and support their project, users
and commenters challenged and confused the aims and strategy of this project.
Indeed, the participatory audience on Facebook constituted a real danger to the
existence of the project’s platform.
While the messages on the Facebook page ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ cer-
tainly spread quickly, it is hard to say how far they reached. Though commenters
frequently pointed out that they lived outside Croatia or had a somehow non-
Croatian background, entries and comments on the page were held predomi-
nantly in Croatian with rare comments or questions in German, English or
other languages. Yet, the page has certainly reached migrant communities out-
side Croatia. In Munich a group of Croatian football supporters staged a small
demonstration and sent photos of it to the ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ page,
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where they were posted on 25 November and received nearly 8,000 ‘likes’. In a
way, the Facebook page thus served to create a memory community across inter-
national borders.
As stated above, starting on 23 November, the Facebook page also promoted
a petition in support of Šimunić and addressed it to FIFA president, Sepp Blatter.
This petition was initiated in the UK and formulated bilingually in English and
Croatian, and it did get support from all over the world and in both languages.
The petition text largely repeated the arguments from the Facebook page, but it
also gave some further explanations for supporting the protest against Šimunić’s
punishment, one being that young Croats were sick of being connected to a Fas-
cist past and having to stand trial for the crimes of the Ustasha, and another that
they wanted freedom to express patriotism.²⁷ Some of the signatories left com-
ments explaining why they supported the petition. Many simply stated that
Šimunić was a patriot, not a Fascist, and that patriotism is not a crime. Others
gave historical explanations similar to those on the Facebook page, and one
posted the complete text of one of the versions of the original entry explaining
the aims of the Facebook page. Yet, in spite of the more than 30,000 signatories,
the petition had no influence on FIFA’s final decision, which was to confirm that
Šimunić was banned from 10 international matches. But it did unite a dedicated
international Internet community and thus contributed to a transnational mem-
ory debate.
The statements and explanations made by signatories of the petition were
more homogenous and in line with the original intent of the petition text than
was the case on the Facebook page. Obviously, participation was quite regulated
in connection to the petition, as only signatories were able to comment. More-
over, it may be argued that a signature and a comment stating the reasons for
signing are more serious and committed ways of expressing one’s support
than a ‘like’ on Facebook. The petition may be regarded as having created a
loose and transcultural virtual memory community of people with fairly similar
views on a particular element of Croatia’s past. While the petition’s electronic
community reached a membership of 34,000, the Facebook page, with its
much less controllable participatory audience, reached 160,000 followers. The
petition page is somehow a finished activity, whereas the Facebook page stays
active. Though the page gradually turned into a more ordinary kind of fan
club platform for supporters of Josip Šimunić, it remained nationalist and very
right wing, with connections to ultra-nationalist popular culture and veterans’
 See the petition webpage on: http://www.change.org/p/fifa-support-for-josip-%C%Aimu
ni%C% ( August ).
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organizations. Moreover, the page continued to make entries and create chains of
comments debating the meaning of Croatian historical symbols, fascism and pa-
triotism, albeit on a much smaller scale, and with much less intervention. Thus,
there is still a digital afterlife of the debate caused by Josip Šimunić’s fascist
chant, but it is hardly vibrant.
Conclusion
The Facebook page ‘Support for Josip Šimunić’ contributed to a very rapid dis-
semination of a particular set of views on the Šimunić case. It reached a large
group of people, who somehow expressed their support through a click on
‘like’. Parts of this group also engaged more actively through commenting, post-
ing clips and links, and recycling the main statements of the page’s authors, thus
sharing and confirming a certain view of the past.We may regard this group, and
also the somewhat similar group of petition signatories, as a very large and very
loose virtual memory community. Yet, the chaotic and anarchic character of the
commenting practices suggests that this is a very fragmented and loose com-
munity at best. Indeed, most commenters do not really relate to comments
from other group members.
Many commenters use the Šimunić debates to condemn Croatia’s political
elite or to make a provocation. Yet, the vast majority of users of this page only
click on ‘like’, which is certainly a minimal kind of participation. The speed, un-
boundedness and participation, though minimal and enigmatic, open complete-
ly new possibilities of memory transmission on the Internet and on Facebook.
Yet, it is hard to say whether, in a case like that of Josip Šimunić, Facebook com-
munication has a much larger reach and impact than other types of memory me-
diation, such as printed media. The support page for Josip Šimunić had an audi-
ence of 160,000 at the most. A tabloid newspaper such as Večernji list has a print
run of around 60,000, presumably reaching 285,000 readers, and it has 881,000
readers online. It seems fair to assume that most Croats learned of the Šimunić
case through these channels, though this tells us nothing of their views.
The Facebook page may be as much an example of the general fragmenta-
tion within Croatian society with regard to the memory of Croatia’s fascist
past. Both the Facebook page and the petition certainly constitute a contestation
of the official and politically accepted view on the issue. Especially the Facebook
page’s posts and comments promote a series of somehow loosely defined mem-
ory narratives, which presents Croatia’s history as a long struggle for national
freedom and independence, with its people often victimized and suffering
from the crimes of others. In these narratives, the Ustasha history is certainly
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not prominent, but certainly also less evil than so many other historical dark fig-
ures. Indeed, in these narratives, the Ustasha do not seem to be taken sufficiently
seriously to be allowed to taint Croatian patriotism in any way. Thus, their role
with regard to the salute ‘Za dom spremni’ is presented as too insignificant to
have any consequence. The Facebook page, and to a lesser extent the petition
also, thus promoted massive banalization, trivialization and downplaying of Cro-
atia’s darkest past. Indeed, the discourse on these pages suggests a lack of con-
frontation with Croatia’s difficult Ustasha history, and in this it may reflect a
more general problem of coming to terms with this past in Croatian society.
Though the political establishment clearly condemns this part of Croatia’s histo-
ry, the legacies from the ambiguous memory politics in the 1990s have left parts
of Croatian society in a memorial grey zone with an unclear relationship to the
Ustasha past.
References
“About Sidney United 58 fc.” http://www.sydneyunited58fc.com/history/sydney-united-58-fc/
(5 April 2014).
Anon. “Croatia football chief Vlatko Markovic hit by gay group’s backlash”. Guardian, 14
November 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/nov/14/gay-backlash-cro
atia-football-chief (6 April 2014).
Anon. “Croatia’s Josip Simunic defends ’pro-Nazi’ World Cup celebration chant”, The
Guardian, 20 November 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/nov/20/cro
atia-josip-simunic-defends-apparent-pro-nazi-chant (8 August 2014).
Arežina, Bojan. “DORH Šimuniću izrelao maksimalno novčanu kaznu”. Večernji list, 21
November 2013. http://www.vecernji.hr/crna-kronika/drzavno-odvjetnistvo-simunicu-izre
klo-maksimalnu-novcanu-kaznu-904274 (8 August 2014)
Bieber, Florian. “Ready for the Homeland? Simunic and a bit of normal fascism” Balkan
Insight, 21 November 2013.
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/ready-for-the-homeland-simunic-and-a-bit-of-nor-
mal-fascism (10 October 2014).
Brentin, Dario. “Fascist Groundhog day? The issue with ‘Za dom spremni’ in Croatian
football.” Balkan Insight 11 April 2015. http://balkanist.net/fascist-groundhog-day-issue-
za-dom-spremni-croatian-football/ (10 May 2015).
“Croatia mourns Vlatko Marković. “ UEFA webpage 23 September 2013. http://www.uefa.com/
memberassociations/association=cro/news/newsid=2000125.html (6 April 2014)
Delač, Hrvoje. “Šimuniću 10 utakmica suspenzije zbog ustaškog pozdrava!”, Večernji list, 16
December 2013. http://www.vecernji.hr/nogomet/simunicu-velika-kazna-dobio-deset-utak
mica-suspenzije-909525 (6 August 2014).
Dijck, José van. The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
“Dinamo Zagreb Prva Momčad.” http://gnkdinamo.hr/hr/1-momcad/igraci/obrana/josip-si
munic1/ (5 April 2014)
Football and Memories of Croatian Fascism on Facebook 315
Graeme Yorke. “Croatia’s Josip Simunic slapped with 10 game ban and will miss the World
cup because of Nazi chanting”. Mail Online 16 December 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.
uk/sport/worldcup2014/article-2524741/Croatias-Josip-Simunic-slapped-10-game-ban-
miss-World-Cup-Nazi-chanting.html (10 August 2014).
Hina. “Šimonić: Pozdrav s’Za dom spremni’ je patriotski; Sud u Lausannei: ‘Ne, to je ratni
poklič ustaša”, Jutarnji list 12 May 2014. http://www.jutarnji.hr/simunic-pozdrav-za-dom-
dozivljavam-kao-patriotski-cas-ne-to-je-bez-sumnje-ustaski-uzvik-/1190847/ (6 August
2014).
Hughson, John. “Football, folk dancing and fascism: diversity and difference in Multicultural
Australia”. Journal of Sociology 33 (1997): 167–186
“Josip Šimunić.” http://www.uefa.com/worldcup/season=2014/teams/player=49993/profile/
(5 April 2014).
“Josip Šimunić and his Australian context (Interview with John Hughson).” http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=NFvavWNUzDs (6 August 2014).
Hoskins, Andrew.”7/7 and connective memory: international trajectories of remembering in
post-scarcity culture”. Memory Studies 4.3 (2011): 269–280.
Kristović, Ivica. “Jovanović: E moj Šimuniću, tebi treba lekcija iz povijesti” Večernji list, 20
November 2013. http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/jovanovic-e-moj-simunicu-tebi-treba-lek
cija-iz-povijesti-903984 (8 August 2014).
Lindgren, Simon. “Youtube gunmen? Mapping participatory media discourse on school
shooting videos”. Media, Culture and Society 33.1 (2010): 1–14.
Lindgren, Simon. “Collective problemsolving and informal learning in networked publics.
Reading vlogging networks on YouTube as knowledge communities.” Interactive Media
Use and Youth: Learning, Knowledge Exchange and Behavior. Eds. E. Dunkels, G.
Frånberg & C. Hällgren. Hershey: IGI Global, 2011. 50–64.
Lindgren, Simon. “The Sociology of Media and Information technologies.” Introduction to
Sociology: Scandinavian Sensibilities. Eds. G.C. Aakvaag, M. Hviid Jacobsen & T.
Johansson. London: Pearson, 2012. 140–159.
Magaš, Vjekoslav. “Eksklusivni intervju.” Hrvatski tjednik 5 June 2014, 22.
Pavlakovic, Vjeran. “Flirting with Fascism: The Ustaša legacy and Croatian politics in the
1990s.” The Shared History. The Second World War and National Question in Yugoslavia.
Novi Sad: Centar za Istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje, 2008. 115–143.
“Potpora Josipu Šimuniću.” https://www.facebook.com/josip.simunic.officialfanpage?fref=ts
(14 August 2014)
Ramet, Sabrina P. “Politics in Croatia since 1990.” Croatia since independence. War, politics,
society, foreign relations. Eds. Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad Clewing and Reneo Lukić.
Munich: R. Oldenbrug Verlag, 2008. 31–57.
Rutten, Ellen & Vera Zvereva. “Introduction. Old conflicts, new media: post-socialist digital
memories.” Memory, Conflict and New Media. Web Wars in Post-socialist States. Eds.
Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor & Vera Zvereva. London: Routledge, 2013: 1–18.
Sindbæk, Tea. “The Fall and Rise of a National Hero: Interpretations of Draža Mikailović and
the Chetniks in Yugoslavia and Serbia since 1945”. Journal of Contemporary European
Studies 17.1 (2009): 47–59.
Sindbæk, Tea. Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s difficult past, 1945–2002.
Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2012.
316 Tea Sindbæk Andersen
“Support for Josip Šimunić.” http://www.change.org/p/fifa-support-for-josip-%C5%A1imuni%
C4%87 (14 August 2014).
Tomasevich, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941– 1945. Occupation and
collaboration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
Football and Memories of Croatian Fascism on Facebook 317

Elvin Gjevori
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform
in Albania
After the fall of communism across Eastern Europe, repressed memories resur-
faced vengefully and became potent tools of political struggle. In the Balkans
and some former Soviet republics such memories were even used to fuel pro-
tracted wars and ethnic cleansing. Consequently, many social science debates
have been interested in analysing memory conflicts and the way that they
have been used by national elites to elicit mobilisation or acquire popular
legitimacy.¹ Although this analytical focus has been enlightening, collective
memory viewed from this perspective has almost exclusively been characterized
as a destructive instrument of political struggle. I argue that collective memory
can also be an appropriate analytical framework to understand the profound
and positive changes that have occurred in post-communist countries. Specifical-
ly, collective memory can be instrumental in explaining the differing paths of in-
stitutional reforms across and within emerging democracies.
In this regard Albania presents an interesting case through which to test col-
lective memory as an explanatory mechanism behind institutional reform, spe-
cifically institutionalisation defined as the situation whereby “[a]uthority and
power are depersonalized, and resource mobilization and principles of resource
allocation are routinized.”² After the fall of communism, in addition to the econ-
omy, Albania had to reform the armed forces and judiciary since they were the
main power centres through which the communist regime had built one of the
most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe. Both reforms started in 1991
and initially suffered from the same symptoms of politicisation, nepotism and
corruption. After the pyramid scheme crisis of 1997, which resulted in the almost
total collapse of the state, both the armed forces and the judiciary had to begin
 Ed Cairns and Mícheál D. Roe. Eds. The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basinstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, ; Craig Larkin. Memory Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the
Past. London: Routledge, ; Conny Mithander, Maria Holmgren Troy and John Sundholm.
Eds. Collective Traumas: Memory of War and Conflict in th Century Europe. Brussels, Belgium:
Peter Lang, ; Victor Roudometof. Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict.
Westport: Preager Publishers, ; Meir Litvak. Ed.Palestinian Collective Memory and National
Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ; Katharina Hall and Kathryn Jones. Eds. Con-
structions of Conflict. Oxford: Peter Lang, .
 Johan Olsen. “Change and Continuity: An Institutional Approach to Institutions of Democratic
Government.” European Political Science Review . (): .
anew and were again politicised. Although their history under communism was
similar since they were politicised and their early transition reforms were also
similar, from the early 2000s on there has been progress towards institutionali-
sation in the military while that of the judiciary lags behind. The success of mili-
tary reform culminated with NATO accession in 2009, while the failure of judicial
reform became one of the main impediments to advancing Albania’s EU integra-
tion. This raises the question as to why Albania was more successful in institu-
tionalising its military than the judiciary.
Collective memory and preference formation
Explaining why Albania was successful in institutionalising its military more
substantially than the judiciary can be approached from different angles, the
most prominent of which would be a rationalist, interest-based approach. Indeed
elite interests are crucial to explain institutional reforms. However, in emerging
democracies experiencing prolonged and volatile transitions, interests are highly
mutable, making it difficult for elites to identify and use them as guides to their
political behaviour. In Albania, the mutability of interests is even more accentu-
ated because it experienced major uncertainty not only in 1991, when commu-
nism fell, but also in 1997, when the above-mentioned pyramid schemes col-
lapsed and resulted in popular revolt, and again in 1999 during the Kosovo
war, when half a million refugees entered its territory. Therefore, undertaking
an analysis of institutional reform in Albania by identifying elite interests in a
particular moment and then connecting them to decisions would be neither en-
lightening nor correct. In emerging democracies like Albania, one has to analyze
the events that happen before interests crystallised because such events affect
interest formation, which in turn affects political behaviour. So I do not deny
the role of interests in explaining variation of political behaviour; I instead ex-
plain how interests are shaped. This perspective is particularly important for
studying transitioning democracies as it enables researchers to understand dif-
fering institutional developments across and within countries.
Therefore, I argue that in transitioning countries with unstructured institu-
tions, a process of social construction occurs, prior to institutional consolidation,
during which actors create an understanding of the problem and the way to ad-
dress it. Under conditions of uncertainty, where the old has been repudiated, the
future is unclear and the high hopes of the first days of freedom have been
dampened by the unavoidable crises of transition, actors have to reassess
their goals, reshape their interests and only then can they act. So to understand
institutionalisation reform, one has to understand how problems are perceived,
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how history is made sense of, how preferences are shaped and then analyze their
effects on institutions. For this reason, I rely on a constructivist account of inter-
est formation with collective memory as an explanatory mechanism to account
for institutionalisation in Albania. The evolution of collective memory defined
as “social representations concerning the past which each group produces, insti-
tutionalizes, guards and transmits through the interaction of its members”³ pro-
vides a variety of frameworks through which diverse actors develop an under-
standing of the past and confront the challenges of the future, especially in
periods of uncertainty. It is through such frameworks that actors form preferen-
ces and against which they evaluate choices. The analysis of elite collective
memory therefore is key to understanding pre-institutionalisation preference for-
mation.
Based on the theoretical understanding laid out above, this chapter’s main
argument is that the differing degrees of military and judicial institutionalisation
in Albania from the beginning of its democratic transition in 1992 to its NATO
accession in 2009 can be explained by the development of elite collective mem-
ory. I argue that the combination of the memory of the communist regime and
the memory of the main crises during the transition created the frameworks
through which political elites ranked priorities enabling substantial institution-
alisation in the military only.
Methodology – tracing collective memory
Tracing the development of collective memory is generally difficult, in Albania
even more so since data on public opinion are either missing or unreliable.
The most effective and practical method by which one can measure such devel-
opment is through the analysis of newspaper coverage of military and judicial
reform. Newspaper coverage is an appropriate medium through which to analyze
collective memory because written language is one of the main mechanisms
through which memory is conveyed, becomes available to the linguistic entity,
and shapes interest formation.⁴ Studying the language used by politically affili-
ated newspapers in particular enables researchers to gain an understanding of
the political elite’s perspective, their memory of the previous regime, their under-
standing of the crises they faced, and the future they envision. Newspaper cover-
 Paolo Jedlowski. “Memory and Sociology. Themes and Issues.” Time and Society . ():
.
 Peter Berger and Tomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Soci-
ology of Knowledge. New York: Random House, , .
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age is not only representative of the elite’s view, but it also reaches and affects
public opinion on a wide scale. Therefore, by analysing newspaper coverage of
military and judicial reform I can trace elite interest formation over time. To
do so, I focus on the level of politicisation based on the assumption that insti-
tutionalisation and politicisation are inversely related. I rely on content and dis-
course analysis of newspaper articles to investigate how the politicisation of
military and judicial reform has developed over the years and to identify the
causal mechanisms explaining any observed change.
I have chosen two newspapers: Rilindja Demokratike (Democratic Rebirth),
the official organ of the centre-right Democratic Party and Zëri i Popullit (Voice
of the People) the official organ of the centre-left Socialist Party. These newspa-
pers provide the official position of the two political parties which have governed
Albania since the fall of communism. Both newspapers are thoroughly political
during the period under analysis and their articles represent the official posi-
tions of their respective parties. Because of tight party control, any change in
their coverage cannot come out of the changing nature of the newspapers, but
out of the political parties controlling their editorial line. I examined all the ed-
itions of these newspapers from 1992 to 2009 and collected all substantive, pol-
icy-oriented articles regarding military and judicial reform. Articles containing
‘simple’ reporting of a story, without analysing and assigning merit/blame
were not collected. At the end of data collection I built a dataset of 1535 articles
covering military and judicial reform from 1992 to 2009.
The collected articles were classified by newspaper, by topic (military/judi-
ciary) and by type of coverage (non-politicised/politicised). The third categorisa-
tion requires some explanation. An article is deemed to provide non-politicised
coverage if it has one of the following attributes: 1. States that the military/judi-
ciary is an independent institution. 2. States that the military/judiciary is under-
going positive reform increasing professionalism and de-politicisation. 3. De-
fends military/judicial reform and calls on the ‘other side’ to refrain from
politicisation. An article is deemed to provide politicised coverage if it has one
of the following: 1. States that the military/judiciary is a politically controlled in-
stitution lacking independence and serving the sitting government’s interests. 2.
Accuses the government of politicising the military/judiciary through political
appointments.
Lastly, from 1992 to 2009 there were three changes of power: in 1992 the
Democratic Party (DP) won the elections and became the first non-communist
party to lead Albania since 1944. In 1997 the Socialist Party (SP) came to
power after pyramid schemes collapsed followed by anarchy, and in 2005 the
DP returned to power. This variation enables me to analyze whether newspaper
coverage of military and judicial reform is connected to the political fortunes of
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the DP and SP. It should be noted that military policy has been remarkably
steady as both sides have constantly downsized the military, relied on the
same strategic partners and provided similar budgetary support. Therefore, if I
notice any change in the newspaper coverage of military reform, it is unlikely
that it reflects policy change.
Findings
Both newspapers dedicate considerable attention to military and judicial reform,
an indication that they see them as problematic. The more significant finding is
that coverage of judicial reform is politicised throughout the period under scru-
tiny. The level of politicisation oscillates in accordance with the Democratic Party
and the Socialist Party being in power and opposition. Each time the DP is in
power, its newspaper Democratic Rebirth (DR) covers the government’s judicial
reforms as positive while the Voice of the People (VP) sees them as attempts to
politicise the judiciary. Each time the SP is in power the VP defends the govern-
ment’s judicial reforms while DR accuses it of politicisation. Regarding military
reform, during the 1990s, its coverage follows the politicised trajectory of judicial
reform. However, from 2002 on, it becomes increasingly less politicised and no
longer oscillates when DP and SP are in and out of power. The graphs below (Fig-
ures 1 and 2) illustrate the fluctuation of politicisation of newspaper coverage of
judicial and military reform in relation to the ideological orientation of the gov-
ernment.
As the graphs show, judicial reform coverage is consistently politicised while
military reform coverage is politicised in the 1990s only and becomes increasing-
ly less so in the 2000s. So it is natural to ask, why did the coverage of military
reform change in the second decade of the transition? Since both institutions
had been similarly politicised during communism and the first decade of transi-
tion, why did the political elites change their approach in the second decade of
the transition, only for the military? What is this change indicatory of? To answer
these questions, the following sections will analyze DR’s and VP’s newspaper ar-
ticles to identify the justificatory mechanisms which allowed their coverage of
judicial reform to be politicised throughout the period under analysis and the
justificatory mechanisms which enabled the de-politicisation of military reform
coverage in the second decade of transition.




Coverage of Judicial Reform
Except for 1992, the Democrats’ first year in power, Democratic Rebirth (DR) pro-
vided a non-politicised coverage of judicial reform so much so that in 1995 and
1996 it had no politicised articles. The coverage was primarily concerned with a
comparison of the democratic judiciary with that under communism. An article
on 16 February 1996 is a good illustration of this approach, as it stated:
[W]e inherited from the communist regime a judiciary which was uniquely dependent on
politics. Only in Albania the ministry of justice and the defence lawyer were abolished in
1967. After the establishment of democracy these institutions were introduced again […]
Since the fall of communism, judicial independence has been accepted as the main priority
for the construction of the new state.¹
The message is clear, Albania has come out of one of its darkest periods, and in
the years of the DP government the healthy foundations of a new judiciary have
been built. This, however, was DR’s message late in the Democratic Party’s term;
before defending the judiciary and judicial reforms, DR applied strong pressure
on the judiciary to follow the government’s political goals. Early in DP’s term DR
pressured the judiciary to put on trial the former communist leadership and ac-
cused the SP of sabotaging the trials since when they had been in power “the
trial was delayed because the SP found it difficult to punish its spiritual inspirers
[…] Only after the victory of [DP] democracy in March 22 1992 the trial restarted.”²
Thus, the first elements of the connection between the ideological orientation of
the government and judicial effectiveness are surfacing as DR argued in this ar-
ticle that only when the Democratic Party is in power the judiciary is effective
and apolitical. Attention to the expected trials of the communist leadership con-
tinued and so did DR’s ‘advice’ to the judiciary by stating:
[T]he people directly responsible for communist crimes will scream: ‘What good comes out
of these trials? What do we gain from punishments? This is not justice, it is revenge […]’
They lie, they are afraid of being punished and this is why they scream. They know
there can be no reconciliation, no rule of law, no social justice without analysing the
past and punishing those responsible for this great tragedy.³
 For practicality, the name of the newspapers and titles are translated in the footnotes while
the original name and title are placed alongside the translation in the bibliography.
Democratic Rebirth. “The Albanian judiciary aims to reach contemporary standards.” 15 Febru-
ary 1996, 4.
 Democratic Rebirth. “Nears the time for the trial of the communist cast.”  July , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “No revenge just justice.”  October a, .
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Here, DR called for the use of the judiciary to try the former communist leader-
ship as a way to analyze the past and punish those responsible for it. Not only
was DR in favour of using the judiciary, but it argued that it could be done only
under the DP government because the SP was the successor of the communist
regime. This perspective was destined to politicise the discussion of judicial re-
form, as the opposition – accused of being camouflaged communists – would
see it as an attempt to control the judiciary and use it against the opposition.
While in 1992 and early 1993 DR pressured the judiciary to investigate the
communist leadership as an indirect way to de-legitimise the SP accused of har-
bouring them, by the end of 1993 the calls to investigate the SP itself became
more direct. DR called upon the judiciary “to fulfil its duty” in investigating
the corruption of the Socialists, whom it saw as a continuation of Enver Hoxha’s⁴
Labour Party.⁵ DR argued that Socialists claimed the accusations were political
because they knew they were guilty. The paper incited the judiciary to action
by saying, “[T]he judiciary MUST HAVE NO MERCY for ordinary thieves like
[SP Chairman] Fatos Nano.”⁶ DR not only accused the SP leader of being corrupt
and the SP of being the inheritor of communism, but it accused the opposition of
being against judicial reform because they wanted to control it as they had when
they were communists. “Such behaviour can be expected only by those who
have never accepted the rule of law,who,when in power, controlled the judiciary
according to their arbitrary wills, who eliminated the right to legal counsel so
that people were left exposed to the cruelties of the dictatorship.”⁷ These articles
connected DR’s overall argument: the communist leadership politicised the judi-
ciary, was criminal and corrupt, for which it had to be investigated. Secondly,
and more importantly, the SP was the inheritor of the communist mentality of
political control over the judiciary, which positioned it against judicial reform.
Just as it used the memory of the communist regime to de-legitimise the op-
position, DR also referenced the abuses of the communists as part of its rhetoric
in defending the government’s judicial reform. In doing so, DR continued to de-
legitimise any Socialist criticism by arguing that they were unreformed commu-
nists in favour of a politicised judiciary. For example, in late 1993, DR defended
the government’s decision to graduate new lawyers in six-month courses to re-
 At the head of the Labour Party, Enver Hoxha was the leader of Albania’s one-party state dur-
ing –.
 Democratic Rebirth. “Now it is the judiciary’s time to fulfil its duty.”  May , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The Judiciary must have no mercy on ordinary thieves like Fatos Nano.”
 May a, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Only a band of thieves can come to the defence of a thief.”  February
, .
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place those judges and investigators considered as co-operators of the commu-
nist regime in an article stating “the Albanian judiciary was the field where com-
munism was the most dominant; otherwise Albanians would not have experi-
enced that kind of dictatorship for fifty years.”⁸ Those who had been
delivering ‘justice’ in the name of the people, claimed the article, were products
of the communist caste and in their education they learned only the Labour Par-
ty’s directives, making them nothing other than Party commissars. For that rea-
son, DR claimed, most judges and prosecutors had to be replaced by lawyers
educated during democracy. It is clear that DR presents judicial reform as a proc-
ess in which the old judges need to be replaced with new ones and this new ju-
diciary then needs to ‘fulfil its duty’ and condemn the communist caste and its
camouflaged inheritors.
The balancing between defending the government’s judicial reform and at-
tacking the Socialist opposition continued in an editorial in which the SP was
accused of being “ready to sacrifice – for the sake of political capital and
power – law, justice and democracy.”⁹ In fact it could not be otherwise; if the
reform is presented as a way to punish communists hidden in the SP and corrupt
Socialists, the latter cannot be anything but enemies of judicial independence.
DR reinforced its accusations and stated that the SP attacked the judiciary be-
cause, they controlled it when they were communists and they yearn to control
it again. That is why the new judiciary should make sure that “criminals like [SP
Chairman] Fatos Nano are tried for genocide […] the communist leadership must
answer for the blood of innocent victims, the people killed in the streets, those
burned alive, the mothers left alone, the destruction done to this country.”¹⁰
From late 1992 on DR was persistent in its message: the SP is the continua-
tion of the Labour Party and the communist regime, and thereby guilty of its
crimes and of the politicisation of the judiciary. Secondly, the SP, as evidenced
by the trial of its chairman, was also characterised as guilty of corruption and
abuse of power. That is why the SP was against judicial reform, and that it
why, in DR’s eyes, its complaints were illegitimate since corrupt unreformed
communists were not to be trusted. The contours of this coverage hold steady
until 1997, when the DP goes into opposition.
 Democratic Rebirth. “Military reform will not be stopped by the communist screams of the VP.”
 November b, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Even Fatos Nano will submit to the law and the judiciary.”  February
a, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Criminals like [SP Chairman] Fatos Nano should be tried for genocide
also.”  June , .
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For the same period VP’s coverage was the exact opposite. After the Socialist
Party (SP) lost the 1992 elections, the VP was initially hesitant to put forth a full-
throated criticism of judicial reform. These reservations, however, soon started
waning as at the end of 1992 it analyzed the appointment of the new Prosecutor
General (PG) arguing that:
[F]or precious services rendered to the DP, by breaking the law in favour of the power-hold-
ers, Mr Dragoshi was rewarded with the position of the PG […] while the former PG Maksim
Haxhia,who refused to break the law and harm the independence of the judiciary,was fired
unceremoniously.¹¹
This was the first accusation against the government for politicising the judiciary
and was followed by many more. For example,VP published a long article where
it analyzed DP’s judicial reform and noted that in Albania instead of the rule of
law, one found a situation where “the pressure of authorities on the judiciary to
follow ‘central directives’ is clear evidence of the flagrant attempts to build a po-
litical and police state which aims to side-track the rule of law.”¹² So by the end
of 1992, the VP had set the contours of its approach towards DP’s judicial reform
by arguing that it was a politically motivated attempt to control the judiciary.
This kind of coverage was on display in early 1993 when the VP accused the
DP of pressuring the judiciary with the aim of using it politically:
[T]his was what the Labour Party tried to do and this is what the DP is doing under the ban-
ner of ‘fighting judicial corruption and communists in the judiciary.’ The latest decisions of
the High Council of Justice¹³ to cleanse the judiciary reached a new peak of politicisation,
which will continue in the future.¹⁴
While DR accused the SP of being unreformed communists, the VP replied by ar-
guing that the DP-led government was beset by a communist mentality of main-
taining political control over the judiciary.
Besides accusing the government of aiming to control the judiciary, the VP
was also specific in its criticisms by analysing sensitive legislative initiatives.
For example, VP criticised the law on defence lawyers, which it saw as a contin-
uation of “the psychological violence on the organs of the judiciary to not dare
follow their juridical consciences in cases involving the party in power […] this
 Voice of the People. “Party knows best.”  December , .
 Voice of the People. “What kind of state are we building in Albania: a political or a legal
state?”  December a, –.
 Constitutionally independent body governing judicial appointments and promotions.
 Voice of the People. “The judiciary under the DP’s attack.”  January , , .
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law is deeply political.”¹⁵ In addition, as part of its campaign to denounce the
government’s control of the judiciary, the VP joined the debate on the condensed
courses graduating judges and prosecutors. The VP stated that “the preparation
of the ‘Party’s faithful’ in the three-month courses is a sign of the dangers to in-
dividual rights.”¹⁶ Interestingly, VP, the newspaper founded by Enver Hoxha, in-
creasingly compared the government’s decisions to the actions taken by commu-
nists when they gained power. From VP’s perspective, DP’s reform was as
politicised and thirsty to control the judiciary as the communists were when
they came to power.
Attacks on the judiciary reached unprecedented levels when a proceeding
for corruption was initiated against SP Chairman Fatos Nano. The trial provided
VP the most opportune moment to demonstrate that indeed the DP had been
working to politicise the judiciary in order to use it against the opposition.
The VP argued that: “the judiciary is under the control of the rightist-fascist
state”¹⁷ and one month later writes “the judiciary is scared. The Constitutional
Court is afraid to defend the law, is afraid to demonstrate its independence, is
afraid to show democratic emancipation, and is afraid to escape the claws of po-
litical control.”¹⁸ After accusing the DP of politicising the judiciary and using the
Nano trial as evidence of its submission,VP argued that the judiciary was merely
an extension of the government.¹⁹ After Mr Nano was declared guilty and given a
long prison sentence, VP concluded “the judiciary is under the total control of
politics.”²⁰ VP’s coverage of judicial reform conveyed the message that the judi-
ciary was politicised and presented DP’s judicial reforms as attempts to ‘capture’
the judiciary and use it as an instrument against the opposition. On numerous
occasions the VP accused the government of following in the footsteps of the
communist regime by building a politicised judiciary. This editorial line contin-
ued until 1997 when the SP gained power.
In 1997, after growing protests over the failure of pyramid schemes, the dec-
laration of a state of emergency, and the looting of military depots, the DP-led
 Voice of the People. “The judiciary under accusation.”  January a, .
 Voice of the People. “The preparation of the Party’s faithful in -month courses shows the
danger to human rights in Albania.”  April b, .
 Voice of the People. “The judiciary under the feet of the rightist fascist state.”  July c,
.
 Voice of the People. “A scared judiciary.”  August d, .
 Voice of the People. “The independence of the judiciary in Albania: a reality or a piece of
paper?”  October e, .
 Voice of the People. “The judiciary under the claws of the political state.”  April , .
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government resigned and new elections were held and won overwhelmingly by
the SP. This change of power was reflected in the direction of newspaper cover-
age. As soon as President Berisha²¹ and the DP were out of power, DR began ac-
cusing the government of politicising the judiciary. Remarkably, however, the
content of the accusations did not change. If during 1992–97 DR de-legitimised
SP accusations against judicial reform on the basis that the SP was not to be
trusted as the heir of the communist regime, after 1997, it used the same accusa-
tion to label SP’s judicial reform as politicised. For example, on the day of the
swearing in of the new president and the official removal of Berisha, DR wrote
“today begins the aggression of the ex-communists on the constitution and inde-
pendent institutions.”²² DR maintains the same line of attack against the SP
whether in opposition or in government: unreformed communists are not to
be trusted.
This approach was on clear display a few days later when DR wrote:
[Justice Minister] Kondi presented yesterday the Socialists’ platform of aggression against
judicial independence. The barbarity of the SP and its henchmen against the young judges
who implemented judicial reform transforming Albania from the country where people
were killed to a country where freedom was protected and guaranteed, was to be
expected.²³
As far as DR was concerned, the return of the SP to power was equivalent to the
return of the communist methods of judicial politicisation. In addition, DR, as it
had done when the DP was in power, continued to attack the SP for connections
with political crime. For example, DR argued that “[President] Meidani, [Minister
of Justice] Kondi and the SP are expected to vote in favour of the reintroduction
of communist criminals and murderers in courts and the Prosecutor’s Office to
transform the judiciary into an obedient tool for the elimination of political
opponents.”²⁴ The article referred to the government’s initiative to return to
work a number of judges and prosecutors removed by the DP government. How-
ever, from DR’s perspective this was equivalent to the return of the former com-
munist judicial cast.
Accusations against the government for politicising the judiciary continued
with high intensity even after the troubled year of 1997. For example, in an inter-
view with the former DP-appointed and SP-fired Chief Justice of the Constitution-
 Albania’s first post-communist President who was forced to resign in  and lead the
Democratic Party in opposition.
 Democratic Rebirth. “The President is stripped of all power.”  July , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The judiciary under the guillotine.”  July a, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The judiciary under the leadership of crime.”  August b, .
330 Elvin Gjevori
al Court, DR quoted him saying that “the year 1999 will be a continuation of the
destruction of the judiciary; its further corruption and political revenge against
those few left who do not obey the government.”²⁵ This quote encapsulates
the continuous attacks regarding politicisation and corruption, which were cru-
cial to DR’s de-legitimatisation of the government’s judicial reform. DR contin-
ued to maintain the same hard line accusing the Socialist government of politi-
cising the judiciary. In 2000 DR provided an overview of SP’s judicial reform
since their accession to power:
[A]fter removing all the chairmen of district courts, the chairmen of appellate courts, and
after inventing political tests as a way to remove judges who did not follow their political
orders, [President] Meidani and [Justice Minister] Kondi now have come out openly with
their plan to install SP militants in the organs of the judiciary.²⁶
Clearly, after the DP lost power in 1997 DR’s coverage of judicial reform changed
significantly by attacking it as politicised. Substantially however, DR’s case
against SP’s judicial reform relied on the same justificatory mechanisms it
used when it was in power.When the DP was in power DR argued that Socialists
were not to be trusted because they wanted to turn the clock back to the com-
munist practices of politicised judiciary; after going into opposition DR argued
that the SP was in fact turning the clock back to the politicised communist judi-
ciary. DR’s coverage followed the same editorial line throughout its opposition
until it returned to power in 2005.
The opposite is true of the Voice of the People’s (VP) coverage of judicial re-
form after the Socialists won the elections in 1997. From VP’s perspective every-
thing needed to begin anew. Therefore, the paper wrote that the government
must prioritise the creation of a new and independent judiciary.²⁷ As SP’s efforts
to reform the judiciary began, in an article entitled “[T]he court mafia collapses”
the paper informed its readers that the new High Council of Justice (HCJ) has
begun judicial reform. Claiming a new beginning for the judiciary, the VP
wrote that “during the five years of the DP government, judges did not wear
the black toga of the judge, but the blue [colour of the DP] apron of the DP.
Courts made political decisions, not judicial ones.”²⁸
Similarly to DR, the VP shows remarkable stability in the content of its cov-
erage as it continues to attack the DP for the politicisation of the judiciary and
 Democratic Rebirth. “The anti-law and thefts are blooming.”  January , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Political cleansing in the judiciary continues.”  January , .
 Voice of the People. “Let us build an independent judiciary.”  September , .
 Voice of the People. “The court mafia collapses.”  September a, .
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attempts to connect DP’s reforms to Albania’s former communist regime. Such
an approach is best encapsulated by an article which analyzed the development
of the judiciary as follows: “the [Labour] Party politicised the judiciary and inter-
vened directly in its affairs. Important trials were conducted under Hoxha’s lead-
ership, which is a clear indication of the absence of an independent judiciary.”
After identifying the first problem as coming from communism, the VP identified
the second one: “[President] Berisha took control of the communist judicial ma-
chinery and simply repainted it blue […] Berisha at the head of the DP state cre-
ated an intellectual and professional desert in the judiciary in order to harass his
political opponents for absurd alleged crimes.”²⁹ It is clear that VP attempted to
draw a straight line between the judicial reform during communism and DP’s ju-
dicial reform during 1992–97. In drawing this straight line, it aimed to discredit
DP’s past reform, justify the need for SP’s reform, and pre-emptively to de-legit-
imate any DP accusations.
With time, as the Socialist-led reform is implemented, the VP no longer men-
tions judicial politicisation. In fact, the VP decreases its coverage of judicial re-
form and in 2004, SP’s last full year in power, it writes only twelve articles. As far
as the VP was concerned, SP’s judicial reform had been successful. Just as DR’s
coverage became politicised once the DP was out of power, VP’s coverage be-
came non-politicised once the SP gained power. However, although the newspa-
pers change the direction of their coverage, the content remains almost intact.
DR continues to accuse the SP of being the institutional heir of the Labour
Party, while the VP continues to accuse the DP of being the ideational heir of
the Labour Party. Both sides use the memory of communism and tie it to their
opponent to de-legitimise their policies, belittle their objections, and justify
their own reforms.
In 2005, the DP returned to power after eight years of opposition, and just as
in 1992 and 1997 both newspapers change the direction but not the substance of
their coverage. During 1992–97 Socialists were accused of being unreformed
communists falsely attacking DP’s judicial reform of politicisation. During
1997–2005 Socialists were accused of applying their communist heritage to po-
liticise the judiciary and use it against the opposition, and after 2005 they were
again accused by DR of pretending to defend the judiciary to maintain their po-
litical control over it.³⁰ There is remarkable continuity in DR’s coverage of judi-
cial reform as it continuously accused the SP of politicising the judiciary because
 Voice of the People. “The judiciary should not serve politics.”  October , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The war against crime and corruption confuses the SP.”  February
, ; Democratic Rebirth, “Criminal bands in the SP leadership.”  April , .
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of its communist heritage. The VP on the other hand, just as it did when it was
first in opposition, after 2005 accused Berisha of being a communist-inspired
politician who wanted to regain political control over the judiciary. Once the
SP moved into opposition, VP’s coverage of judicial reform was re-politicised
and the newspaper accused the government of usurping the judiciary.³¹ As im-
portantly, VP relied on the same ideational mechanisms it used during SP’s
1992–97 opposition, equating Berisha’s reform with the communist practices
of judicial politicisation.
Preliminary Conclusion
During this seventeen-year span it is clear that DR and VP covered judicial re-
form in a politicised way. Each time the DP and SP were in power, their newspa-
pers portrayed the judiciary as undergoing positive reform. Inversely, each time
the DP and SP were in opposition their newspapers accused the government of
politicising the judiciary and using it against the opposition. Secondly, and as
importantly, there is one element that both newspapers share and that connects
their articles on an ideational level; the memory of communism. There was little
analysis of what happened to the judiciary during communism, but both news-
papers agreed that it was politicised to enable the regime to maintain power.
Consequently, the memory of communism became a label for a politicised judi-
ciary. This is why DR, in their first term continually accused the SP of being beset
by the communist mentality of judicial politicisation while the ex-communist VP
accused the DP of applying communist methods to implement its own politicisa-
tion. The accusations of communist tendencies or mentality were used to de-le-
gitimise the other side’s judicial reform or accusations of judicial politicisation.
These accusations of communist mentality/heritage precluded the ‘other
side’ from being viewed as a legitimate partner in judicial reform. If the other
side was communist, then it was by definition against an independent judiciary,
and had an ingrained interest in fighting against judicial institutionalisation.
Therefore, both DR and VP viewed judicial reform as the complete validation
of one side and the political denunciation of the other undemocratic side.
That is why the reform of one side was based on the rollback of the reforms ap-
plied by the other. As is clear through this analysis, from 1992 to 2009 this was
the framework through which judicial reform was portrayed. This coverage made
 Voice of the People. “The majority does anything to invade the HCJ.”  October a, ;
Voice of the People. “The judiciary under the control of the DP.”  October , .
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform in Albania 333
the achievement of a bipartisan agreement impossible because if the other side
was made up of unreformed communists longing to turn back to the communist
practices of a politicised judiciary, agreement was not possible. If the other side
is presented, as both newspapers did, as antithetical to the democratic values of
independent institutions and good governance, then it must be fought and not
accommodated.
Coverage of Military Reform
After the Democratic Party (DP) came to power in 1992, Democratic Rebirth (DR)
defended military reform and argued that the Socialist Party (SP) was against it
because of its communist mentality and heritage. As a result, DR reminded read-
ers of the communist practices of military politicisation as a way to de-legitimise
Socialist criticism:
The Labour Party of yesterday and the SP of today are responsible for the haemorrhaging in
the military. The inhuman, anti-Albanian and anti-democratic actions – the politicisation of
the military – started when the most vehement anti-Albanian and craziest adventurer Enver
Hoxha usurped military leadership […] It became even more evident after 1960 when, mer-
cilessly, Hoxha eliminated military officials whom he deemed, through his demonic mind,
part of enemy groups.³²
From the beginning, military reform was covered in a highly politicised tone,
even more so than with judicial reform, as DR did not just blame the communist
regime for politicising the military, but also equated it with the SP in opposition.
This approach set the stage for the politicisation of military reform, which con-
tinued with its harsh language as the SP was accused of being “a committed op-
ponent of military reform [since] its military doctrine is identical to Enver Hox-
ha’s people’s military.”³³ So, DR claimed that military reform was not just a
repudiation of the communist politicisation of the military, but also a repudia-
tion of the SP as an unreformed communist-inspired party. Just as it did with ju-
dicial reform, DR claimed that DP was undoing communist politicisation of the
military and the SP stood in the way because of its communist heritage and
ideology.
 Democratic Rebirth. “The SP is responsible for the haemorrhaging in the military.”  October
b, , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “SP: A committed opponent of military reform.”  August c, .
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So, for military reform also, the communist past was an important lens
through which reform was evaluated. Although communism could be recalled
in many ways, for DR such coverage had one main angle: communism as a
state which used politically-inspired violence to maintain power. Time and
again, when using communism as a justificatory mechanism in its articles on
military reform, DR described the communist regime as criminal and murderous
and stated that “the entire domestic and international activity of Hoxha’s regime
was criminal and anti-national.” DR argued that after the communists came to
power, “they began a campaign of persecutions, arrests, imprisonments, tor-
tures, killings with no trial, violence against families, entire villages and intellec-
tuals […] aiming to eliminate that part of the population which would not accept
the communist dictatorship.”³⁴ Of the many elements that could have been chos-
en to describe the communist period, DR focused on the violent nature of Hox-
ha’s regime. So when DR argued that the government was undoing communist
military politicisation and that the SP was a communist-inspired party, it had
a specific kind of communism in mind. DR claimed that DP’s military reform
would ensure that the violence inherent to the communist regime never re-
turned, while the SP was longing to bring it back. This approach aimed to under-
cut SP accusations and de-legitimise it as a partner in military reform. DR’s cov-
erage maintains the same editorial line until the end of DP’s governance by
presenting military reform as a great achievement and accusing the SP of
being a communist-inspired party aiming to politicise the military.
The VP on the other hand saw the government’s military reform as fully po-
liticised. From accusations of treason, fascism, and communism no punches
were spared in the heated exchanges:
Mussolini’s fascists and Nazi Germans, those who are still alive at least, their supporters in
Albania, the Greek monarchical-fascists, the Serbian chauvinists, and all the enemies of the
Albanian people, finally can rejoice at the condition in which the Albanian military finds
itself […] The DP has purged 15,000 officers who left the country as refugees while hundreds
of others are locked in prison cells because they have been stained with political
accusations.³⁵
While DR accused the SP of being unreformed communists, VP replied that DP’s
military reform was not only politicised, but was also harming the country’s na-
 Democratic Rebirth. “The SP responsible for the haemorrhaging in the military.”  October
d, , .
 Voice of the People. “Who is responsible for the haemorrhaging in the Albanian military?” 
October b, .
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tional defence.VP criticised military reform as unpatriotic, overly politicised and
consequently weakening the country:
[T]housands of officers are witnesses of the fact that this reform is based upon political cri-
teria. It is sad, but true, that military appointments are approved by DP’s offices. It is un-
fortunate that the present military leadership is entirely politicised. This is not only illegal,
but also very dangerous for the fate of the military and the nation’s defence.³⁶
According to the VP, DP’s government was acting just like the communist regime
did by politicising the military and using it for its own purposes. This is why in
an article entitled “[t]he reform in the armed forces is not led by the law but by
DP’s politics” VP strongly criticised the reform for lacking vision, competence
and for being politicised.³⁷ Evidently, the early exchanges on military reform
were highly politicised and aimed to discredit DP’s reform as unpatriotic, un-
democratic, and a continuation of communist politicisation. Such coverage,
first by DR and then by the VP, precluded the other side from being viewed as
a partner in military reform.
Accusations of a politicised military reform continued in 1994 also. In early
June VP accused the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of using soldiers as ‘travelling
voters’ so that the DP would win a special election. The VP analyzed this
issue and argued that DP’s politicisation of military reform was endangering Al-
bania’s democratic future. The article further accused the leadership of the MoD
of using the military for overtly political reasons as an “instrument of DP’s
interests.”³⁸ This issue was again analyzed and the MoD was accused of
“being committed to follow the road of the anti-law [and] use the Albanian mili-
tary, similarly to third world countries, to keep power at any cost.”³⁹ During SP’s
opposition, the VP maintained the same editorial line accusing the government
of undertaking a politicised reform and using the military to achieve its political
aims. It is clear that during DP’s first term, coverage of military reform was re-
markably similar to that of judicial reform. DR argued that Democrats were re-
forming the military and that the SP was a communist-inspired party against
military institutionalisation. The VP, on the other hand, argued that DP’s reforms
simply replaced communist politicisation.
 Voice of the People. “Military reform is defended through facts and laws, not demagoguery.”
 February  f, .
 Voice of the People. “Military reform is led by the DP not the rule of law.”  August  g,
.
 Voice of the People. “The military should serve the nation, not DP’s political games.”  June
a, .
 Voice of the People. “You are committed to break the law.”  June b, , .
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In 1997, after the collapse of the pyramid schemes, the declaration of the
state of emergency, the attempted use of the military to subdue popular revolts
and the latter’s refusal to follow orders, the military disbanded, its depots were
looted and public order collapsed. As a result, in June 1997 new elections were
held and won by the SP. After the DP lost the elections, DR’s coverage of military
reform changed direction and became accusatory against the SP for undertaking
a ‘communist rebellion’ to take power, undo reforms and re-politicise the milita-
ry:
[O]nly the leaders of the Labour Party and their heirs in the SP are the authors of this de-
struction […] Communism, which destroyed every national value, destroyed the military
also. When the military started breathing again, the same people who applied crime and
destruction, through their communist elements, hit a new, killed again and re-destroyed
the military.⁴⁰
Although the direction of DR’s coverage changed, its content remained intact as
it continued to accuse the SP of being a communist-inspired party aiming to re-
politicise the military. This approach became clearer when DR accused the gov-
ernment of preparing a deep political cleansing in the military and intending to
replace existing officers with political appointees and bandits who overthrew the
democratic government. DR stated that this was “the most severe hit against the
military since 1967 […] underneath the declarations of the Minister are the hid-
eous intentions to bring back all the incriminated people who served the
dictatorship.”⁴¹ Similarly, on 24 August DR wrote an article in which it stated
that “the return of the old communist officers is equivalent to the politicisation
of the armed forces.”⁴² Clearly, after the SP gained power DR’s coverage of mili-
tary reform changed direction by accusing the government of politicising the
military along the lines of the previous communist regime and appointing
party militants at the expense of professionals.
The articles of 1997, however, were not just a reflection of the immediate heat
produced by the events of 1997. For example in 1999, an article written by two
former military officers during the time Mr Berisha was President stated:
[T]he left executed the 1997 armed rebellion to its bitter end, concluding with the barbaric
destruction of the armed forces to gain power by force […] After the SP came to power
 Democratic Rebirth. “Who destroyed the military?”  November c, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The defence minister: Prison for all Democrats.”  August d, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The recall of former officers re-politicises the military.”  August
e, .
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform in Albania 337
through violence, it has used Byzantine methods to damage the military as its ‘mother
party’ had done for fifty years.⁴³
This quote encapsulates DR’s overall argument after 1997. It continued to rely on
accusations of communism to de-legitimate the SP and used the 1997 crisis,
which it labelled as a ‘communist rebellion,’ as an example of a communist-in-
spired armed revolt to take power by force and re-politicise the military. This ap-
proach continued as DR published in two full pages the official DP analysis of
the national security strategy and reform of the armed forces. DR’s article
began by stating that “the 1997 armed revolt lead by the extreme left, which
wanted power at any cost, besides spectacular economic damage […] destroyed
the military.”⁴⁴ Even worse, according to DR, after the left came to power, it im-
plemented a political reform similar to that of the communist regime in which
young officials were replaced by the old communist nomenclature. So DR not
only accused the SP of politicising the military, and not only continued to use
communism as a de-legitimating tool, but it also presented an image of the
1997 crisis as a military failure, and depicted 1997 as the year in which the mili-
tary was attacked by unreformed communists who wanted power at any cost and
once in power re-politicised the military.
On the other hand, after the SP won the 1997 elections, the VP refrained from
attacking the MoD except for those military officers who were connectable to the
DP and President Berisha.VP’s main focus was on the analysis of the 1997 crisis
as a justificatory mechanism for the government’s upcoming reform. The VP ar-
gued that after the 1997 crisis the approach to military reform must change and
that it was worrying that “the DP wants to maintain the same structures in place
and consequently to continue with the failed politicisation of the military.”⁴⁵ So
while it aimed to present a conciliatory tone, VP continued to accuse the DP of
being against the de-politicisation of the military. Similarly, in another article the
VP argued that in 1997 the military “was destroyed by Sali Berisha; it was de-
stroyed by the high leadership of the Democratic Party.”⁴⁶ The paper continued
to present the argument that the politicisation of the military destroyed its foun-
dations by arguing that “DP’s criteria for military reform were a hidden facade to
humiliate the military […] DP militants were awarded with military ranks […]
military preparation was replaced by political party preparation […] the objec-
 Democratic Rebirth. “For a professional and disciplined military.”  September a, ,
.
 Democratic Rebirth. “DP’s national security strategy.”  September b, , .
 Voice of the People. “Popular revolt and the dissolution of the military.”  April b, .
 Voice of the People. “Who destroyed the Albanian military?”  April c, .
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tives of the military were replaced with the objectives of the DP.”⁴⁷ To show the
repercussions of the politicisation of the military and the effects of the 1997 cri-
sis, VP presented an overview of the 1997 destruction: “1311 murders, 75 killed
children, 1450 people injured, 52 police officers killed […] 1200 out of 1500 mili-
tary depots destroyed, 562,000 weapons looted, 1,56 billion bullets stolen, 3,5
million grenades, 24 million artillery bullets and explosives, 1 million mines,
and 3600 tons of explosive devices unaccounted.”⁴⁸
Interestingly, both DR and VP agreed that in 1997 the military was destroyed
and portrayed the events of 1997 as a military/security failure. Although they
blamed one another, they identified politicisation as the cause for the destruc-
tion of the military. Despite the agreement that the politicisation of the military
was wrong and that such politicisation produced the 1997 crisis, they still did not
seem able to find a way to break the vicious cycle of politicised coverage. It
seemed that military reform had entered a stable binary mode of mutual accusa-
tions and de-legitimisation, similar to the situation regarding judicial reform,
which could have become a self-reproducing vicious cycle.
In 2002 however, the politicised coverage of military reform was broken, as
this was the first year in which DR had more non-politicised than politicised ar-
ticles on military reform while in opposition. The reversal in 2002 was evident
through two elements. First, the criticism of military reform became less milita-
ry-centred, coverage of military reform became more NATO-integration oriented,
and accusations of military politicisation decreased drastically.⁴⁹ Besides break-
ing the cycle of politicised coverage while in opposition, after the DP came to
power in 2005, DR did not support policy reversal, did not point the finger at
the previous government for everything wrong with the military, and presented
DP’s reforms as a continuation of Socialist reforms.⁵⁰ Importantly, after the SP
moved into opposition in 2005, VP either paid little attention to military reform
or when it covered the topic, was supportive and almost never accused the gov-
ernment of wanting to politicise it.⁵¹
 Voice of the People. “Why was the military destroyed?”  May d, .
 Voice of the People. “The tragedy through numbers.”  September e, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Albanians support America and NATO.”  September , ; Dem-
ocratic Rebirth. “The military celebrates its th anniversary.”  December a, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The furthering of cooperation with NATO, USA and the EU.”  Septem-
ber , ;
Democratic Rebirth. “For the transformation of Albanian defence.” 11 September 2005a, 13.
 Voice of the People. “Rumsfeld in Tirana: appreciation for our soldiers.”  July , ;Voice
of the People. “SP Resolution: Let us fulfil the obligations for NATO membership.”  January
, , ; Voice of the People. “ Majko: The invitation to join NATO will be the final goodbye
to the Albanian transition.”  February a, .
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So how can one account for what seems an unexpected but stable change of
military reform coverage by DR and VP? What changed between 2000 – when
the VP was still comparing DP’s reforms to communist politicisation while DR
was accusing the government of bringing back communist officers – and 2002
which can account for the shift in newspaper coverage? Let me start with
what stayed the same. The political climate was similarly polarised, the players
were the same and distrust was still high. Albania’s democratisation standards
remained similarly low, as both the local elections of 2000 and general elections
of 2001 were contested by the opposition as manipulated. The international sit-
uation also had not changed substantially as Albania’s partners were not any
closer to accepting it as a possible NATO member. For example, in 2002 Albania
was refused to even be considered for potential NATO membership. While do-
mestically and internationally Albania’s conditions were stable and at first
sight did not point to any factors that could break the vicious cycle of military
politicisation, the 1999 Kosovo war changed the dynamics of military reform cov-
erage dramatically, although not immediately. When NATO decided to bombard
Yugoslavia because of its treatment of the Kosovo Albanians, NATO was seen as
righting an historical injustice. Secondly, and importantly, the 1999 Kosovo war
re-opened the debate on the 1997 destruction of the military under a new per-
spective, allowing the meaning of the 1997 crisis to be remoulded. I argue this
is the slow developing mechanism which allowed the ‘sudden’ shift in 2002
and beyond. The following overview will demonstrate how this process pro-
gressed.
During the Kosovo war DR presented an image of NATO as the defender of
freedom and the Albanian people. DR wrote that NATO “has firmly positioned
itself as the protector of the peaceful people of Kosovo. NATO has shown that
it is willing to shorten Balkan dictatorships to defend democratic values.”⁵² DR
also reported that Mr Berisha called upon the Albanian people to unite around
NATO to win the fight and praised NATO for being close to the Albanian people
in such a difficult moment.⁵³ Similarly, DR published a declaration of Mr Berisha
in which he stated that “the arrival of NATO troops in Albania is a historic devel-
opment in our already positive relationship […] we can say that Albania is a de
facto NATO member and the Albanian people a faithful and dignified NATO
ally.”⁵⁴ Lastly, after the Kosovo war ended DR wrote, “NATO begins the liberation
of Kosovo […] Albanians welcome NATO with jubilation.”⁵⁵ In these articles, and
 Democratic Rebirth. “NATO takes over Albania’s airports.”  June , .
 Democratic Rebirth. “The Albanian nation a faithful NATO ally.”  April c, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Albanians, unite to deserve the victory.”  April d, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “NATO begins the liberation of Kosovo.”  June e, .
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others, NATO is presented as the liberator of Albanians, as the defender of dem-
ocratic values, and as an effective organisation since it managed to do what Al-
banians had never been able to: drive the Serbs out of Kosovo.
Besides cementing NATO’s positive reputation, the Kosovo war brought back
to the surface the discussion of the destruction of the military in 1997. As the Yu-
goslav army was shelling border regions, the Albanian military was incapable of
reacting. In 1999 DR covered extensively the shelling of border villages and
towns by the Yugoslav artillery as a proxy to illustrate the ineffectiveness of
the Albanian military. For example, DR wrote “the Serbian army burns Albanian
villages while our armed forces ‘kept their cool’ and did not respond to the
provocation”⁵⁶ because they could not. A few days later DR again wrote that
the northern border was at the mercy of local farmers since the military could
defend it.⁵⁷ These kinds of articles showed the incapacity of the Albanian mili-
tary, after 1997, to defend the border. To establish the connection between the
military’s incapacity to defend the border and its 1997 destruction, DR comment-
ed that “the destruction of the military during the 1997 communist rebellion has
significantly lowered its capacity to defend the nation.”⁵⁸
As the heat of the Kosovo war was dissipating, DR continued the analysis of
the military’s ineffectiveness and published an article by two former officers stat-
ing that “after the Kosovo war NATO members are analysing their militaries’ per-
formance in the conflict.We should also do the same – but with one difference –
our analysis should begin from the destruction of the military in 1997.”⁵⁹ Lastly,
at the end of 1999, DR wrote a long analytical article and argued that the destruc-
tion of the military in 1997 produced its inability to defend the country. Accord-
ing to DR this failure:
[b]ecame clear to the public, especially to those living in the north-eastern areas, because
the military was not able to defend the country against Serbian attacks. The state was not
capable to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the nation; it was not able to defend the
life of its citizens.⁶⁰
 Democratic Rebirth. “The Serbian military burns Albanian villages.”  April  f, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Serbs invade the villages of Tropoja.”  April  g, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Reith: The Albanian military is far from NATO’s standards.”  August
p, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “For a professional and disciplined military.”  September a, ,
.
 Democratic Rebirth. “DP’s national security strategy.”  September b, , .
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The argument is clear; when the military was needed to defend the country’s ter-
ritorial integrity, it was incapable of doing so because it had been destroyed in
1997. The contrast between the Albanian military and NATO armies could not be
starker. NATO defended Albanians while their own military could not because
they had been destroyed it in 1997.
The VP covered the Kosovo war extensively as an existential threat to and
military aggression against Albania. In early 1999 the VP reported on the PM’s
visit to the border region with Yugoslavia, where he was quoted as saying, “we
have to be ready to defend what we hold dearest: our sovereignty.”⁶¹ One
month later the VP wrote that “in the northern region tanks and cannons are
ready for any eventuality.”⁶² While at the end of March the VP stated “the entire
military has been installed in the north.”⁶³ As the border scuffles intensified, the
VP wrote “our tanks fire back against 120 Serbs.”⁶⁴ Lastly, in an article titled
“Serbs want war with Albania”⁶⁵ the paper reported that military incidents
had increased exponentially and that the military was doing its best to defend
the country. Clearly, VP presented the Kosovo crisis as a serious military threat
in which the armed forces were called upon to perform their duties and did so
in an admirable way. Nevertheless, the VP, on numerous occasions argued
that in cases where the Albanian military would not suffice, then NATO would
be called upon.⁶⁶
The reassurance that in cases where the Albanian military were not able to
defend the country NATO would step in is an indication that the VP was aware of
the military’s limitations. Nevertheless, any admission of the military’s incapac-
ity to perform its role was blamed on the 1997 events. For example, the VP quot-
ed the Minister of Defence as saying that “the military is encountering difficulties
in fulfilling its mission because of a lack of resources and the effects of the 1997
destruction.”⁶⁷ In a sense the VP was saying that the government was bequeath-
ed a very poor situation by the predecessors and was trying its best in a difficult
environment. Similarly, in 1999 the VP quoted the MoD as saying that “the armed
forces are ready to defend the country … after its almost total destruction in
 Voice of the People. “Albanians are ready to defend their sovereignty.”  January a, .
 Voice of the People. “Në veri topa e tanke janë gati.”  February b, .
 Voice of the People. “The entire military is in the north.”  March c, .
 Voice of the People. “Tanks fire back against  Serbs.”  May d, .
 Voice of the People. “Serbs want war with Albania.”  June e, .
 Voice of the People. “The USA will defend us.”  February  f, ; Voice of the People.
“NATO: Bombardments until the Serbs pull back.”  May  g, ; Voice of the People.
“Cohen: Albania an important NATO ally.”  July p, .
 Voice of the People. “The Albanian military ready to defend the nation.”  June , .
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19997, amid countless difficulties, the military has been rebuilt.”⁶⁸ Again, the
message was the same: the military was destroyed and it has been rebuilt, but
still it faced difficulties. So, while the VP presented the situation at the northern
border as a military aggression against Albania for which the military was need-
ed, it also argued that the destruction of the military in 1997 inhibited it from ful-
filling its mission.
This kind of coverage – the connection of the 1997 crisis to the military’s in-
ability to defend the border in 1999 – affected DR’s approach, making it more
supportive of military reform under the NATO-integration perspective. For exam-
ple DR wrote that “government and opposition consider NATO’s presence in the
region as a factor in favour of peace and stability, which should be finalised with
Albania’s NATO integration.”⁶⁹ While in 2004 DR wrote, “after the horrible
events of 1997 and the 1999 Kosovo war in which the military had to fight a
‘real’ war, Albania began its most difficult battle, the battle to join NATO.”⁷⁰
After the Kosovo war DR’s coverage became non-politicised, as it relied on the
re-framed memory of the 1997 crisis to support military reform to join NATO,
which had helped Albania during its hour of need and provided a template of
an effective and apolitical military organisation. The NATO-integration perspec-
tive based on the lessons of the crisis during the transition became dominant in
VP’s coverage also as in 2004, while the SP was in government, it wrote:
Ten years ago [DP’s first term] we were a source of weapons for dictatorships around the
world, seven years ago [1997 crisis] the military disintegrated, for three years after that
we consumed the security of our neighbours and were not able to defend ourselves [Kosovo
war]. Now our military ensures there is peace around the world [Albanian peace-keepers in
NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan].⁷¹
Even after the SP went into opposition the VP maintained the same NATO-inte-
gration perspective as it wrote that the SP “encourages all military personnel to
engage without reservation in fulfilling all obligations for NATO accession.”⁷²
Clearly, after the Kosovo war both sides looked at military reform from the
NATO-integration-perspective, which enabled them to depoliticise its coverage
 Voice of the People. “The military is ready to defend the nation.”  January q, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “Government and opposition with a common position on NATO integra-
tion.”  July b, .
 Democratic Rebirth. “NATO General speak about Albania.”  August , .
 Voice of the People. “ November, everything has been rebuilt, even the military.”  No-
vember , .
 Voice of the People. “The DP applies political pressure on the organs of the judiciary.”  De-
cember , .
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and find bipartisan agreement to join the organisation which saved Albanians in
their hour of need and provided them a template to emulate.
Preliminary Conclusion
Newspaper coverage of military reform in the 1990s was strikingly similar to ju-
dicial reform coverage. Both DR and VP accused the SP and DP respectively of
politicising military reform and of continuing the communist practices of polit-
icisation. Based on the military reform coverage of the 1990s, its similarity to
the judicial reform coverage, and to the coverage of the 1997 crisis which was
viewed by both sides as vindication of their worst fears about the other side,
there was no reason to expect the change identified in the 2002.
The coverage of the Kosovo war enabled the re-framing of the 1997 military
destruction. After 1997 both SP and DP agreed that politicisation destroyed the
military, but they were too distrustful of each other to undertake a bipartisan
military reform; they blamed each other for what happened and saw one another
as antithetical to democracy. The agreement that the military was not capable of
defending the country in 1999 because it had been destroyed in 1997 – an event
for which they continued to accuse each other – enabled them to get over the
deep mutual distrust. The 1997 crisis seen through the prism of the Kosovo
war showed that military politicisation did not have just domestic adverse ef-
fects, but also harmed national interests which transcended political divisions.
The connection of the 1997 crisis with the 1999 Kosovo war, and the conclusion
that the 1997 crisis had led to the inability to defend the country in 1999 pro-
duced the shift identified in 2002. The delay from the end of the Kosovo war
in 1999 to DR’s shift to a non-politicised coverage in 2002 is attributed to two fac-
tors. First, elites require time to analyze events, reach conclusions and then
make them public. Second, and as important, political elites need to find the
right timing to come out in favour of such major policy change. The years
2000 and 2001 were hotly contested electoral years and thereby not appropriate
for DR to publically change its views on military reform.
Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, I conclude that the Kosovo war coverage enabled
the change identified in the second decade of transition, but only regarding mili-
tary reform. The way the 1999 Kosovo war was covered by both newspapers has
some striking similarities. First, NATO is presented as an institution on the side
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of Albanians and an efficient defender of the values of Western democracy. Sec-
ond, the military’s incapacity to defend the border during the Kosovo war ena-
bled a re-framing of the 1997 crisis. The Kosovo war demonstrated that the polit-
icisation and then destruction of the military had major negative repercussions
for Albania and Albanians in the Balkans. The one time both sides agreed that
the military was needed to defend the country, they could not use it because they
had destroyed it. The combination of these two elements – NATO as the defender
of Albanians and the Albanian military’s incapacity to defend its own people
after the 1997 destruction – enabled the two sides to see the 1997 crisis through
a new prism. The Kosovo war showed that the way the Albanian military had
been politicised affected not just domestic politics, but also the country’s ability
to defend itself and the Albanian populations outside the official borders.
In addition to the re-framing of the 1997 crisis, NATO’s intervention in Koso-
vo provided Albanian elites with a model they could strive towards and which
enjoyed an overwhelming backing by Albanians,who viewed it as their defender.
The Kosovo war coverage created a permission structure which allowed both
sides to depoliticise the debate on military reform. They could still blame each
other for the 1997 crisis, as they still do, but they could not deny the reality
that when the military was needed most they could not use it because it had
been destroyed. That realisation, and NATO’s popularity, created the opening
to slowly change the coverage and from 2002 on to view military reform from
the ‘NATO integration’ perspective as an objective uniting Socialists and Demo-
crats.
From this analysis it is clear that the main reason for the temporal shift be-
tween the first and second decades of transition in the coverage of military re-
form has to do with the development of the collective memory of the events of
1997 and its re-framing after the 1999 Kosovo war. This conjunction is the
most likely explanatory mechanism which enabled elites to see the ‘apocalypse
of 1997’ and their defencelessness during the Kosovo war as the result of military
politicisation begun in 1944. The fear of another 1997, when the military was dis-
banded, combined with the fear of another 1999, where the military could not
defend the country because it had been destroyed two years earlier, enabled
the shift in military reform coverage in the early 2000s. The fear of another
1997 and another 1999 created the condition for a broad agreement to institution-
alise the armed forces to reach NATO standards and membership since NATO
showed how a professional military could serve Albania well.
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform in Albania 345
Acknowledgement
This publication was supported by a Swedish Institute Research Grant.
References
Berger, Peter and Tomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Random House, 1967.
Cairns, Ed and Michéal D. Roe. Eds. The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basinstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Mithander, Conny, Maria Holmgren Troy and John Sundholm. Eds. Collective Traumas:
Memory of War and Conflict in 20th Century Europe. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007.
Hall, Katharina and Kathryn Jones. Eds. Constructions of Conflict. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011.
Jedlowski, Paolo. “Memory and Sociology. Themes and Issues.” Time and Society 10.1 (2001):
29–44.
Larkin, Craig. Memory Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past. London:
Routledge, 2012.
Litvak, Meir Ed. Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004.
Roudometof, Victor. Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict. Westport:
Preager Publishers, 2002.
Olsen, Johan. “Change and Continuity: An Institutional Approach to Institutions of Democratic
Government.” European Political Science Review 1.1 (2009): 3–32.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Afron koha për gjyqin a bllokmenëve” (Democratic Rebirth, “Nears the
time for the trial of the communist cast”), 11 July 1992: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Aspak hakmarrje, vetem drejtesi” (No revenge just justice). 20 October
1992a: 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “PP(S) – shkaktare dhe pergjegjese per hemoragjine ne ushtri” (The SP
is responsible for the haemorrhaging in the military). 6 October 1992b: 1 and 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “PS: Kundërshtare e vendosur e reformës në drejtësi” (SP: A committed
opponent of military reform). 7 August 1992c: 2.
Rilindja Demokratike. “PP(S) shkaktare dhe përgjegjëse për hemoragjinë në ushtri” (The SP
responsible for the haemorrhaging in the military). 20 October 1992d: 1 and 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Tani e kanë rradhën organet e drejtësisë të kryejnë detyrën” (Now it is
the judiciary’s time to fulfil its duty”). 8 May 1993: 2.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Drejtësia nuk duhet të ketë mëshirë për uzurpatorë të korruptuar dhe
hajdutë ordinerë si Fatos Nano” (The Judiciary must have no mercy on ordinary thieves
like Fatos Nano). 15 May 1993a: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Reformën e drejtësisë nuk mund ta pengojnë ulërimat komuniste të
ZPsë” (Military reform will not be stopped by the communist screams of the VP). 19
November 1993b: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Vetëm një bandë hajdutësh mund të dale në mbrojtje të hajdutit”
(Only a band of thieves can come to the defence of a thief). 18 February 1994: 3.
346 Elvin Gjevori
Rilindja Demokratike. “Ligjit dhe Drejtësisë do t’i nënshtrohet dhe Fatos Nano” (Democratic
Rebirth, “Even Fatos Nano will submit to the law and the judiciary”). 14 February 1994a:
1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Kriminele si Fatos Nano i pret gjykimi edhe per genocid” (Criminals
like [SP Chairman] Fatos Nano should be tried for genocide also). 1 June 1995: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Sistemi Shqiptar i drejtesise synon te arrije standartet bashkekohore”
(The Albanian judiciary aims to reach contemporary standards). 15 February 1996: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Presidenti dorëzon Mejdanin” (The President is stripped of all power).
29 July 1997: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Drejtësia në gijotinë”, (The judiciary under the guillotine). 31 July
1997a: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Drejtësia vihet nën sundimin e krimit” (The judiciary under the
leadership of crime). 28 August 1997b: 2.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Kush e shkaterroi ushtrine?” (Who destroyed the military?). 1
November 1997c: 7.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Brokaj: burg për gjithë demokratët” (The Defence Minister: Prison for
all Democrats). 5 August 1997d: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Rithirrja e ish-oficerëve politizim i ushtrisë” (The recall of former
officers re-politicises the military). 24 August 1997e: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “NATO merr aeroportet e Shqipërisë” (NATO takes over Albania’s
airports). 13 June 1998: 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Antiligji dhe vjedhjet jane ne lulezim” (The anti-law and thefts are
blooming). 9 January 1999: 7.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Për një ushtri profesioniste dhe të disiplinuar” (For a professional and
disciplined military). 19 September 1999a: 12 and 13.
Rilindja Demokratike. “PD për mbrojtjen dhe sigurinë e vendit” (DP’s national security
strategy). 29 September 1999b: 12 and 13.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Kombi Shqiptar, aleat besnik i NATO” (The Albanian nation a faithful
NATO ally). 23 April 1999c: 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Shqiptarë, të bashkojemi për të merituar fitoren” (Albanians, unite to
deserve the victory). 23 April 1999d: 3.
Rilindja Demokratike. “NATO fillon clirimin e Kosovës” (NATO begins the liberation of
Kosovo). 13 June 1999e: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Ushtria Serbe djeg fshatrat e Tropojës” (The Serbian military burns
Albanian villages). 14 April 1999f: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Serbët pushtojnë fshatrat ne Tropojë” (Serbs invade the villages of
Tropoja). 20 April 1999 g: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Reith: Ushtria Shqiptare larg standardeve të NATOs” (Reith: The
Albanian military is far from NATO’s standards). 28 August 1999p: 2.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Spastrimet politike ne gjyqësor vazhdojnë” (Political cleansing in the
judiciary continues). 12 January 2000: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Shqiptarët me Amerikën dhe NATOn” (Democratic Rebirth, “Albanians
support America and NATO”), 11 September 2002: 5.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Ushtria feston 90-vjetorin” (The military celebrates its 90th
anniversary). 5 December 2002a: 2.
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform in Albania 347
Rilindja Demokratike. “Pozitë-opozitë, qëndrim unik për NATO-n” (Government and opposition
with a common position on NATO integration). 5 July 2002b: 4.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Gjeneralë të NATOs flasin për Shqipërinë” (NATO General speak about
Albania). 10 August 2004: 15.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Zgjerimi i bashkepunimit me NATO-n, SHBA-te dhe BE-ne” (The
furthering of cooperation with NATO, USA and the EU). 11 September 2005: 11.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Per transformimin e mbrojtjes Shqiptare” (For the transformation of
Albanian defence). 11 September 2005a: 13.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Goditja e krimit dhe korruptionit dalldis PSnë” (The war against crime
and corruption confuses the SP). 26 February 2006: 1.
Rilindja Demokratike. “Bandat e Krimit ne kupolën e PS” (Criminal bands in the SP
leadership). 22 April 2007: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “PD presion politik ndaj organeve të drejtësisë” (Voice of the People, “The DP
applies political pressure on the organs of the judiciary”). 7 December 2008: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Atë punë e di partia.” (Party knows best). 2 December 1992: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Cfarë shteti po ndërtohet në Shqipëri; shtet juridik apo shtet politik?” (What
kind of state are we building in Albania: a political or a legal state?). 17 December
1992a: 1 and 2.
Zëri i Popullit. “Kush pergjigjet per hemoragjine ne ushtrine Shqiptare?” (Who is responsible
for the haemorrhaging in the Albanian military?). 2 October 1992b: 1 and 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Intelektualët e drejtësisë nën shenjestrën e PD” (The judiciary under the DP’s
attack). 6 January 1993: 1 and 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Pushteti gjyqësor në bankën e të akuzuarve” (The judiciary under
accusation). 10 January 1993a: 5.
Zëri i Popullit. “Përgatitja e ‘Benikëve të Partisë’ në kurse 3–mujore tregon se sa në rrezik
janë të drejtat e njeriut në Shqipëri” (The preparation of the Party’s faithful in 3–month
courses shows the danger to human rights in Albania). 10 April 1993b: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Drejtësia nën këmbët e shtetit Ballisto-Fashist” (The judiciary under the feet
of the rightist fascist state). 27 July 1993c: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Drejtësia a trembur” (A scared judiciary). 11 August 1993d: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Pvarësia e pushtetit gjyqësor në Shqipëri një fakt apo një nen në letër?” (The
independence of the judiciary in Albania: a reality or just a piece of paper?). 13 October
1993e: 2.
Zëri i Popullit. “Reforma në ushtri mbrohen me fakte dhe ligje, jo me servilizëm dhe
demagogji” (“Military reform is defended through facts and laws, not demagoguery”). 10
February 1993f: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Reforma në ushtri udhëhiqet nga PD dhe jo nga ligjet” (Military reform is led
by the DP not the rule of law). 20 August 1993 g: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Drejtësia nën kthetrat a shtetit politik” (The judiciary under the claws of the
political state). 8 April 1994: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Ushtria i shërben kombit, jo lojrave politike të PD” (The military should serve
the nation, not DP’s political games). 11 June 1994a: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Ju jeni i vendosur të enci në rrugën e anti-ligjit” (You are committed to break
the law). 24 June 1994b: 1 and 2.
Zëri i Popullit. “Të bëjmë një drejtësi të pavarur” (Let us build an independent judiciary). 6
September 1997: 2.
348 Elvin Gjevori
Zëri i Popullit. “Bie mafia e gjykatave” (The court mafia collapses). 25 September 1997a: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Revolta popullore dhe shpërbërja e ushtrisë” (Popular revolt and the
dissolution of the military). 9 April 1997b: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Kush e shkatërroi ushtrinë Shqiptare?” (Who destroyed the Albanian
military?). 23 April 1997c: 8.
Zëri i Popullit. “Pse u shkatërrua ushtria?” (Why was the military destroyed?). 9 May 1997d:
6.
Zëri i Popullit. “Tragjedia përmes numrave” (The tragedy through numbers). 23 September
1997e: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Ushtria Shqiptare e gatshme të mbrojë vendin” (The Albanian military ready
to defend the nation). 9 June 1998: 2.
Zëri i Popullit. “Drejtësi jo për t’i shërbyer politikës” (The judiciary should not serve politics).
23 October 1999: 9.
Zëri i Popullit. “Shqiptarët të gatshëm të ruajnë sovranitetin” (Albanians are ready to defend
their sovereignty). 30 January 1999a: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Në veri topa e tanke janë gati” (In the north tanks and cannons are ready).
27 February 1999b: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Në veri është gjithë ushtria” (The entire military is in the north). 24 March
1999c: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Tanket qëllojnë mbi 120 Serbë” (Tanks fire back against 120 Serbs),12 May
1999d: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Serbët duan luftë me Shqipërinë” (Serbs want war with Albania). 8 June
1999e: 2.
Zëri i Popullit. “SHBA do të na mbrojnë” (The USA will defend us). 4 February 1999f: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “NATO: Bombardime derisa Serbët të tërhiqen” (NATO: Bombardments until
the Serbs pull back). 12 May 1999 g: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “Cohen: Shqipëria aleati ynë i rëndësishëm” (Cohen: Albania an important
NATO ally), 13 July 1999p: 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Ushtria është e gatshme për të mbrojtur vendin” (The military is ready to
defend the nation). 16 January 1999q: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Dokumenti i sigurimit kombëtar – shprehje e përgjegjësisë politike e
kombëtare” (The document of national security strategy – an expression of political and
national responsibility). 15 February 2000: 5.
Zëri i Popullit. “29 Nëntor, rimëkëmbet gjithcka, edhe ushtria” (29 November, everything has
been rebuilt, even the military). 30 November 2004: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Rumsfeld ne Tiranë: vlerësim për ushtarët” (Rumsfeld in Tirana: appreciation
for our soldiers). 6 July 2006: 5.
Zëri i Popullit. “Mazhoranca bën gjithcka për pushtimin e KLDsë” (The majority does
anything to invade the HCJ). 4 October 2006a: 4.
Zëri i Popullit. “Sistemi i Drejtësisë në duart e PD” (The judiciary under the control of the
DP). 24 October 2007: 1.
Zëri i Popullit. “PSSH Rezolutë: Të përmbushim detyrimet për anëtarësimin në NATO” (SP
Resolution: Let us fulfil the obligations for NATO membership). 9 January 2008: 1 and 3.
Zëri i Popullit. “Majko: Ftesa për në NATO do të jetë një lamtumirë për tranzicionin Shqiptar”
(Majko: The invitation to join NATO will be the final goodbye to the Albanian transition).
9 February 2008a: 13.
Collective Memory and Institutional Reform in Albania 349

Igor Pietraszewski and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa
Clashes between National and
Post-national European Views on
Commemorating the Past:
The Case of the Centennial Hall in Wrocław
In June 2007, the mayor of the city of Wrocław received a certificate from the
UNESCO director-general. This document confirmed that the Jahrhunderthalle,
designed by Max Berg and built in 1911–1913, had been added to the World Her-
itage List. The building, for 62 years (specifically since 1945) known to genera-
tions of Poles as Hala Ludowa (“People’s Hall”) was registered at the UNESCO
office in Paris under its original historical Prussian name from 1913, which trans-
lates as “Centennial Hall”. This was just one of many events and commemora-
tions that have taken place in Wrocław in recent years. The name change is an
important symbolic act symptomatic of the process of change in the city’s histor-
ical memory narrative, and more broadly of the political and cultural transfor-
mations taking place in Poland. The processes that led to the new name can
be traced to the changes in the politics of memory¹ at the macro (EU politics
of memory), meso (politics of history of Poland and Germany) and micro
(local politics of history) levels. In this article we concentrate in particular on
the process on the micro scale, by analyzing the actions of mnemonic actors par-
ticipating in the construction of the space of local historical memory in Wrocław.
We aim to examine the local debate sparked by the name change. We consider
this debate significant since in our view it represents a good example of the
squabbles and conflicts witnessed in today’s Europe between the proponents
of a traditional, national approach to history and the advocates of a common Eu-
ropean one (and the one supported by the EU and Council of Europe). This post-
national idea of the past emphasizes the artifice of ideologically constructed na-
tional divides in the entangled national histories of Europe, encouraging instead
the removal of the stereotypical and often ahistorical categorizations into “ours”
and “yours” or friends and enemies. This vision of a European past strives to lib-
 We understand “politics of memory” as the top-down implementation by elites of ways for
society to see the past, mostly for political-ideological objectives. For an insightful discussion on
the definition of the politics of memory see Lech M Nijakowski. Polska polityka pamięci.Wars-
zawa: Wyd. Profesjonalne i akademickie, , –.
erate the European memory narratives from any excessively emotional, national
particularisms.²
Wrocław’s history makes it a particularly good place to observe the disputes
between these two ideologically deep-rooted ways of viewing the past affecting
the way in which the formation of Europe’s future is seen. It is a borderland city
that during its long history has belonged to several countries: the Polish Crown,
the Czech Crown, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia, Germany, and since 1945 to Po-
land. Moreover, after the Second World War the city experienced a complete ex-
change of population that was unprecedented in such a large settlement. Due to
the changed borders and a decision by the Allies, the German population³ was
 This project of a post-national, European community is articulated both at an intellectual
level (see for example writings by Jürgen Habermas or Gerard Delanty,) and in political decla-
rations of European institutions (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty) as well as expressed in practice (e.g.
the European Culture Capital initiative, European Heritage Label, European Heritage Trails).
 Officially and according to the orders of the authorities, no single German was to remain. In
practice, though, a small group of Germans did stay, slowly diminishing as a result of Poloniza-
tion or emigration to Germany. Since this was a long-lasting process, specific numbers are hard
Fig. 1: The Centennial Hall in Wrocław
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forced to leave and was replaced by Poles. This complex history constitutes a
challenge for the city’s inhabitants. While making decisions about its develop-
ment, they also have to take positions and express their attitude to the German
past of the city in particular and their approach (national or post-national) to the
past in general.
The analysis of the debate which follows is based mainly on media sources
such as the press and comments on Internet forums. The latter communication
channel would appear to be one of few widely available methods for people
to articulate their views in the public space since it airs the views of people out-
side of the select group of the opinion-forming elites.When analyzing the situa-
tion regarding the change to the hall’s name, we concentrate on the relationship
between the “official memory”⁴ and the reactions it triggers that are visible in
Internet forums.We supplemented the Internet sources by holding several inter-
views with representatives of Wrocław’s local authorities.⁵
In the analysis that follows, we treat the participants of the debate on the
Centennial Hall as mnemonic actors participating in the construction of the
space of local historical memory in Wrocław. We want to show the course of
this process, as well as attempt to give a typology of the positions of the actors
participating in it. To do this, we make use of theoretical concepts formulated by
Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik,⁶ who stress that, through their actions in the
cultural memory field,⁷ mnemonic actors construct “memory regimes” – under-
stood as organized ways of remembering a specific issue at a given moment.⁸
Bernhard and Kubik offer a typology of memory regimes (fractured, pillarized,
unified) based on the combination of different types of actors (whom they cate-
to come by – see Grzegorz Strauchold’s article “Polityka narodowościowa na Ziemiach Zachod-
nich i Północnych w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej.” Pamięć i Przyszłość” . ().
 We define “official memory” as the ways of remembering the past propagated by actors (po-
litical and other) in the public space. Cf. Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik. Eds. Twenty Years
after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, New York: Oxford University
Press, , .
 The interviews were held in .When quoting them we retain the respondents’ anonymity.
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemo-
ration.
 Cultural memory can be defined as representations of the past encapsulated in material ob-
jects (including written words). Cultural memory is a kind of institution. “It is exteriorized, ob-
jectified and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sound of words or the sight of ges-
tures, are stable and situation-transcendent”; see Jan Assmann. “Communicative and Cultural
Memory.” Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Eds. Astrid
Erll and Ansgar Nünning. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter , .
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemo-
ration, .
The Case of the Centennial Hall in Wrocław 353
gorize as warriors, pluralists, abnegators) involved in the construction of these
regimes. The whole set of memory regimes in a given society in a given period
can be called “the field of memory” or “mnemonic field.” In our analysis we
see the change of the name of the famous building in 2007 in Wrocław as a con-
struction of a memory regime aiming to contribute to the changes of the memory
field in Poland in general and in Wrocław in particular. We try to identify the
types of mnemonic actors involved in this process and the type of memory re-
gime, and to describe the changes to the memory field.
The origins of the debate
During the communist era in Poland Wrocław was cast as an original Polish,
Piast city which, although seized as a result of an unfortunate twist of fate for
a long time by the Germans, Poland’s eternal enemies, had been returned to
the “mother ship” in 1945. This narrative lacked any positive evaluation of the
German past input in Wrocław’s development. The material traces of the German
culture were neglected and sometimes simply destroyed. However, since the fall
of communism in 1989 there has been a radical change in the local memory
field.⁹ In 1989, with the change to the political system and implementation of de-
mocracy, the generation that had created and struggled in the anti-communist
opposition movement known as Solidarity came to power in Wrocław. This
was manifested in the approach to history and the new memory narrative con-
cerning the history of the city. As Bernhard and Kubik point out:
A radical regime change, such as that experienced in Eastern Europe in 1989, is not only
about the reconfiguration of economic interests, redistribution of political power, and reor-
dering of social relations. It is also about the reformulation of collective identities and the
introduction or reinvigoration of the principles of legitimizing power [emphasis ours]. These
two tasks cannot be realized without a reexamination of the group’s past, their historical
memory.¹⁰
The elites ruling Wrocław from 1989, who came from liberal circles, officially
adopted and approved the new vision of Wrocław’s past, thus rejecting the nar-
rative dominant in the communist era. The new narrative of the past is in tune
with European models of narrating the past with focus on cultural encounters,
 See Gregor Thum. Uprooted: How Breslau became Wroclaw. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, .
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, –.
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mutual recognition and discourses of multiculturalism.¹¹ Thus the creators and
proponents of the new narrative pay attention to the German cultural traces in
Wroclaw. At the same time they attempt to balance the sometimes bothersome
weight of the German heritage in Wrocław by stressing the city’s “multicultural”
past, understood as memory of the fact that Wrocław’s development was deter-
mined by many cultures.Wrocław’s multiculturalism seems debatable, however,
since although the city was for a long time dominated by German culture, today
it is almost totally ethnically Polish. However, the creation of historical memory
is rarely a simple attempt to formulate a “truthful” reconstruction of the past; it
is usually about selective remembering and forgetting in order to create a specific
vision of it for a number of reasons: political, ideological, existential and com-
mercial.
The constructed myth of “multicultural” Wrocław is a conscious action of
the authorities.¹² It has become part of the city’s strategy,¹³ and was used in
its successful candidature for the title of European City of Culture 2016. Accord-
ing to the idea of a multicultural past, Wrocław should draw from its history to
become an important European center, a modern “meeting place” in which both
present and past inhabitants as well as people of various cultures and nations
feel equally at home. At the same time, this means recognition of the co-exis-
tence of various memories in Wrocław, in particular the German and the Polish
memory and their burden of conflicts. In the light of this idea, the authorities’
decision to revert to the old German name of the hall designed by Max Berg
seems reasonable.
The idea of registering the People’s Hall on the UNESCO list was explained
by a leading Lower Silesia official:
Where did the Centennial Hall idea come from? Wrocław really wanted to have something
put on the UNESCO list. The UNESCO list is already full of all kinds of things, and it’s hard
to find a reason to nominate something. Most of Wrocław’s beautiful old buildings are re-
constructions because they were rebuilt […]. Added to which, the UNESCO list already has
so many buildings like that that no more will get into that category. As it turned out, there
was a gap for the early 20th century, the architecture from that time, something like that.
 For analysis of this discourse see for example Thomas Risse. A Community of Europeans?
Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press, ; or Cris
Shore.”Inventing Homo Europaeus. The Cultural Politics of European Integration.” Ethnologia
Europaea. Journal of European Ethnology . (): –.
 Stanisław Kłopot “Kreowanie mitu wielokulturowego Wrocławia.” Pamięć jako kategoria
rzeczywistości społecznej. Eds. J. Styka and M. Dziekanowska. Lublin: Wyd UMCS, .
 “Strategy Wrocław  Plus” from , “Wrocław  Plus. Studies on the city strat-
egy”, Biuro Rozwoju Wrocławia Bulletin . (): –.
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Generally UNESCO had inscribed older ones. Perhaps someone noticed it might work. […]
So what could be nominated from Wrocław? […] Oh, the People’s Hall! But the People’s Hall
was built as the Centennial Hall. So if you lodged an application with a historical outline,
then you’d probably have to refer to the historical name. ¹⁴
One high-ranking official from the City Council described the way in which the
name change was made as follows:
When we decided to apply for the UNESCO list for the People’s Hall, the specialists, the
UNESCO administration in Paris, said that to make the addition of this entry successful
we shouldn’t use two names, because we were using the name the People’s Hall and the
historical name, the Centennial Hall. And to be honest they didn’t order us, just said ‘stand-
ardize’ the nomenclature in the application that you’re submitting. As a result, the group of
historians writing the application made what was in my opinion the correct decision, to use
the historical name, because it had from the beginning been called the Centennial Hall. ¹⁵
As the above statements show, the people who put together and submitted the
application for the hall to be added to the UNESCO list were convinced about
the need to invoke the historical, Prussian name. This was a decision that fitted
the strategy adopted in the 1990s to redefine the historical narrative about Wro-
cław, one with ideological, political and economic motivations. The policy-mak-
ers therefore did not expect any resistance.
The information that a change had been made to the name of the hall
reached the public through diverse information in the media. There were ques-
tions as to what event the Prussian name commemorated. In nationwide and
local newspapers and the Internet, differing historical interpretations concerning
the name of the Centennial Hall began to appear. A fierce debate was unleashed.
What is commemorated by the name
“Centennial Hall”?
The official version of the building’s erection, as described on the hall’s official
website, is given in very neutral terms: “the Centennial Hall was designed by
Max Berg, an architect and constructor. This facility is the most famous work
of Wrocław Modernism. Its structure was erected between 1911 and 1913, and
 Interview conducted by the authors in November .
 Interview conducted by the authors in November .
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its interiors held the Centennial Exhibition to commemorate the 100th anniver-
sary of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig.”¹⁶
Writing in the right-wing national daily Rzeczpospolita, the well-known col-
umnist Piotr Semka complained about the lack of historical context in this de-
scription. His article “Raising Prussian ghosts”¹⁷ quoted information from Ger-
man Wikipedia. According to this version, the official opening of the hall took
place on 10 March 1913, the day on which, in an effort to increase the anti-French
mood before the impending conflict with Napoleon’s army, King Frederick Wil-
liam III of Prussia had founded the new order of the Iron Cross. According to
Semka, this order:
[…] was a fetish of Prussian glory at the time of Breslau’s celebrations. This style was adopt-
ed by the Nazis […] The proponents of a return to the old name are outraged at the iden-
tification of the hall with an order that has a strongly negative connotation in Poland, re-
peating that one can speak solely about the connection with the anniversary of Prussia’s
wars of liberation against Napoleon. But the thing is that there is no contradiction between
the two – the cult of the Iron Cross was and is inextricably connected in German national
mythology with the 1813 war and Breslau. Therefore, the circumstances in which the hall
came into being are not quite so innocent for a Polish observer. […] Regardless of the chau-
vinistic character of the centenary celebrations, though, another question arises. Why
should we in Polish Wrocław revive a date that for Poland meant Napoleon’s betrayal enact-
ed by Prussia? A date that foreshadowed the defeat of the Duchy of Warsaw,¹⁸ the annihi-
lation of Prince Józef Poniatowski’s army?¹⁹ The date of the renewed alliance of Russia and
Prussia, the two most aggressive partitioning powers? […] The opponents of the name
change pointed to the clandestine way in which it was reinstated and asked a simple ques-
tion: “why should we even in a seemingly unimportant name celebrate the triumph of Prus-
sian glory?”
A similar note was struck by history professor Jerzy Robert Nowak, a commen-
tator and columnist for Trwam Television, Radio Maryja, the newspaper Nasz
Dziennik and other Catholic right-wing media:
 http://www.halastulecia.pl/en/historia?m= ( January ).
 http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/-Wywolywanie-pruskich-duchow.html ( October
).
 The Duchy of Warsaw was a Polish state established by Napoleon I in  from the Polish
lands ceded by Prussia. Following Napoleon’s defeat, the duchy was occupied by Prussian and
Russian troops until , when it was formally partitioned between the two countries at the
Congress of Vienna.
 Prince Józef Poniatowski was a Polish military hero who led the Polish troops allied with
Napoleon. His death at the Battle of Leipzig in  became a legend, depicted in Polish nation-
al iconography.
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The defeat of the Polish armies alongside the French at the Battle of Leipzig meant both
further thwarting of hopes for independence and being plunged into the ever stronger
bondage of the partitions, including that of Hohenzollern Prussia. To revert to the old
name commemorating the centenary of the Prussian triumph at the Battle of Leipzig there-
fore means today in Polish Wrocław a kind of national masochism – reconciling ourselves
with a name commemorating Poland’s once again falling into long and hopeless slavery.
This was the reason for the very turbulent disputes that arose over the name change,
which unfortunately ended in triumph for the proponents of the Prussian name, mostly
owing to the position of Wrocław’s present stewards.²⁰
Such interpretations of the name met with opposition from the liberal-oriented
media. An especially active participant in the mounting debate was the Gazeta
Wyborcza journalist Beata Maciejewska. As historian specializing in the history
of Wrocław, she has written several dozen articles on this subject. Her response
to the two statements cited above was as follows:
Whose centenary is it? This was evident in the last debate provoked by Prof. Jerzy Robert
Nowak, the Radio Maryja ideologist, who claimed that Wrocław is being re-Germanized and
has entered into battle with the Prussian invader and its Fifth Column. One of the most im-
portant items in the account of damages he lodged on the city’s behalf was the change of
the name of the People’s Hall to the Centennial Hall. The opponents of this change stressed
that it is a symbol of Prussian militarism, confirmation of the Prussian triumph in the Battle
of the Nations at Leipzig. Its supporters spoke of respect for Wrocław’s foreign history, and
said that it is not worth using another name, as the building can be seen by its historic
name on the UNESCOWorld Heritage List. I have been following this debate online: almost
none of its participants used the most important argument – that the people of Breslau had
no intention of honoring the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig. Of course, the
imperial court wanted this. But the liberal Breslau city council, in which almost half of the
councilors were social democrats, decided to remember the proclamation of King Frederick
William III, “To my people” (An mein Volk), in which the ruler called for a joint war for lib-
eration “from foreign rulers”. The councilors understood the royal appeal as giving some of
the power to the nation, the victory of its democratic aspirations, incidentally more limited
after the events of the 1848 revolutions. In such a situation it makes sense that Emperor
William II did not give money for the building of the Hall, and that the city had to take
out a loan, which was a huge burden for its budget. The emperor also failed to become
a patron of the Centennial Exhibition (only the Four-Domes Pavilion was devoted to his his-
torical honor, not the Hall) and he was not present at its opening. Note that the occasion
was celebrated with a show of Gerhart Hauptmann’s drama Festspiel im deutschen Reimen,
about the Battle of Leipzig. The play had pacifist overtones, and portrayed Napoleon as the
destroyer of the ancien régime and creator of common Europe. A scandal erupted, the Euro-
pean press was severe in its criticism, and the play had to be cancelled. And this should be
 http://www.jerzyrobertnowak.com/artykuly/Nasz_Dziennik//...php ( No-
vember ).
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remembered before we start to hold fervent orations about the “glorification of Prussian
militarism”. […] The Rzeczpospolita columnist Piotr Semka has written that [the Iron
Cross] is a symbol of Prussian militarism and a fetish of Prussian glory later adopted by
the Nazis. Proof: the Nazis put the Iron Cross with a Prussian eagle in Wrocław’s coat of
arms from 1938. Indeed they did, but with the eagle of the Silesian Piasts. And the Iron
Cross itself was something that many Polish officers fighting in the German army during
the First World War had. […] It is also worth remembering that today a stylised Iron
Cross is a symbol of the German armed forces, with whom the Polish army is allied. History
likes to complicate everything, so before passing censure it is better to learn it.²¹
The polemic over the name in the national and local press also soon captured
the attention of Wrocław’s inhabitants. Rather than being the sole preserve of
the elites (politicians, academic, journalists etc.), debate also flared on Internet
forums. Wrocław residents displayed varying attitudes to the name change and
the politics of historical memory pursued by the city’s authorities. Some asked
whether the building and street names given by the former partitioners and en-
emies of Poland should be reinstated, or monuments erected to eminent former
German inhabitants of the city. Earlier initiatives of the authorities to put up
monuments and plaques to remember famous German personalities such Frie-
drich Schiller or Dietrich Bonhoeffer had not aroused much opposition,²² yet
commemorating the Prussian victory brought a wave of indignation expressed
especially online in the form of comments on articles addressing the hall’s
name change. Posts on forums revealed differences in positions regarding the
complicated Polish-German history, and difficulties in bridging the line dividing
the distinct memories of the victors and defeated. Furthermore, they demonstrat-
ed the problem of some Internet-users in assimilating Poland’s post-war commu-
nist history.²³
 Beata Maciejewska. “Zakończmy wojnę wrocławsko-pruską.” Gazeta Wyborcza [Wroclaw, n.
]  March .
 See Thum. Uprooted: How Breslau became Wroclaw.
 Discussed was the extent to which the name “People’s” was tied to the legacy of commu-
nism. “Zdecydowanie Hala Ludowa. Lud to pojęcie niekomunistyczne”, awas_awas, http://
m.wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/,,.html?i= ( November ).
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The debate on the Centennial Hall on Internet
forums
Internet forums have become a unique communication channel open to all, in
which anyone can articulate their views in the public space. Their anonymity
means that people can speak freely. The hundreds of posts on the hall included
not only those at odds with political correctness (and thus with the officially im-
plemented politics of memory), but also those who expressed support for the
name change or attempted to reconcile the two sides of the argument.
Using the above-mentioned typology suggested by Bernhard and Kubik, and
based on the posts on the hall’s name change, several categories of mnemonic
actors can be distinguished.
The most obvious category is that of “mnemonic warriors.” Their character-
istic trait is that they claim to represent the sole legitimate truth. They also tend
to espouse a single, unidirectional, mythologized vision of time. They see the
present as permeated by the ‘spirit’ of the past. Thus, in their view, “the prob-
lems of the present (and the future) cannot be effectively addressed unless the
whole polity is set on the proper foundation constructed according to the
‘true’ vision of history. The alternative visions of the past – by definition ‘distort-
ed’ – need to be delegitimized or destroyed.”²⁴ Mnemonic warriors in Wrocław
include both proponents and adversaries of the name “Centennial Hall”. Its op-
ponents delegitimize supporters by accusing them of conscious or unconscious
(resulting from stupidity) betrayal of national interests. The supporters of the
new name delegitimize its opponents by presenting them as national chauvin-
ists. Those against the name change often invoke national myths of the past
(“Wrocław was always Polish”, “Germany is our eternal enemy”). Those in
favor promote a post-national vision and Europe, and also have a tendency to
mythologize both the past and the future (applying the myth of a multicultural
Wrocław).
Let us take a look at the dynamic of the debates raging on forums among
mnemonic warriors. On the Website of the Wrocław club of the right-wing Gazeta
Polska newspaper, the following proclamation appeared:
As residents of Wrocław we express our deep concern, which has recently only heightened, at
the process of Germanisation of our city [emphasis ours]. Aware as we are that the time of
Wrocław’s greatest development came at a time when it found itself in German hands, this
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, .
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does not stop us from invoking its Polishness.We believe that, as Poles living for over half a
century in Wrocław, we have every right to shape our national identity [emphasis ours], cul-
tivate Polish tradition and honor. Polish heroes. The restoration of German building and
street names, which takes place under the aegis of being part of the European trend [empha-
sis ours], is possible thanks to the exploitation of Wrocław’s citizens’ ignorance and is hap-
pening without a broad debate on the topic. A clear example is the already universally used
name “Centennial Hall”, which is a faithful translation of the German name “Jahrhunder-
thalle”. One should recall that the name given to the building after it was erected in 1913
alludes to the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig (1813).We have no doubt that
for Poles to celebrate the anniversary of the tragic “Battle of the Nations” is at the very least
regrettable [emphasis ours], since it brought the victory of the partitioners of Poland over
Napoleon’s army together with its ally, the Army of the Duchy of Warsaw. This was a defeat
which put an end to the possibility to create a free Poland. It was also here that one of the
greatest Polish national heroes, the Commander in Chief of the Polish Armies of the Duchy
of Warsaw Prince Józef Poniatowski, fell. The remarkable cult which arose after his death
gave the Polish Nation heart for over 100 years as it awaited its victory. The French historian
Bainville described him as a “symbol of Poland faithful though in vain”, while late in his
life, Napoleon – acknowledged as the greatest leader in world history – admitted that Po-
niatowski was “the true king of Poland”.
Given the divergence between the actual name, associated with the People’s Republic
of Poland, the Wrocław People’s Hall Company Sp. z o.o.²⁵, and the name in public circu-
lation for several years, “Centennial Hall”, we propose an entirely new name, which also
makes reference to the building’s history. Our compromise suggestion is “Prince Józef Po-
niatowski Hall”.²⁶
The idea to give the hall the name of Prince Józef Poniatowski, a Polish national
hero who died at the Battle of Leipzig fighting at Napoleon’s side, did not go
down well with the supporters of the Centennial Hall name. One person to
react fiercely was the aforementioned Beata Maciejewska, one of the main “mne-
monic warriors”, and as a Gazeta Wyborcza journalist someone with a tremen-
dous influence on the formation of the historical narrative in Wrocław. She
used her articles and columns²⁷ to criticize and ridicule this idea and met with
an emotional reaction from some readers through comments on Gazeta Wybor-
cza. The followings are representative comments from eight readers participating
in the discussion; we report their posts maintaining the same readers’ nick-
 “Sp. z o.o.” means limited liability corporation.
 “Wrocław: Chcą zmienić nazwę Hali Ludowej.” Gazeta Polska http://wroclaw.naszemias-
to.pl/artykul/,wroclaw-chca-zmienic-nazwe-hali-ludowej,id,t.html ( November
).
 “Hala Stulecia czy imienia Poniatowskiego [FELIETON].” Gazeta Wyborcza http://wroclaw.-
gazeta.pl/wroclaw/,,,Hala_Stulecia_czy_imienia_Poniatowskiego__FELIE-
TON_.html ( November ).
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names, as they appear on the Webpage: “wrocławianin”, “45rtg”, “WK”,
“1410_tenrok”, “Flying_jureczek”, “jerzyt21”, “karakalla” and “Jacek”.
the standard of journalism at gw [Gazeta Wyborcza] has hit rock bottom… and as for chang-
ing the name of the hall to Józef Poniatowski, I’m absolutely in favour, as you can’t have
much between the ears if you celebrate the victory of the Prussians over Napoleon […]
why stick to that? Since we have centennial hall why not name it after hakata²⁸ or good
old uncle Adolf?²⁹
Another post:
What, Maciejewska, does it hurt that only your paper uses the name you made up for the
People’s Hall? That the people of Wrocław say “People’s Hall”, just as they always have?
Come on then Maciejewska, get used to the fact that you can’t get everything done through
your paper’s “social actions” that have the finesse and standard of honesty of the “sponta-
neous workers” actions’ in Gomułka’s time.³⁰
And one more comment:
Wait a moment. After convincing the lemmings that the People’s Hall “must” be the Cen-
tennial Hall (as if the name in Polish is of any significance for foreigners), the time will
come for an exhibition of the eminent figures who have appeared there. And then, to re-
spect history (after all, ‘our’ city was faithful to the Nazi Party and Hitler like few others
in the Third Reich), we will have to hang up a portrait of Hitler.
Ms Maciejewska, it’s time to write a justification – what are you waiting for? In the
meantime – as an exercise – please show what the difference is between renaming the Im-
perial Bridge the Grunwaldzki Bridge³¹ and renaming the Centennial Hall the Prince Józef
Poniatowski Hall.³²
 Hakata – colloquial name for the German nationalist organisation Deutscher Ostmarkenver-
ein, which sought the Germanisation of the Polish lands in the Prussian partition.
 Posted by “wrocławianin” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,Re_Hala_Stulecia_czy_imienia_Poniatowskiego_FEL.html (
November ).
 Posted by “rtg”. Gomułka was the leader of Communist Poland from  to . http://
wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/,,,Co_ma_wspolnego_Hala_Stulecia_z_Poniatow-
skim_i_inne.html?v=&obxx=#opinions ( November ).
 This refers to a historic Wrocław bridge, known in pre-war German Breslau as Imperial
Bridge and renamed by the Poles after  as Grunwaldzki Bridge.
 Posted by “WK” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,Przyjdzie_czas_i_na_portret_Hitlera_w_Hali.html ( November
).
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The comments under the articles on the hall’s name included both individual
posts and entire discussions. It is worth quoting an extract that is symptomatic
of the dispute over the name. Particularly notable is the amount of historical
knowledge and emotional involvement of the participants using the login
names “WK” and “1410_tenrok”. They present differing positions towards histor-
ical interpretation. “WK”’s stance seems to be characteristic of a traditional, na-
tional understanding of history, whereas “1410_tenrok” presents a new, Europe-
an model of post-national memory that relativizes the traditional, national view
of history. This user writes, for example:
Two hundred years post factum, nobody comprehends those events. Unfortunately Napo-
leon was a kind of Hitler of the early nineteenth century! He did little for the Polish
cause, if anything! […] It’s worth remembering that this was by no means a Polish battle,
but just a battle of nations who wanted to defeat a troublemaker and usurper […].³³
“WK” countered this comment as follows:
Absolutely agree, the battle was not Polish and THAT’S WHY WE HAVE NO REASON TO
COMMEMORATE IT!
[…] By what right should we in Poland refer to the brand of a hall from the worst pe-
riod of Prussian militarism,whose immediate successor was after all Hitlerism? If it was the
“Bierut”, “Stalin”, “Polish Workers’ Party”, ‘People’s Republic Workers’ Hall (or something
like that), that would be a disgrace, but what’s wrong with the name “People’s”?³⁴
The reaction of “1410_tenrok” was fierce, underlining its arguments, taking the
role of teacher and accusing opponents of chauvinism:
[…] The Centennial Hall is a hall that was built for various reasons […]. In 1811 it was in
Breslau that the Prussian Revolution broke out. It was here that Frederick William’s famous
proclamation was made, aimed at the nation. It was from here, from the church in Sobótka-
Górka, that the revolutionary units went off to fight for the freedom of Prussia, which sev-
eral years later at the Congress of Vienna was acknowledged as more of a Slavic than a Ger-
manic country, as it was Slavs (not just Poles) who were in the majority. There was no
thought at the time of militarism, but rather of such prosaic matters such as secularisation
and freeing the peasants from serfdom. Interesting, eh???
This was the fundamental reason for which this great monument was raised. The
whole moronic discussion, especially on the part of nutty chauvinists, ought to remember [em-
 Posted by “_tenrok” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,i_kto_tu_jest_lemingiem_WK_.html Fehler! Textmarke nicht
definiert.( November ).
 Posted by “WK” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,Re_i_kto_tu_jest_lemingiem_WK_.html ( November ).
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phasis ours] that in oh so Catholic Rome the Pantheon still exists, the place in which all the
main deities of the people conquered by the Romans were put. And nobody ever thought of
changing its name to, for instance, the papal church or something similar. In recognition of
its sacredness even, great Italians were buried there. Lay off history. This is not a game for
little kids. History is too complicated.³⁵
“WK” remained unconvinced, answering:
“That ‘famous’ proclamation called for a battle with Napoleon, did it not? Moreover, it proved a
success – the coalition formed defeated Napoleon at Leipzig. The struggle for the freedom of
Prussia was not a struggle for the freedom of Poland. Indeed, Poles made up a sizable propor-
tion of the population of Prussia (after all, there weren’t many Sorbs, or perhaps we’re now start-
ing to distinguish the Masurians – I’m no expert on the trends of spreading ‘local patriotism’),
and later on, that fact was one of the main arguments for forced Germanisation.
In London there’s a Waterloo station and in Paris, Austerlitz – not the other way
round. The years pass and somehow nothing changes. No nation celebrates foreign victo-
ries or foreign nationalism.³⁶
WK’s comments are supported by another user, who writes:
It’s one thing to restore German street names like “Garden Street”, and quite another to re-
turn to a name commemorating the victory of Germans in a war with the French, or anyone
else. It’s not our victory, and not in our interest to celebrate it. History should be treated
seriously.³⁷
We should stress that those taking part in the debate were not just “mnemonic
warriors”, but also representatives of another type of mnemonic actors: “mne-
monic pluralists.” Such people respect the rights of others to distinct, equivalent
interpretations and visions of the past. They are open to searching for a common
truth and ready to construct a common memory regime, which Bernhard and
Kubik call a “pillarised mnemonic regime” in which competing visions of the
past coexist.³⁸ This type of actor is represented by the two following posts:
 Posted by “_tenrok” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,i_znowu_dosc_nieprawda_niestety_.html ( November ).
 Posted by “WK” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,,,Hala_Stulecia_czy_imienia_Poniatowskiego_FELIE_.html?v=, ( November
).
 Posted by “Flying_jureczek” [Timestamp: .., :] http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/
w,,“Kto_sie_boi_Hali_Stulecia ( November ).
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, .
364 Igor Pietraszewski and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa
Geez, what’s up with all of you? Two names have been adopted anyway. It’s not the only
instance of something like this, e.g. La Manche/English Channel, Persian Gulf/Arab
Gulf, and Mount Everest has over a dozen names. I know what the Centennial Hall is
and the People’s Hall, too. And I live “a stone’s throw” from the HALL. I’d protest if some-
one wanted to call it “Caterpillar Hall”.³⁹
And:
But there is already an excellent, uncontroversial idea for the name: Max Berg Hall.With all
the problematic burdens of connotations removed, associated with both the People’s Hall
and the Centennial Hall, honoring an outstanding architect for the city, and at the same
time stressing that the history of Wrocław didn’t begin in 1945.⁴⁰
However, “mnemonic pluralists” are very much in the minority on Internet forums.
The least visible users, meanwhile, are of course the so-called “mnemonic abne-
gators”, who by definition are not interested in history and do not involve them-
selves in it. They “tend to be uninterested in thinking in terms of mythical time,
treat the past as a reservoir of useful tests of practical solutions, focus on the pres-
ent, and strive to avoid participating in cultural (including mnemonic) wars”.⁴¹
From time to time, however, their voices are heard on forums. For example:
Don’t you have bigger problems? Everyone’s got used to the People’s Hall. Who’s it
bothering?⁴²
As well as:
They should get working. There are more important things to do in the city than thinking
about changes to the name of the Centennial (People’s) Hall. Leave one of the most pre-
cious buildings in the city in peace…⁴³
 Posted by “jerzyt.” http://wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/,,,Co_ma_wspol-
nego_Hala_Stulecia_z_Poniatowskim_i_inne.html#LokWrocTxt, ( November ).
 Posted by “karakalla.” http://wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/,,,Co_ma_wspol-
nego_Hala_Stulecia_z_Poniatowskim_i_inne.html#LokWrocTxt ( November ).
 Bernhard and Kubik. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, .
 Posted by “Jacek” [Timestamp: –– ::] on the article “Wrocław: Chcą zmie-
nić nazwę Hali Ludowej”
http://wroclaw.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/1208639,wroclaw-chca-zmienic-nazwe-hali-ludowe-
j,id,t.html (26 November 2013).
 Posted by “Wrocławianin” [Timestamp: –– ::] on the article “HalaLudo-
wa, StuleciaczyPepi?” http://wroclaw.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/,hala-ludowa-stulecia-
czy-pepi,,id,t,nk.html#skomentuj ( November ).
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Although the quantitative research on knowledge and interest in Wrocław’s
history⁴⁴ has shown that a large percentage of the city’s residents are memory
abnegators, the debate on the hall revealed that this situation may change. As
the number of articles on the hall grew, more and more people started to
show an interest in issues concerning Wrocław’s historical memory and to par-
ticipate in the debate on Internet forums. This is a good illustration of the dy-
namic accompanying the processes of collective memory construction. A certain
mnemonic equilibrium exists until some political entrepreneur (in the case de-
scribed here – the opinion-makers representing the nationalist right) finds an ef-
fective discursive strategy to champion a vision of the past that challenges the
hitherto dominant view. What happens then is that with the entrance of a mne-
monic warrior a memory regime constructed as pillarised (based on peaceful co-
existence) or unified (based on consensus) becomes “fractured.”⁴⁵ This means
that the memory regime becomes a field of political struggle. This conflict will
last until the warriors transform into pluralists and/or abnegators who do not
see any advantage in engaging in memory conflicts. A mnemonic equilibrium
can then be reinstated, only to be shaken again as soon as a new memory war-
rior is able to ignite a memory conflict.
The reactions of the local decision-makers
The heatedness of the debate on the name change came as a surprise to the Wro-
cław authorities. As the name that was “new” to Poles, i.e. Centennial Hall, had
already been added to the UNESCO World Heritage List, it could not be changed
without their losing face, and they therefore compromised, allowing both names
to be used. As one journalist dealing with the city’s history put it:
…those in power were put up against the wall, they had some German toy pistol pointed at
them and started to have their patriotism picked apart. They started to think slightly con-
servatively, sat astride the barricade, getting hit on the backside and neither right nor left.
 See results of the research conducted by Paweł Czajkowski and Barbara Pabjan. “Formy Pa-
mięci Historycznej Miasta. Architektoniczne Dziedzictwo Kulturowe Miasta w Świadomości
Młodzieży.” Pamięć jako Kategoria Rzeczywistości Społecznej. Eds. Józef Styka and Małgorzata
Dziekanowska. Lublin: Wyd.UMCS, .
 Kubik and Bernhard. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, . The authors discern three kinds of memory regimes: “() a fractured regime when at
least one actor is a warrior, () a pillarized regime when there is no warrior in the mix and at
least one actor is a pluralist, and () a unified regime when no actor is a warrior or a pluralist;
that is, all are abnegators.”
366 Igor Pietraszewski and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa
They don’t want to make any courageous decisions. Look at the wretched Centennial Hall.
It was registered at UNESCO as the Centennial Hall. That’s the trade mark, there’s even a
plaque in the wall etc. All over the city we have tourist signs pointing to the “Centennial
Hall”. If we go out somewhere, it’s the Centennial Hall, but the company is called “People’s
Hall”.⁴⁶
The politicians’ behavior can be understood by reading Bernhard and Kubik,
who point out that mnemonic actors often try to treat history instrumentally,
but are not totally free in their construction of historical memories. There are lim-
its to malleability in the presentation of the past imposed by the visions of his-
tory that the target audience cultivates and considers valid.⁴⁷ If the mnemonic
actor crosses the line between credible and non-credible visions of the past,
his legitimacy and power is weakened.⁴⁸ We can assume that it was the contro-
versies revealed by the name change (and then discussed broadly on Internet fo-
rums) that made the authorities worry about their legitimacy, thus leading to the
delay in the official process of the hall’s renaming. Along with the criticism,
ideas surfaced in the public space of giving it an entirely new name, such as
that of its creator, “Berg Hall”, or of the Polish pope – “John Paul II Hall”.
The idea was not accepted by the authorities. A high-ranking official represent-
ing the local government gave the following reasons:
But even if you’d called it the Berg Hall, you’d still have to write in the application, “Berg
Hall, once known as Centennial Hall”, and that was what the administrators wanted, to
avoid that context. And then […] a discussion began over whether it should be called Cen-
tennial Hall or People’s Hall. I took the position in this discussion that I personally like
Centennial Hall, and don’t like People’s Hall. I don’t like People’s Hall because it derives
from communism, and I have more against the name People’s Hall than against the
name Centennial Hall, but I said that we wouldn’t change the name of the “Hala Ludowa”
[People’s Hall] business, it’d still be called “Hala Ludowa, sp. z o.o. [ltd]” and people could
say what they wanted. And it is interesting that the language usage is clearly flowing to-
wards Centennial Hall. And I must insist here that the great majority say Centennial
Hall, not People’s Hall. There were certain controversies over it, but with the hindsight
of a few years I’d say actually pretty negligible controversies. If we meet in five years we
 Interview conducted by the authors in November .
 Such visions evolve and sometimes even become radically modified in a complex process
involving a play of mutual adjustment between what the mnemonic entrepreneur proposes
and what a given audience is prepared to accept, see Kubik and Bernhard. Twenty Years after
Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, –.
 Ibid.
The Case of the Centennial Hall in Wrocław 367
won’t even remember that there were any significant disagreements over what it should be
called.⁴⁹
This analysis is hard to fault. The generation is slowly diminishing that remem-
bers the German crimes of the Second World War and has been most strongly
emotionally involved in the debates over the name change. Communicative
memory becomes cultural memory.⁵⁰ Debates over history and memory become
ever less personal ideological disputes, which will doubtless before long cease to
have the same significance as they still do today. The space is opened for rein-
terpretation of history and commemorations free from the burden of individual
historical memory. In this kind of situation, politicians fighting for votes do not
have to make controversial decisions and become involved in disputes. If for any
reason a situation is arrived at that triggers social tensions, the rational strategy
of action is to calm emotions and set the matter aside to “sort itself out” later.
The field of political memory is a unique place:
…it is here where political success depends heavily on skillful interweaving of “realpolitik”
manoeuvres (often behind the scenes) with an effective formulation and communication of
cultural interpretations, including public presentation of mnemonic positions. Effective po-
sitions are those that are consonant with the cultural terrain of target groups, those that
resonate with their images of the past.⁵¹
In this case, the unambiguous views of Internet posts demonstrated a clear aver-
sion on the part of some residents to the hall’s name change. At the same time,
the authorities’ behind-the-scenes activities “did not meet” the “images of the
past” and expectations held by a proportion of potential voters. The most sensi-
ble political strategy was to call to a halt the official process of the name change
and trust that the new name – whose proposal and dissemination exploited all
possible means (such as signs pointing to the hall, information in guide books,
maps and tourist guides, support in some media) – would with time become con-
solidated in the public consciousness of its own accord.
 Interview with a high official, politician, born , conducted by the authors in October

 According to Jan Assmann communicative memory means daily memory, representations of
the past expressed just orally, thus not leaving material traits. See Assmann. “Communicative
and Cultural Memory,” .
 Kubik and Bernhard. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commem-
oration, .
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Conclusions
If we take into account the conceptual framework proposed by Bernhard and
Kubik⁵² and adopted in this case study, it is clear that what we are dealing
with in Wrocław is a political form of a fractured memory regime, dominated
by mnemonic warriors. The decisions taken in the field of memory and the cre-
ation of new memory regimes require important calculations that, as pointed by
Bernhard and Kubik, are of two kinds:
One – positional – is based strictly on the grounds of the (political) cost/benefit analysis
[e.g. “Do I improve my electoral chances by inviting ‘them’ to form a coalition?”]. The sec-
ond consideration – semiotic – is about cultural consequences of such a decision (e.g.,
“What kinds of meanings can be attached to my decision of forming this coalition?”). In
this second calculation a set of possible interpretations of one’s actions is considered.
The most successful politicians calculate political efficacy and cultural significance
simultaneously”.⁵³
During the decision process on the hall’s name change, several factors were
doubtless taken into account. Among these were not only the material benefits
resulting from the possibility of securing European funding for its renovation,
but also the change in the historical narrative of Wrocław and the idea of Wro-
cław’s multicultural history that came from the EU memory field. Having been a
feature of the city development strategies for well over a decade,Wrocław’s new
memory narratives are seeping into the residents’ consciousness, but the process
is not as fast as the city’s authorities would like it to be. In their political calcu-
lation (political efficacy and cultural significance), Wrocław’s authorities in fact
failed to appreciate correctly two fundamental factors in the field of memory pol-
itics: the cultural and instrumental-political.⁵⁴ In the former case, they reckoned
without the persistence of traditional, national, Polish approaches to the past.
They presumed that the inhabitants either shared the new view on the city’s
past propagated since the 1990s, or that the majority of them were “mnemonic
abnegators.” This was why they did not see the need to consult with the city’s
residents on the change of the hall’s name. The local authorities were actually
unprepared for the scale and intensity of negative reactions expressed by two
(partially overlapping) groups: conservative and nationally oriented mnemonic
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warriors marginalized in the local, public discourse, as well as the older resi-
dents of the city who had become used to the name “People’s Hall” over the dec-
ades. The latter associated the name “People’s” with their happy (isn’t it always?)
youth, and not with a remnant of dreary communism. As for the champions of a
conservative, national vision of history, it is no easy task to convince the opinion
leaders in these communities and social circles of the EU’s post-national histor-
ical narrative. At the meso (state) level, these people are often ideologically as-
sociated with the conservative, national-Christian Law and Justice party (PiS).
Regarding structural factors, it seems that the local authorities overestimat-
ed their capacity to influence and control public opinion. The unbroken hold of
liberal parties in the city government since 1989 has restricted the access of right-
wing nationalists to local opinion-forming circles and official media. What the
local authorities did not expect was that this hegemonic position could be chal-
lenged by the new social media, but this was precisely what happened.
Internet forums became the most important and accessible platform for ar-
ticulating rightist-nationalist views, seen by Wrocław’s authorities as “politically
incorrect”. Today this is the city’s main communication channel through which
the struggle between supporters of the traditional, national historical narrative
and those who strive to reinterpret it in the European and post-national spirit
is fought. It is probable that the Wrocław controversy may have its counterparts
in other cities in contemporary Europe, as the European integration process is
the backdrop for a constant tension between the national and the European.
A visible dispute is going on between champions of the renationalization of
the memory of individual national communities and the common European
memory.
The case of the Centennial Hall described here shows the great importance
of continual public dialogue in the process of the construction of a European,
post-national memory. This does not mean aiming for the political construction
of a “unified memory regime”, as Wrocław’s city authorities have tried to do, but
rather the creation of a “pillarised regime” based on respectful co-existence of
different memories and an understanding for different experiences and perspec-
tives. Only on this basis can a difficult compromise be built. A good note to close
on is the historian Robert Traba’s diagnosis:
Europe today wants and is seeking elements of a common memory. Yet constructing a cul-
tural memory requires that the dialogue be made civic, shifted from the political level to
that of heated public debate, in which the heightening of differences will generate a new
value – the living memory of twenty-first century Europe.⁵⁵
 Robert Traba. “Wprowadzenie.” Pamięć: Wyzwanie dla nowoczesnej Europy = Erinnerung :
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